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A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Theories of Spectator-
Character and Actor-Character Identification in the Theatre 
 
From Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis to Brecht’s formulation of the 
Verfremdungseffekt, theorists of the theatre have long engaged with the 
question of what spectatorship entails. Such question has, directly or indirectly, 
extended to the investigation of acting. In the wake of Brecht’s critique of 
conventional theatre, emphasis has been put on the study of spectatorship from 
the point of view of its cultural determinants and its conscious cognitive aspects, 
while unconscious processes have been mostly ignored. 
 
In this thesis I take a psychoanalytic perspective to analyse theories of the 
theatre that have investigated the process of identification of the spectator or 
the actor with the character. According to psychoanalysis, mechanisms of 
unconscious identification, such as projection and introjection, are fundamental 
to psychic development and to the construction of the self. 
 
By analysing Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis through Freud’s theory of 
transference, I propose a new understanding of spectatorship as transference 
dynamic. I then conduct an in-depth enquiry into eighteenth-century theories of 
acting which lead up to Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le comédien. I investigate the 
paradox of the actor, in its fruitful tension between sensibility and 
understanding, from the perspective of Melanie Klein’s concept of unconscious 
phantasy and Bion’s theory of alpha-function. I hence interpret the art of the 
actor as the performing of alpha-function on the spectator’s unconscious 
emotions. 
 
The new insights afforded by a psychoanalytic perspective of spectating and 
acting illuminate the moral function of theatre and resolve some of the 
controversial points brought forward by various theorists, including Brecht and 
Rousseau. The moral function of theatre can be construed as a transpersonal 
process in which unconscious identifications between spectator and actor 
promote the development of a reflective view of the self. 
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PREFACE 
 
The research presented in this thesis was carried out first at the Department of 
Theatre and Drama at Royal Holloway (University of London) and since 2013 at 
the Drama Department at the University of Exeter, where I transferred following 
my supervisor’s change of post. 
 
The project was born from my desire to understand the nature of the pleasure I 
felt when labouring as actress, or spectator, or indeed when I witnessed the 
pleasure of the children to whom I taught drama. While working as psychiatrist 
and training in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, I gained the impression that a 
similar pleasure was sometimes afforded in sessions with patients. My previous 
studies at the ‘Dipartimento di Musica e Spettacolo’ (DAMS) of the University of 
Bologna, providing me with the background knowledge in theatre history and 
theories of the theatre, allowed me to formulate a preliminary proposal to frame 
the project. From there, the research grew into the exploration of theories of the 
theatre in different historical periods, affording exciting opportunities for in-depth 
samplings of theatre history. The application of psychoanalytic theory has 
grown organically with the research; not only has psychoanalysis been an 
opportunity for reading theories of the theatre afresh, but conversely, theories of 
the theatre have been the occasion to look at established psychoanalytic 
concepts in detail, so to extend their relevance to the understanding of theatre. 
 
Although my research has remained within the scope of theory, my practice as 
actress and as psychoanalytic psychotherapist has had an important bearing on 
its development. In the text I have used some examples from my practice as 
psychotherapist to illustrate certain psychoanalytic concepts.  
 
I have given some consideration to the question of how to use gender pronouns 
when writing in general terms, so as to avoid using the masculine as the 
universal gender. Any convention has got its limitations; my choice has been 
partly practical in terms of helping the reader to navigate the text more easily. I 
have used the feminine for the actor and for the analyst, and the masculine for 
the spectator and for the patient, and this convention mirrors the use of the 
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feminine for the mother and the masculine for the baby, when I am talking about 
the mother-baby relationship. Quotations or specific examples necessarily, and 
happily, escape from this system. As I will have the occasion to discuss in 
Chapter 1, my use of pronouns wishes to counterpoise the gender stereotyping 
that, through a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective, assigns to the gaze of the 
spectator the masculine dominant status, in relation to the actor’s femninine 
position of subordination. In opposition to this, and within the Kleinian 
framework of the mother-baby relationship, I allude to the ‘she’ actor as the 
bearer of the wise maternal function which sustains the emotional development 
of the fragile psyche of the ‘he’ spectator. 
 
As concerns quotations, I have kept all the French quotations in the original 
given the relevance that the use of specific words has for my analysis. I have 
also kept the few Italian quotations in the original, but for those I have provided 
my own translation as a footnote. For quotations from texts originally written in 
German, such as Brecht’s and Freud’s, I have used translations from published 
English versions. In a minority of cases when the specific use of terminology 
was particularly significant to the discussion, and solely referring to quotations 
by Brecht, I have provided the original German text as a footnote.  
 
In relation to the bibliography, I have used the official style required for citations 
from ‘The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud’; this entails that each paper is quoted separately. I have followed a 
similar convention for what concerns Klein’s and Brecht’s essays, listing those 
that I quote in the text as single entries. Although I have used the collected 
versions of their essays, these writings were originally published individually. I 
believe that my choice will help the reader to follow more easily and with greater 
precision my exposition of these writers’ theories. 
 
The content of Chapter 2 has been published in The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis (April 2015, Volume 96, Issue 2, pp. 369–387). 
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CHAPTER 1 – THEORIZING THEATRE SPECTATORSHIP 
 
SETTING THE QUESTION 
 
Theatre masters and theorists of the distant or less distant past have always 
concerned themselves with spectators. Their preoccupations have been 
multiple: it might have been to dictate a measure for playwriting (Aristotle) or a 
measure for acting (Luigi Riccoboni); or it might have been to justify their 
condemnation of theatre (Rousseau) or to defend their reformation of it (Brecht). 
While the twentieth century has been particularly fertile in its attempts to 
theoretically redefine and practically reconfigure the relationship between 
theatre and audience, the audience has always been the point of reference 
against which theatre has defined itself (Freshwater, 2009). 
 
The study of spectatorship, however, has been and remains hampered by a 
number of complications. The definition itself of what spectatorship entails is 
problematic. The audience can be seen as a collective entity, expressing group 
responses, or as a collection of individuals each presenting a subjective 
response. Moreover, the domains of enquiry have been and may be manifold. 
Scholars have investigated contingent factors which spectators (as individuals 
or as a group) carry with them to the theatre and which supposedly influence 
their reception: from intrinsic factors such as gender, race or sexual orientation, 
to cultural and political expectations, to more banal circumstances such as 
mode of travel to the venue or personal motivation for attending the 
performance (Bennett, 1997). On the other hand, alternative theories of 
spectatorship have departed from the assumption that theatre activates 
universal psychological processes, but often without clarifying whether they 
situate the response in the individual spectator or in the audience as a group. 
Another substantial variation has consisted in theorizing spectatorship as an 
intellectual or rather an emotional experience. Permutations within these 
themes are potentially infinite: the focus can shift in examining the spectator’s 
response in relation to the plot versus the characters, or in concentrating on 
aesthetic questions versus moral or political ones.  
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Of course theatre reception is most likely to partake of all the elements just 
mentioned, and more; accordingly, it is not difficult to fall into the trap of 
confounding or conflating them. A relevant example is given by Joseph Harris 
(2014) in his study of theories of spectatorship in early modern France: in the 
early seventeenth century, theorists focussed especially on the spectator’s 
intellectual experience of the play as a whole and were concerned with 
questions about dramatic illusion. By the end of the eighteenth century, an 
interest in the emotional participation of spectators and their engagement with 
the characters on stage had come to the fore. As this shift was developed, 
concepts related to spectatorship such as interest, illusion and the emerging 
notion of identification, changed their meaning, but their denotation could also 
differ between contemporary authors. Therefore any investigation of 
spectatorship has to deal with at least two complications: the necessity to define 
the more or less broad frame of reference within which it operates, and the 
need to remain aware of the permutations in meaning that certain words have 
endured.  
 
In this thesis I will concentrate on that facet of spectatorship that has to do with 
the response of the individual spectator, for what pertains to the psychic 
operations which induce him to identify with the character(s). I will therefore 
exclude any consideration of the audience response as a group, despite 
recognizing that this must be an important aspect of the theatrical experience. 
Moreover, I will focus on identification as a universal aspect of spectatorship, 
again deliberately excluding a discussion of those contingent factors that may 
bear on spectators’ idiosyncratic reactions. My approach will be entirely 
theoretical. 
 
The question of the spectator’s identification with the characters calls for the 
examination of its relation with the actor’s impersonations. Although the 
extension of the field of enquiry from spectating to acting is not always applied 
by theorists of spectatorship, this is clearly the case with Brecht. In his 
conception of the epic theatre he advances a new theory of acting based on the 
Verfremdungseffekt precisely as an unfolding of his critique of spectatorship. 
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Considerations on acting which concern the ultimate effect on the spectator’s 
identification with the character(s) will also be the focus of this thesis. 
 
My research has developed a new approach to spectatorship, by using a 
psychoanalytic perspective to improve understanding of spectators’ 
unconscious emotional engagement. While contemporary theatre studies have 
examined spectatorship from the perspectives of its socio-cultural determinants 
(Bennett, 1997), conscious cognitions (McConachie, 2008), and embodied 
perceptions (Fischer-Lichte, 2008), they have failed to explore the significance 
of the underlying unconscious mechanisms. Even approaches that have 
deliberately stressed the importance of broadening the research perspective 
beyond the material and visible factors influencing performance, like Phelan’s 
(1993) theory of the ‘unmarked’, end by defining their field of enquiry within the 
boundaries of consciousness. Phelan, for instance, defines the ‘unmarked’ as ‘a 
deliberate and conscious refusal to take the payoff of visibility’ (Phelan, 1993, 
p.19). 
 
The neglect towards the exploration of the unconscious in theatre reception 
implies a tendency to underestimate the relevance of emotional aspects of 
spectatorship. This may seem surprising, given that since Aristotle and for many 
centuries, reflections on spectatorship generally took it for granted that the 
audience’s emotional involvement was intrinsic to theatre reception. Considered 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, though, this is not unexpected because 
much emotional engagement happens at an unconscious level, while emotional 
awareness consists of the sparse epiphanies of the underlying continuous flow 
of the unconscious. 
 
In a recent study focusing on performance at large, but also accounting for 
modern forms of participatory theatre that have emerged after the 1960s, 
Fischer-Lichte (2008) grounded her new aesthetics on conscious processes of 
reception, which she deems to entail conscious perceptions and the generation 
of conscious ethical acts in the audience. As she explicitly states: ‘unconscious 
perceptions remain meaningless for the perceiving subject and cannot be taken 
into consideration […] because nobody can claim any knowledge of them’ 
 16 
(Fischer-Lichte, 2008, p.4). Likewise, the insurgence of emotions in the 
audience is seen as secondary either to physical sensations or to a prior 
cognitive appraisal of the meaning of a certain situation. For instance, when 
discussing the emotions aroused in an audience witnessing an actor being 
subjected to self-inflicted injuries or to physical abuse by others, Fischer-Lichte 
(2008, p.153) suggests that ‘the spectators experienced these emotions 
because violence against self and others had been charged and connoted with 
intense emotions for them prior to the performance’, discarding the possibility of 
a primary emotional resonance between actors and spectators. 
 
In contrast, I will emphasise the emotional ties which are primarily formed at an 
unconscious level between actors and spectators, and which can explain the 
current of communication between the stage and the auditorium in a bilateral 
direction. My illustration of what Fischer-Lichte (2008, p.39) calls the ‘feedback 
loop’ between actors and audience will therefore be very different from hers, 
based as it is on unconscious emotional mechanisms rather than perceptual 
and conscious ones. It must be said, however, that privileging one perspective 
over another does not necessarily make them incompatible, because in a 
complex phenomenon like theatre spectatorship it is likely that conscious, 
unconscious, and perceptive psychic mechanisms are activated simultaneously.  
 
Another main difference between our focus of interest, partly determined by the 
fact that Fischer-Lichte refers to contemporary performances which have 
deliberately sought to make the spectator into a co-participant, is the emphasis 
on the role of the actors. While she argues that in participatory performances 
the actors tend to desist from transmitting predetermined meaning, restricting 
themselves to emitting sensual and material signals, which will stimulate the 
spectator to generate his own meanings (Fischer-Lichte, 2008, p. 139), I 
analyse how the actor’s choice of meaning influences the spectator’s emotional 
process. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, the actor’s refraining from 
communicating meaning to the audience may hinder, rather than promote, the 
spectator’s ability for processing meaning, particularly at an emotional level.  
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The contemporary trend towards discounting considerations of unconscious 
emotional processes in theatre spectatorship can, at least partly, be ascribed to 
Brecht and his bitter critique of the unconscious emotional involvement that 
theatre entails. In discussing Brecht’s ideas on spectatorship, identification, and 
related questions of acting, I will argue that his antithesis between a passive 
and an active spectator is unsatisfactory and reveals a narrow view of 
identification which excludes careful consideration of unconscious dynamics in 
spectatorship. I will then consider how his perspective has unduly influenced 
contemporary scholarship to neglect unconscious aspects of spectatorship, by 
focussing on mainstream approaches to theatre reception: Susan Bennett’s 
seminal work on the audience, the semiotic approach to theatre reception, 
McConachie’s pioneering book on spectatorship from a cognitive science point 
of view. I will then introduce Freud’s view of the unconscious as an essential 
principle of all mental life. I will conclude by outlining the questions about 
spectatorship that I propose to address in this thesis through a psychoanalytic 
approach. 
 
STARTING WITH BRECHT 
 
Brecht sets the foundation of his reform of the theatre on his interpretation of 
conventional spectatorship as katharsis. Among theories of spectatorship, 
Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis is not only the most ancient, but also the 
most authoritative paradigm which has served as prototype, or as bone of 
contention, up unto the present (Elam, 1980; Fabbri, 2000). Brecht is exemplary 
in grounding his critique of traditional theatre practice on the assumption that 
spectatorship is bound to Aristotelian katharsis. Under the epithet of ‘Aristotelian 
theatre’ he portrays a certain effect on the spectator, consisting in enticing him 
into an identification with the characters of the play through which he is 
transported into their emotional states. Although the word ‘identification’ does 
not feature in Aristotle’s text, the concepts of fear and pity on which it is based 
pertain to it, as I shall discuss in Chapter 2. Furthermore, Brecht decidedly 
interprets katharsis as entailing emotional identification. 
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Brecht maintains that Aristotelian or conventional theatre ‘is based on the 
spectator’s ability to be carried along, identify himself, feel empathy and 
understand’1 (1929, p.25). To define emotional identification, he uses the 
German word ‘Einfühlung’, which literally means ‘feeling into’, and whose most 
common English translation is ‘empathy’.  
 
Brecht equates the spectator’s emotional identification with the character to a 
form of understanding which is undesirable, because it leads to passive and 
uncritical submission to the situation presented by the play; by maintaining that 
the audience’s emotional identification amounts to becoming ‘a passive 
(suffering) part of the total work of art’ (1930, p.38), he establishes an abiding 
correlation between the concepts of emotional identification and passivity. Such 
notion will remain engrained in contemporary theories of spectatorship. For 
instance, Augusto Boal gives the following post-Brechtian description of 
theatrical empathy:  
 
From the moment the performance begins, a relationship is established 
between the character, especially the protagonist, and the spectator. 
This relationship has well defined characteristics: the spectator assumes 
a passive attitude and delegates the power of action to the character. 
Since the character resembles us (as Aristotle indicates), we live 
vicariously all his stage experiences. Without acting, we feel that we are 
acting. We love and hate when the character loves and hates.  
(Boal, 2008, pp.30-31) 
 
The relationship between empathy and passivity is justified by Brecht’s 
understanding of katharsis: his specific interpretation of the term, in line with the 
prevailing rendition of his times, is ‘Reinigung’ (purgation), and to this he adds 
implications which are specifically derived from his own presumptions: ‘the 
catharsis of which Aristotle writes – cleansing by fear and pity, or from fear and 
pity – is a purification which is performed not only in a pleasurable way, but 
precisely for the purpose of pleasure’2 (1949, p.181). The distinctive Brechtian 
                                                       1 ‘Unsere dramatische Form beruht darauf, daß der Zuschauer mitgeht, sich einfühlt, verstehen 
kann, sich identifizieren kann’ (Brecht, 1963, Schriften zum Theater. Vol.1-4. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, Vol. 1, p.208). 2	 ‘jene Katharsis des Aristoteles, die Reinigung durch Furcht und Mitleid, oder von Furcht und 
Mitleid, ist eine Waschung, die nicht nur in vergnüglicher Weise, sondern recht eigentlich zum 
Zwecke des Vergnügens veranstaltet wurde’ (Brecht, 1964, Schriften zum Theater. Vol.5-7. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, Vol. 7, p.11).	
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reading extends the concept of purgation to mean that the spectator will 
undergo, through empathy, a wider cleansing not limited to his emotions, but 
comprising any tendency to political or social activism, or even awareness of 
their possibility. Conventional theatre is static, ‘its task is to show the world as it 
is’  (Brecht, 1935, p.79) because the audience needs to be kept in a state of 
intoxication which numbs their critique or dissent. Society uses this kind of 
entertainment ‘to reproduce itself. This means that an innovation will pass if it is 
calculated to rejuvenate existing society, but not if it is going to change it – 
irrespective whether the form of the society in question is good or bad’ (Brecht, 
1930, p.34).  
 
Because according to Brecht no theatre can ever be un-political (1963, p.151), 
the apparently innocuous ‘purpose of pleasure’ (1949, p.181) at the heart of 
Aristotelian theatre is a powerful device for social oppression. In his extension 
of the Brechtian interpretation of katharsis, Boal defines it as ‘the purification of 
the extraneous, undesirable element which prevents the character from 
achieving his ends. This extraneous element is contrary to the law; it is a social 
fault, a political deficiency’ (Boal, 2008, p.29). Therefore, katharsis is the 
instrument through which Aristotelian theatre becomes an ‘extremely powerful 
poetic-political system for intimidation of the spectator, for elimination of the 
“bad” or illegal tendencies of the audience’ (Boal, 2008, p.3). 
 
A gripping and authoritative precursor to Brecht’s analysis of katharsis is that of 
Rousseau, when he asks what the Aristotelian pity amounts to:  
 
mais quelle est cette pitié ? […] une pitié stérile qui se repaît de quelques 
larmes, et n’a jamais produit le moindre acte d’humanité. Ainsi pleurait le 
sanguinaire Sylla au récit des maux qu’il n’avait pas faits lui-même. Ainsi 
se cachait le tyran de Phères au spectacle, de peur qu’on ne le vît gémir 
avec Andromaque et Priam, tandis qu’il écoutait sans émotion les cris de 
tant d’infortunés qu’on égorgeait tous les jours par ses ordres. 
(Rousseau, 2003, pp.72-73) 
 
Brecht will echo Rousseau’s sceptical view in one of his rather scathing 
portrayals of traditional theatre:  
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As for the world portrayed there, the world from which slices are cut in 
order to produce these moods and movements of the emotions, its 
appearance is such, produced from such slight and wretched stuff as a 
few pieces of cardboard, a little miming, a bit of text, that one has to 
admire the theatre folk who, with so feeble a reflection of the real world, 
can move the feelings of their audience so much more strongly than 
does the world itself. 
(Brecht, 1949, p.187) 
 
Emotions felt as part of the play function as an insulated experience which at 
the worst is corrupting, at the best is immaterial to human morality. 
 
Brecht’s understanding of katharsis as a form of purgation which implies 
passive emotional submission and results in socio-political inertia deserves 
some in depth analysis. Of course, the extension of the meaning of katharsis to 
encompass political submissiveness is linked to Brecht’s aim to attack a 
bourgeois reactionary political agenda, as von Held has pointed out in her in-
depth study of alienation in Brecht and Diderot: ‘Brecht’s appropriation of the 
Poetics, which overall had little in common with Aristotle’s dramatic principles, 
serves to attack an essential mechanism activated by the bourgeois theatre that 
seeks to gratify a need for catharsis’ (von Held, 2011, p.23). It is as an 
alternative to what he identifies as the aesthetic and political agenda of 
capitalism, that Brecht invents epic theatre:  
 
In his anti-Aristotelian critique, the event of catharsis constitutes a 
‘commodity’ ‘trafficked’ by a theatre ‘apparatus’ determined by the 
capitalist conditions of production. It serves the interests of a privileged 
capitalist spectator who uses the theatre as a retreat from the hostilities 
of a competitive capitalist world. 
(von Held, 2011, p.23) 
 
However, such a view is restrictive as it excludes the thorough consideration of 
the psychological premises on which his theory was based. 
 
The epic theatre 
 
Brecht developed the idea of the ‘epic theatre’ in the early 1920s, in the context 
of his activity as playwright. The concept, which ‘already enjoyed some 
currency’ in the Berlin theatre scene before Brecht appropriated it (Parker, 
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2014, p.229) was originally dramaturgical, but Brecht soon made it pertinent to 
questions of acting and spectating.  
 
As the Aristotelian theatre, in the Brechtian sense, is characterized by a strict 
correspondence between the process of emotional identification and katharsis 
intended as passivity and conformism, so the epic theatre is based on a causal 
relationship between the alienation effect and the spectator’s active and socially 
critical response. The epic theatre  
 
makes nothing like such a free use as does the aristotelian of the 
passive empathy of the spectator; it also relates differently to certain 
psychological effects, such as katharsis. […] Anxious to teach the 
spectator a quite definite practical attitude, directed towards changing the 
world, it must begin by making him adopt in the theatre a quite different 
attitude from what he is used to. 
(Brecht, 1933, p.57) 
 
If Aristotelian theatre implies a correspondence between the spectator’s 
empathy and socio-political inertia, in order to oppose the harmful cathartic 
effects of theatre it is necessary to dispel the audience’s empathic response. 
Epic theatre is characterized precisely by its ability to break the emotional 
identification between spectator and character:  
 
The spectator was no longer in any way allowed to submit to an 
experience uncritically (and without practical consequences) by means of 
simple empathy with the characters in a play. The production took the 
subject-matter and the incidents shown and put them through a process 
of alienation: the alienation that is necessary to all understanding. When 
something seems ‘the most obvious thing in the world’ it means that any 
attempt to understand the world has been given up. 
(Brecht, 1957a, p.71) 
 
For the purpose of alienation, the whole apparatus which promotes illusion is 
deconstructed. Titles are used to break the continuity of the play (Brecht, 1931, 
p.43), actors’ positions are organised so to avoid naturalistic grouping and to 
reveal instead the socio-historical context (Brecht, 1933, p.58). While these and 
other alienation devices are controlled by the playwright or the director, it is to 
the actor herself and her technique that the main responsibility for the alienation 
effect falls.  
 22 
 
The implicit recognition of the actor as the principal vehicle of emotional 
identification between spectator and character justifies Brecht’s appeal to her to 
mediate a different kind of experience for the spectator. From this concern 
originates the idea of the Verfremdungseffekt or V-effekt, translated into English 
as alienation or A-effect:  
 
It is well known that contact between audience and stage is normally 
made on the basis of empathy. Conventional actors devote their efforts 
so exclusively to bringing about this psychological operation that they 
may be said to see it as the principal aim of their art. Our introductory 
remarks will already have made it clear that the technique which 
produces an A-effect is the exact opposite of that which aims at empathy. 
The actor applying it is bound not to try to bring about the empathy 
operation. 
(Brecht, 1951, p.136)3   
 
It is of note that Verfremdungseffekt is Brecht’s neologism, which he introduces 
in 1936, at a time when he sharpens his attention towards the function of the 
actor.  Until then, Brecht had employed the conventional word Entfremdung 
referring to the usage of the concept in Hegel and Marx; as has been 
suggested, Verfremdung  ‘draws a clearer distinction between a sociological 
category of alienation and an aesthetic of estrangement’ (von Held, 2011, p.25). 
Whereas Marxist Entfremdung entails the workers’ dispossession of the fruits of 
their labour, resulting in their estrangement from their own humanity, through 
Brecht’s Verfremdung the workers can enhance their social awareness by 
exploiting their emotional estrangement from the characters on stage. It is by 
refraining from portraying the characters in an empathic way, and thus at some 
level depriving them of their humanity, that actors promote political 
consciousness. 
 
                                                       3	 ‘Der Kontakt zwischen Publikum und Bühne kommt für gewöhnlich bekanntlich auf der Basis 
der Einfühlung zustande. Auf die Herbeiführung dieses psychischen Aktes konzentriert sich die 
Bemühung des konventionellen Schauspielers so vollständig, daß man sagen kann, er erblicke 
das Hauptziel seiner Kunst nur darin. Schon unsere einleitenden Bemerkungen zeigen, daß die 
Technik, die den V-Effekt hervorbringt, der Technik, die die Einfühlung bezweckt, diametral 
entgengegesetzt ist. Der Schauspieler ist durch sie gehalten, die Herbeiführung des 
Einfühlungsaktes nicht zu betreiben’ (Brecht, 1963, Schriften zum Theater. Vol.1-4. Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, Vol. 3, pp.156-157). 
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In an essay dedicated to his new technique of acting, Brecht explains the 
fundamental rules through which an actor creates the Verfremdungseffekt:  
 
The first condition for the achievement of the A-effect is that the actor 
must invest what he has to show with a definite gest of showing. It is of 
course necessary to drop the assumption that there is a fourth wall 
cutting the audience off from the stage and the consequent illusion that 
the stage action is taking place in reality and without an audience. That 
being so, it is possible for the actor in principle to address the audience 
direct. 
(Brecht, 1951, p.136) 
 
There is in fact in Brecht’s theory an assumption that the breaking of the fourth 
wall and the distancing of the actor from the character through ‘observation’, as 
opposed to empathy, are the synergic forces which create an alienated acting.   
 
The actor portrays her character through symbolic gestures which allow her to 
maintain the function of actor as observer, rather than converting herself into 
the character through a process of emotional identification. Moreover, the 
function of actor as observer is fostered by her awareness of the presence of an 
audience who watches her. If emotional empathy is that situation in Aristotelian 
theatre which relies on identification between actor, character and spectator, 
observation is the new psychological process which links actor, character and 
spectator in the epic theatre:  
 
The performer’s self-observation, an artful and artistic act of self-
alienation, stopped the spectator from losing himself in the character 
completely, i.e. to the point of giving up his own identity […] Yet the 
spectator’s empathy was not entirely rejected. The audience identifies 
itself with the actor as being an observer, and accordingly develops his 
attitude of observing or looking on. 
(Brecht, 1957c, pp.92-93)4 
 
There are interesting facets to the Verfremdungseffekt for what pertains to 
identification. As von Held has argued, Brecht’s definition of acting remains 
                                                       4 ‘Das Sich-selber-Zusehen des Artisten, ein künstlicher und kunstvoller Akt der Selbst-
entfremdung, verhindert die vollständige, d.h. die bis zur Selbstaufgabe gehende Einfühlung 
des Zuschauers [...] Auf die Einfühlung des Zuschauers wird trotzdem nicht verzichtet. Der 
Zuschauer fühlt sich in den Schauspieler als in einen Betrachtenden ein: so wird seine 
betrachtende, zuschauende Haltung kultiviert’ (Brecht, 1993, Schriften 2. Schriften 1933-1942. 
Teil I. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, p.202).	
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grounded in ‘a mirroring relation between actor and spectator. If the actor 
emotes, so does the spectator. If the actor remains rationally self-detached, the 
spectator, too, will be rationally detached’ (von Held, 2011, p.43). Admittedly, 
the A-effect still engenders a form of identification between spectator and actor; 
but this is of a different kind to that of empathy in two ways. More obviously, it is 
based on observation and critical detachment, and hence divested of the 
emotional charge of empathy. But more strikingly, it is an identification which 
links actor and spectator with the exclusion of the character. The spectator is 
permitted to mirror the actor as she observes, and indeed the actor is permitted 
to invite the spectator to enter into her attitude, if not her feelings, as long as the 
character remains excluded from their psychological and aesthetic complicity. It 
is not surprising then that the best metaphor for the job of the actor is the 
eyewitness at a street accident (Brecht, 1950). The eyewitness invites 
bystanders to form an opinion about the accident: while he takes upon himself 
the task to demonstrate to them how the accident took place, he has no 
intention or desire to press them into re-experiencing the victim’s feelings as the 
protagonists of the tragic scene.  
 
The status of emotions 
 
Brecht conceives the emotional identification of spectators with characters as a 
passive experience because deriving from a submission to the theatrical illusion 
of the play that he defines as hypnotic (1935, p.78), and he condemns it 
because he believes it to result in a conformist attitude to society. In contrast, 
he demands that theatre find devices to break the illusion and ensuing 
emotional identification, and engage the spectators’ reason in active criticism of 
society, ultimately inducing them to become actors of social change (1957a). 
Deprived of the possibility for emotional identification, the audience is left to 
grapple with the play through its rational faculties. As Brecht says, epic theatre 
appeals ‘to reason’ (1926, p.14).  
 
Brecht’s formulation of a dichotomy between a passive and an active spectator 
finds some correspondence with the view of a divergence between emotional 
and rational engagement, grounded ‘within an Enlightenment tradition of 
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dramaturgical discourse that similarly theorizes the psychological processes at 
work in theatre production and perception as suspended between two poles: 
reason and feeling’ (von Held, 2011, p.38). In fact, his theory of the theatre may 
appear to be founded on the opposition between feelings, somewhat vilified, 
and reason, which is contrasted to them and commended: ‘Feelings are private 
and limited. Against that the reason is fairly comprehensive and to be relied on’ 
(Brecht, 1926, p.15).  
 
However this opposition is not absolute, and the role of emotions remains 
ambiguously formulated in his later theoretical developments. In an interview of 
1952 he declares:  
 
It is not true, though it is sometimes suggested, that epic theatre (which 
is not simply undramatic theatre, as is also sometimes suggested) 
proclaims the slogan: ‘Reason this side, Emotion (feeling) that.’ It by no 
means renounces emotion, least of all the sense of justice, the urge to 
freedom, and righteous anger; it is so far from renouncing these that it 
does not even assume their presence, but tries to arouse or reinforce 
them. The ‘attitude of criticism’ which it tries to awaken in its audience 
cannot be passionate enough for it. 
(Brecht, 1952, p.227) 
 
As has been pointed out (Bennett, 1997, p.29), Brecht’s theatre reform does not 
exclude the spectator’s emotional involvement; rather, the Verfremdungseffekt 
‘intervenes, not in the form of absence of emotion, but in the form of emotions 
which need not correspond to those of the character portrayed’ (Brecht, 1957c, 
p.94). In fact, the apparent ambiguity towards emotions finds a resolution if it is 
clarified that the undesirable emotions are those that the spectator feels in 
identification with the character, while the permitted or even desirable ones, are 
those that belong to the spectator as a detached observer of the character. 
Brecht distinctly illustrates this point in his essay Theatre for Pleasure or 
Theatre for Instruction, where the feelings of the spectator in Aristotelian drama, 
here called ‘dramatic theatre’, are opposed to those of the spectator in epic 
theatre.  
 
The dramatic theatre’s spectator says: Yes, I have felt like that too – Just 
like me – It’s only natural – It’ll never change – The sufferings of this man 
appal me, because they are inescapable – That’s great art; it all seems 
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the most obvious thing in the world – I weep when they weep, I laugh 
when they laugh. 
The epic theatre’s spectator says: I’d never have thought it – That’s not 
the way – That’s extraordinary, hardly believable – It’s got to stop – The 
sufferings of this man appal me, because they are unnecessary – That’s 
great art: nothing obvious in it – I laugh when they weep, I weep when 
they laugh. 
 (Brecht, 1957a, p.71) 
 
The dichotomy between passive and active spectator is therefore not precisely 
the opposition between emotion and reason, but rather between an emotion 
which arises as a reflex to an identification unmediated by reason, such as 
katharsis seems to imply, and an emotion which arises as a consequence of a 
deliberate critical judgement, as is the case in the epic theatre. This distinction 
is crucial to the understanding of spectatorship and forms one of the focuses of 
my research. 
 
Brechtian katharsis and the unconscious 
 
While Brecht confers a higher value to reason, he also recognizes a role for 
emotions. However this is restricted to those emotions which result from 
awareness, while no positive role is identified for those emotional processes 
which arise independently from the operations of rational judgement. His view 
that emotions originate from thoughts, intended as conscious ideas, leads him 
to entrust psychic change (and, most importantly for Brecht, the social and 
political change that ensues) to conscious thought. As he declares: ‘People’s 
opinions interest me far more than their feelings. Feelings are usually the 
products of opinions. They follow on. But opinions are decisive’ (Brecht, 1926, 
p.16), although he admits that opinions, in turn, can sometimes be generated by 
experience.  
 
In view of this, I would like to suggest that Brecht’s preoccupation with the 
opposition between feelings and reason fundamentally reflects a preoccupation 
with the contrast between conscious and unconscious psychic processes. In 
fact, in his essay On the use of music in the epic theatre, he specifies: ‘It is a 
frequently recurring mistake to suppose that this – epic – kind of production 
simply does without all emotional effects: actually, emotions are only clarified in 
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it, steering clear of subconscious origins and carrying nobody away’ (1957b, 
p.88). Again, in a compilation of notes written in 1936, Brecht spells this idea 
out even more clearly:  
 
A creation that more or less renounces empathy need not by any means 
be an ‘unfeeling’ creation, or one which leaves the spectator’s feelings 
out of account. But it has to adopt a critical approach to his emotions, just 
as it does to his ideas. […] But above all the actor must make certain that 
no worthwhile feeling is weakened when it is brought clearly and critically 
to the conscious level.  
(Brecht, 1938, pp.100-101) 
 
Brecht was not ignorant of the existence of powerful unconscious emotions 
which keep the human mind under their sway; on this supposition, after all, was 
based his whole critique of the Aristotelian theatre. But he chose to emphasize 
the power of reason, sometimes simplistically overstating the aptness of reason 
to override emotions. Thus he constructed a model of theatre spectatorship 
which, in acknowledging its unconscious aspects, at one and the same time 
dismisses them as an object worth of enquiry. 
 
OTHER MODELS OF SPECTATORSHIP 
 
While reflections on theatre spectatorship are at least as ancient as Aristotle’s 
theory of tragic katharsis, the theory of the epic theatre may be credited with 
representing a turning point in the terms of reference. Generally, spectatorship 
had been conceived as entailing, at least in part, the audience’s submission to 
the theatrical illusion and their emotional identification; Brecht instead converted 
emotional identification into an unwanted ‘side effect’ of theatre reception and 
laid the field open to novel theories of spectatorship.  
 
The flourishing of different approaches to understanding theatre reception and 
the richness of their insights is welcome. However, there remains a 
fragmentation of discourses that cannot be integrated into a coherent system. 
That is why I believe that a new perspective into theatre spectatorship is 
necessary, and I propose to use psychoanalysis to construct a conceptual 
framework that will illuminate universal aspects of theatre reception so far 
neglected, embedded within our unconscious psyche.  
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Before entering into a discussion of my approach, I will briefly survey three 
contemporary key theories of theatre reception, showing how the unconscious 
has found hardly any claim in their discourses. These are: 
- Susan Bennett’s approach to spectatorship as cultural phenomenon, a 
theory of theatre reception which is considered a reference point in the 
field (Freshwater, 2009, p.3); 
- the semiotic viewpoint on theatre as a global system of signification of 
which the spectator is the ultimate meaning-maker; 
- McConachie’s pioneering attempt at reading theatre spectatorship from 
the perspective of cognitive psychology. 
 
Theatre spectatorship as cultural phenomenon 
 
Brecht’s theory of the epic theatre did not just pose an alternative to traditional 
theatre, and to the cathartic effect that it supposedly entailed. It seemed also to 
create the opportunity for doing away with the very notion of katharsis or at 
least to expedite the arrival of new, ‘katharsis-free’, conceptualisations of 
spectatorship. In particular, its emphasis on the socio-political context of theatre 
reception instigated a view of the audience’s engagement as culturally and 
socially determined and prompted the surge in investigations of specific 
audiences, historically, culturally or socially situated. 
 
Susan Bennett’s (1997) attempt at creating a unified theory of spectatorship as 
a cultural phenomenon, grounds itself on at least two premises derived from 
Brecht’s theory: the concept of the passive spectator, and the idea that theatre’s 
value resides in its potential for instigating socio-political awareness. These two 
premises are interlinked and are ultimately based on the disavowal of 
unconscious mental processes as active components of productive reflection 
and psychic development. 
 
Brecht’s idea of the passive spectator coincides with a condemnation of the 
spectator’s emotional identification with the character(s), which is considered a 
means to political subjugation, whereas moral value is assigned to a theatre 
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which deliberately seeks the spectator’s critical engagement. In this sense 
Susan Bennett, in her theory of reception, can speak of the ‘productive and 
emancipated spectator’, a spectator ‘who can think and act’, as the subject of 
her study (1997, p.1). 
 
Although it is not explicitly stated, the opposition between active and passive 
seems to imply a divergence between conscious and unconscious engagement. 
In epic theatre, feelings are derived from the awareness of social conditions, 
and audience participation is consciously constructed; in that disavowed theatre 
which promotes katharsis, emotions proceed from a hypnotic experience which 
arises involuntarily, outside the realm of the spectator’s conscious control. Too 
hastily perhaps, unconscious phenomena perceived as outside the control of 
the spectator are dismissed, and unconscious engagement is construed to 
equate with middle-class pursuits. 
 
It may be argued that the concept of katharsis fostered theories of reception 
which ignored the political and ideological implications of theatre spectatorship, 
or which appeared to conceal a bourgeois mind-set under the pretension of a 
supposed universalism (Elam, 1980, p.34). But on the other hand, focussing on 
the social and cultural markers of reception has obscured questions about the 
common psychological elements that transcend social class and cultural 
variation. Ultimately, Brecht’s emphasis on the socio-political aspects of 
reception has justified not only a condemnation but also an outright denial of 
unconscious aspects of spectatorship. 
 
In The Future of an Illusion Freud proposes that culture, intended in its broadest 
sense to include science, religion and art, is the work of the repression of 
unconscious instincts. As he declares, he disdains ‘to distinguish between 
culture and civilization’ (Freud, 1927, p.6) because he believes that both result 
from the transformation of unconscious repressed dynamics into conscious 
elaborations. Such conscious re-elaborations are also known in psychoanalytic 
terms as sublimations. So for instance long-established cultural practices such 
as sport competitions or artistic pursuits may represent sublimations of 
aggressive or erotic drives. If the purpose of culture is, as Freud maintains, to 
 30 
express under disguise the relics of repressed unconscious processes, this 
would explain why cultural studies may naturally be blind to the workings of the 
unconscious, or perhaps be even incompatible as such with its study. Taking a 
psychoanalytic perspective, I will endeavour to address the unconscious 
dynamics of spectatorship as a complementary analysis to that of its cultural 
determinants.  
 
Theatre spectatorship from a semiotic perspective 
 
Shortly after Brecht’s formulation of the epic theatre, the 1930s saw the birth, 
within the Prague School, of theatre semiotics, which introduced opportunities 
to look at theatre reception from a systematic perspective. This new discipline, 
consolidated and expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, had the merit of 
establishing the distinctiveness of theatre as an art form and to encourage the 
differentiation of theatre studies from literary studies. The complexity of the 
theatrical performance as a system of communication which utilizes multiple 
sensory channels, compounded by its ephemeral status which effaces its 
availability for subsequent scientific enquiry, has represented one of the biggest 
challenges to the formulation of satisfactory theories of theatre reception and 
has undoubtedly contributed, historically, to the more convenient conflation of 
theatre with its literary texts (Elam, 1980).  
 
The Prague School overcame the assimilation of theatre within literary studies 
and emphasized the complexity of theatre as a system of signs, as compared to 
other arts, including literature, music or sculpture (Veltruský, 1981). Theatre 
was regarded as a global system of signification, rather than a sum of semiotic 
subsystems, which pointed to its unique and peculiar nature: a pluricodified and 
multileveled organisation of heterogeneous components that are 
interdependent (Amossy, 1981). Although this conferred on theatre a 
differentiated status, the difficulty with making it the object of scientific enquiry 
remained. 
 
While attempts have been made at constructing systems of analysis which 
embrace the semiotic complexity of a theatrical performance in its entirety (see 
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for instance Elam, 1980), other scholars have instead concentrated on distilling 
what may be peculiar about theatre compared to other forms of art. Eco (1977), 
for instance, has highlighted that the special semiotic property of theatre is to 
show, or ostend, real objects as signs. In this aspect, theatre differs from 
literature, where words are unambiguous artificial signs produced by man in 
order to communicate (Eco, 1977). It also differs from the visual arts (Helbo, 
1985), and even from cinema, in as far as cinema is only a reflection of real 
presence:  
 
Au théâtre, la fiction – c’est là sa force – se sert de choses réelles: la 
scène, l’acteur, pour prendre forme: il devient alors impossible de scinder 
ce qui dans la représentation appartient à l’un ou à l’autre, puisque la 
représentation théâtrale utilise des choses réelles pour parler de choses 
fictives. 
(Pavis, 1985, p.73) 
 
The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure defined ‘the sign as a two-faced 
entity linking a material vehicle or signifier with a mental concept or signified’ 
(Saussure, 19155, cited in Elam, 1980, p.6). In the 1970s the Polish semiotician 
Tadeusz Kowzan (19756, cited in Bassnett-McGuire, 1980, p.49) distinguished 
  
two kinds of sign – the natural, which includes phenomena unprovoked 
by man (e.g. thunder and lightning as the sign of a storm, skin colour as 
the sign of race, etc) and the artificial, which is created by living creatures 
in order to signify or communicate something.  
(Bassnett-McGuire, 1980, p.49) 
 
Eco disputed Kowzan’s belief that theatre is made up entirely of artificial signs 
because, according to Kowzan’s definition, the mise-en-scène is entirely a 
deliberate act. Notwithstanding, the presence of the actor, differently from a 
word or a picture, ‘has not been actively produced (as one produces a word or 
draws an image) – it has been picked up among the existing physical bodies 
and it has been shown or ostended’ (Eco, 1977, p.110). Theatre leaves open an 
ambiguity between the body of the actor as natural sign and the body of the 
actor as artificial sign representing the character. The actor plays ‘a double 
game: In order to be accepted as a sign, he has to be recognised as a “real” 
                                                       5 Ferdinand de Saussure, 1915, Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot.	
6 Tadeusz Kowzan, 1975, Littérature et spectacle. The Hague/Paris: Mouton. 
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spatio-temporal event, a real human body’ (Eco, 1977, p.111). Such double 
game opens a gap ‘between the experience of an absence and the play with a 
presence’ (Ubersfeld, 1982, p.128) which constitutes one of the sources of 
pleasure for the spectator. Such pleasure, based on an act of understanding, is 
the pleasure of ‘doing’ (Ubersfeld, 1982, p.132).  
 
In an essay of 1956, Roland Barthes interpreted Brecht’s theory of the epic 
theatre and the Verfremdungseffekt as altogether addressing this semiological 
problem: ‘For what all Brechtian dramaturgy postulates is that today at least 
dramatic art should not so much express the real as signify it’ (Barthes, 1979, 
p.28). Brecht’s proposition of the epic actor ‘holding himself remote from the 
character portrayed’ (Brecht, 1957c, p.92) is conceived as an attempt at 
resisting the natural tendency of the theatrical system to conflate the artificial 
and the natural sign. In this sense, the epic theatre can be understood not so 
much to negate emotional identification between spectator and character, as to 
compensate for it (Ubersfeld, 1982, p.134). As we shall see, the fruitful dynamic 
between the natural and the artificial sign, will be crucial to a psychoanalytic 
theory of spectatorship. 
 
Although the double game of the theatrical sign applies to all real objects on 
stage, including scenery and costumes, the element that is of interest to my 
research pertains specifically to the actor. As theatre semiotics acknowledged 
from its early days: ‘all that goes on during the performance centers on the 
actor, so to speak. It is through him that the other components receive their 
theatrical function and meaning’ (Veltruský, 1981, p.230). 
 
On the other hand, theatre semiotics has focussed mainly on the study of 
theatre reception, emphasizing the spectators’ active function as the recipients 
of the theatrical communication and the ultimate makers of its meaning. 
Moreover, as responders, spectators ‘in turn assume the role of transmitter of 
signals to the performers […]. This feedback process […] is one of the major 
distinguishing features of live theatre’ (Elam, 1980, p.38). Semiotic attempts at 
defining the actor-audience transaction have had to contend with the difficulty 
raised by the French linguist George Mounin who challenged the notion of the 
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actor-spectator relationship as entailing communication, given that there is no 
sharing of a common communicative code and no reciprocation of roles 
between sending and receiving messages: in theatre, claims Mounin, actors 
remain the senders and spectators the receivers (Mounin, 19697, cited in Elam, 
1980, p.33). This claim has been rejected not only by theatre semioticians but 
also by scholars of other approaches, and, indeed, actors themselves. For 
instance, Bennett recognizes the reciprocal relationship between audience and 
performance ‘even for the most “culinary” theatre’ let alone for contemporary 
theatre events in which the audience is deliberately enticed into a productive 
role’ (1997, p.21).   
 
Dario Fo (1977, pp.54-55), the Italian actor-playwright who received the Nobel 
Prize for Literature in 1997, and who has grounded his practice in Brecht’s 
vision of the political significance of theatre, talks about the audience response 
to the actor in terms of laughter, breathing, uneasiness, as an instantaneous 
spur to the actor’s own reactions. 
 
While there is hardly any doubt that theatre spectators send live signals during 
a theatrical performance, the difficulties of semiotics have lain in deciphering 
the codes of such transaction, and semioticians have resorted to responding to 
Mounin’s challenge by establishing that spectator-actor communication 
happens through a different set of codes from the counter-route of actor-
spectator communication (Ruffini, 19748, cited in Elam, 1980, p.34). I will argue 
that the unconscious emotional communication between actor and spectator 
can overcome this difficulty, because it consists precisely in a common code 
through which the reciprocal and productive communication between actor and 
spectator operates. 
 
A preoccupation with the status of emotions in the spectator has led scholars of 
theatre semiotics to interesting conclusions, not dissimilar to those emphasized 
by post-Brechtian approaches to the theatre. In particular, De Marinis’s (1985) 
attempt to formulate a ‘cognitive semiotics’ of spectatorship is symptomatic of 
                                                       7 Georges Mounin, 1969, Introduction à la sémiologie. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.	8 Franco Ruffini, 1974, ‘Semiotica del Teatro: Ricognizione degli Studi.’ Biblioteca Teatrale, Vol. 
9, pp.34-81.	
 34 
this trend. De Marinis repudiates ‘an ingenuous neo-romantic vision of theatrical 
emotion; a vision according to which it consists of an immediate, primary 
phenomenon completely independent of cognitive processes that take place 
during the reception of the spectacle’ (1985, p.7). Although he acknowledges 
that there is a complex set of psychic processes that contribute to the 
experience of the spectator, and that emotive and cognitive aspects do not 
operate in opposition to each other, he concludes that the emotional experience 
of the spectator is regulated by cognition. As I have discussed earlier, the new 
aesthetics of performance proposed by Fischer-Lichte (2008) adopts the same 
notion. 
 
De Marinis’s suppositions are based on cognitive theories that presume that 
‘the emotions are largely determined cognitively’ (1985, p.10). As I shall discuss 
in the next section, departing from premises based on opposite cognitive 
theories, and despite a prejudiced aversion to semiotics, Bruce McConachie 
(2008) would not consider De Marinis’s approach disagreeable.  I suspect that 
both would find a point of resonance in their search for explanations that may 
do away with the significance of the spectator’s unconscious. 
 
Theatre spectatorship from the perspective of cognitive science 
 
Since the 1970s, cognitive psychology has exponentially grown as a scientific 
domain that investigates a wide range of mental processes, including memory, 
attention, language and perception. Among theatre scholars who have sought 
to assimilate these findings into their research, McConachie has undertaken an 
ambitious attempt at applying this knowledge to a novel approach to theatre 
spectatorship, in his book Engaging Audiences (2008).  
 
McConachie’s method consists in using scientific theories of cognition to inform 
a new understanding of spectatorship, which he claims to be the only valid 
approach, because ‘grounded in falsifiable theories and empirical knowledge’ 
(2008, p.14), in contrast with what he sees as unscientific and hence invalid 
theories derived from disparate disciplines such as semiotics, philosophy and 
psychoanalysis. He also downplays the significance of cultural determinants 
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and maintains that ‘evolution, biology, and the cognitive structures of the 
mind/brain place limits on the extent to which society and history can shape 
individuals and cultures’ (2008, p.4). 
 
In common with many other theorists of spectatorship, he is moved by the same 
desire to discover those elements of reception which seem to establish the 
spectator as an active and conscious participant. For instance, he insists on 
attention as a conscious activity that spectators employ to make deliberate 
choices about what they watch and see: ‘At one time or another, all 
theatregoers have trouble focusing their attention. More than simple awareness, 
attention requires conscious, selective effort’ (McConachie, 2008, pp.23-24). On 
the other hand, he identifies in the unconscious process of cognitive blending 
the basis for the spectator’s ability to ‘comprehend and negotiate the 
“doubleness” of theatre – that is, the fact that a single body on stage can be 
both an actor and a character, simultaneously existing in both real and 
simulated time-space’ (McConachie, 2008, p.7).  
 
McConachie informs us that ‘blending is learned in infancy and soon occurs 
automatically to generate complex cognitive concepts, mostly below the level of 
consciousness’ (2008, p.42). However he is at pains to relate all aspects of 
spectatorship back to consciousness: 
 
Spectators make some conscious decisions about what they will pay 
attention to on the stage. Even the cognitive concepts in their memories 
and their ability to blend actors and characters into single identities 
depend upon mind/brain dynamics that were once partly conscious 
before they became habitual. 
(McConachie, 2008, p.56) 
 
Seen from the perspective of psychoanalysis, there is a resistance to admit to 
the significance of unconscious mental processes for cognition, even if their 
existence is scientifically proven. 
 
The concept of cognitive blending, which consists in the spectator perceiving 
the person on stage as a mixture of actor and character, addresses the same 
phenomenon that semiotics formulates as the double game of the theatrical 
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sign. It is perhaps a missed opportunity that McConachie chooses to dismiss 
other approaches, instead of seeking to integrate the knowledge derived from 
them. For Eco and other semioticians, the question of the ambivalence of the 
theatrical sign between its natural facet (the actor’s body) and its artificial facet 
(the representation of character) is posed to interrogate the peculiar status of 
theatre as an object of communication, and ultimately to reveal new insights 
into our understanding of it. For McConachie blending is just one of many 
cognitive activities that, having been described as characteristic of human 
thinking outside theatre, he applies to theatre, in what he calls a ‘page-to-stage’ 
method (2008, p.19). What follows, is often a description in a new language 
(that of cognitive psychology) of phenomena which had been discovered by 
those disciplines that McConachie would like to exclude from theatre studies. 
 
For instance, when McConachie only fleetingly touches on katharsis, he 
accepts the definition of emotional release that was established, as I shall show 
in the next chapter, in the nineteenth century and remained widely accepted 
including by Brecht. When he says: ‘Crying as a means of helping to modulate 
our physiological thermostats may be the closest that cognitive science can 
come to the Aristotelian notion of catharsis’ (2008, p.111), he is trying to fit an 
ancient and much debated theory, into a simplistic re-branding. Overall, insights 
from cognitive science lead him to conclude that spectators’ cognitive abilities 
are employed to deal with understanding theatre, while there is no attempt at 
establishing whether theatre reception may have a special function in instigating 
psychic change. Thus, McConachie seems to miss that deeper link between life 
and theatre, whereby life may be construed, as Eco puts it,  
 
as an instance of theatrical performance. This finally explains why 
aesthetics and criticism have always suspected that theatrical 
performances were instances of everyday life. It is not theatre that is able 
to imitate life; it is social life that is designed as a continuous 
performance and, because of this, there is a link between theatre and 
life. 
(Eco, 1977, p.113) 
 
From this perspective, one may argue with Brecht that it is theatre spectatorship 
to be useful to the investigation of psychic life.  
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Despite the many differences, there is however one element which tends to 
unify McConachie’s approach to theatre reception with semiotics as well as with 
cultural perspectives: it is the tendency to conflate the ‘active’ spectator with the 
‘conscious’ spectator. These diverse theories arrive at a common emphasis on 
the active and conscious spectator despite departing from opposite 
assumptions about the emotional and rational experiences of the audience. As I 
have shown in the previous section, this is for instance the case in point with 
McConachie and De Marinis. While De Marinis (1985) sees cognitions as 
primary and regulating the emotional response of spectators, McConachie 
prefers cognitive theories which ‘affirm that emotional drives undergird and 
sustain even the simplest of intellectual tasks’ (2008, p.3). Yet, they both 
equally dismiss the significance of unconscious processes. 
 
I would like to conclude this section on cognitive studies of spectatorship, with a 
word of caution in response to McConachie’s (2008, p.156) exhortation that 
theatre scholars should undertake collaborations with cognitive psychologists to 
run experiments on audiences and replicate the successful partnership 
practiced in music scholarship. Experiments in the cognitive basis of music-
making have been criticized for leading ‘to types of research projects that lack 
theoretical or practical interest and relevance; and to results that are, at most, 
common sense’ (Regelski, 1996, p.11). While scientific insights should be 
welcomed, one should be weary of taking the slippery slope of scientism, 
by making wildly inflated claims for the explanations of modern science, while 
denigrating all other modes of understanding. Such attitude may be suspected 
of being a trademark of a capitalistic society’s struggle to maintain cultural 
hegemony (Marcuse, 1964). As Marcuse points out, by banning any other form 
of knowledge as fallacious, the tyranny of scientism leads to a form of one-
dimensional thinking which capitalistic ideology can exploit to secure its 
unchallenged dominion. 
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SPECTATORSHIP AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
The significance of the unconscious to mental life 
 
Freud first glanced at the unconscious through hypnosis, the technique that he 
had learnt from famous contemporary neurologists, such as Charcot and 
Bernheim (Gay, 2006) and which, as a young doctor, he had employed in the 
cure of hysterical patients. Hypnosis had given him the proof that there were 
hidden aspects of the psyche which could be brought into focus through certain 
techniques:  
 
The ‘unconscious’ had, it is true, long been under discussion among 
philosophers as a theoretical concept; but now for the first time, in the 
phenomena of hypnotism, it became something actual, tangible and 
subject to experiment. […] From a theoretical as well as from a 
therapeutic point of view, psycho-analysis has at its command a legacy 
which it has inherited from hypnotism.  
(Freud, 1924b, p.192)  
 
Although he was left eager to understand the unconscious and its relationship 
to thinking and behaviour, he soon abandoned hypnosis as a technique; instead 
he gave birth to psychoanalysis, as a new ‘science of unconscious mental 
processes’ (Freud, 1925c, p.70).  
 
During his entire career Freud remained acutely aware that his discoveries 
about the unconscious were running contrary to prevailing views of the mind in 
medical and scientific institutions of his time. As he wrote in 1926:  
 
Psychology had barred its own access to the region of the id by insisting 
on a postulate which is plausible enough but untenable: namely, that all 
mental acts are conscious to us – that being conscious is the criterion of 
what is mental, and that, if there are processes in our brain which are not 
conscious, they do not deserve to be called mental acts and are no 
concern of psychology.  
(Freud, 1926, pp.196-197) 
 
Against the prevailing tide in medicine and psychology, he continued to 
examine and explain the prominence of unconscious processes within the 
psyche and he compared the significance of his discovery to that of Darwin’s 
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theory of evolution. He once described psychoanalysis as ‘the psychological 
blow to men’s narcissism, and compared it with the biological blow delivered by 
the theory of descent and the earlier cosmological blow aimed at it by the 
discovery of Copernicus’ (Freud, 1924b, p.221).  
 
Freud was convinced that much opposition to psychoanalysis, which is still 
prevailing today, sprang from resistance against the idea that an unruly 
unconscious holds sway over a relatively constrained conscious ego. In his 
criticism of what he calls Aristotelian theatre, Brecht is precisely concerned 
about the powerful dominance of unconscious aspects of spectatorship over 
conscious ones. Indeed, Brecht talks of the hypnotic state of the audience, 
when he describes the spectators’ passive submission to the cathartic effects of 
a play. As I have discussed, hypnotic in Brecht’s terms could be substituted for 
by ‘unconscious’. For Brecht the hypnotic state is synonymous with something 
that represents a threat and therefore needs to be avoided at all costs, in 
opposition to Freud who made of the unconscious a new field of scientific 
enquiry. 
 
The significant divergence between Freud’s and Brecht’s attitude towards the 
unconscious, is illustrated by a curious instance, which can almost be construed 
as an indirect exchange of opinions between the two men. In his essay The 
Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre (1930) Brecht uses a quotation from Freud, 
the only mention of Freud to be found among his writings on the theatre. The 
quote is from one of Freud’s works of maturity, Civilization and its discontents 
(1930), and Brecht uses it to support his claim that conventional theatre is 
functional to a society which employs art as a narcotic drug against critical 
engagement, ultimately leading to the abdication of social responsibility. The 
passage, following Brecht’s own omissions, runs as follows:  
 
Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many pains, 
disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot 
dispense with palliative measures. […] There are perhaps three such 
measures: powerful deflections, which cause us to make light of our 
misery; substitutive satisfactions, which diminish it; and intoxicating 
substances, which make us insensitive to it. Something of the kind is 
indispensable. […] The substitutive satisfactions, as offered by art, are 
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illusions in contrast with reality, but they are none the less psychically 
effective, thanks to the role which phantasy has assumed in mental life.9 
(Freud, 1930, p.75)  
 
Freud seems to claim that art’s ultimate aim is to furnish man with an escapist 
route into a fantasy world, and that is why, adds Brecht, art as traditionally 
intended, and theatre in particular, need to be radically reformed. It could be 
argued, in fact, that Freud’s theorizing about artistic production and reception, 
taken at face value, corroborates Brecht’s preoccupations about the function of 
art.  
 
Freud had attempted his own formulation of a theory of spectatorship in an 
essay entitled Psychopathic Characters on the Stage, which he wrote in 1905 
but, significantly, never published during his lifetime. Unsurprisingly taking 
Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis as his springboard, and following the 
accepted nineteenth-century translation of katharsis as purgation, he 
maintained that the spectator derived pleasure from the theatre by identifying 
with the sufferings of the tragic hero, but with the consolation that ‘firstly, it is 
someone other than himself who is acting and suffering on the stage, and, 
secondly, that after all it is only a game, which can threaten no damage to his 
personal security’ (Freud, 1906, p.306). It is striking how close this explanation 
is to Brecht’s account of the harmful effects of Aristotelian theatre. 
 
Despite the proximity of their conclusions on spectatorship, Freud and Brecht 
depart from very different premises. In particular, Freud could never endorse 
Brecht’s proposition that the unconscious can simply be bypassed through 
reason and conscious purpose. As he maintains: ‘psychoanalysis cannot situate 
the essence of the psychical in consciousness, but is obliged to regard 
consciousness as a quality of the psychical, which may be present in addition to 
other qualities or may be absent’ (Freud, 1923, p.13). Because psychoanalysis 
puts the unconscious at the basis of all mental activity, including higher 
functions such as rational thinking, there can be no coherent picture of the 
                                                       9 This English translation of Freud’s words as quoted by Brecht is taken from the ‘Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud’, as per reference, and it is 
therefore slightly different from Willet’s own translation. 
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operating of the mind in one particular context without some description of 
unconscious processes.  
 
It is of note that in Civilization and its discontents, the essay quoted by Brecht, 
Freud engages in a specific critique of communist ideology – possibly the 
reason why Brecht particularly took an interest in this work. Freud’s main 
concern is that the communist ideology is based on the false psychological 
presumption that inequality and injustice among mankind is solely dependent 
on external or material factors. As he acknowledges:  
 
I have no concern with any economic criticisms of the communist 
system; I cannot enquire into whether the abolition of private property is 
expedient or advantageous. But I am able to recognize that the 
psychological premises on which the system is based are an untenable 
illusion. 
(Freud, 1930, p.113) 
 
What the communist ideology fails to consider is the prominence of the 
unconscious psychic processes in determining human behaviour; and any 
system that ignores the unconscious foundations of social and cultural activities 
is flawed.  
 
Whilst Freud’s theoretical view of the function of art remained somewhat 
narrow, seemingly justifying a negative judgement about any unconscious 
aesthetic engagement, his broad discoveries about the unconscious, and their 
extension by his disciples, provide a crucial paradigm for the enhancement of 
our understanding of theatre spectatorship. 
 
Psychoanalysis in context 
 
It has been argued (Anderson, 1980) that Freud’s ideas about the unconscious 
are a plagiarism of those of Nietzsche’s and that he built his defence of 
psychoanalysis as a science by denying his debt towards the intuitions of artists 
and philosophers. Freud, however, was well aware of the insights that artists 
and philosophers had contributed to the understanding of psychic functioning 
ahead of science in general and psychoanalysis in particular. He writes about 
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the merits of the creative writer: ‘The description of the human mind is indeed 
the domain which is most his own; he has from time immemorial been the 
precursor of science, and so too of scientific psychology’ (Freud, 1907, pp.43-
44). Of his particular relationship to Nietzsche’s philosophy, he confesses in a 
private letter: ‘I have rejected the study of Nietzsche although – no, because – it 
was plain that I would find insights in him very similar to psychoanalytic ones’ 
(Freud to Lothar Bickel10, cited in Gay, 2006, p.46).  
 
While the existence of the unconscious and certain aspects of its functioning 
had been already anticipated by artists and philosophers, Freud must be 
credited with creating a method of observation of unconscious processes that 
allowed for their systematic study.  The invention of psychoanalysis opened a 
new field of knowledge whereby the unconscious was methodically investigated 
through the collection of clinical data as well as methodical self-observation. It is 
only because of Freud’s endeavours and discoveries that insights into the 
unconscious were accepted, although with much struggle, to bear on medicine 
and the treatment of mental illness. While Freud was keen for the scientific 
community to embrace psychoanalysis, it is well known that he was often 
ostracized or ridiculed by the medical and scientific establishment of his age. 
Incidentally, it was an age when being a Jew was not a recommendation. This 
contextualization may help understand why Freud may, at times, have yielded 
to the temptation of producing overbearing statements about psychoanalysis as 
a scientific discipline. 
 
In this thesis I will use psychoanalytic theories which explore the unconscious 
mechanisms of identification at the basis of emotional development and ego-
formation and I will draw mainly on the conceptualizations of Freud, Klein and 
Bion.  
 
Psychoanalytic descriptions of the relationship between identification and 
identity have been harshly critiqued by humanities scholars, especially from a 
feminist perspective. These critiques have especially focussed on Freud’s 
formulation of the Oedipus complex, and on its further elaborations by Lacan. 
Butler (1999, p.56), for instance, has argued that through the Lacanian 
                                                       10	Freud to Lothar Bickel, June 28, 1931.	
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perspective, the male gender comes to represent the conscious subject, while 
the female gender is reduced to serve the function of objectifying male’s desire, 
thus providing a ‘dialectical confirmation of its identity’. This rigid gender 
stereotyping resonates with some of Freud’s own opinions about gender 
development. For instance, Freud’s association of the male gender with activity 
and of the female one with passivity, presupposes a gender-biased approach to 
psychology, which justifies ‘dividing up functions and sexual roles’(Irigaray, 
1993, p.36) and the unequal distribution of privileges that this entails. 
 
In this thesis I will not employ theories of gender-identity formation. Although 
the Oedipus complex becomes somewhat magnified by the intense scrutiny 
under which it has rightly been brought, its focus on gender-identity is at odds 
with many other psychoanalytic formulations of ego-development and 
unconscious functioning which are gender-neutral. Freud’s theory of 
transference, which I will consider in detail in Chapter 2, Klein’s concept of 
unconscious phantasy, and Bion’s theory of alpha-function, both of which I will 
discuss in Chapter 5, are all instances of gender-neutral psychic processes. 
 
In my discussion of psychoanalytic theories, while departing from Freud, I will 
particularly focus on Klein’s elaborations of his ideas. Although outside the remit 
of my discussion, it must be emphasised that Klein’s development of the theory 
of the Oedipus complex, very much in opposition to Lacan’s, vindicated the 
significance of the female gender, emphasising the role of the vagina and its 
creative potential. Klein’s insights into the operations of the unconscious are 
generally dissimilar to those of Lacan.  Both give consideration to the 
development of the self in relation to the encounter with the other, a field of 
enquiry that Phelan (1993) rightly puts at the centre of any investigation of 
identification and identity; however, their perspective is very different. Within a 
Lacanian framework, it may be justified to accuse psychoanalysis of theorising 
a parasitic view of the other, whereby the other gets pushed in a subordinate 
position, in order to be exploited by the observing subject to reinforce its self-
identity. On the contrary, for Klein there is no primary self outside the encounter 
with the other. In this sense any primary experience is fragmented and self-less 
and only through the sympathetic engagement of the other, can the subject 
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painstakingly construct its sense of self.  The dynamic of power is reversed. 
Within a Kleinian framework, an a-gendered infant psyche is at the mercy of the 
maternal function. Although both male and female mature minds may perform 
the maternal function, the linguistic metaphor assigns to the female gender the 
active role of promoting the infant’s psychic development. She is active, he (if 
we want, for the sake of simplicity, to give the baby a gender) is the passive 
one, at the mercy of his unconscious. The mother then is, yes, putting herself at 
the service of her a-gendered and vulnerable baby, but not reverentially, not in 
order to allow him (or her) the re-affirmation of an already established sense of 
self, but rather as an act of generosity that will promote the development and 
integration of the primitive and fragmented baby’s mind.  
 
As I have briefly indicated in the Preface, assigning the actor a female pronoun 
and the spectator a masculine one, is an allusion to the theory of alpha-
function, which I will discuss in Chapter 5. Far from hinting at a predatory male 
spectator who exploits the female actor to satisfy his desire and cement his 
sense of self, my linguistic use of pronouns indicates a vulnerable spectator 
who depends on the actor’s maternal function for his psychic development. 
 
It must be stressed that my perspective on identification focuses on 
unconscious mechanisms, and these are not implied to be exclusive. Conscious 
mechanisms of identification, of voluntary resistance to identification (Phelan, 
1993) or, indeed, conscious efforts at disidentification (Muñoz, 1999) are not 
incompatible with the complexities of psychic functioning, and are rightly given 
consideration by other scholars. My hope is that my novel approach to the study 
of spectatorship will serve as a complement to the analyses of performances 
and the formulation of theories of theatre reception, where active and conscious 
processes will also continue to be examined. 
 
A psychoanalytic perspective of theatre spectatorship 
 
As I discussed above, Brecht’s vision for a new theatre challenged established 
theatre practices and their approach to the audience. The twentieth century saw 
a flurry of experiments, as well as new theories, aimed at exploring and 
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exploiting new paradigms for engaging the audience. But despite the richness 
of the available perspectives, there are still a number of questions about theatre 
spectatorship that remain unclear or unanswered. 
 
In this thesis I will use a psychoanalytic perspective to explore certain themes of 
contention raised by current scholarship about the spectator and about related 
aspects of theatrical processes which bear on the problem of reception. In 
particular, I will address: 
1- The supposed opposition between a passive and an active spectator 
which parallels a perceived dichotomy between an emotionally engaged and a 
critically or intellectually engaged spectator; 
2- The quality of emotional engagement, and the supposed distinction 
between a passive (or hypnotic) emotional engagement derived from 
identification; and a positive emotional arousal subordinate to a critical 
judgement and intellectual understanding of the play’s messages. I will explore 
this aspect with regards to both spectator and actor; 
3- The nature of identification in theatre and its unconscious facets. Again, I 
will explore this in both spectator and actor; 
4- The significance of the double nature of the actor’s status in relation to its 
effects on the spectator; 
5- The nature of the reciprocity of communication between stage and 
audience, which is universally recognized but not coherently explained.  
 
As I will have ample opportunity to illustrate, psychoanalysis shows that the 
unconscious works at an interpersonal level and our minds are born out of an 
intersubjective morass whereby ‘self-consciousness emerges through contact 
with another’ (Symington, 1986, p.187). Therefore, my study of theatre 
reception will address processes of unconscious emotional identification 
between spectator and character, actor and character, and spectator and actor.  
 
Brecht’s emphasis on the role of the actor in mediating the spectator’s 
response, both at an intellectual and emotional level, rightly demands a 
complementary analysis of unconscious emotional processes in both actors and 
spectators. That is why in the course of the thesis I will probe the 
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psychoanalytic perspective against theories that have considered the 
spectator’s or the actor’s emotional engagement in depth. My choice of theories 
has been determined first by their prominence as discourses on the relevance 
of emotional processes for spectating and acting, and secondarily by their 
trans-temporal connection with Brecht. Unsurprisingly, Aristotle’s theory of 
tragic katharsis represents both a pivotal point of reference for reflections on 
spectators’ emotional engagement with theatre, and the key conception of 
spectatorship against which Brecht launches his invective.  
 
For what concerns theories of acting, although the twentieth century is not 
lacking in a rich debate and a flurry of experiments on the art of the actor, I 
chose to focus on the eighteenth-century theorists representing the background 
references to Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le Comédien (1994), because they give 
thorough consideration to the significance and the modalities of the actor’s 
emotional involvement. Not only does the Paradoxe, with its sources, represent 
a point of reference for future theorists, including twentieth-century theatre 
masters such as Stanislavski and Copeau, but it also establishes the prototype 
for Brecht’s formulation of the epic actor.  
 
Following this framework, in Chapter 2 I will engage with Aristotle’s theory of 
tragic katharsis as the classical theory of spectatorship. I will first re-consider 
the theory in the context of a re-evaluation of the meaning of mimēsis, fear and 
pity. I will then describe the evolution of Freud’s theory of transference from his 
earlier conceptualisation of the ‘cathartic method’, the precursor to 
psychoanalysis. Through a comparative analysis between transference and 
katharsis, I will suggest how tragic katharsis may reveal the transference 
dynamic embedded in spectating. 
 
In Chapter 3 to 5 I will shift my attention to the actor. I will depart from Diderot’s 
Paradoxe as the emblematic theory of the actor which bridges the rich 
eighteenth-century debate on the art of the actor to twentieth-century 
formulations, most notably Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt. In Chapter 3 I will give 
considerable attention to the eighteenth-century theoretical works on the actor 
which constitute the direct and indirect references of the Paradoxe. In doing this 
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I will describe the different interpretations that theorists have given of the 
relationship between sensibility and understanding in the actor’s art. In Chapter 
4, I will analyse the terms of contention about the actor’s art (sensibility, 
understanding, and nature) with reference to the eighteenth-century cultural and 
philosophical context. I will first demonstrate that the paradox of the actor 
cannot be solved through the notion of ‘double consciousness’ as has been 
proposed, among others, by William Archer. I will then show how the shifting 
cultural paradigms of the Enlightenment, and in particular the emphasis on the 
possibility to study human nature and the philosophy of sensism have much in 
common with the debate on the art of the actor and provide a cross-reference to 
it. In Chapter 5 I will propose a psychoanalytic understanding of the dynamic 
between sensibility and understanding in the actor through the concept of 
alpha-function. First, I will summarize the key concepts in Freud, Melanie Klein 
and Bion, which describe the functioning of the unconscious in relation to 
mechanisms of identification, and the processing of emotions into self-
reflections that promotes psychic development. It is the notion of alpha-function 
which precisely describes the interpersonal process through which raw 
unconscious emotional dynamics are transformed into conscious insights 
through the mind of another. In applying the notion of alpha-function to the art of 
the actor, I will show how it can resolve its paradox and provide us with a 
meaningful understanding of the dynamic between sensibility and judgement.   
 
In chapter 6, I will return to the spectator in light of the propositions I made 
about the art of the actor and I will advance a new understanding of 
spectatorship according to the insights afforded by the psychoanalytic 
perspective. I will also discuss how unconscious processes of spectatorship 
may underpin theatre’s moral value. 
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CHAPTER 2 – TRANSFERENCE AND KATHARSIS, FREUD TO 
ARISTOTLE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis has been ‘the most celebrated concept in 
the entire field of literary criticism’ (Golden, 1976, p.437) and the subject of 
discussion and dispute at least since the rediscovery of the Poetics during the 
Renaissance and well into the twentieth century. Brecht took it as a point of 
reference for his condemnation of conventional theatre, in the context of his 
concern with the social and political function of this art. In doing so, he departed 
from the prevailing interpretation of katharsis as purgation and did not question 
its validity; instead he brought its implications to bear on his own theory of 
spectatorship. This amounted to an equation of katharsis with a hypnotic 
experience supposed to induce the spectator into a passive state and to inhibit 
his capacity for critical distance. Accordingly, Brecht’s assumptions excluded 
the possibility that unconscious dynamics may contribute productively to theatre 
reception. 
 
In this chapter I will challenge the interpretation of katharsis which formed the 
basis of Brecht’s understanding of spectatorship, and against which he framed 
his reform. In doing so, I will examine unconscious aspects of spectatorship, so 
far neglected or denied, from a psychoanalytic perspective. In particular I will 
apply Freud’s theory of transference to propose a new interpretation of tragic 
katharsis. First, I will illustrate and discuss Aristotle’s theory of tragedy as 
pertains to the concepts of katharsis, mimēsis, fear and pity. Then, I will 
describe the evolutions of Freud’s idea of how psychoanalysis relieves psychic 
sufferings, from the cathartic method to the discovery of transference and its 
further elaborations. Finally, I will propose an understanding of tragic katharsis 
as transference dynamic, highlighting it as a productive unconscious 
phenomenon which is conducive to self-analysis. 
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ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF MIMĒSIS AND TRAGIC KATHARSIS 
 
Tragic katharsis: purgation or purification? 
 
Aristotle’s Poetics presents a theory of tragedy comprising the most renowned 
pronouncement on spectatorship of all times (1449b24-28): tragedy is ‘a 
representation [mimēsis] of an action which is serious, complete…and through 
the arousal of pity and fear effecting the katharsis of such emotions’ (trans. 
Halliwell, 1987). 
 
Despite giving the impression of clarity, this dense definition has been the 
subject of controversies and of many attempts at explaining what it means 
(Halliwell, 1992). In particular, what Aristotle ‘meant in claiming that tragedy 
produces a katharsis, is a question which has dominated western philosophy 
and literary criticism since the Renaissance’ (Lear, 1988, p.297). The debate 
has especially been engaged with the question whether he meant purification of 
the emotions (i.e. their sublimation or perfection within the mind) or purification 
of the mind from the emotions (i.e. their discharge or abreaction from the mind) 
(Halliwell, 1992). 
 
This second meaning has been the most accepted of the last hundred years, 
hence the tendency to translate katharsis as ‘purgation’. Nevertheless the 
controversy has never abated and questions regarding the emotional versus the 
intellectual nature of katharsis, its supposed or doubtful moral value, and the 
relative import of pity and fear, are still pending (Butcher, 1951; Leon, 1976; 
Fabbri, 2000). Some justification for this may be found in the suggestion that 
Aristotle, being most likely the first author to apply the idea of katharsis to the 
theory of tragedy (Halliwell, 2002), borrowed the term from the medical literature 
of his time (Jauss, 1982). A passage in the Politics (1342a4-14), where the 
philosopher is writing about katharsis in relation to the effects of music, affirms 
that in people whose soul is affected by strong emotions certain sacred 
melodies may induce a state of katharsis ‘just as if they were receiving a 
medical treatment’ (trans. Kraut, 1997).  
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Nevertheless, the understanding of katharsis as sublimation or moral perfection 
has been very popular until the last century (Halliwell, 1986).  But in the 
nineteenth century, there was the reaching of a general agreement to the 
settling on katharsis as purgation although, as I said, this has never been 
universally accepted (see for instance Leon, 1976). One of the most important 
contributions to this rendition was a book by Jakob Bernays, originally published 
in German in 1857 (Bernays, 188011, cited in Lear, 1988), who emphasized the 
medical origin of the term (Halliwell, 1992). Curiously, Bernays was Freud’s 
wife’s uncle, and Freud was well acquainted with his work (Stok, 2010). It 
seems therefore likely that the two physicians relied on his interpretation of 
katharsis when Breuer suggested that they call the first psychoanalytic 
treatment the ‘cathartic method’ (Freud & Breuer, 1895). I will come back to this 
point in the next section of the chapter. 
 
In the Politics (1341b39-41), Aristotle anticipates that he would expand on what 
he means by katharsis in the future work of the Poetics, but unfortunately either 
this did not happen or we have lost the fragment which might have done so. 
Hence we have to rely solely on the discussion in the Politics to expand on 
Aristotle’s views of some aspects of the cathartic effect. 
 
In the Poetics (1449b24-28) Aristotle attributes the arousal of fear and pity to 
the mimetic character of tragedy, but he gives no explanation for this. In the 
Politics (1340a12-14), talking about music, he theorizes more openly that the 
mimetic quality of music is that responsible for the arousal of corresponding 
emotions: ‘Furthermore, everyone who listens to representations [mimēseon] 
comes to have similar emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies of 
those representations’ (trans. Kraut, 1997). If mimēsis is necessary for the 
arousal of emotions, a causal link is posited between mimēsis and katharsis. 
Applied to tragedy, this principle implies that mimēsis of tragic actions leads to 
the arousal of the emotions of fear and pity, which are then subject to the 
cathartic effect. 
 
                                                       
11 Jakob Bernays (1880), Zwei Abhandlungen über die aristotelische Theorie des Drama. 
Berlin: W. Hertz. A chapter of this book has been translated as ‘Aristotle on the Effects of 
Tragedy’ by Jonathan and Jennifer Barnes in: Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 4 (J. Barnes, M. 
Schofield & R. Sorabji eds., London, 1979). 
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Mimēsis being a necessary premise to katharsis, it is useful to illustrate some of 
its properties that contribute to the understanding of katharsis. 
 
The meaning of mimēsis 
 
The concept of mimēsis12 figures in the pre-Socratic tradition (Halliwell, 2002) 
and is amply used by Plato in a number of works and contexts, but most 
famously in his critique of it in the Republic III (386a-417b) and X (595a-621d). 
For what concerns the scope of this discussion, I will here consider the following 
three important properties of mimēsis: 
- in the Poetics mimēsis means dramatic enactment; 
- mimēsis is characteristic of human innate behaviour and it is a source of 
pleasure; 
- mimēsis has a moral value. 
The examination of these attributes will inform my comparative analysis 
between Aristotle’s tragic katharsis and Freud’s theory of transference in the 
last section of the chapter.  
 
According to Aristotle all arts are forms of mimēsis. These include poetic arts 
such as tragedy, comedy, epic and dithyramb, as well as music and painting. In 
Aristotle’s words: ‘epic and tragic poetry, as well as comedy and dithyramb (and 
most music for the pipe or lyre), are all, taken as a whole, kinds of mimesis’ 
(1447a 13-18, trans. Halliwell, 1987); and ‘the poet, like the painter or any other 
image-maker, is a mimetic artist’ (1460b 8-11, trans. Halliwell, 1987). 
 
Mimēsis operates according to Aristotle as a key factor that distinguishes 
artistic creation from other forms of human intellectual activity. In reference to 
the art of the poet, he emphasizes that mistakenly the poet is attributed his title 
on the basis of whether he writes in verses, rather than according to the real 
criteria of whether he engages in mimēsis:  
 
since, if a work of medicine or natural philosophy is written in metre, 
people still use these same descriptions. But Homer and Empedocles 
have nothing in common except their metre; and so, while one must call 
                                                       
12 For a detailed discussion of mimēsis and related referencing, see Halliwell, 2002. 
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the former a poet, the latter should be called a natural philosopher rather 
than a poet. 
(1447b 16-20, trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
Within the arts, however, the denotative attributes of mimēsis are less clear. 
Plato uses mimēsis and its related terminology in a wide range of contexts, in 
connection with epistemology, ethics, psychology, politics and metaphysics. 
Within the arts, like Aristotle, he applies it to both the musico-poetic and the 
visual arts (Halliwell, 2002). Yet this is not univocally true and in Republic III 
(392c6-394b2) Plato refers to a restricted meaning of mimēsis as specifically 
denoting dramatic impersonation. As has been suggested, it is possible that 
mimēsis  ‘as popularly applied to poetry, was […] suggested to the Greeks by 
those dramatic forms of poetry in which acting or recitation produced an 
impression allied to that of mimicry’ (Butcher, 1951, p.138). 
 
In Republic III (392c6-394b2) the restricted meaning of mimēsis is specifically 
intended as personification in the dramatic art, i.e. the embodiment of a 
character, in opposition to narration [diēgēsis]. As explained through the words 
of Socrates, to whom Plato attributes the authority of his philosophy, poets can 
choose between two forms of telling their story: by narrating it or by talking as if 
they were the characters of the story. Tragedy and comedy are the paradigm of 
a poetic form entirely based on mimēsis, dithyrambs are based solely on 
narration, while epic poetry presents as a mixture of the two forms (394b6-c5).  
 
Aristotle himself refers to this restricted meaning in the Poetics (1460a5-11), 
when he suggests that one of the reasons why Homer is such a superior poet is 
that he lets his characters speak for themselves, and only rarely engages in 
narrative. Here Aristotle, somewhat contradicting what he had said elsewhere in 
the Poetics, distinguishes the poetic form based on narrative to the one based 
on mimēsis, granting mimēsis a denotation of the dramatic as opposed to other 
forms of poetic composition. 
 
Among Homer’s many other laudable attributes is his grasp – unique 
among epic poets – of his status as poet. For the poet himself should 
speak as little as possible, since when he does so he is not engaging in 
mimesis. Now, other epic poets participate persistently, and engage in 
mimesis only to a limited extent and infrequently. But Homer, after a 
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short preamble, at once brings onto stage a man, woman or some other 
figure (and his agents are always fully characterised).  
(trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
It is often emphasized how Aristotle discounted dramatic representation as an 
essential component of tragedy, for example when he said that spectacle is not 
important (1450b16-20):  
 
Spectacle is emotionally powerful but is the least integral of all to the 
poet’s art: for the potential of tragedy does not depend upon public 
performance and actors; and, besides, the art of the mask-maker carries 
more weight than the poet’s as regards the elaboration of visual effects. 
(trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
One should be wary however of maintaining that by doing so he ends up 
equating tragedy to a literary form. Other literary forms in Aristotle’s times were 
represented through public readings and hence what the dramatic performance 
is here contrasted to is not likely to be a silent reading, but rather a recitation. 
What Aristotle may well be rejecting are the decorative elements of theatre (like 
masks, as he specifically says, or scenery) rather than the enacted rendition of 
text. Incidentally, the history of twentieth-century theatre does not lack masters 
who have similarly deplored the decorative aspects of theatrical spectacle, 
while emphasizing the importance of the actor’s embodiment. Suffice to think of 
Grotowski and his formulation of ‘the poor theatre’ (1975). 
 
Talking about the composition of tragedy, Aristotle provides us with an 
important pointer to the central role of impersonation. Here there is an 
emphasis on enactment of gestures and arousal of affects with regards to the 
creative work of the poet (1455a22-34):  
 
So far as possible, the poet should even include gestures in the process 
of composition: for, assuming the same natural talent, the most 
convincing effect comes from those who actually put themselves in the 
emotions; and the truest impression of distress or anger is given by the 
person who experiences these feelings.  
(trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
Within a far from unitary conception, mimēsis retains an area of meaning which 
refers to dramatic enactment. According to Plato, imitative poetry (Republic, 
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603c4-9) ‘portrays men engaged in involuntary or voluntary actions, and as a 
result of their action believing that they have succeeded or failed, and either 
grieving or rejoicing in all these circumstances’ (trans. Halliwell, 1988). In the 
Poetics Aristotle applies this definition to tragedy unquestioned (1449b36-
1450a3):  
 
Since tragedy is a representation [mimēsis] of an action, and is enacted 
by agents, who must be characterized in both their character and their 
thought (for it is through these that we can also judge the qualities of 
their actions, and it is in their actions that all men either succeed or fail).  
(trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
As I discussed above, in the restricted meaning mimēsis stands for 
impersonation of a character in the dramatic form. More specifically, both Plato 
and Aristotle clarify that it refers to the impersonation of a character in action, 
whether such action is voluntary or not. Despite remaining influenced by the 
large semantic field of the word, in the Poetics Aristotle ultimately veers towards 
equating mimēsis with the impersonation of a dramatic role (Halliwell, 1986). 
 
Whilst mimēsis refers to the activity of the artist, and especially of the actor, it is 
by no means confined to be a specialist skill; on the contrary, it is considered to 
be characteristic of human innate behaviour. According to Aristotle the peculiar 
character of artistic creativity, grounded as it is in mimēsis, derives from two 
natural causes: that man has got a natural propensity to mimēsis, expressed 
since childhood, and which facilitates his first steps in understanding; and that 
mimēsis is a universal source of pleasure for human beings.  
 
Poetry in general can be seen to owe its existence to two causes, and 
these are rooted in nature. First, there is man’s natural propensity, from 
childhood onwards, to engage in mimetic activity (and this distinguishes 
man from other creatures, that he is thoroughly mimetic and through 
mimesis takes his first steps in understanding). Second, there is the 
pleasure which all men take in mimetic objects. 
(1448b4-10, trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
Plato remarks on a related point, when in Republic III (395d1-3) he gets 
Socrates to ask: ‘Or haven’t you noticed that imitations, if they are practised 
much past youth, get established in the habits and nature of body, tones of 
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voice, and mind?’ (trans. Reeve, 2004). Here mimēsis is thought to be a natural 
predisposition that is responsible for acquired habits. The transformation of 
what is innate into what is acquired depends on the possibility to either foster or 
hinder the former in order to shape the latter. As the argument in Republic III 
goes (396a5-e2), this should be precisely the call of a proper education, which 
will foster good habits through the mimēsis of good models and hinder bad 
habits through the abolition of mimēsis of bad models. 
 
Both Plato and Aristotle recognize an intimate link between mimēsis and 
pleasure. A passage in the Poetics (1448b9-13) underlies the ability of artistic 
representation to attach an experience of pleasure to things that we would find 
painful to look at in their actual form, such as unattractive animals or cadavers. 
Similarly, in the Republic X Plato speaks of the compelling enjoyment which 
tragic mimēsis provides to its audience, inescapable even by the most virtuous 
philosophers (605c10-605d5): 
 
When even the best of us hear Homer, or some other tragic poet, 
imitating [mimoumenou] one of the heroes in a state of grief and making 
a long speech of lamentation, or even chanting and beating his breast, 
you know we enjoy it and give ourselves over to it. We suffer along with 
the hero and take his sufferings seriously. And we praise the one who 
affects us most in this way as a good poet. 
(trans. Reeve, 2004) 
 
A propensity to dramatic enactments is recognized as natural and innate, and 
part of human development. Even more significantly, it is considered the 
earliest form of meaning-making in human beings. Moreover, there is 
recognition that such enactment is a source of pleasure, so much so that it is 
difficult to subtract oneself from its allure. The attribute of being innate and the 
intimate link with pleasure seem, by implication, to grant mimēsis a certain 
compelling quality. Such quality will lead the two Ancient philosophers to 
opposite conclusions with regard to the ethical value of mimēsis.  
 
Both Aristotle and Plato are interested in the debate about the ethical qualities 
of mimēsis, although for Plato these considerations are imperative while 
Aristotle places pleasure above moral instruction as the chief aim of poetry 
(Butcher, 1951). Nevertheless moral considerations enter into the Poetics and 
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their subordination to pleasure may be more suggestive of a particular belief 
about the way theatre affects moral improvement, than of a disregard for its 
relevance to the effect of tragedy. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 6. 
 
As I have briefly anticipated above, in Republic III Plato distinguishes mimēsis 
on the basis of the objects that it sets out to represent, and proposes that it 
should be fostered for the good models but hindered for the bad ones (396c5-
e2). Yet in Republic X he proceeds to condemn mimēsis at all levels, regardless 
of whether the models it portrays are good or bad. Here mimēsis is described 
as a most dangerous impediment to the education of citizens, and it justifies the 
total banning of poets from the ideal city. Tragic mimēsis, which induces the 
audience to partake in the hero’s grief, is seen as particularly dangerous and 
irrational, taking us far from virtue and the Truth (Republic, 604d-e). 
 
In the Republic, through Socrates’ voice, Plato gives three justifications for the 
condemnation of mimēsis. At an ontological level, he engages in a long 
exposition (600e4-602c3) which aims at showing how the mimetic objects are 
twice removed from the Truth (602c1-3) and hence of limited value to the ideal 
city. At a psychological level, he maintains that mimetic poetry promotes a 
resonance in the audience with feelings that belong to the irrational character to 
the detriment of reason (604e1-5):  
 
Now, this element – the one that gets irritated – admits of much complex 
imitation; whereas the wise and quiet character, which always remains 
pretty much selfsame, is neither easy to imitate nor easy to understand 
when imitated - especially not at a festival where multifarious people are 
gathered together in theaters. For the experience being imitated is alien 
to them. 
(trans. Reeve, 2004)  
 
The poets, interested in pleasing their audience, will naturally choose to 
represent the irrational (605a2-6). Finally, on the moral plane, it is the tight link 
between mimēsis and pleasure which causes Socrates to bring the harshest 
charge (Republic, 605c6-8): ‘But we haven’t yet brought our chief charge 
against imitation [mimēsis]. For its power to corrupt all but a very few good 
people is surely an altogether terrible one’ (trans. Reeve, 2004). Because of the 
compelling nature of mimēsis, which enchants even the best citizens into giving 
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in to an irrational pleasure taken at the expense of reason, Plato ends up 
suggesting its global censure.  
 
The Platonic overarching condemnation of mimēsis creates a precedent that 
cannot be ignored. Aristotle contradicts it by arguing that the link between 
pleasure and mimēsis constitutes one of the pillars on which the much-
celebrated art of the poet stands, in no way alienating us from the truth. As he 
had explained in the Politics, the pleasurable or painful emotions experienced at 
the view of the representation is akin to feelings that might arise in 
consequence of the view of their corresponding real object, rather providing a 
faithful surrogate for truth itself (1340a23-28): ‘Someone who is accustomed to 
feeling pain and pleasure in things that are likenesses is close to someone who 
reacts in the same manner to true things’ (trans. Kraut, 1997). 
 
In the last section of the Poetics (1461b26-62b15), Aristotle discusses the merit 
of tragedy as compared to that of epic poetry. Initially, he admits that if he were 
to judge the value of poetic genres on the basis of its spectators, tragedy would 
indeed be found to be the most vulgar. However, he refutes such criteria and 
attributes the vulgar effects of tragic performances to the clumsy attitudes of the 
actors.  
 
The whole tragic art, then, is to epic poetry what these later actors were 
compared to their predecessors, since according to this view, epic 
appeals to a cultivated audience which has no need of actor's poses, 
while tragedy appeals to a lower class. If then it is vulgar, it must 
obviously be inferior. First of all, this is not a criticism of poetry but of 
acting: even in reciting a minstrel can overdo his gestures, as Sosistratus 
did, or in a singing competition, like Mnasitheus of Opus.  
(1461b33-62a8, trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
 
Aristotle’s assertion that actors may spoil the performance of any poetry, 
including epic recitations, does not need to imply an overarching condemnation 
of acting. The history of theatre does not lack practitioners who set off to reform 
acting departing from a condemnation of the form it has taken. My discussion in 
Chapter 3 of theories of acting in the eighteenth century will provide many 
examples. 
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Aristotle then proceeds to list a number of technical reasons why tragedy is 
superior to epics, including its more condensed and unitary plot (1462b1-7). 
Finally, its higher value is also decreed by its superiority in attaining its aim 
(1462b12-15), which is to effect the katharsis of pity and fear, as long as these 
emotions have been aroused through mimēsis. Because a work of art cannot 
be separated from its effects on its recipients, effects which constitute its 
intrinsic quality (Butcher, 1951), the greatest merit of mimēsis is indeed to 
enable katharsis.  
 
Pity and fear 
 
Pity and fear are the two emotions which are central and exclusive to Aristotle’s 
definition of tragic katharsis. While the association of katharsis with tragedy was 
most likely Aristotle’s original idea, the notion that pity and fear were central to 
the reception of serious poetry, including tragedy, was well established in 
ancient Greece, long before the Poetics (Halliwell, 2002, pp.218-219). 
 
Aristotle does not discuss pity and fear anywhere in the Poetics, but their 
description is to be found in the second book of the Rhetoric, where he 
discusses a wide range of human emotions. In the section dedicated to it, fear 
[phobos] is described as ‘a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some 
destructive or painful evil in the future […] only if they appear not remote but so 
near as to be imminent’ (1382a21-26, trans. Roberts, 1954). Fear is about 
oneself, as Aristotle states: ‘fear is felt by those who believe something to be 
likely to happen to them’ (1382b34, trans. Roberts, 1954). In a later paragraph 
of the Rhetoric, pity [eleos] is defined as a ‘feeling of pain caused by the sight of 
some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and 
which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover 
to befall us soon’ (1385b13-16, trans. Roberts, 1954). Pity, differently from fear, 
is felt about someone else, as long as the situation presents enough similarities 
to one’s own conditions that one can imagine the same event might happen to 
him. Yet Aristotle specifies that when we witness a harmful event occurring to 
someone who is very close to us, such as one’s son, fear rather than pity 
ensues:  
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The people we pity are: those whom we know, if only they are not very 
closely related to us – in that case we feel about them as if we were in 
danger ourselves. For this reason Amasis did not weep, they say, at the 
sight of his son being led to death, but did weep when he saw his friend 
begging: the latter sight was pitiful, the former terrible, and the terrible is 
different from the pitiful.  
(1386a17-24, trans. Roberts, 1954) 
 
As has been shown, there is a strict correlation between pity and fear and it is 
only when considering their reciprocity that Aristotle’s notion of the effect of 
tragedy can be understood (Butcher, 1951). There are important similarities and 
differences between these two emotions. They both are forms of suffering in 
relation to some painful event, but while fear is aroused by the imagination of a 
personal direct involvement in a painful experience, pity is aroused by the vision 
of a painful experience happening to someone else. Importantly, Aristotle is 
quite specific in determining who this other person should be for pity to be 
aroused: close enough to our representation of the self, that one can imagine 
the same painful event could well be happening to him, but not too close to 
one’s heart, like for instance one’s son, in which case fear rather than pity 
ensues. There is an emphasis here on ‘a rather delicate balance between 
psychological involvement and distance’ (Halliwell, 2002, p.215) that needs to 
take place in pity. I will discuss in the last section of the chapter why this 
emphasis is crucial to the understanding of tragic katharsis. 
 
FREUD’S THEORIES OF THE CATHARTIC METHOD AND THE TRANSFERENCE 
 
The cathartic method 
 
In 1895, a relatively unknown Viennese neurologist, Sigmund Freud, and his 
colleague Joseph Breuer, published Studies on Hysteria, a book which was 
later to become the foundation text of psychoanalysis, and a seminal work in its 
own right (Freud & Breuer, 1895). The book endeavoured to set forth a new 
scientific theory of hysteria, and for the first time, a clinical method to cure its 
symptoms.  
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Freud and Breuer proposed that each hysterical symptom originates in a 
psychical trauma. The trauma originally provoked an emotional response (for 
example disgust or anger) that for certain reasons could not be expressed at 
the time. Hence this emotional response was ‘repressed’, i.e. retained within the 
patient’s unconscious psyche but lost to her awareness. The repressed affect 
(or strangulated, to use Freud’s vivid metaphor) found a disguised way of 
expression through the body, in which it became a hysterical symptom (a 
paralysis, a spasm, the inability to speak, or any other).  
 
Interlinked to the theory of the origin and meaning of hysterical symptoms was 
the discovery of how they could be cured. If it was a strangulated affect that 
caused the hysterical symptom in the first place, might the patient be liberated 
from the symptom if she eventually succeeded in giving expression to the 
affect? And how could this be obtained, given that the emotional response had 
at first been successfully repressed at the expense of the patient’s health? 
Breuer discovered that through hypnosis, presumably because of the partly 
unconscious state that it produces, the patient could be induced to represent in 
her mind the original trauma and to re-experience it in its full emotional power. If 
under hypnosis the patient succeeded in expressing the repressed emotions, 
awakening from it she would be symptom-free. As Freud puts it:  
 
For we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysterical 
symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had 
succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it 
was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and when the 
patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had 
put the affect into words. 
(Freud & Breuer, 1895, p.6) 
 
In the detailed exposition of several case studies, Freud and Breuer gave 
numerous clinical examples of such curative process. For the purpose of 
clarification, I will illustrate one example taken from the case study of Anna O., 
the first patient to enter the history of psychoanalysis (Freud & Breuer, 1895). 
Anna was a young woman who had developed a plethora of hysterical 
symptoms around and following the death of her father, whom she had 
devotedly nursed for many months. One example of these was hydrophobia, a 
terror of drinking which resulted in Anna’s refusal to drink any liquid. This had 
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been so debilitating that she suffered a tormenting thirst and could only take 
fluids by eating large amounts of fruit. The theory went that, if Anna could bring 
to her mind the original trauma and give expression to the repressed affect, she 
would be able to abreact the feeling(s) associated with the trauma and hence 
be cured of the symptom. In fact, under hypnosis Anna recounted with disgust 
that once she had seen her English maid let her dog drink from a glass. 
Inhibited by the duties of politeness, Anna had repressed her feelings and not 
said anything. Under hypnosis, however, she could express the disgust and 
rage that she had then felt towards her maid. Giving expression to these 
feelings meant abreacting them, hence, freed from the strangulated affects, she 
asked for a glass of water, drank profusely and woke up from the hypnotic state 
with the glass at her lips. The symptom had been cured.13 
 
Breuer and Freud called this treatment the cathartic method, most likely 
because they were directly aware of Bernays’s interpretation of Aristotelian 
katharsis, but anyway in line with their contemporaries’ understanding of the 
Aristotelian theory of the effects of tragedy. Incidentally, we know that Freud 
was aware of Aristotle’s theory at least as early as 1905 and that he translated 
katharsis as purging. In the opening paragraph of his introduction to 
Psychopathic Characters on the Stage (Freud, 1906), he writes:  
 
If, as has been assumed since the time of Aristotle, the purpose of drama 
is to arouse ‘terror and pity’ and so ‘to purge the emotions’ [...] the prime 
factor is unquestionably the process of getting rid of one's own emotions 
by ‘blowing off steam’.  
(Freud, 1906, p.305) 
 
In this passage he is clearly translating katharsis with purging. Like Brecht, 
‘Reinigung’ is the German word he employs.  
 
 
 
 
                                                       
13 At this very early stage of psychoanalysis, the Oedipus complex had yet to be discovered. 
Hence, although it might be reasonably hypothesized that the development of hysteria in Anna 
O. is linked to her unresolved Oedipus Complex for her dying father, and the anxieties and 
conflicts that this would imply, Freud and Breuer’s present theory does not contemplate this 
occurrence. 
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The discovery of transference 
 
At the point of publishing Studies on Hysteria (Freud & Breuer, 1895), Freud 
was already dissatisfied with some aspects of the cathartic method. Part of his 
dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that he found hypnosis short of his 
expectations to bring people to the arousal and expression of their repressed 
affects. But this is not the whole story. Not yet aware of the significance of his 
observations, he was also discovering transference.  
 
It is precisely in the last chapter of Studies on Hysteria (Freud & Breuer, 1895) 
dedicated to ‘The Psychotherapy of Hysteria’ that transference gets its first 
mention. At this point Freud considered transference to be a mere impediment 
to treatment and he was certainly not aware of the weight that this discovery 
would carry for his future theory and practice. It took Freud another fifteen years 
and a number of detours in his speculations, to eventually postulate that the 
analysis of transference is the principal factor involved in the therapeutic action 
of psychoanalysis. In Freud’s own words: ‘Transference, which seems ordained 
to be the greatest obstacle to psycho-analysis, becomes its most powerful ally’ 
(Freud, 1905, p.117). 
 
Freud defined transference as a new version of impulses and fantasies that 
have been awakened in the patient and brought to her awareness by the 
analytic process; their peculiar characteristic being that they replace some 
person who was familiar to the patient, with the person of the analyst (Freud, 
1905). The repressed emotion which is being expressed is not an original 
emotion directed towards the therapist, but instead a reproduction of an 
emotion once directed towards a significant person in the patient’s life. The 
critical difference with the cathartic method is that the representation and 
expression of the repressed emotion is here achieved not in the mind of the 
patient, but in a communicative re-enactment with the therapist.  
 
Freud gave a significant example of his discovery of the transference as an 
important therapeutic tool in the famous case study of the Rat Man (Freud, 
1909b). The Rat Man was a young man so nicknamed after one of his most 
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characteristic obsessional thoughts: that his deceased father might suffer a 
horrid torture implying live rats being made to enter the anus of the victim. This 
obsession was the more horrifying, as it seemed to imply an unconscious fancy 
of sadistic quality, which contrasted with the Rat Man’s affectionate and 
devoted feelings for his father. These were the only feelings he could recognize 
in himself ever to have felt towards his parent.  
 
In the course of therapy, an episode belonging to the Rat Man’s childhood was 
unveiled. His mother had told the Rat Man that when he was about 3 years old 
he had been beaten by his father for having bit someone. To this he had 
rebelled so furiously, hurling insulting words at his assailant, that his father had 
stopped in astonishment and declared: ‘The child will either be a great man or a 
great criminal!’ (Freud, 1909b, p.265). The Rat Man had no personal 
recollection of such a memorable story. Not doubting the truth of his mother’s 
words, he superficially conceded to Freud that this early scene bore some 
evidence of anger and revenge towards his father. Nevertheless his 
estrangement from any hostile feelings remained unshakeable, until when, and 
only when, these feelings eventually emerged in the transference. 
 
Some time after the memory was reported in analysis, insults towards Freud 
and his family made their appearance in the Rat Man’s associations, alongside 
impulses to punch Freud during the sessions, impulses that compelled the 
patient to walk around the room in an attempt to keep them at bay. The Rat 
Man was ashamed as he could not establish what might be the reason for his 
overbearing hostility towards his analyst. Prepared by observations that he had 
conducted with other patients, but not taken yet to their full consequences, 
Freud attributed this apparent nonsense to the transference. According to his 
new theoretical view of the transference, the Rat Man’s hostile feelings for 
Freud were the representation of the long buried hostility for his father. The 
transference was the necessary medium for the re-experiencing of affects 
otherwise inaccessible, because only the actual re-experiencing of the hostile 
feelings could defeat the Rat Man’s estrangement from them.  
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The Rat Man’s experience of hostility for Freud in the transference was the 
necessary premise to his ability to acknowledge the repressed hostility for his 
father. Brought to his awareness from the recesses of his unconscious, such 
powerful emotion could be recognized as belonging to the forgotten past. The 
analytic work hence allowed, firstly, the arousal of the feelings themselves in 
the transference re-enactment, and, secondly, the recognition that they 
belonged to the Rat Man’s past significant relationship with his father. Through 
this process, the feelings were finally deprived of their despotic power on the 
mind and the Rat Man could at last walk away freed of his horrific obsessions. 
The psychoanalytic treatment had proved successful. 
 
Transference re-enactment and transference analysis 
 
According to Freud, the merit of the transference is to allow the representation 
of an emotion which would otherwise remain repressed and manifest itself as a 
symptom impinging on the patient’s health (Freud, 1912a). Here Freud does not 
speak any longer purely of hysterical symptoms, but of any kind of symptoms, 
for example an obsession in the case of the Rat Man.  
 
Freud understands this representation as a re-enactment: ‘the patient does not 
remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He 
reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of 
course, knowing that he is repeating it’ (Freud, 1914, p.150). This re-enactment 
of repressed emotions (for example the anger for the father in the Rat Man’s 
case) is compelling and while it may get activated in any current situation which 
the patient finds himself in, it becomes particularly prominent in the course of 
the analytic treatment. 
 
As long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape from this 
compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way 
of remembering. [...] We must be prepared to find, therefore, that the 
patient yields to the compulsion to repeat [...] not only in his personal 
attitude to his doctor but also in every other activity and relationship 
which may occupy his life at the time.  
(Freud. 1914, pp.150-151) 
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But for the scope of the successful outcome of the analytic treatment, the 
transference as means of representation and expression of the repressed, has 
only accomplished half of its task, and a dangerous albeit necessary half. It is in 
the response of the analyst to the re-enactment that lies the crucial outcome of 
the transference cure.  
 
In a paper dedicated to the erotic transference and its management (Freud, 
1915a), Freud warned against two equally detrimental and opposite tactics in 
which the analyst might respond to the transference: inviting the patient to 
repress her erotic longings for the analyst, or giving in to the temptation of 
satisfying them. It is in the transference that the patient mostly looks for 
surrogate satisfaction of her repressed desires and it is on this ground that the 
physician must leave her ‘with unfulfilled wishes in abundance’ (Freud, 1919, 
p.164). 
 
Especially the risk of responding by what in psychoanalytic jargon has become 
known as ‘acting in’ on the part of the analyst represents the greatest hindrance 
for the progress of analysis. Again on the specific case of erotic transference, 
Freud writes:  
 
If the patient’s advances were returned it would be a great triumph for 
her, but a complete defeat for the treatment. She would have succeeded 
in what all patients strive for in analysis – she would have succeeded in 
acting out, in repeating in real life, what she ought only to have 
remembered, to have reproduced as psychical material and to have kept 
within the sphere of psychical events.  
(Freud, 1915a, p.166) 
 
Although Freud is here specifically talking about erotic transference, these 
reflections can be generalized to all transference situations. 
 
In order for the re-enactment in the transference to effect a curative process, 
the analyst needs to engage in  
 
a perpetual struggle with his patient to keep in the psychical sphere all 
the impulses which the patient would like to direct into the motor sphere; 
and he celebrates it as a triumph for the treatment if he can bring it about 
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that something that the patient wishes to discharge in action is disposed 
of through the work of remembering. 
(Freud, 1914, p.153) 
 
By avoiding ‘acting in’, the analyst allows the patient to recognize that the 
repressed affect belonged to a past relationship between him and another 
person: ‘We soon perceive that the transference is itself only a piece of 
repetition, and that the repetition is a transference of the forgotten past’ (Freud, 
1914, p.151). It is such recognition, given through an analytic interpretation, 
which creates a healthy distance to be put between the emotion itself and the 
patient today.  
 
The transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness 
and real life through which the transition from the one to the other is 
made. [...] From the repetitive reactions which are exhibited in the 
transference we are led along the familiar paths to the awakening of the 
memories which appear without difficulty, as it were, after the resistance 
has been overcome. 
 (Freud, 1914, pp.154-155) 
 
I would like to exemplify the two facets of the transference by reflecting on the 
example of the Rat Man’s obsession (Freud, 1909b). When the Rat Man started 
to hint at his aggressive impulses towards Freud, he was encountering the re-
enactment phase of the transference, the one in which he was finally re-
experiencing a long-repressed affect (anger and aggression). If Freud had 
chosen to ignore these hints, or dismiss them as senseless, he would have 
allied himself with the repressing forces. If Freud had instead been frightened or 
critical of them, he would have ‘acted in’, repeating the original response that 
the Rat Man’s father had given to the Rat Man’s anger (when he stopped 
beating the child and predicted he might be a genius or a criminal, showing a 
mixture of astonishment and concern about his son’s strong, angry feelings). In 
both these cases, the re-expression of feelings would have likely led to the 
reinforcement of their repression.  
 
Instead, by recognizing the feelings as part of the transference, the analyst can 
foster awareness of them in the patient. Ultimately, through the tool of 
interpretation, the analyst formulates and communicates to the patient his 
recognition of the feelings as part of the transference and their attribution to 
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their original situation. By doing so, he is hoping to make conscious what was 
unconscious, hence working against repression. When repression is eventually 
overcome, the patient is freed from the symptom that represented the disguised 
expression of the repressed emotions.  
 
This final outcome remains similar to the one that Freud had theorized for the 
cathartic method; however not only has the technique changed, but also the 
related theory. In the cathartic method it was the discharge from the mind of 
aroused affects which was taken as the curative factor: here the emotions were 
presumed to be removed from the mind. In the transference it is the 
reattribution of the aroused affects to a past relationship which cures through an 
elaboration of meaning that allows the patient to take a view on his emotions 
from a distance wherein he can reflect on them as signifying a part of his history 
and re-evaluate their validity for the here and now. Here the emotions are 
presumed to be processed within the mind.  
 
Repetition-compulsion – beyond the pleasure principle 
 
In a seminal paper with the suggestive title Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(Freud, 1920) Freud turns to explore the significance of the compulsion to 
repeat, seen in the re-enactment phase of transference. He explains that he 
has also encountered this phenomenon in the way trauma is represented in 
patients’ dreams over and over again, and in some instances of children’s play. 
What Freud sets out to understand is why it appears that the repetition-
compulsion associated with a traumatic experience takes precedence over the 
re-enactment of its pleasurable resolution. The importance of this question lies 
in the fact that it challenges the idea Freud held up to this point that the 
fundamentals of psychic life are organized by the pleasure and the reality 
principles, and that both of them, either directly or indirectly, have as their final 
aim the reaching of a state of pleasure (Freud, 1911b).  
 
In order to illustrate his point, Freud gives a detailed observation of a game that 
his grandson has been engaging with at the age of one and half (Freud, 1920). 
The little boy, who was very obedient and showed little protest at times when 
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his mother would leave him for a few hours, had a habit of throwing objects into 
a corner of his room, while vocalising a long-drawn-out ‘o-o-o-o’ which Freud 
could establish stood for the German word ‘fort’, which means ‘gone’. The child 
used to repeat this game untiringly, and without displaying any evident pleasure 
in it. However at times, but much less frequently, he also played a variant of the 
game, when a reel attached to a string was first thrown out of sight, coupled 
with the expressive ‘o-o-o-o’, but subsequently pulled back to its reappearance, 
which was accompanied instead by a joyful ‘da’ [there].  
 
Freud interprets the game as a re-enactment of the little boy’s feelings about his 
mother leaving him. While the boy refrains from protesting at his beloved 
mother’s leaving him behind, he stages her disappearance over and over by 
representing it with the throwing away of the objects. Interestingly, while this act 
of disappearance is staged relentlessly, the second act of making the object 
return is only rarely performed, despite being evidently the pleasurable part of 
the game and despite it representing what would seem to be the most desirable 
aim, the mother’s return. 
 
If one cannot maintain that the act of throwing away the object is acted out by 
the child as a preliminary to the enactment of the joyful satisfaction of getting it 
back, which alternative explanation can be given and how does it fit with the 
supremacy of the pleasure principle in Freud’s theory of the psyche? Freud 
eventually comes to the conclusion (corroborated by a number of other 
observations) that there must be a principle of psychic functioning which lies 
‘beyond the pleasure principle’ (Freud, 1920). In Freud’s words:  
 
one gets an impression that the child turned his experience into a game 
for another motive. At the outset he was in a passive situation – he was 
overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable 
though it was, as a game, he took on an active part. These efforts might 
be put down to an instinct for mastery that was acting independently of 
whether the memory was in itself pleasurable or not. 
(Freud, 1920, p.16)  
 
Freud’s conclusion is that beyond the pleasure principle, at a more fundamental 
level, the psyche engages in repetition-compulsion to create bedrock for the 
pleasure principle, and only when the task of the repetition-compulsion has 
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been achieved, can the pleasure principle become the regulator of psychic 
process.  
 
The repetition-compulsion which manifests itself in the transference re-
enactment turns out to be the most fundamental phenomenon of psychic life. In 
reference to children’s play, Freud states that the centrality of such 
phenomenon implies that ‘that there is no need to assume the existence of a 
special imitative instinct in order to provide a motive for play’ (Freud, 1920, 
p.17). In other words, if from a popular view, the motive of play may have been 
seen as imitation, from Freud’s new perspective it may be regarded as the 
instinct for mastery of psychic pain through repetition-compulsion.  
 
AN INTERPRETATION OF TRAGIC KATHARSIS AS TRANSFERENCE DYNAMIC 
 
Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis is the most ancient and debated theory of 
the effect of the theatrical experience on the audience and it affirms that 
mimēsis (or representation) of the heroic actions in tragedy arouses fear and 
pity in the spectators and effects their katharsis (Poetics, 1449b24-28). 
Although we are forever intrigued by it, we cannot know for sure what Aristotle 
meant by tragedy effecting the katharsis of pity and fear, leaving this mysterious 
expression as an inexhaustible source of inspiration to new discoveries.  
 
It is perhaps because katharsis talks about the way our mind deals with 
emotions and aims at explaining ‘the relationship between the soul and the 
body’ (Fabbri, 2000) that the introduction of the concept of katharsis from the 
realm of medicine to that of poetics operated by Aristotle (Jauss, 1982, p.25) 
has ignited our imagination for more than two thousand years. When Freud and 
Breuer used the term ‘cathartic method’ (Freud & Breuer, 1895) to describe 
their new cure of hysterical symptoms, they borrowed the term katharsis from 
Aristotle’s Poetics or rather from the ample referencing that the term had long 
enjoyed. After it resided for many centuries in literary theory, Freud and Breuer 
returned the concept of katharsis back to medicine. 
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My historical description of Freud’s journey, from the cathartic method to the 
transference, hints at Freud’s struggle with the question of how a therapeutic 
technique can help our psyche process emotions: does psychoanalysis act as a 
purging effect (the cathartic cure) by releasing entangled emotions or, in a more 
complex but also finer way, does it promote working through the meaning of 
emotions causing our minds to shift from a compelling, irrational and 
unconscious stance to a reflective and conscious one? It is of course the 
second explanation which will be gradually unveiled and brought to the fore by 
the theory of transference. The parallel here with the debate around the 
Aristotelian meaning of katharsis is plain. 
 
I will hereby suggest an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis 
based on Freud’s theory of transference, as a way into understanding 
unconscious aspects of theatre spectatorship. In order to show how Freud’s 
development of the theory of the cathartic cure into the theory of transference 
can contribute to our understanding of Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis, I will 
start by suggesting that there are a number of parallel features between the two 
phenomena.  
 
A comparison between tragic katharsis and transference 
 
Aristotle maintains that katharsis is possible only after the emotions of fear and 
pity have been aroused in the spectator by mimēsis. Although mimēsis is a 
complex concept, in the Poetics Aristotle mainly refers to it as meaning dramatic 
enactment (Halliwell, 2002). This is a first point of correspondence with the 
transference phenomenon: mimēsis intended as dramatic enactment functions 
for the spectator like re-enactment in the transference functions for the patient, 
in as far as both katharsis and the analysis of transference are possible only 
following the arousal of emotions through mimēsis or transference re-
enactments respectively. 
 
Moreover, the relation between mimēsis and transference re-enactment runs 
even deeper in as far as it is through an action that both processes allow 
emotions to be experienced, or more precisely through a surrogate action. In 
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the case of theatre reception, the surrogate action is the representation of the 
tragic actions by the performers, while, in the case of transference, it is the 
patient’s re-enactment with the analyst. 
 
Now, according to Freud, transference re-enactments are forms of repetition-
compulsion and repetition-compulsion allows for representation of repressed 
emotions in action. In the example of the young child throwing away the cotton 
reel over and over again, this surrogate action is performed to represent the 
painful experience of his mother leaving him (Freud, 1920).  In the transference, 
the surrogate action consists of the re-enactment of an emotional dynamic 
between patient and analyst, like the expressions of anger that the Rat Man 
enacted towards Freud (Freud, 1909b). Such a phenomenon is the departing 
point of analysis, what enables the repressed emotions to be aroused so that 
they can be subject to the analytic work. Like mimēsis enables katharsis, so 
transference re-enactments enable psychoanalysis. 
 
Both mimēsis and transference re-enactments (intended as a form of repetition-
compulsion) are fundamental phenomena of psychic life and have an intimate 
link with pleasure. According to both Aristotle and Plato, mimēsis is an innate 
principle of psychic development. Aristotle attributes to it the ability to facilitate a 
child’s first steps in understanding, while Plato identifies it as the natural 
predisposition to the formation of habits. Freud believed that repetition-
compulsion is an innate psychic process which gets activated each time that a 
repressed emotional experience needs to be made sense of, and in this way it 
equates, in psychoanalysis, to the birth of any understanding. In as far as 
repetition-compulsion is at the basis of unconscious representations of 
emotional dynamics (for example the Rat Man’s anger for his father), it also 
represents the matrix of psychological ‘habits’, for example the tendency of a 
man like the Rat Man to re-enact anger towards surrogate figures who come to 
represent his father, like Freud in the transference or other significant people in 
his present life. Freud’s case study talks of the Rat Man’s unjustified aggressive 
fantasies towards his fiancée as a further symptom of his repressed emotions. 
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Both Plato and Aristotle recognize an intimate link between mimēsis and 
pleasure. For Plato, mimēsis has a compelling quality, the paradigmatic 
example being the virtuous philosopher giving himself over to the enjoyment of 
tragic representations of grief, even if rationally he recognizes them as 
inappropriate or undesirable. Here the parallel with repetition-compulsion is in 
the compelling quality of the arousal of emotions, which, despite appearing 
irrational, can take over even the most rational mind. Although mimēsis does 
not need to be identified solely with the irrational, as it is the case for the 
obligatory association between repetition-compulsion and the unconscious, 
Plato is clearly inclined to link mimēsis with lack of reason, one of the main 
motives for its condemnation.  
 
For Aristotle, the link between mimēsis and pleasure is proved by the attraction 
which mimetic objects, by which he means works of art, exert on all human 
beings. He further specifies that the surrogate nature of mimēsis, as realized in 
all art, including but not limited to tragedy, allows us to feel pleasure in 
situations when looking at the real objects in their actual form, such as 
unattractive animals or cadavers, would prove painful.  
 
The link between repetition-compulsion and pleasure, a complex one, reveals 
some correspondence with Aristotle’s insights into mimēsis. Freud’s first 
thorough model of the mind postulated the pleasure principle as the basic 
principle of psychic life (Freud, 1911b). However, Freud later found out that 
what he had imagined to be the ultimate drive of any human psychic activity, i.e. 
the search for pleasure, gets outclassed by the psychic mechanism of 
repetition-compulsion, which dictates psychic functioning ‘beyond the pleasure 
principle’ (Freud, 1920). In the psychoanalytic experience of the Rat Man, the 
child’s murderous anger towards his father, memorable for the family history but 
personally forgotten by its protagonist because intolerably painful, is compelled 
to get re-expressed in the Rat Man’s adult obsessions (Freud, 1909b). The Rat 
Man’s childhood experience of his father’s beating evoked powerful feelings of 
anger and a thirst for revenge, a desire of putting his father in the position of 
being the victim. His obsession of rats entering his father’s anus is the 
representation of an action in which the Rat Man, with sadistic pleasure, 
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witnesses (or rather engineers in unconscious fantasy) the victimisation of his 
father. Repressed emotions are so powerful that they beguile the unconscious 
mind into an incessant repetition where pleasure and displeasure are interlinked 
and the mastering of pain is equated to a fundamental experience of pleasure.   
 
In his first formulation of the theory of repetition-compulsion (Freud, 1920), while 
discussing its links with the pleasure principle, Freud inserted a short reflection 
hinting at the implications of his new theory for the understanding of theatre 
reception.  
 
Finally, a reminder may be added that the artistic play and artistic 
imitation carried out by adults, which, unlike children’s, are aimed at an 
audience, do not spare the spectators (for instance, in tragedy) the most 
painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as highly enjoyable. This 
is convincing proof that [...] there are ways and means enough of making 
what is in itself unpleasurable into a subject to be recollected and worked 
over in the mind. 
(Freud, 1920, p.17) 
 
In this passage Freud comes closest to affirming that the principle of repetition-
compulsion lies at the basis of the value of spectatorship. However, he does not 
further elaborate on this point, and instead he calls for a new system of 
aesthetics that would account for his new discoveries. 
 
The link that both mimēsis and re-enactment have with pleasure poses the 
question, in the classical debate as well as in Freud, of their ethical value. 
Earlier I have illustrated the controversy between Plato and Aristotle: mimēsis 
can be seen as dangerous (Plato) in as far as it promotes in the audience the 
arousal of feelings which belong to the irrational character to the detriment of 
reason; but it is a precious and valuable process (Aristotle) in as far as it allows 
the arousal of truthful emotions and it constitutes the basis for katharsis. For 
Freud the value of re-enactment as a surrogate of a repressed emotional 
experience consists in putting unconscious unprocessed material at the 
disposal of analysis, which, if conducted properly, will lead to the proposition 
‘Where id was, there ego shall be’, psychoanalysis being ‘a work of culture’ 
(Freud, 1933, p.80). Yet any re-enactment, being a surrogate of a true 
experience, is both truthful and deceitful. It is a self-deceit in as far as the 
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hysterical patient believes herself to be in love with her analyst or the Rat Man 
believes himself angry with Freud. If such re-enactments, with their compelling 
quality, manage to find an actualization without being subject to the analytic 
work, they represent dangerous distortions of the truth which lead to the 
replication of a past trauma. Instead, if they come to be helpfully seized as 
bedrock for the analytic work, they represent the golden road to the Truth. 
  
Tragic katharsis as transference dynamic 
 
If we accept that the dynamic within transference between re-enactment and 
analysis can be a useful parallel to the dynamic between mimēsis and 
katharsis, I am now turning to look at how this parallel can help answer the 
question of what katharsis means – purgation or perfection? – and hence what 
might the effect of the theatrical experience be on the spectator’s emotions. 
 
Here it is useful to return to the other central point for the interpretation of 
Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis: the specific reference to the emotions of 
pity and fear, which are exclusive to the definition of tragic katharsis. According 
to Aristotle, both these emotions are forms of suffering but, while fear is self-
referential, pity implies suffering for someone similar enough to oneself, that 
one could imagine being this other person, but not so close to one’s heart that 
fear instead would be aroused. There is a gap between fear and pity, which 
emphasizes the measure of one’s ‘distance’ between the self and the 
representation of another as a possible self. 
 
For the scope of my proposed interpretation of tragic katharsis, such a measure 
of distance is central to the understanding of the definition. Returning for a 
moment to reflect on transference, what determines its therapeutic effect is the 
ability to let repressed affects be aroused, and subsequently analysed. Both the 
arousal and the analysis are essential to the therapeutic process, as there 
would be no emotions available for analysis unless they were first aroused and 
experienced, but most importantly the arousal not followed by analysis would be 
anti-therapeutic. The transference re-enactment is therefore a double-edged 
sword: dangerous trigger to the repetition of traumatic experiences or unique 
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opportunity for the overcoming of compelling dynamics, which, lifted from the 
recesses of the unconscious, can be subject to reflection and understanding. It 
is the analysis of transference which puts the unconscious dynamic under the 
scrutiny of reason. Such scrutiny is based on the ability of the analyst to 
maintain a distancing and observing posture towards the re-enactment: 
interested in it enough but able to see it for what it is, a surrogate of truth. By 
interpreting the re-enacted emotion as alive in the present, but its meaning 
belonging to the patient’s past, the analyst achieves a regulation of distance 
between the patient today and his previously repressed emotion(s), allowing a 
‘working through’ from the unconscious to the conscious. 
 
Similarly, mimēsis is the dramatic enactment which facilitates the spectator’s 
emotional participation in the tragic events in full identification with the 
character(s), as if he was imagining himself personally involved in the tragic 
actions. At the same time, suggests Aristotle, tragedy also promotes a 
distancing effect between the spectator and the emotions of the tragic hero, as 
if his involvement in the painful experience is of a sympathetic witness. 
Katharsis is hence neither an immersive emotional identification with the hero 
which results in a release of tension, a sort of purgation of the emotions, nor a 
detached or rational re-elaboration of the meaning of emotions from an 
observing perspective; I argue that it is the fruitful dynamic between close 
emotional identification and sympathetic detachment which represents the 
quintessential meaning of tragic katharsis. 
 
In conclusion, what in psychoanalysis is the dynamic between a compelling re-
experiencing of powerful unconscious emotions, and the reflective distancing 
facilitated by the analyst, suggests a new interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
tragic katharsis: that one fundamental process in theatre reception may be a 
form of self-analysis in which the spectator, having identified closely with the 
character’s emotional dynamics, is led to take a meta-position with reference to 
himself, a look of sympathy which allows him to become aware of his repressed 
emotions through the representation of a character as a possible self. Reason 
can thus talk to feeling, in a relationship of mutual psychic growth, which 
overtakes the split between compulsive irrationality and a detached and 
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repressive rationality. According to this interpretation of Aristotle’s theory, 
through transference, spectatorship can be an opportunity for psychic 
integration which favours the processing of unconscious emotions, and thus it 
may leave us unsurprised why Aristotle gave tragedy such a pre-eminence 
above all poetic arts. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE ART OF THE ACTOR IN DIDEROT’S 
PARADOXE AND ITS EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY REFERENCES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I focussed on the analysis of the spectator’s theatrical 
experience with particular reference to Aristotle’s definition of tragic katharsis, 
departing from the proposition that tragedy through mimēsis effects the 
katharsis of fear and pity. I applied the psychoanalytic concept of transference 
to develop a more articulated understanding of katharsis and, by extension, of 
spectatorship. Interpreting katharsis as transference dynamic, I have illustrated 
its significance as an unconscious process during which the spectator shifts 
between the re-enactment of an emotional identification with the character(s) 
and a reflective stance which allows distancing from the re-enactment and 
generates new learning about his own unconscious.  
 
In psychoanalysis the transference dynamic happens between the patient and 
the analyst, and the analyst’s response to the patient is the crux of the 
resolution of the re-enactment into an increased ability for self-reflection. Only 
when the analyst can maintain the patient’s unconscious identification within the 
psychic sphere and render it meaningful through an interpretation, the 
submission of the patient to the compulsion to repeat will have an opportunity to 
be worked through into self-reflection and psychic development. 
 
When Brecht took issue against katharsis he interpreted this as a subjugation of 
the spectator into passive emotional identification with the character and 
disavowal of his critical distance. He also suggested that it is the actor and her 
own identification with the character that are the means through which the 
spectator’s hypnotic submission to the theatrical illusion is effected. Brecht 
typifies the essence of spectatorship as ‘a mirroring relation between actor and 
spectator’ (von Held, 2011, p.43) suggesting a tight correspondence between 
conscious and unconscious acting techniques and their conscious or 
unconscious (hypnotic, in Brecht’s terms) effects on the audience. 
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In this and the next two chapters, I intend to give in depth consideration to the 
actor’s art and her approach to interpretation, in order to shed light on her 
function as the mediator of the transference dynamic within the spectator. For 
this purpose I will focus on eighteenth-century theories of acting, and in 
particular Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le comédien (1994, pp.31-120) and those 
works which represent a direct or indirect reference to it. I will describe these 
theories within their historical context and their cross-referencing. In the next 
chapter I will formulate and analyse ‘the paradox of the actor’ in the context of 
the eighteenth-century cultural and philosophical context. In Chapter 5, I will use 
a psychoanalytic perspective to resolve the paradox of the actor and will argue 
that the art of the actor can be understood to correspond to the unconscious 
process of alpha-function. 
 
The eighteenth century, an age of reflections about acting 
 
Although theories of acting can be found across all times, the eighteenth 
century is of particular interest because, for the first time in history, the actor 
becomes a privileged object of enquiry, as opposed to the preceding standpoint 
which considered acting to fall within the sphere of rhetoric (Mazzocut-Mis, 
2010). Rhetorical theory, originated in Classical texts of Ancient Greece and 
Rome, stipulated that both the composition and declamation of a poetic or 
dramatic text required an emotional participation on the part of the author in its 
composition as well as of the orator or actor in its rendition (Vicentini, 2000, 
pp.5-6). This is paradigmatically exemplified by Aristotle’s proposition, already 
discussed in Chapter 1, that a tragic poet creates more effective work when he 
experiences in himself the emotions that he intends to portray. Talking about 
the composition of tragedy, Aristotle writes (1455a22-34):  
 
So far as possible, the poet should even include gestures in the process 
of composition: for, assuming the same natural talent, the most 
convincing effect comes from those who actually put themselves in the 
emotions; and the truest impression of distress or anger is given by the 
person who experiences these feelings.  
(Poetics, trans. Halliwell, 1987) 
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Horace’s famous passage in the Ars Poetica: ‘Si vis me flere, dolendum est 
primum ipsi tibi’ (102-103)14 is a common quotation in eighteenth-century 
treatises on the art of the actor, representing the relic of one of the mainstays of 
rhetoric. 
 
Within the boundaries of rhetorical theory, the emotional participation of the 
author and actor/orator to the emotions of the characters is necessarily 
subservient to the actor’s final expressive aim of reaching the spectator so that 
he will also feel the emotions displayed (Vicentini, 2011). While the tenet of a 
spectator who shall feel the characters’ emotions is hardly challenged in the 
eighteenth century, it is the principle of an actor who feels which is for the first 
time put into question. In fact the eighteenth century will forever undermine the 
belief in the doctrine exemplified by Horace’s quote and will represent both the 
cradle of a controversy and the springboard for a future contention. The text that 
best testifies to this transitional state is the famous Paradoxe sur le comédien 
(hereafter cited as Paradoxe). 
 
The Paradoxe by Denis Diderot was published posthumously in 1830. The 
nearly 50 years which elapsed between the death of its author and the first 
edition, symbolize the bridging nature of this work, which projects itself into the 
future to become a seminal work for nineteenth- and twentieth-century actors 
and theatre scholars (Vicentini, 2000), but through its author’s contemporary 
references, also roots itself in the theories which developed in the decades 
preceding its composition, representing the climax of a debate which travels 
across the eighteenth century and across Europe. 
 
Famously, the Paradoxe proposes a theory on the art of the actor which 
demands that a good actor should not feel the emotions of the character he 
portrays: ‘C’est l’extrême sensibilité qui fait les acteurs médiocres; c’est la 
sensibilité médiocre qui fait la multitude des mauvais acteurs; et c’est la 
manque absolu de sensibilité qui prépare les acteurs sublimes’ (Diderot, 1994, 
p.46). Diderot calls as the privileged testimonies of his assertion the essay L’art 
                                                       
14 ‘If you would have me weep, you must first feel grief yourself’ (Horace, trans. Fairclough, 
1970, p.459).	
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du théâtre, by François Riccoboni (1750), and the acting practices of David 
Garrick and Mademoiselle Clairon. On the other hand, he calls into question the 
validity of those theories or practices which he sees as privileging sensibility, 
such as the acting practices of Mademoiselle Dumesnil and Madame Riccoboni, 
and the theories of Le Comédien by Rémond de Sainte-Albine (1749) and, 
above all, of Garrick ou les Acteurs Anglois (Sticotti, 1770), the very book which 
Diderot takes issue with in the Paradoxe.  
 
In his references to the eighteenth-century debate on the art of the actor, 
Diderot sharply categorizes contributors as belonging to two strictly opposed 
camps: those like him who champion judgement and lack of sensibility as the 
basis of great acting, and those who, foolishly, plead the cause of sensibility. 
This neat contrast, which was later defined by William Archer, in his study on 
the psychology of acting, as the dispute between the emotionalist and anti-
emotionalist positions (Archer, 1888), may well serve the purpose of making 
Diderot’s argument clear and strong. However, as I hope to show, this antithesis 
does not do any justice to the complexity of the theories of the so-called 
emotionalist camp; rather, it is more truthfully the reflection of an opposition 
between Diderot’s own views in the Paradoxe and his earlier views on acting. 
 
Diderot had first touched on some critical ideas of the theatre in his 1748 novel 
Les bijoux indiscrets (1968), but it is in 1757, with the publication of his first 
play, Le Fils naturel (1939, pp.3-84), accompanied by a long commentary, the 
Entretiens sur Le Fils naturel (1939, pp.85-168) that Diderot’s pursuit as a 
theorist of the theatre thrived. These beginnings testify to a desire for reforming 
the theatre along the lines of ‘nature’ and ‘simplicity’, very much within the 
eighteenth-century mainstream movements of other dramatists and reformers in 
France and Europe at large, including Goldoni in Italy. For the rest of his career 
Diderot takes an interest in theatrical matters, both as a dramatist and as a 
theorist, writing, eclectic as he is, on topics such as dramaturgy, directing and 
acting. As far as concerns acting, his views will change so drastically that he will 
eventually take a stance contrary to that of his former assertions. In 1757, in the 
Entretiens sur Le Fils naturel Diderot had claimed: ‘Les poëtes, les acteurs, les 
musiciens, les peintres, les chanteurs de premier ordre, les grands danseurs, 
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les amants tendres, les vrais dévots, toute cette troupe enthousiaste et 
passionnée sent vivement, et réfléchit peu’ (Diderot, 1939, p.108). About twenty 
years later, in the Paradoxe, he took the exact opposite view: ‘Les grands 
poètes, les grands acteurs, et peut-être en général tous les grands imitateurs 
de la nature […] doués d’une belle imagination, d’un grand jugement, d’un tact 
fin, d’un goût très sûr, sont les êtres les moins sensibles’ (Diderot, 1994, p.43). 
 
I intend to explore Diderot’s own paradoxical shift in his theory of the actor’s art 
by placing it within the landscape of the wider contemporary debate, in 
particular by tracing the story of those eighteenth-century works which have a 
direct or indirect link with Diderot’s.  
 
FROM SAINTE-ALBINE, THROUGH JOHN HILL, TO STICOTTI- GENETIC AND TRANS-
EUROPEAN LINKS 
 
The stupefying argument of the Paradoxe had first been occasioned by the 
publication in 1769 of a treatise on the art of the actor called Garrick ou les 
Acteurs Anglois by Michel Sticotti (1770- hereafter cited as Garrick). This is the 
book that inspired Diderot’s invective, the book that he, as the premier 
interlocuteur of the Paradoxe, declares he takes issue with, when he says to the 
other speaker at the very beginning of the dialogue: ‘C’est l’ouvrage de votre 
ami’ (Diderot, 1994, p.33).  
 
In a later passage of the Paradoxe, Diderot presents another reference to a 
contemporary debate on the art of the actor: ‘la question que j’approfondis a été 
autrefois entamée entre un médiocre littérateur, Rémond de Sainte-Albine, et 
un grand comédien, Riccoboni (Diderot, 1994, p.101). Here Diderot refers 
respectively to two treatises on the art of the actor, Le Comédien by Rémond de 
Sainte-Albine, first published in 1747, and L’art du théâtre by François 
Riccoboni, published in 1750. François Riccoboni’s book is called upon to testify 
of the correctness of his theory, while Le Comédien is confined to representing 
the fallacious argument that he sets out to refute. 
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In the Paradoxe, Diderot persistently refers to the eighteenth-century debate on 
the art of the actor as the opposition between those, like himself, who champion 
judgement, power of observation and lack of sensibility and those who support 
sensibility, by which, he says, they mean instinct, lack of understanding and 
lack of judgment. Diderot’s binary divide, despite being mistaken, is helpful in 
that it establishes an affinity between Le Comédien and the Garrick, although 
the depth and details of such affinity were most likely unknown to Diderot 
himself as well as to other protagonists of the time. As first reconstructed by 
William Archer (1888), and further clarified by recent scholarly research 
(Valentino, 2011), these two treatises are joined by a direct genetic link which 
points to the cross-referential, if not always coherent, nature of the debate. 
Leaving the Paradoxe aside and following the trails of this link provides an 
amazing picture of the travelling through time and space of ideas on the art of 
the actor in the eighteenth century.  
 
Pierre Rémond de Sainte-Albine, a French journalist and author of a few plays, 
first published Le Comédien in 174715, but the book saw a second, augmented, 
and definitive edition in 1749. As Sainte-Albine (1749) affirms in the forward to 
his second edition, his book had some success; perhaps, he claims, because 
he has been the first to try and set the language and the theory of the actor’s 
art. As we shall see, his claim of primacy is, innocently or not, untrue. 
Nevertheless Le Comédien remains a cornerstone of the eighteenth-century 
debate on acting. 
 
Continuing to remain a success, the second edition of the treatise was the 
subject, as early as 1750, of a translation and adaptation into English in a book 
called The Actor: A Treatise on the Art of Playing. Interspersed with Theatrical 
Anecdotes, Critical Remarks on Plays, and Occasional Observations on 
Audiences16. This work in turn also saw three possible new editions (Valentino, 
2011) of which the first two are no longer extant and the last one was dated 
                                                       
15 M. Rémond de Sainte-Albine, 1747, Le Comédien. Ouvrage Divisé en Deux Parties. Paris: 
Desaint & Saillant.	
16 John Hill, 1750, The Actor: a Treatise on the Art of Playing. Interspersed with Theatrical 
Anecdotes, Critical Remarks on Plays, and Occasional Observations on Audiences. London: R. 
Griffiths. 
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1755 (Hill, 1755). All editions were published anonymously, which has 
generated some debate about their authorship and whether the various editions 
should be attributed to the same hand. Recent scholarship however has tended 
to settle on John Hill, an amateur actor, literary critic and botanist, as their 
identified and common author (Valentino, 2011). Analysis of the two surviving 
versions has shown a salient feature: that the 1755 edition differs substantially 
from the original. While the 1750 edition was an almost faithful translation of the 
French treatise, the 1755 one presents a number of novelties. The title itself, 
The Actor: or a Treatise on the Art of Playing. A New Work, Written by the 
author of the former, and Adapted to the Present State of the Theatres (Hill, 
1755 – hereafter cited as The Actor), announces it as a new work. In fact, the 
organisation of the material loses the structure of divisions and chapters, as 
inherited by Le Comédien, and takes an original turn. Furthermore, there is the 
notable addition of a great profusion of illustrative examples taken from the 
English contemporary acting practice, as announced in the subtitle: Containing 
Impartial Observations on the Performance, Manner, Perfections, and Defects 
of Mr. Garrick, Mr. Barry, Mr. Woodward, Mr. Foot, Mr. Havard, Mr. Palmer, Mr. 
Ryan, Mr. Berry, &c. Mrs. Cibber, Mrs. Pritchard, Miss Nossiter, Mrs. Gregory, 
Mrs. Woffington, Mrs. Clive, Mrs. Green, Miss Bellamy, &c. In their several 
Capital Parts. Finally, there are some differences in the content of the theories 
exposed, whose implications I will discuss below.  
 
The last passage of the genetic link is the loose translation of the latest edition 
of The Actor (Hill, 1755) into a French treatise entitled Garrick ou les Acteurs 
Anglois (Sticotti, 1770 - hereafter cited as Garrick), which keeps to the structure 
and content of the source text, preserving the examples taken from the English 
stage. The main deviation from John Hill’s book, besides the restyling of some 
of the passages, is the addition of notes which contain the translator’s 
comments, as well as examples of acting practice taken from the contemporary 
French stage, mostly the Comédie Française. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
the author of the Garrick, erroneously reputed to be Antonio Fabio Sticotti, is the 
actor Michel (Kelly) Sticotti (Meldolesi, 1969), Antonio’s brother in fact. Michel 
and Antonio Sticotti are of Italian origins, born in France into a family of actors 
of the Comédie Italienne. Their parents had moved to France in 1716 following 
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a newly formed troupe which was being set up by the actor-manager Luigi 
Riccoboni. While Antonio pursued his career as actor and playwright within the 
walls of the Comédie Italienne and in close collaboration and competition with 
François Riccoboni, Michel failed his debut with the company in 1739 and went 
to perform first into the provinces and then abroad, including a short stay in 
London in 1749. Because Antonio was much better known in France, Michel’s 
literary works, including his various theoretical works on the theatre, were 
attributed to his brother, before the mistake was rectified (Meldolesi, 1969) 17.  
 
It is thought extremely likely (Archer, 1888) that Michel Sticotti was unaware of 
the fact that the English source of his translation was itself an adaptation of a 
French treatise. At the same time, it is possible that he may have read Le 
Comédien without realizing its connection with The Actor. He certainly knew 
François Riccoboni’s L’Art du Théâtre (Riccoboni F., 1750), and the writings of 
Luigi Riccoboni, as proved by one of the notes from his book (Sticotti, 1770, pp. 
148-149, note ‘n’). It has been suggested that he may have been strongly 
influenced by Luigi Riccoboni’s theories on the theatre (Meldolesi, 1969).  
 
The journey of evolution of the treatise Le Comédien across these five versions 
and adaptations by three different authors of three different cultural heritages 
lets us catch a glimpse of a web of links of extraordinary intricacy, which must 
be further discussed with reference to the Riccoboni family and to some other 
pivotal theatre figures which directly or indirectly participate in the debate of 
which the Paradoxe is the climax. Before plunging further into the historical 
background, I will describe the main concepts exposed in Le Comédien, The 
Actor and the Garrick.  
 
For what concerns Le Comédien, I will refer exclusively to the second edition of 
1749, which has four additional chapters as compared to the first one and 
presents a few corrections that the author accepted following the comments on 
                                                       
17 Michel Sticotti is also the author of other theoretical works, wrongly attributed to his elder 
brother Antonio Fabio, including: Avis d'un comédien à sa fille; Epître à Monsieur Diderot sur la 
défense de continuer le Dictionnaire encyclopédique; Le sauvage en contradiction (an invective 
against Rousseau); Dictionnaire des passions, des vertues et des vices ou recueil des meilleurs 
Morceaux de morale pratique tirés des auteurs anciens & modernes, étrangers & nationnaux 
(Meldolesi, 1969). 
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his first edition of 1747. With respect to The Actor, I will refer to the 1755 
edition, given that the 1750 edition is merely a translation of Le Comédien. 
 
Le Comédien 
 
Sainte-Albine introduces his book as the first attempt to fix the language and 
theory of the art of the actor, whose terminology and principles, he claims, have 
been so little developed. Later in the chapter, I will discuss the contributions to 
the subject by Luigi Riccoboni, Italian actor-manager of the Comédie Italienne 
and author of theoretical works on acting which precede Le Comédien by about 
two decades. As I will show, Sainte-Albine is probably malicious in proclaiming 
his work to be the first in its kind and therefore dismissing any knowledge of 
Luigi Riccoboni’s contributions on the same topic. However his treatise contains 
an element of novelty in respect to Luigi Riccoboni’s theoretical works, 
especially for its aiming at a comprehensive and systematic handling of the 
subject. 
 
In his ‘Avertissement de l’auteur’ prefaced to the second edition of Le 
Comédien, Sainte-Albine touches on the very question that constitutes the 
kernel of the debate about the art of the actor in the eighteenth century and far 
beyond: the relationship between sensibility and judgement, instinct and 
intelligence. In the first edition of Le Comédien of 1747, he had maintained that 
the actor needs to possess much ‘esprit’ (translatable as ‘reason, judgement or 
intelligence’, as will become evident in the forthcoming discussion), to which 
critics had raised the objection that ‘instinct et sentiment’ had been the 
recognized principal attributes of some good contemporary actresses. In the 
second edition, he responds to this point of contention by an intriguing remark: 
that in extremely sensitive souls ‘le sentiment devient quelquefois esprit’ 
(Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.2). Sainte-Albine’s observation may seem an attempt to 
pacify his critics, whose opinion reflects common contemporary assumptions 
about the subject, without renouncing his belief that the use of intelligence is 
fundamental to the actor’s art. As I will show in the next chapter, it also points to 
a contemporary philosophical debate and the notion of a primacy of the senses 
over reason. Besides, it also gives us a first glimpse of how misled is the 
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Paradoxe’s contention that certain theorists such as Sainte-Albine have placed 
sensibility at the centre of the actor’s art at the full expense of intelligence. 
There will be many other opportunities to bring evidence of Diderot’s mistake. 
 
The matter under study is recognized by Sainte-Albine as consisting of an array 
of truths which sometimes appear to contradict each other:  
 
Pour répandre quelque lumière dans la théorie d’un Art de goût, il faut 
soumettre au raisonnement et à l’analyse diverses vérités, qui semblent 
n’être que du ressort du sentiment : il faut en concilier plusieurs, qui 
présentent en apparence des contradictions : il faut en même tems 
distinguer des idées qui ne différent que par de légères nuances, et faire 
apercevoir ces nuances au Lecteur le moins clairvoyant. […] Non 
seulement les uns rejettent des maximes que les autres donnent pour 
constants, mais on n’attache pas les mêmes significations aux termes 
qu’on employe. 
 (Sainte-Albine, 1749, pp.5-7) 
 
Diderot will briefly put this same point at the beginning of the Paradoxe, where 
he attributes the contradictory nature of ideas and opinions on the actor’s art to 
the vagueness and lack of specificity of the language employed. As I will 
discuss later, he will be guilty of contributing considerably to such confusion, 
especially when he insists on defining sensibility on his own terms, ignoring the 
fairly consistent tradition from Sainte-Albine to Sticotti. In fact, as I will discuss 
at the end of the chapter, Diderot’s rendering of sensibility needs to be 
understood in the context of the proliferation of meanings that the word enjoyed 
during the eighteenth century (Csengei, 2011).  
 
The discussion of esprit and sentiment takes up most part of Le Comédien’s 
first section. Both these terms are considered by Sainte-Albine to be natural 
endowments, although they need to be fostered in order to become 
accomplished: ‘Il faut que la Nature ébauche le Comédien. Il faut que l’Art 
acheve de le former’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.16). Perhaps because they are 
considered natural talents, one might be deceived into thinking that their 
employment requires no effort, hence one possible explanation of the simplistic 
equation between sensibility and instinct. On the other hand, Sainte-Albine’s 
description points in the opposite direction: both esprit and sentiment concern 
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the actor’s ability to create a character which is beyond any equation with her 
person.  
 
Esprit corresponds to the actor’s ability to think, to reflect; an ability without 
which, Sainte-Albine insists, a good actor cannot do. Such skill consists in the 
actor’s capability for observing and distinguishing the details of her role, relating 
the quality and degree of the different emotions to the circumstances of her 
character (the ‘given circumstances’ later embedded in theatrical jargon by 
Stanislavski, 1980, pp.50-52). The actor’s ability to feel is far from enough, ‘On 
veut qu’il ne se passionne qu’à propos, et dans le degré qu’exigent les 
circonstances’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.21). In its function to guide what in 
modern terms we would call the interpretation of a role, esprit is raised to the 
honours of helmsman of the actor’s art: ‘L’esprit est donc aussi nécessaire au 
Comédien, que le Pilote l’est à un vaisseau. C’est l’esprit qui tient le gouvernail ; 
c’est lui qui dirige la manœuvre, et qui indique et calcule la route’ (Sainte-
Albine, 1749, p.26). 
 
Sainte-Albine concedes that a long experience of the theatre may sometimes 
make up for a lack of intelligence, and he admits the possibility that a great 
actor playing by instinct may fortuitously provide a correct interpretation, but 
such success will be short lived and soon her lack of command over her acting 
will become apparent. The cliché of the lack of consistency in the performance 
of actors who play by instinct will continue to be cited by a string of authors 
leading up to the Paradoxe. Diderot will bring the example of Mademoiselle 
Dumesnil as the actress whose instinctual playing condemns her to 
inconsistency, with one or two sublime moments interspersed within a shallow 
and incoherent performance. Diderot condemns acting by instinct on the very 
same basis on which Sainte-Albine has condemned it, and yet he does not 
acknowledge their common intent at all. On the contrary, Diderot makes his 
point appear to contradict the likes of Sainte-Albine, and in support of his 
crusade against them, again revealing some of the Paradoxe’s mistaken 
presumptions. 
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As a final attempt at clarifying the contentious point of whether esprit should be 
considered an important component of the actor’s art and why it has been often 
dismissed, Sainte-Albine offers the explanation of the different connotations that 
the word carries. In certain social gatherings esprit may signify ‘wit’, but such 
meaning is the most misleading if applied to the type of esprit that he requires of 
the actor: not a vain and superficial display, but a deep and useful form of 
understanding. It is of note how Sainte-Albine is attempting to shed some light 
on that imprecision of language which both he and later Diderot will identify as 
one of the causes of the confusion surrounding this subject. In the next chapter, 
I will expand on the semantic domain of the key words of the debate in the 
context of the eighteenth-century philosophical and cultural idiom. 
 
If the discussion of esprit was already advancing the argument in the direction 
of explaining the attributes of the actor’s art, Sainte-Albine’s effort with regards 
to sentiment is even more thorough. Sentiment is not the actor’s temperamental 
predisposition to soft feelings and easy tears, although this may be of use to 
tragic actors, as much as a natural predisposition to cheerfulness is useful to 
comic actors. ‘La signification de ce mot a beaucoup plus d’étendue, et il 
désigne dans les Comédiens la facilité de faire succéder dans leur ame les 
diverses passions, dont l’homme est susceptible’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, pp.31-
32). Esprit and ‘cœur’ (sentiment) of an actor need to become ‘comme une cire 
molle’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.32), as soft as wax, to allow themselves all the 
modifications appropriate to the interpretation of the role according to the 
author’s text. This is the quality that an actor cannot be in want of.  
 
Although this exposition appears in a chapter dedicated to sentiment, Sainte-
Albine does not draw such a sharp distinction between the function of sentiment 
as opposed to that of esprit. Interestingly, as the theory will get transposed in 
subsequent treatises, the quintessential quality of the actor’s art will be 
eventually identified as esprit, or rather ‘understanding’ or ‘judgement’ (the 
words used in the translations and adaptations of the Comédien), while 
sensibility will be pushed in second place; yet another instance which 
demonstrates Diderot’s misled dispute against his supposed adversaries.  
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Taking up a notion that he has already offered under the chapter dedicated to 
esprit, Sainte-Albine assumes that the aim of the actor is to display ‘l’espece et 
le dégré de sentiment’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.38), which she achieves through 
her ability not only to take on the different emotions but also to move swiftly 
from one to the other. Such ability will be much more easily exercised, says 
Sainte-Albine, if the actor does not allow any distraction by her personal 
feelings, and a tendency not to be affected by her own pains or joys will 
enhance the quality of her performance. The obvious implications of this 
conceptualization are that the actor’s easiness with feeling the character’s 
emotions (the right kind and degree) is in inverse proportion with her inclination 
to be sentimental with regards to her own affairs. If this is Sainte-Albine’s 
description of an actor who performs with sentiment, what could be more 
different from Diderot’s description in the Paradoxe of himself (with his tendency 
to be moved in a very personal way by all occurrences) as the specimen of 
someone who champions sentiment? 
 
Following the discussion of esprit and sentiment, there is another quality which 
Sainte-Albine identifies as essential to the actor’s art, what he calls ‘feu’, and 
which represents the actor’s power of expression. Feu allows the actor to 
express effectively those character’s emotions that she has correctly identified 
with esprit and reproduced within herself with sentiment, accomplishing thereby 
her final aim to affect the spectator’s senses and emotions. Again, the 
description of feu is accompanied by the clarification that the actor’s emotions 
need to correspond to the quality and degree required by the expressive 
demands of the characterization of her role within the intentions of the play. 
Expressive capabilities are this way put at the service of verisimilitude: ‘le Feu 
dans une personne de Théâtre n’est autre chose que la célérité et la vivacité, 
avec lesquelles toutes les parties, qui constituent l’Acteur, concourent à donner 
un air de verité à son action’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.44). On the other hand, the 
random expression of emotions out of context denotes lack of feu, and Sainte-
Albine again clarifies a terminological inconsistency: what others have 
erroneously identified as instances in which an actor had too much feu were in 
fact situations in which actors had arbitrarily moved away from expressing the 
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character’s emotions and into wrongly expressing their own personal feelings, 
with ‘déraison et maladresse’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.46). 
 
One reason why Le Comédien may lend itself to be misunderstood in its effort 
to systematize acting theory around an emphasis on the use of intelligent 
insight and controlled expression of feelings, against arbitrariness, personalism 
and instinct, may be due to the fact that following the first exposition of the 
principles I have discussed, the book (in the Livre second) proceeds to discuss 
other topics that contradict the earlier remarks. For example, as a legacy of the 
rhetoric tradition, Le Comédien stands by rules of propriety (‘le sentiment fin des 
convenances’, Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.21), which will necessarily be called upon 
to limit the actor’s expression even at the expenses of truth (Fumaroli, 1993, 
p.704). Even more strikingly, the emphasis on the actor’s ability to reproduce 
any emotions at will is visibly contradicted by Sainte-Albine’s subsequent 
requirement that actors who will play the roles of lovers be lovers in their 
personal life, or that tragic actors be noble (Sainte-Albine, 1749).  
 
This internal discrepancy may be partly due to the fact that Le Comédien’s 
theory of esprit and sentiment is too irksome to be accepted with its full 
implications, and old stereotypes on acting continue to permeate the treatise 
(Wasserman, 1947) next to the new ideas which are just starting to germinate. 
Incidentally, one of the promoters of the new conception of acting was Luigi 
Riccoboni and below I will discuss his connections with Sainte-Albine and other 
protagonists of the debate. Because Le Comédien sits at a junction between an 
ancient acting theory based on Greek and Latin rhetoric and a new paradigm 
dedicated to the actor’s art which will be projected into the future towards the 
twentieth century and beyond, perhaps it is not surprising that it contains both 
the germs of the new and the relics of the past. In particular, its strongest link 
with the past remains at the level of the theory of the spectator’s emotional 
experience, with the rhetorical tenet that the actor/orator needs to feel the 
emotions that she intends to raise in the spectator. It is this inalienable principle 
that brings Sainte-Albine to declare:  
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Au théâtre, lorsqu’on n’éprouve pas les mouvemens qu’on a dessein de 
faire paroître, on ne nous en présente qu’une imparfaite image, et l’art ne 
tient jamais lieu du Sentiment. Dès qu’un Acteur manque de cette 
qualité, tous les autres présens de la nature et de l’étude sons perdus 
pour lui.  
(Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.32)  
 
From Le Comédien through The Actor to the Garrick there will be an 
increasingly stronger emphasis on the need for sentiment to be regulated by 
esprit, to the point that already with The Actor, sentiment will lose its primacy in 
favour of esprit, or rather ‘understanding’, as it will be translated in English. But 
despite the acknowledgement that the actor needs to be able to manipulate her 
sensibility sheltered from the influence of any personal or spontaneous feelings, 
the not unreasonable possibility that this may equate to emotional experiences 
feigned by a talented and artful actor is positively rejected by Sainte-Albine and 
by his translators, contrary to what will be claimed by François Riccoboni and 
eventually by Diderot. This is obviously the true kernel of the controversy. 
 
Sainte-Albine discusses openly the objection that certain actresses are good at 
feigning passions in their personal life, when they trick a lover to believe that 
they love him. Voicing the possible contention from the point of view of his 
opponents, he writes:  
 
Vous avez établi pour principe, que sur la scene on n’exprime 
qu’imparfaitement une passion, si on ne l’éprouve effectivement. Mais 
comment nous persuaderez-vous que des Actrices, qui savent si bien 
feindre en particulier des sentimens qu’elles n’éprouvent point, ne 
puissent les feindre en public, et qu’étant si habiles à se contrefaire avec 
des Amans, elles soient incapables de se contrefaire avec les 
Spectateurs ?  
(Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.39) 
 
His answer is that in personal life a lover may have a certain vested interested 
in being tricked and the lover’s vanity will push him to believe more easily to be 
the object of the actress’s love. On the other hand he thinks that spectators hold 
it more to their interest to find out those actors who feign, as an audience wants 
to be tricked through the theatrical illusion but not too grossly. The spectator’s 
vanity pushes him to disbelieve rather than to believe:  
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La vanité du [spectateur] lui fait craindre de ne pas voir l’ [actrice] telle 
qu’elle est […] Il goûte [du plaisir] à montrer qu’il n’est pas le dupe du 
prestige, lorsque l’artifice est trop grossier pour lui faire illusion. Il 
consent d’être abusé, mais il veut que son erreur ait l’air raisonnable.  
(Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.40) 
 
Here the adherence to the rhetorical principle of the correspondence between 
actor’s and spectator’s feelings opens, perhaps unwittingly, a breach into the 
seemingly unquestioned tenet of the audience’s submission to the theatrical 
illusion. Although such a principle will never be questioned by the authors that I 
discuss here, including Diderot, the analysis of the audience’s response will 
increasingly be granted a more complex articulation, as will be evident in the 
next section dedicated to The Actor. The revised final edition of The Actor, 
which the author qualifies as a new work, will partly address questions and 
ambiguities left open by Le Comédien. 
 
The Actor 
 
The treatise of The Actor merits special attention because of the important 
function it serves in the transposition of ideas on acting across the eighteenth 
century. Despite its first edition being merely a translation of Le Comédien, it 
had the merit of spreading these new ideas in the English language. Its 
reworking into a renovated treatise in the second edition (Hill, 1755) provides a 
further articulation of the theories on acting and constitutes the substantial link 
between Le Comédien and the Paradoxe (Valentino, 2011), given that the 
Paradoxe, as I explained, is a response to the Garrick, itself a translation into 
French of the second edition of The Actor. 
 
In the introduction to the 1755 edition of The Actor, Hill makes a considerable 
effort in explaining the rationale for his publication, so helping to clarify some of 
the questions left open by Le Comédien. Hill takes pain to specify that the 
treatise is written for the benefit of both actors and spectators, differently from 
Sainte-Albine who had only fleetingly mentioned his target audience and 
identified it principally with actors. This extension of address to spectators 
constitutes an important innovation, because it is grounded in the 
acknowledgement of the tight link between the actor’s performance and the 
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audience’s response. This link had already been anticipated by Luigi Riccoboni 
(Riccoboni L., 1728), as I shall discuss below. 
 
At one level, the actor affects the senses and imagination of the spectators and 
this is in essence the principal aim of the theatrical undertaking. This concept, 
rooted in classical rhetoric theories, is already found in Le Comédien, but Hill 
will discuss its implications more in depth in later chapters. There is moreover 
another level of analysis, of the link between actors’ performance and 
audience’s response. This time it is the effect that the audience has on the actor 
that comes under scrutiny, with implications which are more revolutionary for 
theorizing on acting. Here, the audience’s judgement is considered instrumental 
to the advancement of the actor’s art, because, as Hill points out, when the 
audience judges badly, bad acting is encouraged and real talent may be lost or 
remain underdeveloped. The rules set out in the book should hence contribute 
to the improvement of acting not only by instructing actors on ‘how they 
advance towards it’ but also by instructing audiences when to dispense their 
applause and when their censure (Hill, 1755, pp.2-3). 
 
There are three main consequences of placing the audience’s judgement in 
such a prominent position. First, it is the acknowledgement that although the 
actor puts her spell on the audience, spectators are not entirely enchanted: their 
faculty of judgement remains active alongside their submission to the theatrical 
illusion. It is as if The Actor, by expanding its address from actors to spectators, 
is also granting emphasis to the rational faculties of the spectators. As I will 
discuss in Chapter 4, similar considerations partake of a parallel debate on the 
spectator’s psychological status, anticipating later concerns, including Brecht’s. 
 
Secondly, there is a question of jurisdiction. If actors should raise the objection 
that no one who was not herself an actor should preach about their art, on 
which authority should playwrights or philosophers or anyone else take part in 
the debate? It seems that granting themselves such authority in the role of 
spectators is by far the preferred defence, as I shall discuss further in the next 
chapter. 
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Thirdly, when actors are described as the recipients of the judgement of 
spectators, the power of spectators to push changes in the actor’s performance 
is emphasized. It follows that between the relative contribution of innate talent 
and artistic endeavour to the actor’s art, the emphasis now falls on the 
significance of the artistic effort. Hill believes that acting depends so much on 
acquired skills, that while natural talents are important for principal players, 
most actors can just do with the sole contribution of art: ‘while those [the capital 
performers] improve and perfect themselves by art, these [the others] may form 
themselves entirely upon it’ (Hill, 1755, p.4).  
 
The whole of the first chapter of The Actor is thereby dedicated to emphasizing 
the need for study in the actor’s art. Garrick is described as the paradigmatic 
example of the talented actor who cultivates with ‘indefatigable assiduity’ (Hill, 
1755, p.5) the talents that nature has endowed him with. Garrick, celebrated in 
The Actor for his dedication to studying his art, shall also be Diderot’s example 
of the perfection of skilful acting, another point of consonance between Diderot 
and his alleged adversaries which invalidates once again Diderot’s contention 
that they supposedly praise a form of acting based on wild spontaneity. 
 
In fact, like it was for Le Comédien, the emphasis on the use of intelligence 
leads The Actor to the condemnation of spontaneity and instinct: when acting ‘is 
ungoverned and undirected we may admire a flight, or stare at some 
unexpected stroke, but after that we are disgusted’ (Hill, 1755, p.7). This 
passage, which runs from Sainte-Albine, through Hill and Sticotti into Diderot 
nearly unaltered, here is taken to more extreme consequences with the 
condemnation of acting by instinct as carrying the risk of extravagance, of which 
nothing can be more contemptible. In a way, the mistakes of a great natural 
talent who acts without art are less tolerable than the mistakes of untalented 
actors. ‘Insipidity is the general character of inferior performers; and 
extravagance is too much that of the superior ones’ (Hill, 1755, p.8). While 
uneducated audiences may be unable to discern, sophisticated spectators will 
be offended by both these faults, and their ‘censure falls almost entirely upon 
the superior class: they pity what the others cannot help, but they condemn in 
these what their judgement ought to have taught them to avoid’ (Hill, 1755, p.8). 
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Overall this pronouncement is not too far off the Paradoxe’s famous aphorism: 
‘C’est l’extrême sensibilité qui fait les acteurs médiocres; c’est la sensibilité 
médiocre qui fait la multitude des mauvais acteurs; et c’est le manque absolu 
de sensibilité qui prépare les acteurs sublimes’ (Diderot, 1994, p.46). Obviously 
it is the third clause which is the exclusive trademark of the Paradoxe, while the 
first two are drawn from the tradition that Diderot professes to reject. 
 
Extravagance derives from the lack of judgment which leaves sensibility 
unleashed. This points to the indissoluble link between sensibility and 
judgement in the actor’s art, as already established by Le Comédien. But The 
Actor brings the argument full circle back to the effect on the spectator. The 
extravagance of uncontrolled sensibility not only induces the spectator to 
advance a negative judgement on the actor, but disgusts the spectator by 
forcing itself upon him and leaving him with a sense of untruthfulness and 
displeasure (Hill, 1755, p.11). It is in fact this effect on the spectator’s sensibility 
that is ultimately the cause of the spectator’s negative judgement. In both actors 
and spectators, thought and feeling, judgement and sensibility, are at their best 
when they work in unison.  
 
As spectators, says Hill, ‘we feel, as if they were our own, the sentiments and 
passions represented by a good writer, and animated by a performer who has 
judgement and genius’ (Hill, 1755, p.10). Although sensibility and judgement 
have both got a place in The Actor’s theory, judgement clearly surpasses 
sensibility in the second edition of the treatise: ‘So great an error is it that nature 
alone makes the player, and so vast the advantages which even the highest 
talents will acquire from regulation’ (Hill, 1755, p.18). With Hill, the actor’s art 
becomes ‘a science, and is to be studied as a science’ (Hill, 1755, p.12). What 
could be more opposed to Diderot’s pretension that Sticotti, faithful translator of 
The Actor, glorifies acting based on natural instinct? 
 
After taking great pain to explain the supremacy of judgement and art over 
sensibility and nature in Chapter I, The Actor dedicates the whole of Chapter II 
to illustrating the importance of understanding (or judgement), with lots of 
examples taken from the contemporary English stage. But what is it that the 
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actor needs to judge or understand? Again, it is Hill who clarifies and extends 
insights already mentioned by Sainte-Albine. The actor is expected to 
understand the ideas contained in the text which she receives from the author. 
These ideas are not descriptions of states of mind of the characters, but rather 
such states of mind are what the actor needs to derive from studying the text: 
‘Here it is that the greatest discernment of an actor is shewn, in understanding 
the intent of the author; and his highest judgement in representing the temper of 
his mind as the other intended’ (Hill, 1755, p.14).  
 
Understanding serves the purpose of distinguishing the passions in nature and 
degree according to the given circumstances (Hill, 1755, p.29) but also to mark 
the transitions from one to the other (Hill, 1755, p.37). This skilful activity will 
eventually lead the actor to the portrayal of feelings which solely will ring true to 
the audience, an important purpose of her effort if the stage is to represent the 
human mind (Hill, 1755, p.20). The actor is ultimately at the service of truth and 
although she is at the service of the playwright’s text, she also has a duty to 
enhance those ideas where the author has been incomplete, becoming ‘in some 
degree an author’ herself (Hill, 1755, p.31).  
 
Retaining the parallel argument of Le Comédien, Hill asks whether acting by 
imitation may ‘supply the place of understanding’ (Hill, 1755, p.21) and refutes 
such proposition more definitely than Sainte-Albine, adding the example of 
Garrick as proof of an actor who is so great and so original that it would be 
impossible to suppose that his greatness is due to imitation. Moreover, the 
supposition of imitation at the basis of acting would impede any scope of 
advancement in the discipline, because any bad practice would be perpetuated 
indefinitely. 
 
The chapter dedicated to ‘understanding’ already contains mention of 
sensibility, to which Chapter III will be dedicated. This is because, as I have 
pointed out before, understanding and sensibility are interconnected, and their 
discussion needs to proceed interwoven. As it was for understanding, the 
discussion of sensibility is also redundant at times, with the same ideas 
reiterated in various manners. Such ideas are similar to those already asserted 
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by Le Comédien, the main difference being that in The Actor sensibility loses 
the parity with understanding and is pushed in second position, becoming the 
next most important requisite for the actor’s art (Hill, 1755, p.48). 
 
Following the rule of the Greek orator, Hill does not question ‘that whatever 
passion we would raise by our discourse in others, we must first feel ourselves. 
The disposition to receive those impressions by which our own passions are 
affected, is this quality of sensibility’ which men and actors may possess in 
variable degree and it is by Hill equated to ‘the strokes of nature’, a 
representation of feelings which are universally ‘perceived and acknowledged 
among mankind’ (Hill, 1755, pp.49-50).  
 
Hill specifies that sensibility does not depend per se on understanding, and it 
can manifest in actors independently of it, but within the acting theory here 
proposed, these instances drive to the extravagance that displeases the 
audience (Hill, 1755, pp.51-52). As already emphasized by Sainte-Albine, 
sensibility unregulated by understanding runs the risk of misleading actors into 
exhibiting their own personal feelings: ‘these people make a mistake when they 
suppose this is an excellence: The passion they exhibit is their own, and not 
that of the character’ (Hill, 1755, p.34). And as a matter of fact The Actor 
defines sensibility as a ‘disposition to be affected by the passions which plays 
are intended to excite’ (Hill, 1755, p.48). For this reason an accomplished actor 
should be equally able to feel and express all emotions, and to make quick 
transitions between different emotions. Drawing on a metaphor from Le 
Comédien, her heart ‘should be as the shapeless wax pliable’ and ‘ready to be 
moulded’ at her pleasure (Hill, 1755, p.59). 
 
In keeping with Le Comédien, Hill specifies that sensibility should not be 
conceived as restricted to ‘the tender and melancholy passions’ (Hill, 1755, 
p.75), a restriction that Diderot will apply in the Paradoxe, erroneously 
interpreting the meaning of the term in his references, as I will discuss later. 
Moreover, if the only true sensibility is a ‘ductility of mind’, Hill also keeps to the 
request that the actor’s heart be free of any passion of its own, to be ready to 
receive any passion that the text requires (Hill, 1755, p.61). Again, among the 
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many examples taken from the English stage, Garrick stands out as the actor 
who ‘runs from one passion into another, with a consummate ease’ (Hill, 1755, 
p.69). 
 
Although qualities of sensibility and understanding may often be disjoint in 
actors, it is sensibility piloted by understanding (the helmsman according to the 
metaphor in Le Comédien) which makes great acting: ‘What we should wish in 
the perfect player is, that he has all the sensibility […] and yet all the command 
of himself necessary to regulate its emotions’ (Hill, 1755, pp.53-54). What Hill 
classifies as the perfect player is an actor who comprises in herself the 
emotional expression that in the Paradoxe Diderot assigns to Mademoiselle 
Dumesnil and the rational control that he grants to Mademoiselle Clairon. The 
great actor ‘has both in such a degree, that while the judgement regulates the 
sensibility, the sensibility animates, enlivens, and inspires the understanding’ 
(Hill, 1755, p.58). 
 
In this cohabitation and collaboration within the actor’s mind, sensibility and 
understanding lead to a form of feeling which is peculiar:  
 
Here is the great perfection of the science: we would have him, while he 
feels all this, yet command his passions, so that they do not disturb his 
utterance, and yet we would not have that expression he keeps for 
himself take away the pain of it from us; we would have his manner of 
pronouncing the words take all that effect upon us, which the passage 
has on the most sensible reader; but we would not have it take that effect 
on himself.  
(Hill, 1755, pp.54-55) 
 
As I shall show in the next section, this description is not at all incompatible with 
François Riccoboni’s theory of acting, supposedly based on the absence of 
sensibility, and ultimately not entirely at odds with Diderot’s paradox.  
 
Importantly, however, Hill preserves Sainte-Albine’s argument against the idea 
that an actor may well be effective in feigning emotions, as much as women can 
feign love for a hidden purpose:  
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The lover is desirous to believe the lady is fond of him, and therefore he 
is easily made to receive the pretence of such a fondness: but an 
audience are unbiased; they look with eyes of impartiality; they will not 
allow what does not exist. 
(Hill, 1755, p.77) 
 
Keeping to the rule of the Greek orator, Hill maintains that ‘what the actor 
himself does not feel, he will never make the audience feel, tho’ he copy ever so 
perfectly the best player who ever pronounced a sentence’ (Hill, 1755, p.92). 
This is the true measure of the schism between Diderot and what he considers 
his opponents: if excessive and unregulated sensibility is the enemy of good 
acting and understanding is the first quality of an actor, it is the cooperation 
between understanding and sensibility which leads the actor to her ‘paradox’: 
that she may feel while being in control of her feelings. Diderot’s notion of the 
paradox of the actor entails instead that no feeling at all must occupy the 
psychological stance of the great actor’s mind. Such a notion, albeit not fully 
original as admittedly inspired by François Riccoboni’s L’Art du Théâtre, will 
lead Roach (1993, p.147) to attribute to Diderot the original formulation of the 
concept of dual consciousness, which William Archer will pronounce to be the 
resolution of the paradox. As I will show in the next chapter, dual 
consciousness, however, has little to offer to the explanation of the actor’s art.  
 
Returning to the discussion of The Actor, it is perhaps unfortunate that 
alongside the articulated analysis of the actor’s art, the new edition also 
maintains in later chapters those contradictory remarks found in the Livre 
second of Le Comédien. Hence next to the increasingly coherent theory that Hill 
takes the pain to construct, there is a parallel perpetuation of stereotypes that 
the theorists have not been able to dispense of. If I have many times questioned 
Diderot’s originality and attempted to show his debt towards earlier theorists, he 
must be granted the merit of having cut the umbilical cord with those ancient 
relics. 
 
Garrick ou les Acteurs Anglois 
 
Because the Garrick is principally a translation of the final edition of The Actor, 
mostly its content is equal to what I have expounded in the preceding section. 
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Here I will therefore summarize the principal points that are paramount to 
discuss Diderot’s response to the Garrick and add any significant information 
about the notes that Sticotti appended to his translation.  
 
In the Avant-propos du traducteur, Sticotti (1770, aiij-xij) comments that the 
necessity of a continuous enhancement and perfection in the actor’s art is 
hindered by the obstacles derived from the prejudices and hostility against 
actors, which discourages the most talented to undertake this profession. He 
suggests that the situation of the theatre in England is the only favourable 
exception, in that actors are respected and more liberally treated. Although this 
remark appears irrelevant to the focus of my discussion, it anticipates an 
important aspect of its implications that I shall discuss in Chapter 6: the link 
between the person of the actor, her approach to playing her character and the 
ultimate effect on the spectator. If morally bad actors play themselves, then how 
they are in private life, or even how they are perceived to be, will be relevant to 
the spectator’s experience of the character, including questions related to the 
ethical value of theatre. 
 
In keeping with the remarks found in The Actor, the audience is granted the 
ability to respond both by submitting to the emotional identification with the 
characters and by being a sober judge of the actor’s performance; from which 
follows the necessity to educate the spectators’ taste to make them active 
contributors to the enhancement of the actor’s art. The actor’s first quality is, in 
accordance with The Actor, identified with ‘intelligence’, sentiment being the 
second most important. ‘De toutes les qualités naturelles à l’acteur, une 
heureuse intelligence est, sans contredit, la plus nécessaire’ (Sticotti,  1770, 
p.25). It is of note that through the passage into English, Sainte-Albine’s esprit 
becomes intelligence, and some of the time jugement, the two terms seemingly 
used as synonyms: ‘Ceux qui prétendent qu’on voit de bons Comédiens privés 
de jugement, n’y font point assez d’attention; ces Acteurs ont plus d’intelligence 
qu’ils ne disent, ou ne sont pas aussi grands Comédiens qu’ils le pensent’ 
(Sticotti, 1770, p.31). Importantly, intelligence and jugement will be the terms 
used by Diderot in the Paradoxe, while sentiment, surviving the transposition 
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from Sainte-Albine to Sticotti, will become sensibilité. I will take up again this 
semantic question in the next chapter. 
 
The interplay between sentiment and jugement is also expressed as the 
intertwining of nature and art, again following an idea already present in The 
Actor: ‘l’art porté à son comble devient nature, […] les grands Acteurs ne 
l’abandonnent jamais; ils élèvent sur cette base un édifice, pour ainsi dire, plus 
naturel quel la nature même’ (Sticotti, 1770, p.10). Here the actor’s art grounds 
itself in abiding to the principle of a theatre which reflects nature. Sticotti further 
underscores this point in one of his notes: it is part of the actor’s creative 
function to amend the author’s possible affectation or lack of truthfulness 
through a performance which is natural and simple. In short, the actor’s study 
and art are put to the service of a performance which is devoid of artfulness, but 
appears instead more natural that nature itself.  
 
In another note to the text, close to the passage which states: ‘L’art du Théâtre 
est une science, il faut donc l’étudier comme une science’ (Sticotti, 1770, p.19), 
Sticotti emphasizes the link between the actor’s jugement, and her ability to 
discriminate and express the nuances of the passions according to the 
necessity of the text: ‘ce qui sert à déterminer leur espèce, est ce qu’on appelle 
génie dans le grand Auteur, et jugement dans l’habile Comédien’ (Sticotti, 1770, 
p.20, note ‘q’). Sensibility directed by judgement is the guiding principle of the 
actor to express all passions, in all circumstances and according to their infinite 
variety.  
 
On voit des Acteurs pleurer lorsqu’il faut se mettre en colère. Il ne s’agit 
pas de chercher ici combien ils ont de sensibilité, mais comment ils 
doivent la gouverner. […] On se trompe fort d’imaginer que ces pleurs si 
faciles sont une beauté; la passion larmoyante est souvent celle du 
Comédien, non pas celle du personnage.  
(Sticotti, 1770, pp.44-45) 
 
As I will discuss below, Diderot’s own interpretation of sensibility is very much 
akin to what Sticotti here calls ‘la passion larmoyante’ and hence his objection 
to sensibility is based on a very different premise to that of the authors he 
argues against.   
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However, it is important to emphasize that as it was for Hill, and perhaps even 
more so, Sticotti could never conceive acting as deprived of sentiment. In one of 
his notes, in which he reinforces The Actor’s principle that acting could never be 
based on imitation, he declares: ‘Dans un art de sentiment on ne peut 
intéresser que par les propres mouvements de son cœur’ (Sticotti, 1770, p.30, 
note ‘c’). Even if faithfully keeping its source as a translator, Sticotti seems to 
feel the need, in his comment to the text, to rebalance the primacy between 
jugement and sentiment. In another note he states:  
 
Un Acteur, quelque préparé qu’il soit, entre, pour ainsi dire, sur la scène 
à l’impromptu: ses talens dépendent des dispositions momentanées de 
son âme et de ses organes. Un rôle est composé à loisir; l’Acteur le plus 
consommé ne peut répondre, en se présentant au public, des moindres 
traits qu’il va rendre. 
 (Sticotti, 1770, p.40, note ‘g’) 
 
His heritage of actor of the Commedia dell’Arte tradition weighs on his 
temptation to doubt the supposedly absolute influence of judgement on the 
actor’s art, perhaps providing Diderot with a pretext for his critique that he would 
not have found in The Actor.  
 
In a further note, Sticotti discusses the question of whether sensibility is 
important or detrimental to the actor in reference to the difference of opinion 
between Luigi Riccoboni and his son François. In doing so, he may well have 
pointed Diderot in the direction of François’s book; he is also giving us proof of 
his own knowledge of the theories of the two Riccoboni’s, with whom he was, as 
we know, closely acquainted. In considering their divergence of views, he tends 
to agree with Luigi:  
 
Deux Comédiens célèbres, qui ont écrit en grands Maîtres de l’art du 
Théâtre, sont de sentiments contraires sur un point assez important: il 
s’agit du don de verser des larmes. Mr R.L. [Luigi Riccoboni] convient 
qu’elles mettent le comble à l’imitation parfaite, et Mr R.F. [François 
Riccoboni], croit qu’elles doivent la détruire, ou du moins la rendre très 
désagréable. Selon lui, s’il tombe une seule larme de vos yeux, des 
sanglots involontaires vous embarrasseront le gosier, il vous sera 
impossible de proférer un seul mot sans des hoquets ridicules. Cette 
observation fine, et généralement vraie pour la plûpart des Comédiens, 
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paroit moins forte pour le grand Acteur, qui sait, dans le désordre même 
de ses sens, diriger ses organes sans sortir de la nature, ou la masquer. 
On sentira combien la chose est possible, si l’on se rappelle qu’on voit 
souvent des personnes dans le plus grand désespoir, se plaindre à 
demi-voix par égard pour quelqu’un, sans en être  moins affligées: ce 
grand effort que l’on fait sur soi-même dans l’exacte réalité, prouve que 
l’Acteur peut donc aussi, sans cesser d’être fortement affecté, conduire 
sa voix dans tous les tons de la belle nature, même en répandant des 
larmes.  
(Sticotti, 1770, pp.148-149, note ‘n’) 
 
Sticotti’s referencing demonstrates once more what a scholar has rightly called 
Diderot’s ‘considerably reductive reading of Sticotti’ (Vicentini, 2012, p.19) and 
anticipates the question discussed by the Paradoxe. It also reveals Luigi 
Riccoboni as a pivotal figure in the debate on the actor’s art, although Diderot 
was most likely unaware of this. In the next section I will turn to the theories of 
the Riccoboni and I will endeavour to show Luigi Riccoboni’s great relevance to 
the debate and how his contributions link, directly or indirectly, to its other 
protagonists, including his son François. 
 
THE RICCOBONI, LUIGI AND FRANÇOIS, FATHER AND SON 
 
The Paradoxe identifies one of the closest allies of the anti-emotionalist cause 
in an actor called Riccoboni: ‘la question que j’approfondis a été autrefois 
entamée entre un médiocre littérateur, Rémond de Sainte-Albine, et un grand 
comédien, Riccoboni. Le littérateur plaidait la cause de la sensibilité, le 
comédien plaidait la mienne’ (Diderot, 1994, p.101). The Riccoboni here alluded 
to is François, actor and playwright at the Comédie Italienne, and author of a 
treatise on the art of the actor, L’Art du Théâtre (Riccoboni F., 1750), where he 
exposes the theory referred to by Diderot in the Paradoxe. Most significantly for 
this historical reconstruction, François is Luigi Riccoboni’s son, and it is possible 
that in calling him ‘un grand comédien’, Diderot may have mistaken father for 
son (Archer, 1888, p.14). Actor within a family tradition of Commedia dell’Arte, 
manager, translator, playwright, Luigi Riccoboni is also one of the most prolific 
theorists of the eighteenth century to have written on the history of the theatre 
and on the art of the actor.  
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Both Luigi and François dedicated most of their lives to the theatre. Son of the 
Pantalone of the Duke of Modena’s troupe, Luigi was an actor since his teenage 
years and became actor-manager at the early age of 22 (Courville, 1943, p.38). 
In the Commedia dell’Arte scenarios he played the stock character of the lover 
Lelio; however he also took on many principal roles in other dramas, such as 
tragedies, tragicomedies and authored comedies. He toured extensively across 
northern Italy with his Commedia dell’Arte troupe, attempting a reform of both 
tragedy and comedy in collaboration with Italian prominent men of letters. Maffei 
wrote his famous Merope, later emulated by Voltaire, for Riccoboni’s troupe and 
specifically under the exhortation of the actor-manager who was endeavouring 
to resurrect Italian tragedy to what he conceived to be its former splendours of 
the Renaissance (Courville, 1943). Riccoboni’s efforts were crowned by 
success until 1715, when his attempt to duplicate his accomplishments with 
tragedy in the sphere of scripted comedy failed miserably: the opening in 
Venice of La Scolastica, a Renaissance comedy by Ludovico Ariosto, ended in 
ridicule as the audience hissed the performance. Venice would have to wait 
another thirty years or so to give birth to the renovated Italian comedy: 
Riccoboni’s dream would finally come true with the reformation by Carlo 
Goldoni, Riccoboni’s spiritual heir (Cappelletti, 1986). 
 
Perhaps partly motivated by the humiliation and demoralisation of this defeat, 
Riccoboni looked with renovated enthusiasm at the opportunity which in 1716 
came from Philippe d’Orléans, Regent of France for Louis XV, who called on 
him to organize a troupe which would re-establish the Italian Theatre in Paris. 
The old Comédie Italienne had been shut down by Louis XIV in 1697, with the 
shameful expulsion of all its actors, following the announcement of a 
performance which was understood to be intended as a satyr of the King’s wife 
(Courville, 1943, p.271). Louis XIV now dead, Paris and the court were ready 
for a re-opening. 
 
Incidentally, it was in forming his new troupe in Italy before leaving for France 
that Luigi Riccoboni recruited Michel Sticotti’s parents-to-be. They will remain at 
the Comédie Italienne for the rest of their careers and their sons, Antonio and 
Michel, will also see their acting debut there, although for Michel, as I described 
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previously, it will be a brief experience, a prelude to a career mostly outside of 
France. 
 
Born in 1707, Luigi’s only son François was nine years old when his family 
moved to France, country of adoption where he established himself for good. 
He made his debut at the Comédie Italienne in 1726, just two years before his 
father’s retirement from the stage, and continued to work there for the next forty 
years, in the capacity of actor and playwright, making for himself an overall 
different career from that of his father. Despite his eclecticism, Luigi had kept 
his chief endeavours within the Commedia dell’Arte tradition, often performing 
the stock character Lelio and writing or adapting many Commedia scenarios. 
François also authored around thirty plays, but comedies were a minority, while 
he wrote or co-wrote many parodies, divertissements and ballets (Courville, 
1945, p.275). Following the evolution of the repertoire of the Comédie Italienne, 
François chiefly performed in these new forms of drama, including as a ballet 
dancer, but he never got as far as gaining the reputation of the great actor. He 
was married to Marie-Jeanne de Laboras, actress and later a popular novelist, 
the same Madame Riccoboni with whom Diderot will exchange correspondence 
on matters of acting in his famous Lettre à Madame Riccoboni (Diderot, 1994, 
pp.121-143). Despite their correspondence, Diderot will mistake the lady’s 
identity: he will believe her to be a Riccoboni by birth and will call her supposed 
father ‘an acteur aimé’ (Courville, 1958, p.43, footnote 63), hence proving to 
have an incorrect knowledge of the Riccoboni family, which may substantiate 
the hypothesis that he may have believed the same ‘acteur aimé’, surely Luigi, 
to be the author of the essay L’Art du Théâtre. 
 
Luigi Riccoboni was actor-manager and lead actor of the Comédie Italienne 
from 1716 to 1728, year of his retirement from the stage. During these years, 
despite remaining within the tradition of the Commedia dell’Arte, he continued 
his attempt at reformation, both in the direction of the repertoire as well as in the 
refinement of the acting style.  In Italy, Riccoboni’s troupe had succeeded in 
making modern and contemporary Italian tragedy triumph on the stage, but his 
wish to play tragedies was greatly limited in Paris by the public expectations 
about the Italian Theatre (Courville, 1945). He hence concentrated on 
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comedies, and within his adaptations of the repertoire mostly drawn from the 
scenarios of Commedia dell’Arte, he sought to emphasize the moral lesson, 
anticipating some of the features of the drame bourgeois. As his biographer, 
Xavier de Courville, points out: 
 
Et voici, sans attendre Diderot, plus d’un drame bourgeois. Les scrupules 
de Lélio le portaient instinctivement de ce côté : il sait, avant l’heure de la 
comédie larmoyante, doubler le titre de ses pièces d’un sous-titre qui en 
dit la moralité : il dit Arlequin courtisan ou l’Ambition punie. 
(Courville, 1945, p.76) 
 
One intriguing example of this attempted renovation of dramaturgy is the 
comedy La Force de l’Amitié [La Forza dell’Amicitia], performed by the Comédie 
Italienne on 6th February 1717 (Dict. Th. t. II pp.614-61918, cited in Courville, 
1945, p.76, footnote 5). Riccoboni claimed the paternity of this scenario, which 
he intended to publish in a collection as an exemplar of the reformed Commedia 
(Riccoboni L., 1973). It is also the scenario on which Goldoni based Il vero 
amico (Goldoni, 1939), the comedy which Diderot was accused of plagiarising 
in his Le Fils naturel (Olsen, 2011). Although it is not known whether Diderot 
may have been aware of this scenario, which was played for a second time by 
the Comédie Italienne on 5th February 1748 (Dict. Th. t. VII p.53019, cited in 
Courville, 1945, p.77 footnote 3), the existence of such a curious point of 
reference between Riccoboni’s and Diderot’s dramaturgical reforms is indeed 
suggestive of a renovation of the theatre which was taking place at the 
crossroads between traditions of different cultural and national heritages.  
 
Riccoboni will be among the first ones to greet with enthusiasm the thriving of a 
new dramatic genre, half way between comedy and tragedy, and to ascribe to 
Nivelle de La Chaussée as early as 1738 the merit of having created a good 
model for it  (Riccoboni L., 1740, p.117). Nivelle de La Chaussée’s invention, 
subsequently called comédie larmoyante, will also be cited in the Garrick 
(Sticotti, 1770, p.64, note ‘z’), and considered the model of Diderot’s drame 
bourgeois (Wilson, 1972). 
 
                                                       
18 Dictionnaire des théâtres de Paris. Tome second, 1756. Paris: chez Lambert. 
19 Dictionnaire des théâtres de Paris. Tome septième, 1756. Paris: chez Lambert.	
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Another curious dramaturgical event in the history of the Comédie Italienne, 
which happened in 1716, links Riccoboni to Rémond de Sainte-Albine, who was 
then a young intellectual participating in the fashionable literary circles which 
saw the birth of the first collaborations between the Italian theatre and French 
playwrights. The string of successes of the Italian troupe had spurred cynics 
and enemies to doubt the supposed improvised nature of the actors’ 
performances. On the occasion of a particularly successful play, Sainte-Albine 
suggested challenging the Italian troupe to stage a scenario newly written for 
them and he composed the French scenario Lélio Vainqueur des Epreuves de 
la Constance, which was successfully performed by the troupe in Italian without 
previous rehearsals (Courville, 1945, pp.115-117).  
 
This episode is an important proof of Sainte-Albine’s acquaintance with the 
Comédie Italienne and with Luigi Riccoboni. Moreover, it bridges the question of 
dramaturgy with that of the art of the actor. As the renovation of dramaturgy and 
the experimentation with questions on acting were interlinked in Diderot’s 
project, so they were in Riccoboni’s. He wrote:  
 
Mais lorsqu’un Auteur est parvenu à bien peindre la nature et que les 
Acteurs récitent la Piece dans son véritable ton, en sorte que l’esprit 
séduit agréablement, prenne la fiction pour la vérité même: alors on est 
obligé de convenir qu’une représentation Théâtrale est un amusement 
supérieur à tout autre Spectacle public tel qu’il puisse être, parce qu’en 
satisfaisant les yeux, il intéresse le cœur et l’esprit. 
(Riccoboni L. 1767, p.323) 
 
The staging of comedies which portrayed more realistic situations with a moral 
intent, by consequence, implied a naturalistic acting style which kept its 
distance from the farcical tone of the former Italian theatre in Paris. At the same 
time, given that the reformation was springing from actors who were masters of 
extempore performance, their acting was also very different from the renowned 
declamatory style typical of many tragic actors of the Comédie Française.  
 
In January 1717 the Nouveau Mercure’s magazine wrote about the Italian 
troupe:  
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On ne peut rien désirer en eux du côté de l’action, du naturel, de la 
présence d’esprit ; ils sont au qui va là toujours à propos ; ils ont l’art 
d’animer, de passionner tellement ce qu’ils jouent, qu’ils se rendent 
maîtres du sentiment, et saisissent l’attention malgré le voile des paroles, 
et renvoient les auditeurs presque aussi contents que s’ils sortaient 
d’une comédie française où l’on a tout compris.  
(Nouveau Mercure, janvier 1717, cited in Courville, 1945, p.46) 
 
Luigi Riccoboni in particular would acquire fame as a great actor, reputed to be 
‘un des plus grands savants et des plus grands comédiens de l’Europe’ 
(Mercure, juin 1716, p.22, cited in Courville, 1945, p.46). After his retirement 
from the stage, in 1728, Riccoboni would begin to put his forty years of 
experience as actor on paper, writing several theoretical works on the theatre, 
making him a central protagonist of the eighteenth-century debate on the art of 
the actor and the renovation of the theatre, linked directly or indirectly with many 
of the other theorists. 
 
Why has he then remained relatively overshadowed? Although there may be 
many reasons for it, it is likely that the intense rivalry between the Italian and the 
French theatres in Paris, which was continuous during the first half of the 
eighteenth century, will have contributed to the temptation to downplay or ignore 
his contribution. The antagonism had deep roots and the Comédie Italienne had 
its detractors, among which the prominent voice of Voltaire, whose tragedies 
had seen many parodies on the Italian stage. Whereas Voltaire consistently 
took a position of disdain towards the Italian theatre, which he ‘n’eut pas de 
peine à imposer, dans l’histoire officielle de la littérature’ (Courville, 1945, 
p.158), there were also those who declared the Comédie Française defeated. 
As early as 1716, the Mercure’s magazine, a loyal supporter of the Italian 
troupe, wrote: ‘La Comédie Française languit à la vérité bien fort; d’autres 
disent qu’elle est à l’agonie; d’autres ajoutent qu’elle expire; d’autres enfin font 
courir le bruit qu’elle n’est plus’ (Mercure, juillet 1716, p.28, cited in Courville, 
1945, p.48).  
 
In years to come, the favours of the King would have to be contended for 
between the two companies, with the Italian troupe being invited to take a 
leading position in the celebrations for the coronation of Louis XV in 1722 and 
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being granted the privilege of regular residential performances for the Court at 
Fontainebleau, between 1724 and 1726. Luigi Riccoboni, his wife, and son, 
were conferred the honour of French naturalization in 1723 (Courville, 1945, 
pp.231-240). If many fruitful crosspollinations exist between the European 
traditions and especially between the French and Italian ones, it has to be 
acknowledged that they were somewhat obscured by rivalry and animosity. 
Moreover, the tendency of scholarly studies to place their focus within the 
boundaries of national history is particularly disadvantageous for the theatre 
history of this lively age, being prone to overlook important developments at the 
cross-roads of national cultures. 
 
Luigi Riccoboni’s published contributions to the history and theory of the theatre 
span the period from 1728 to 1743. Because of their author’s intention to 
address an international audience (Cappelletti, 1986), they are nearly all written 
in French, with the notable exception of Dell’Arte Rappresentativa, which is 
most probably, albeit largely unacknowledged, the first eighteenth-century work 
on the art of the actor. Its author’s claim for primacy may be taken more 
seriously than Sainte-Albine’s:  
 
Per lo spazio di molti anni, o cortese Lettore, sono andato frà mestesso 
pensando, che non essendo mai fin ad ora stata data regola alcuna a’ 
Comici per ammaestrarli nell’esercizio del’Arte loro ben fatto sarebbe che 
si trovase alcuno, che desse mano ad una tal Opera.20 
 (Riccoboni L., 1728, ‘A lettori’) 
  
 
As I have discussed earlier, Sainte-Albine declared his book published in 1747 
to be the first to address specifically a discussion of the art of the actor and 
made no mention of Luigi Riccoboni’s contributions. However, by 1747 Luigi 
Riccoboni had published a copious body of five theoretical treatises and two 
books on the history of the theatre.  
 
Riccoboni’s historical works are the Histoire du théâtre italien of 1728 
(Riccoboni L., 1730) and the Réflexions historiques et critiques sur les différens 
                                                       
20 For the duration of many years, kind Reader, I have been pondering that, as no rule has yet 
ever been given to Actors to instruct them in the practice of their Art, it would be a good thing to 
find someone who could turn his hand to such a Work. 
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théâtres de l’Europe of 1738 (Riccoboni L., 1740), this second book being the 
first comparative history of European theatre traditions (Courville, 1943, p.8), 
including an historical account of theatrical practice in Italy, Spain, France, 
England, Holland and Germany, and testifying to the breath of Riccoboni’s 
knowledge, both formed through scholarship and based on first hand 
experiences.  
 
The most copious of his other theoretical efforts are dedicated to dramaturgy 
and reveal the author’s ambition to carry out a systematic reformation of the 
theatre. His analysis of tragedy is expounded in the Dissertation sur la tragédie 
moderne (Riccoboni L., 1730), a work that he published in 1728 as an 
accompaniment to his history of the Italian theatre, while on comedy he wrote 
the Observations sur la comédie et sur le génie de Molière (Riccoboni L., 1736). 
His ideas are clearly the result of his practical attempt at reformation of both 
comedy and tragedy as an actor-manager working in northern Italy; this is 
attested by his Discorso della commedia all’improvviso (Riccoboni L., 1973), an 
essay written around 1721-22, but discovered and published posthumously. His 
last published essay, De la Réformation du Théâtre of 1743 (Riccoboni L., 
1767), intended as a synthesis of his previous efforts, insists on a call for moral 
reformation which entails the necessity for actors and actresses to conduct a 
morally irreprehensible private life (a request which Riccoboni had always 
imposed on his troupe actors), the nearly complete banning of love plots from 
all plays, and the regular donation of any profits to charity. It is a curiosity that 
Riccoboni dedicated this final work to the Empress of the Russian empire, 
Elisabeth I, anticipating Diderot in entrusting Russia with that renovation of 
theatre that Russia will eventually deliver, albeit two centuries later.  
 
Luigi Riccoboni’s writings on the art of the actor 
 
Despite Riccoboni (1767, p.64) believing that the reformation of the theatre 
needed to be dramaturgical in its essence, he also put great emphasis on the 
reformation of acting, writing two works dedicated to this subject: the poem 
Dell’Arte Rappresentativa, published in 1728, and the essay Pensées sur la 
Declamation (Riccoboni L., 1740), of 1738. The merit of Riccoboni’s reflections 
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on acting is suggested by an anecdote about Stanislavski. While reading 
extracts from the Pensées sur la Declamation, the Russian master ‘trembled 
with excitement. “Oh, the darling, the darling!” he exclaimed in a voice of infinite 
tenderness, stretching out his arms as though he could actually see the old 
Italian actor before him and wished to press him to his heart’ (Magarshack, 
195021, pp.336-337, cited in Cappelletti, 1986, p.15). Stanislavski had realized 
that nearly two centuries earlier Riccoboni had been his forerunner. 
 
Dell’Arte Rappresentativa was written in verse, supposedly following the 
suggestion of friends, while Riccoboni’s original intention had been to write the 
treatise in prose and in a dialogical form, a striking foreshadowing of the 
Paradoxe. The poem, written in Italian by the actor-manager of one of the most 
prominent theatres in Paris, was published in London, with a dedication to Lord 
Chesterfield, its international character testifying once more to the webs of 
cultural referencing across eighteenth-century Europe.  
 
The existence of this work seems to have been mostly ignored by its 
contemporaries and up to the most recent scholarship (Chaouche, 2007). Even 
François Riccoboni failed to mention Dell’Arte Rappresentativa in his essay 
L’Art du Théâtre, while he cited his father’s Pensées sur la déclamation. Albeit 
concealed, Dell’Arte Rappresentativa is a forerunner of the incipient tradition of 
essays dedicated exclusively to actors, pointing to Luigi Riccoboni’s timely 
awareness of the emerging of the art of the actor as an ‘autonomous object of 
study’ (Vicentini, 2011, p.11). 
 
Published ten years later as an accompaniment to his history of the European 
theatres, the essay entitled Pensées sur la Declamation (Riccoboni L., 1740), in 
French prose, was more readily accessible to a wide audience but constituted a 
more traditional treatise, concerning itself with declamation as an art which is of 
interest to all rhetorical practice, in continuity with the longstanding custom of 
considering acting a branch of oratory. Nevertheless, the Pensées sur la 
Declamation is still innovative and anticipates some of the important concepts of 
                                                       
21 David Magarshack, 1950, Stanislavsky: A Life. London: Macgibbon and Kee.  
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essays such as Le Comédien and the like. This work enjoyed a better fortune 
and was translated into English as early as 1741 (Cappelletti, 1986, p.14). 
 
In the Pensées sur la Declamation, Riccoboni states that the most important 
tool for the actor/orator is study, as opposed to natural gifts, anticipating the 
view expressed by The Actor and the Garrick.  Natural gifts, as a matter of fact, 
can be fully supplanted:  
 
On a vu très souvent, et on le voit tous les jours, qu’un homme à qui la 
Nature n’a point donné les talens nécessaires, ni d’inclination pour 
l’exercice de la profession qu’il a embrassée, parvient avec le travail 
presque au même degré de perfection que celui qui y est porté par goût, 
et à qui la Nature a prodigué tous les dons. 
(Riccoboni L., 1740, p.244) 
 
Rhetoric and acting require a long course of study and labour, but it is not – like 
in seventeenth-century treatises on oratory – a matter of learning fixed rules or 
set forms of expression. Human expressive capabilities are so varied that no 
rule could capture them; on the contrary an orator needs to find the truth of the 
expression according to the subtleties of each individual situation. And the 
means he suggests to reach this aim is for the orator to plunge himself into an 
introspective act. Riccoboni attributes the primary act of introspection to poets 
and writers:  
 
L’enthousiasme des Poëtes, et les profondes réflexions des Savans 
dans les tems qu’ils composent, ne sont que l’effet dans grand 
recueillement de leur esprit, qui examine la source des sentimens 
intérieurs et des passions de l’ame: c’est alors qu’ils voient la colère, la 
compassion, la vengeance, la tendresse, et le reste des passions en 
elles-mêmes: en sorte que la peinture qu’ils en font ensuite, est tellement 
vive et véritable, que les Lecteurs n’y trouvent rien à retrancher, ni à 
ajouter. 
 (Riccoboni L., 1740, p.251) 
 
In this he echoes Aristotle’s idea that poets’ creative work is grounded in their 
ability to experience the emotions they want to portray.  
 
Riccoboni extends the rule of introspection to the orator as by necessity: 
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Or comment pourroit-on réciter ou déclamer de tels Ouvrages, autrement 
qu’avec les tons de l’ame aussi? C’est pour cela qu’il me paroit inévitable 
que les Orateurs, les Savans, les Poëtes, &c. entrent aussi en 
enthousiasme en déclamant, de la même façon qu’ils ont fait en 
composant. Si l’ame qui en a inspiré les pensées en dicte pareillement la 
prononciation, les tons seront vrais & variés à l’infini, depuis l’héroïque  
le plus élevé, jusqu’au familier le plus simple.  
(Riccoboni L., 1740, pp.252-253) 
 
 
The final expressive deed for the orator remains an act of sentiment: ‘Sentir ce 
que l’on dit, voilà les tons de l’ame […] Il faut pour cela qu’il [l’Orateur] déclame 
si naturellement, qu’il force, pour ainsi dire, les Spectateurs à croire que tout ce 
qu’il dit il le pense dans l’instant même’ (Riccoboni L., 1740, pp.263-264). 
Although still imbued with rhetorical principles, Riccoboni introduces the 
dynamic relationship between esprit and sentiment, which will be essential in 
the understanding of the art of the actor from Le Comédien onwards. And it is in 
his earlier essay on the subject, Dell’Arte Rappresentativa, that Luigi Riccoboni 
will indicate more clearly, albeit in a less accessible style, his views on the 
actor’s relation with her own feelings. 
 
Dell’Arte Rappresentativa is written in response to the perceived lack of rules 
that has brought acting to its decline, and the corresponding corruption of the 
audience’s taste. Hence, anticipating The Actor’s line of reasoning on the 
interdependence of spectators’ judgement and actors’ performance, Riccoboni 
addresses his pledges to both actors and spectators, and moreover he wishes 
that his work will urge others to follow in his steps, an entreaty which will be 
amply yielded to.  
 
The principles of Riccoboni’s reform, as we have seen, are along the lines of an 
acting style which is more naturalistic (‘l’oro puro della semplice Natura’ [the 
pure gold of simple Nature], Riccoboni L., 1728, ‘A lettori’). He has very harsh 
words for the monotonous style of declamation, which he calls ‘cantilena’ 
[singsong] (1728, p.42), used in France and in the Italian Academies following 
the French example: ‘Ella ti ucide, ti sfibra, ti svena’ [it kills you, it wears you 
out, it bleeds you] (1728, p.42). To promote a naturalistic acting style he is 
probably the first to suggest a self-absorption of the actors on stage, which 
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anticipates the rule of the fourth wall, subsequently formulated by Diderot in De 
la poésie dramatique: 
 
Nel arte de la Rappresentazione/ La prima delle regole è il supporre,/ 
Che tu sei solo fra mille persone;/ E che l’Attore che teco discorre/ È il 
solo, che ti vede, e ch’egli solo/ I veri sensi tuoi deve raccorre.22 
(Riccoboni, 1728, p.53) 
 
This idea is linked to the necessity for the actor to harmonize her body language 
to the meaning of the words she is pronouncing, being constantly aware of her 
bodily stage presence including times when she is not speaking. In pursuing a 
naturalistic performance which encompasses the delivery of the words as well 
as the posturing of the body, he proscribes actors from using a mirror when 
studying a character, and he wishes he could ‘cut off’ those limbs which are 
used in a stereotyped or disorderly manner (Riccoboni L., 1728, p.15) perhaps 
here thinking of the excessive gestures of a certain unbridled style of 
Commedia. These principles will be repeated word for word by François 
Riccoboni in L’Art du Théâtre, the striking similarities pointing to François being 
a good student at his father’s school, if not to a direct but unacknowledged 
familiarity with Dell’Arte Rappresentativa.  
 
According to Luigi Riccoboni, the aim of a naturalistic style of performance is its 
ability to entertain the spectator within the norm of truthfulness (‘dilettare col 
vero’ [to please with the truth], 1728, ‘A lettori’). The relationship between the 
actor’s performance and the spectator’s experience remains within the canons 
of classical rhetoric, the actor feeling the emotions of the character so that the 
audience can be under the illusion that she is experiencing the character’s 
passions in the first person: she has to ‘si ben cercare/ Di sentire la cosa, che ci 
esponi,/ Che si creda esser tuo l’altrui affare’ (1728, p.17)23. However there are 
limitations within which this relationship needs to be bounded. First of all, 
following the rule of classical decorum, which he rebrands as ‘buon senso’ 
[common sense] (1728, p.46), Riccoboni prescribes the absolute abstaining 
                                                       
22 In the art of Representation/ The first rule is to imagine,/ That you are alone among a 
thousand people;/ And that the Actor who converses with you/ Is the only one who can see you, 
and that he alone/ is to gather your true meanings. 
23 try so carefully/ to feel the matter that you exhibit,/ that we believe someone else’s concern to 
be yours. 
 
 
115 
from excesses: ‘Natura si, ma bella dee mostrarsi’ [Nature indeed, but its 
appearance must be pleasing] (1728, p.25). Secondly, there may well be 
situations in which it becomes impossible for the actor to reach the extent of the 
feeling required. In this case, the actor’s effort is to make the audience believe 
in her feeling, even if she does not actually experience it: ‘E sia fittizio il Ver 
s’altro non puoi/’ [let Truth be feigned if you cannot otherwise] (1728, p.34). 
 
The considerations about the limits of the actor’s sensibility take Riccoboni on 
the path of exploring the intriguing dynamic between truth and pretence. He 
describes the not uncommon situation of an actor who is portraying a character 
who is feigning a feeling before another character, for example a lady who 
simulates despair with her lover to keep him enthralled: such actress will have 
to show the other character the signs of a credibly felt desperation while 
indicating to the spectator the feigned nature of her feelings. This is ultimately 
the sign of great acting: ‘Son queste le reti, e son gli aguati/ Ove il Comico 
attende i Spettatori/ Per renderli confusi, edificati’ (1728, p.36)24. And as models 
for her endeavours, Riccoboni points to courtiers, flatterers and hypocrites, all of 
whom know very well how to feign a passion to the point that it is experienced 
as real by their target audience (1728, pp.36-37). In this formulation Riccoboni 
sets the foundations of the paradox of the actor which will be addressed with 
special interest by future theorists up to the Paradoxe. 
 
L’Art du Théâtre by François Riccoboni 
 
L’Art du Théâtre is François Riccoboni’s only essay on the theatre. Publishing it 
in 1750, under friendly solicitation (or so its author claims, similarly to what his 
father had declared about his poem on the actor’s art), François reveals to have 
written it years before (Riccoboni F., 1750, ‘Avant Propos’).  It is in French and 
dedicated to an anonymous actress, who, it is claimed, has approached the 
author to ask for his advice (1750, p.2). François recommends his father’s 
Pensées sur la Declamation as a work which contains fine reflections on acting, 
but which lacks in setting down the most basic principles (1750, pp.3-4), and 
                                                       
24 These are the nets, and the snares/ Where the Actor waits upon the Spectators/ To make 
them confused, edified. 
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this is what he proposes to do himself. He then proceeds to discuss a long list 
of topics in a systematic and at times dogmatic way, and in some of the content 
he repeats ideas that can be found in Dell’Arte Rappresentativa: he proscribes 
the use of the mirror, he warns against the excessive movements of the limbs, 
he criticizes the monotonous declamatory tone of the French style and he refers 
to the need of the actor to be absorbed by what happens on stage. 
 
Similarly to Luigi, he emphasises the necessity of studying, and formulates with 
precision the object of study, with a description of what Sainte-Albine (1749, 
p.21) had already called ‘les circonstances’:  
 
Il ne suffit pas d’entendre les discours qu’un Auteur a mis dans notre 
bouche, et de ne pas les rendre à contresens. Il faut concevoir à chaque 
instant le rapport que peut avoir ce que nous disons avec le caractère de 
notre rôle, avec la situation où nous met la scène, et avec l’effet que cela 
doit produire dans l’action totale. 
 (Riccoboni F., 1750, p.31) 
 
Walking in his father’s footsteps, whose legacy he acknowledges, his points of 
reference are nature and truth, but moderated by the relics of the classical 
decorum, which he calls ‘vernis de politesse’ (1750, p.43):  
 
Mon père a coutume de dire, que pour être frappant, il faut aller deux 
doigts au-delà du naturel; mais que si l’on passe cette mesure d’une 
ligne, on est sur le champ outré et desagréable. Cette façon de parler 
explique à merveille le danger où l’àcteur est continuellement d’exprimer 
ou trop ou trop peu. Examinons cependant si l’on ne pourroit pas trouver 
dans la nature, des modèles, qui parfaitement suivis, donneroient 
l’extrême vérité accompagnée de la vigueur nécessaire.  
(Riccoboni F., 1750, p.42)  
 
The rule of rhetoric determined that the spectator or auditor should bring to feel, 
and to this end, the actor or orator should also feel. ‘La seule règle à suivre est 
celle que nous prescrit le sentiments que nous avons à rendre’ (1750, p.26) 
writes François, and in this he is still following a predictable trail. But what 
makes him a distinct voice, skilfully picked by Diderot to represent his 
controversial view, is his willingness to break the supposed continuity between 
the spectator’s and the actor’s emotional state. As I have amply discussed 
already, most theorists acknowledge the complexity of such continuity and 
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especially they do not allow, despite Diderot’s insinuations, for an easy solution 
for the actor. The actor has to work hard with her intelligence and rational 
judgement, to create the conditions to express emotions which will be 
compellingly felt by the spectators. François Riccoboni instead denies that such 
continuity ever existed:  
 
L’on appelle expression, l’adresse par laquelle on fait sentir au 
spectateur tous les mouvements dont on veut paroître pénétré. Je dis 
que l’on veut le paroître, et non pas que l’on est pénétré véritablement. 
Je vais à ce sujet, Madame, vous dévoiler une de ces erreurs brillantes 
dont on s’est laissé séduire, et à laquelle un peu de charlatanisme de la 
part des Comédiens peut avoir beaucoup aidé. Lorsqu’un Acteur rend 
avec la force nécessaire les sentiments de son rôle, le Spectateur voit en 
lui la plus parfaite image de la vérité. Un homme qui seroit vraiment en 
pareille situation, ne s’exprimeroit pas d’une autre manière, et c’est 
jusqu’à ce point qu’il fait porter l’illusion pour bien jouer. Etonnés d’une si 
parfaite imitation du vrai, quelques-uns l’ont prise pour la vérité même, et 
ont cru l’Acteur affecté du sentiment qu’il représentoit. 
 (Riccoboni F., 1750, pp.36-37)  
 
This is the paradox of acting, says Diderot, the severing of the tie between the 
actor’s and the spectator’s emotional states.  
 
And yet, François Riccoboni’s formulation is interesting more because of its 
difference than its similarity with Diderot’s assumption. Diderot depicts the 
profile of crafty actors, almost cynical in their shrewd approach to performance. 
François instead talks of an impossibility:  
 
si l’on a le malheur de ressentir véritablement ce que l’on doit exprimer, 
on est hors d’état de jouer.  […] Si dans un endroit d’attendrissement 
vous vous laissez emporter au sentiment de votre rôle, votre cœur se 
trouvera tout-à-coup serré, votre voix s’étouffera presqu’entierement; s’il 
tombe une seule larme de vos yeux, des sanglots involontaires vous 
embarrasseront le gosier, il vous sera impossible de proférer un seul mot 
sans des hocquets ridicules. 
(Riccoboni F., 1750, pp.37-38) 
 
To avoid being trapped by the real emotions, the actor is left with little choice, 
but to work on herself to reproduce the signs of feeling without experiencing the 
feeling itself. 
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Such work is costly for the actor, not just in terms of the physical effort, but also 
emotionally:  
 
Je ne dis pas qu’en jouant les morceaux de grand passion l’Acteur ne 
ressente une émotion très-vive, c’est même ce qu’il y a de plus fatiguant 
au Théâtre. Mais cette agitation vient des efforts qu’on est obligé de faire 
pour peindre une passion que l’on ne ressent pas, ce qui donne au sang 
un mouvement extraordinaire auquel le Comédien peut être lui-même 
trompé, s’il n’a pas examiné avec attention la véritable cause d’où cela 
provient. 
 (Riccoboni F., 1750, p.41)  
 
Far from Diderot’s actors, who tease each other with ease while they also 
perform a love scene, François Riccoboni’s actors labour emotionally and 
physically to keep themselves passion-proof. 
 
Great connoisseur of the human heart, the actor knows how to make the 
spectator believe her feigned feelings to be true.  
 
Il faut connoître parfaitement quels sont les mouvements de la nature 
dans les autres, et demeurer toujours assez le maître de son âme pour 
la faire à son gré ressembler à celui d’autrui. Voilà le grand art. Voilà 
d’où naît cette parfaite illusion à laquelle les spectateurs ne peuvent se 
refuser, et qui les entraîne en dépit d’eux.  
(Riccoboni F., 1750, p.41) 
 
While Luigi Riccoboni would have never renounced the rhetoric dogma of 
‘Sentir ce que l’on dit’ (Riccoboni L., 1740, p.263), his description in Dell’Arte 
Rappresentativa of the actor who portrays a character who feigns a feeling, or 
his pointing to courtiers, flatterers and hypocrites as models of great acting 
(Riccoboni L., 1728, pp.36-37), is the closest one can get to François’s 
conceptualization. 
 
DIDEROT’S THEORY OF ACTING- A TRAJECTORY 
 
Diderot’s earlier theories 
 
Diderot’s significance to the history of theatre grounds in his attempts to 
establish a new form of drama, that he calls le genre sérieux as opposed to the 
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classical taxonomical genres of comedy and tragedy. His project is that of a 
playwright and of a theorist. In 1757 he writes his first play, Le Fils naturel, 
followed the next year by Le Père de famille (1939, pp.169-298). Both plays are 
accompanied by significant expositions of theory, respectively in Les Entretiens 
sur Le Fils naturel, a triplet of dialogues supposedly between Diderot and 
Dorval, author of the play, and in De la poésie dramatique (1939, pp.299-394), 
a more conventional treatise on theatrical matters addressed to his friend 
Grimm. Because the discourse in these works is somewhat dominated by 
dramaturgy, it must be specified that within the wider scope of a general reform 
of the theatre, the preoccupation with acting is fairly marginal. Nevertheless, it is 
significant. 
 
As I have discussed earlier, there are a number of intriguing parallels between 
Diderot’s project and Luigi Riccoboni’s pioneering endeavours. Indeed there is 
the perhaps accidental, nevertheless noteworthy fact that Le Fils naturel is the 
grandchild of one of Riccoboni’s scenarios, which he considered a normative 
example of the new style of comedy that he wanted to promote towards his 
proposed renovation of theatre. As I shall discuss below, the passage from 
Riccoboni’s scenario to Diderot’s play is mediated by one of Goldoni’s 
comedies, which took the scenario as its source and became in turn a source 
for Diderot’s play. Aside from the common rooting of their plot, most importantly 
what joins together Riccoboni, Diderot and indeed Goldoni, is a preoccupation 
with the renovation of theatre that stemming from dramaturgy inevitably falls 
into generating theories of acting.  
 
The first accomplished expression of Diderot’s ideas on the theatre comes with 
the Entretiens sur Le Fils naturel. Diderot’s spokesman is Dorval, the supposed 
author of Le Fils naturel, an amateur playwright eager to promote a view of the 
function and scope of playwriting centred on vraisemblance. The quest for 
truthfulness extends to the various levels of dramatic composition, from 
thematic choices, which need to reflect real and realistic facts, to the details of 
the dramatisation, being inclined to favour the Aristotelian unities, in as much as 
they are at the service, not the disservice, of realism. Following a domino effect, 
vraisemblance becomes a concern in relation to acting; and what could be more 
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apt to study the scope of this subject than Dorval’s project, to put actors in the 
condition to play themselves? The ploy of Le Fils naturel is that Dorval has 
based the play entirely on a true fact which has occurred to him and his family 
and that he has called the life-protagonists of the event to become protagonists 
on stage of the dramatisation of the event itself. 
 
Diderot’s game between fiction and reality (Hobson, 1974) is already a paradox: 
the play itself and the dialogues which accompany it are fictional but they 
represent Dorval/Diderot’s experimentation with the absolute correspondence 
between fiction and reality, both on the plane of dramatic writing and on that of 
acting. While the play, as declared in its Introduction (Diderot, 1939, pp.19-21), 
is supposed to be the dramatisation of a real event, it is in fact the adaptation of 
a subplot of the Italian comedy Il vero amico by Goldoni (1939), first published 
in 1751. The actors are supposed to be people made of flesh and blood, who 
have lived through the events described in the play as well as performed them, 
while their reality is twice removed because their existence is only based on the 
sparse references of the Entretiens (Hobson, 1974). The Entretiens are 
supposedly the transcription of Diderot’s conversations with Dorval, Diderot 
even scrupling to point out that such transcription may not do justice to Dorval’s 
impromptu words. In fact, they are Diderot’s lucubrations with himself. 
 
The circular cross-referencing between fiction and reality justifies the question 
of what might be Diderot’s intention. It could be argued that Diderot’s wish to 
emphasize vraisemblance may have induced him to hide the fictional source in 
order to make plot and actors appear as truthful as possible. If this was the 
case, it still begs the question of why Diderot chose to base his play on a 
comedy by Goldoni rather than a news story, for instance. On the other hand, it 
has been suggested (Mittman, 1973) that calling his play a true story was 
Diderot’s device to hide the plagiarism. I will discuss the relation between 
Diderot and Goldoni more in detail later in this chapter. In particular I will 
emphasize how Diderot’s most significant borrowing from Goldoni, is perhaps 
not that of the plot, but rather of his poetic motives. As has already been shown 
(Cederna, 2007), Goldoni’s substantial contribution to the development of the 
genre sérieux as championed by Diderot, has long remained unacknowledged 
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partly because of that rivalry between the French and Italian theatrical traditions 
which was particularly felt in eighteenth-century Paris. Moreover, as I have 
already hinted at, historical studies concentrating on national landscapes have 
tended to perpetuate such lack of recognition. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Entretiens present, within a wider emphasis on 
vraisemblance, an emerging theory on the art of the actor which endorses the 
need for a realistic performance. Dorval’s entreaty is that his play be judged 
according to the standards of domestic truth (‘le salon’, literally the sitting room), 
not those of established theatrical conventions. He hence deplores the habit of 
actors who perform the most dramatic lines disposed in a symmetrical 
semicircle facing the audience. Here the critique against the declamatory style 
of the actors of the Comédie Française is not new, for example having been 
voiced by both Riccobonis (Riccoboni L., 1740, pp.266-269; Riccoboni F., 1750, 
pp.20-23), although it is somewhat unusual in coming from a very French 
quarter. Dorval’s insistence on the importance of gesture as an expressive 
means, along with his emphasis on the global visual effect, as realized by the 
tableau, while testifying to Diderot’s cultural background as a prolific art critic, 
resonates, again, with a similar concern found in both Riccobonis (Riccoboni L., 
1728; Riccoboni F., 1750, pp.4-5), and, more in general, within the Commedia 
dell’Arte tradition. 
 
Alongside these motifs, there are other intriguing remarks on acting, like for 
example Dorval’s observation that his fellow actors were influenced in their 
performance by their present feelings even if they were asked to act according 
to their feelings in a not very distant past. He gives the example of how the 
acquired tenderness for each other following the forming of romantic bonds 
between himself and Constance and between Clairville and Rosalie, leads to a 
mellowing of their interpretation of past vicissitudes during which their real 
sentiments had been somewhat sharper. It is worth noting the colossal 
difference between this imaginary experiment on acting in which the 
coincidence between actor and character is taken to extremes, and Diderot’s 
later theoretical formulation in which the absolute distinction between actor’s 
and character’s feelings becomes a paradox. 
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How to find the truth of emotional expression for the characters, both from the 
perspective of the playwright and the actor, is a matter of interest, and Dorval’s 
solution is – again, not an absolute novelty – that the characters need to be 
placed in the given circumstances: ‘il ne faut point donner d’esprit à ses 
personnages; mais savoir les placer dans des circonstances qui leur en 
donnent’ (Diderot, 1939, p.103). So established, and re-emphasizing that the 
expression of feelings lies in their connection with gesture and visual 
representation, the theory concludes by giving prominence to sensibility in the 
art of the actor. An actress of mediocre intelligence but great sensibility can 
reach the heights of emotional expression: she finds ‘sans y penser, l’accent qui 
convient à plusieurs sentiments différents qui se fondent ensemble, et qui 
constituent cette situation que toute la sagacité du philosophe n’analyserait pas’ 
(1939, p.108). Here lies the already quoted Dorval/Diderot’s assertion ‘Les 
poëtes, les acteurs, les musiciens, les peintres, les chanteurs de premier ordre, 
les grands danseurs, les amants tendres, les vrais dévots, toute cette troupe 
enthousiaste et passionnée sent vivement, et réfléchit peu’ (1939, p.108), 
nothing more distant from the theory of the Paradoxe where sensibility is an 
absolute hindrance to good acting and only the intellectual faculty of analysis 
befits the great actor. 
 
In De la poésie dramatique, the treatise which accompanies Le Père de famille, 
other significant passages on acting can be found. One of the most striking is 
Diderot’s demand that both author and actor forget the audience: ‘Imaginez, sur 
le bord du théâtre, un grand mur qui vous sépare du parterre; jouez comme si la 
toile ne se levait pas’ (1939, p.345). This may well be the first ever explicit 
formulation of the rule of the fourth wall, which will become established more 
than a century later with Antoine (Artioli, 2000).  
 
As I have previously described, the rule of the given circumstances had already 
been recommended by previous essays on the actor, especially the couplet 
Comédien-The Actor (The Garrick was yet to come) while the concept of the 
fourth wall was already present in its embryonic form in Dell’Arte 
Rappresentativa and in De l’Art du Théâtre. Were it possible that Diderot 
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ignored these background references, it is most probable that he would have 
encountered them in Goldoni, of whom, as we have seen, he knew at least one 
play. 1750 saw the Venetian first edition of Goldoni’s collected plays, which was 
followed shortly afterwards, in 1753, by a Florentine edition. Both editions 
included Goldoni’s (1983) play-manifesto Il teatro comico which contains 
passages that describe theatrical rules akin to the given circumstances and the 
fourth wall. Hereafter, I shall discuss the relationship between Diderot’s and 
Goldoni’s ideas on the theatre by taking a closer look at various aspects of their 
theories. 
 
Diderot and Goldoni 
 
Shortly after the publication of Le Fils naturel, the polemicist and journalist Élie 
Fréron reviewed the play in the June 1757 issue of the Année Littéraire. In the 
July issue he proceeded to publish the summary of Goldoni’s Il vero amico, thus 
revealing the fictional source of Diderot’s play and preparing the ground for 
subsequent accusations of plagiarism (Olsen, 2011), such as the one by 
Palissot, in his November 1757 publication Petites lettres sur des grands 
philosophes (Palissot, 1777, p.149). There is no doubt that Diderot’s play 
follows Goldoni’s quite closely (Mittman, 1973). However, in his vehement self-
defence in De la poésie dramatique, Diderot rejects the accusation on the basis 
that his work is substantially different from Goldoni’s at the level of plot, 
definition of characters and overall genre. Goldoni’s comedy is dismissed as a 
farce, while Diderot’s is of course the paradigmatic example of the new genre 
sérieux.  
 
It is a point of note, that Diderot became very bitterly enraged with Goldoni 
himself, despite Goldoni having had no part in the accusation in the first place. 
Goldoni gave his version of events first in 1764, in the preface of Il vero amico 
(1939, pp.573-575) published in the Paperini Edition, and then in 1787, in his 
French Mémoires (1935, pp.456-458). Published thirty years after the quarrel 
about Le Fils naturel, Goldoni’s account in the Mémoires shows how afflicted he 
had been by Diderot’s unfair scorn towards him. Goldoni had always been 
unconcerned about the borrowing from his play, and was anxious to excuse 
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Diderot on all fronts, except the fact that in De la poésie dramatique (1939, 
pp.337-339) the philosophe had called his comedies ‘farces’, showing an utter 
disregard for his stature as playwright and theatre reformer. This was despite 
the fact that he had been praised by many, including Fréron, and most 
flattering, Voltaire25. Since his move to Paris in 1762, Goldoni had hoped to be 
able to explain himself in person to Diderot, but his failed attempts left him with 
the impression that the philosophe was perhaps purposefully trying to avoid 
meeting him. Eventually a short meeting took place at Diderot’s home and 
seemingly peace was made (Goldoni, 1935, pp.456-458). 
 
Despite Diderot’s protestations against Fréron’s accusations, the script of Le 
Fils naturel is very similar in structure to Il vero amico (Mittman, 1973). 
However, as Diderot pointed out in his defence, the borrowing of material from 
author to author was a very common practice in the eighteenth and earlier 
centuries: Molière did it many times, says Diderot, and Goldoni himself took half 
the plot of Il vero amico from Molière’s Avare (Diderot, 1939, p.337). In fact, 
Goldoni often employed Commedia dell’Arte scenarios as his sources and in 
this instance there is indeed a corresponding scenario entitled La force de 
l’amitié. This had been composed by Luigi Riccoboni and played at the 
Comédie Italienne in Paris in 1717 and 1748 (Courville, 1945, pp.76-77). 
Riccoboni (1973) considered it a model comedy and intended to publish it 
alongside other five comedies in the appendix to his treatise on the reformation 
of Commedia, which remained unpublished.  
 
Although Luigi Riccoboni had been the forerunner of the attempt at cleansing 
the Commedia dell’Arte from immorality and coarseness, Goldoni’s reform of 
comedy within Italy was without doubt the most influential and successful, so 
much so as to grant him the epithet of ‘Molière d’Italie’, first given him by Fréron 
in 1763 (Olsen, 2011). In the presentation of his works to the reader (Goldoni, 
1971), starting from the Venice Edition of 1750 and reproduced in subsequent 
editions, Goldoni was introducing himself as a reformer of the theatre and was 
indicating the thread of his conduct. In 1751 his play Il teatro comico, which is 
                                                       
25 In his letter to Albergati. Voltaire’s Correspondence. Edited by Theodore Besterman. Vol. 
XLII. Letter 8242, p.140. Genève: Institut et Musée Voltaire. Les Délices.  
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the manifesto for his poetics, was also published. In line with many of his 
contemporaries, Goldoni’s emphasis was on nature and ‘verosimiglianza’ (the 
Italian for vraisemblance), and his intention was to write comedies which would 
be of moral instruction to the spectators, in particular with regard to the 
condemnation of vice and promotion of virtues that were the domestic concerns 
of his bourgeois audience. He hence strove to remove all farcical elements from 
his plays, which explains why Diderot’s remark on him had been particularly felt.  
 
As Goldoni declares in Il teatro comico, one of the routes he employed in order 
to follow nature and vraisemblance was to slowly but surely lead his Commedia 
dell’Arte actors to give up the traditional masks and to perform following a script 
rather than impromptu. Through the voice of his alter-ego, the actor-manager 
Orazio, he also talks of the importance of placing the characters with their 
virtues and vices within the specific circumstances (1983, pp.86-87), although 
this is a reference to dramaturgy rather than acting. Orazio also exhorts actors 
to imagine, while they perform, that they are alone on the stage and that no 
audience is there to see them, an anticipation of the ‘fourth wall’: 
 
E non vedete, che col popolo non si parla? Che il comico deve 
immaginarsi, quando è solo, che nessuno lo senta e che nessuno lo 
veda?26 
(Goldoni, 1983, p.75) 
 
It is not known for sure whether Diderot knew these declarations of poetic 
principles by Goldoni. However, it does not seem at all unlikely that the edition 
of Goldoni’s works where he read Il vero amico may have also put at his 
disposal Il teatro comico. Diderot’s project of reformation of drama initiated with 
Le Fils naturel and the Entretiens has many points in common with Goldoni’s 
poetics. Might this be the ‘plagiarism’ that, consciously or unconsciously, 
preoccupied Diderot most and lay behind his exaggerated denial of Fréron’s 
accusation and his unjust hostility towards Goldoni? 
 
                                                       
26 And can’t you see that one should not address the audience? The actor must imagine, when 
he is alone on stage, that no one can hear him and no one can see him. 
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If some of Goldoni’s ideas may have been an important source of Diderot’s 
theories, it must be remembered that most of these notions are not Goldoni’s 
original inventions, but rather leitmotivs which run through the eighteenth-
century debate on theatre, especially but not solely in works of the Italian 
heritage. Dario Fo (1977, p.98-99) for instance maintains that the invention of 
the fourth wall is due to the actor-manager Francesco Andreini and may date as 
early as the mid sixteenth century, at a time when Andreini and his company 
were playing for the King of France, initiating the tradition of Italian Commedia 
being played in Paris. Andreini initiated a change of acting style when the 
company was performing in theatres as opposed to street stages: he incited his 
actors to ignore the presence of the audience and banished the established 
custom to address spectators directly through the ‘aside’. 
 
While a slow process of evolution is a most likely explanation, Luigi Riccoboni 
was instrumental in consolidating these principles in theoretical works. It is 
therefore possible that his endeavours represent one of the indirect but 
essential roots of Diderot’s, which seep into the encyclopaedist’s theoretical 
system both through the mediation of Goldoni and through the French writers 
who studied and worked with Luigi Riccoboni, such as Sainte-Albine, Sticotti, 
and Riccoboni’s own son François.  
 
The context of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ theatrical vicissitudes 
in Paris, characterized by a relentless rivalry between its major theatres and 
uppermost between the Comédie Française and the Comédie Italienne – the 
official and powerful representative of Commedia dell’Arte in France – may 
further justify the supposed emulation of and antagonism towards Goldoni, that 
might have played a part in Diderot’s early theatrical works. Diderot makes a 
rare mention of the Italian troupe in Paris when, in De la poésie dramatique 
(1939, p.377), he talks about their superiority compared to the French actors in 
the ease with which they use bodily expression (‘pantomime’) on stage and in 
their performance being more respectful of the fourth wall. Aside the various 
demeaning comments that accompany the praise, a glimpse of the pressure 
that a French intellectual might have felt in writing in approbation of the Italian 
actors is given by Diderot’s allusion when he anticipates that many readers will 
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be disgusted by his comment. As I have discussed above, many were the 
borrowings and cross-referencing between the Italian and French tradition 
which were kept quiet or fell into obscurity. 
 
It is ultimately the Paradoxe that acts as an undeclared but exemplary synthesis 
of the trans-European debate on the art of the actor that I have so far 
considered. In discussing this masterpiece in the next section, I will have the 
opportunity to draw further conclusions about its direct or indirect cross- 
referencing.  
 
The Paradoxe sur le comédien 
 
The composition of the Paradoxe may be dated to the years between 1770 and 
1773 (Wilson, 1972, p.620), since Diderot informed Madame d’Épinay in August 
1773 that a ‘certain pamphlet sur l’art de l’acteur est presque devenu un 
ouvrage’ (Abirached, 1994, p.206). It had been occasioned by the publication, in 
1770, of the treatise Garrick ou les Acteurs Anglois (Sticotti, 1770) which 
Diderot reviewed in an article published in the Correspondance littéraire27, an 
article which anticipated the argument of the posthumously published essay. 
Despite being written as a dialogue between two interlocuteurs, the first of 
whom is supposedly Diderot himself, the arguments and counterarguments of 
the Paradoxe are predominantly carried by this first speaker, while the second 
one has mostly the function of attentive listener, who facilitates the unfolding of 
Diderot’s reasoning through his docile questioning.  
 
As I have previously described, references to previous theories are scarce and 
tend to be unhelpfully categorized into polarities: Sticotti and Sainte-Albine 
versus Diderot and François Riccoboni, the first two representing the old-
fashioned mistaken assumption of an emotionalist theory of acting (to use 
Archer’s (1888) later terminology), while Diderot, following in the footsteps of 
François Riccoboni, appears to open the new path of an anti-emotionalist theory 
of the actor’s art. In reality, many ideas of the Paradoxe that get discussed by 
                                                       
27 In: Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique de Grimm et de Diderot, depuis 1753 
jusqu’en 1790. Nouvelle édition. Tome septième, 1770-1772, pp.73-84 + pp.94-105. Paris: 
Furne et Ladrange, 1829.   
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the first interlocuteur seemingly as if they were his original intuitions, had been 
anticipated by previous writers, and particularly by Luigi and François 
Riccoboni, Sainte-Albine, Hill and Sticotti. The Paradoxe, as well as being an 
inspiring and intriguing work of genius, is also an inaccurate piece of scholarly 
critique, where the misrepresented points of contrast with the Garrick and its 
related references are in fact points of difference or frank oppositions to 
Diderot’s earlier theories. 
 
In the Entretiens sur Le Fils naturel the encyclopaedist had derived his rules of 
acting through the supposed experiment of untrained actors endeavouring to 
perform themselves. In 1758, shortly after the publication of Le Père de famille 
and De la poésie dramatique, Madame Riccoboni, François Riccoboni’s wife, 
had written to him a letter (Diderot, 1994, pp.121-143) correcting what she 
perceived to be his mistaken assumptions on acting and gently accusing him of 
lacking the specific knowledge of the craft. Diderot, she claimed, did not have 
first-hand experience of the stage and hence could not understand the rationale 
behind some of the acting devices that he criticized or wanted to modify. In 
particular, she was sceptical of the emphasis he put on following the rules of 
nature:  
 
La nature est belle, mais il faut la montrer par les côtés qui peuvent la 
rendre utile et agréable. [...] La scène ne peut jamais devenir aussi 
simple que la chambre; et pour être vrai au théâtre, il faut passer un peu 
le naturel. 
(Diderot, 1994, p.126) 
 
Neither in his response letter to Madame Riccoboni, nor in later writings, will 
Diderot admit heeding Madame Riccoboni’s advice, and in the Paradoxe he will 
actually take an opportunity to name her, perhaps maliciously, as ‘une des plus 
mauvaises actrices qui aient jamais paru sur la scène’ (Diderot, 1994, p.102) on 
account of her excessive sensibility. However, in the Paradoxe, he will 
eventually resolve the opposition between nature and art in decisive favour of 
art. For instance, in one of its passages, the first interlocuteur declares: ‘portez 
au théâtre votre ton familier, votre expression simple, votre maintien 
domestique, votre geste naturel, et vous verrez combien vous serez pauvre et 
faible. Vous aurez beau verser des pleurs, vous serez ridicule, on rira’ (1994, 
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p.47) and later on: ‘un moyen sûr de jouer petitement, mesquinement, c’est 
d’avoir à jouer son propre caractère’ (1994, p.71).  
 
The Paradoxe establishes acting on the firm grounds of a theory which 
emphasizes study as opposed to nature as the principal maker of a great actor. 
While the first interlocuteur grants nature a part to play in endowing actors with 
gifts such as looks, voice and intelligence, he affirms that art only can put those 
gifts to use, through the learning and practice of a craft which requires the study 
of other actors’ models, the experience of the stage, as well as the study of the 
human heart through observation of human behaviour in society (1994, p.36). 
Perhaps unwittingly, Madame Riccoboni’s reproach had been taken on board. 
 
Besides, in emphasizing the importance of study over the consideration given to 
natural talents, the Paradoxe is stating a principle already firmly established by 
the triplet Comédien-The Actor-Garrick. It is not a novel idea, except in relation 
to the earlier writings of Diderot himself. However our author chooses to 
misrepresent the sources he makes reference to, denying any consonance of 
his theories to those of the Garrick which he calls an ‘ouvrage, écrit d’un style 
tourmenté, obscur, entortillé, boursouflé, […] plein d’idées communes’ (1994, 
p.36). As we shall see, many more will be the unacknowledged similarities with 
the Garrick, but expressed with such unlikeness of language to uphold the 
suspicion of difference. Incidentally, at the opening of the Paradoxe, the first 
interlocuteur warns against the vagueness and flexibility of the technical 
language of theatre, indirectly providing some justification for the many 
misunderstandings of previous scholarship that travel across the essay: ‘il y a 
dans la langue technique du théâtre une latitude, un vague assez considérable 
pour que des hommes sensés, d’opinions diamétralement opposées, croyent y 
reconnaître la lumière de l’évidence’ (1994, p.38). In particular, as I will discuss 
below, this vagueness will underlie his critique of ‘sensibilité’, a term used by 
other authors in a system of cross-references that is different from Diderot’s and 
which he partly genuinely ignores and partly, perhaps, chooses to overlook.  
 
This point is particularly important because the contrast between sensibility 
(sensibilité) and judgement is the crux of the Paradoxe. As specified by the first 
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interlocuteur, there is one point at least on which Sticotti’s views are completely 
the opposite to his:  
 
Mais le point important, sur lequel nous avons des opinions tout à fait 
opposées, votre auteur et moi, ce sont les qualités premières d’un grand 
comédien. Moi, je lui veux beaucoup de jugement; il me faut dans cet 
homme un spectateur froid et tranquille; j’en exige, par conséquent, de la 
pénétration et nulle sensibilité, l’art de tout imiter, ou, ce qui revient au 
même, une égale aptitude à toutes les sortes de caractères et de rôles. 
(Diderot, 1994, pp.38-39) 
 
According to Diderot there are hence two distinct types of actors, and by 
implication, of people: those ruled by sensibility and feeling, and those governed 
by their rational judgement. ‘L’homme sensible obéit aux impulsions de la 
nature et ne rend précisément que le cri de son cœur’ (1994, p.68). Equally, an 
actor who bases her performance on sensibility is equated by Diderot with an 
actor who acts out her personal feelings, leading to incoherence and 
unpredictability:  
 
Si le comédien était sensible, de bonne foi lui serait-il permis de jouer 
deux fois de suite un même rôle avec la même chaleur et le même 
succès? Très chaud à la première représentation, il serait épuisé et froid 
comme un marbre à la troisième. [...] S’il est lui quand il joue, comment 
cessera-t-il d’être lui? 
(Diderot, 1994, p.39) 
 
Instinct, sensibility, nature, become, in that vagueness of language which 
Diderot has warned us against, synonymous with an actor who does not make 
much effort in learning her part, nor applies her reason to the understanding of 
it. The paradigmatic example of this acting style is the actress Dumesnil, of 
whom the first interlocuteur says: ‘Elle monte sur les planches sans savoir ce 
qu’elle dira; la moitié du temps elle ne sait ce qu’elle dit, mais il vient un 
moment sublime’ (1994, p.42). 
 
Poles apart is the man of genius: ‘La sensibilité n’est guère la qualité d’un grand 
génie. [...] Ce n’est pas son cœur, c’est sa tête qui fait tout’ (1994, p.43). The 
equivalent actor is the one who measures, combines, learns, arranges her 
performance to a degree of precision that can only increase with repetition and 
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never risk being random or unequal: ‘le comédien qui jouera de réflexion, 
d’étude de la nature humaine’ (1994, p.40). Mademoiselle Clairon is indicated 
as the epitome of this acting style and Diderot, seemingly giving in to an 
excessive confidence in his intuitive abilities, goes as far as presuming a 
specific acting technique, by which a great actress such as Clairon first 
imagines her role as an ideal model and then endeavours to comply with it 
(1994, pp.40-41). While the first interlocuteur grants that Clairon, master in an 
acting style deprived of sensibility, may well feel tormented by feelings in her 
first approach to a part during the rehearsal stage, he affirms that eventually her 
struggle will undoubtedly be superseded by the mastery of her role without any 
emotional involvement. What ensues is a status akin to what Archer (1888, 
p.150) has called dual consciousness: at the point of her utmost performance, 
Clairon ‘est double: la petite Clairon et la grande Agrippine’ (Diderot, 1994, 
p.41). 
 
Sainte-Albine, Hill and Sticotti had imperatively condemned acting by instinct or 
an actor acting her personal feelings very much along the same lines and nearly 
with the same words as in the Paradoxe. Moreover, they had arrived at a 
conceptualization of acting as principally based on study, while natural talents 
remained useful for a handful of great actors but not at all necessary for the vast 
majority. And the actor had been described as controlling the expression of 
feelings in her role through the application of understanding and judgement very 
much like Diderot recommended. 
 
While the emphasis on study or use of judgement constitutes a similarity 
between the Paradoxe and the Garrick, it must be admitted that Diderot, along 
the lines anticipated by François Riccoboni, strikes a fundamental point of 
difference in his absolute condemnation of sensibility although, as I shall further 
discuss, this is a matter of a difference in the meaning given to the word, more 
than a contrast of the underlying conceptions. And besides, even Diderot at 
times seems compelled to make concessions to sensibility, especially in his 
more explicit references to real actors. For instance, in calling the example of 
Garrick (meaning here the actor proper rather than the essay which bore his 
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name) to substantiate his theory, he has to concede that he is a great actor 
although he openly declares himself to feel deeply:  
 
Je te prends à témoin, Roscius anglais, célèbre Garrick [...] Ne m’as-tu 
pas dit que, quoique tu sentisses fortement, ton action serait faible, si, 
quelle que fût la passion ou le caractère que tu avais à rendre, tu ne 
savais t’élever par la pensée à la grandeur d’un fantôme homérique 
auquel tu cherchais à t’identifier? Lorsque je t’objectai que ce n’était 
donc pas d’après toi que tu jouais, confesse ta réponse: ne m’avouas-tu 
pas que tu t’en gardais bien, et que tu ne paraissais si étonnant sur la 
scène, que parce que tu montrais sans cesse au spectacle un être 
d’imagination qui n’était pas toi? 
(Diderot, 1994, p.81)  
 
This long passage suggests that Diderot may have been inspired by Garrick in 
his proposed conceptualization of an acting technique which endeavours to 
comply with an ideal model. Besides, it shows Diderot’s persistence in equating 
his invective against ‘sensibility’ with a disdain for actors who ‘play themselves’, 
once more highlighting how Diderot’s indictment against sensibility is primarily a 
sturdy rejection of his first theories on acting, those based on Dorval’s 
experiment with actors who play themselves. 
 
Sensibilité had been described by Sainte-Albine, Hill and Sticotti as the faculty 
of the actor which allows her to express all the nuances of the character’s 
emotions, the skill by which the actor, far from acting herself, manipulates her 
feelings at the service of acting the character in the given circumstances. 
Diderot does not accept this definition: ‘Ce serait un singulier abus des mots 
que d’appeler sensibilité cette facilité de rendre toutes natures’ (1994, p.77). 
Appealing again to the example of the actor Garrick, he denies that it may be 
possible to move from emotion to emotion in the short space required by 
artificial performances:  
 
Garrick passe sa tête entre les deux battants d’une porte, et, dans 
l’intervalle de quatre à cinq secondes, son visage passe successivement 
de la joie folle à la joie modérée, de cette joie à la tranquillité, de la 
tranquillité à la surprise, de la surprise à l’étonnement, de étonnement à 
la tristesse, de la tristesse à l’abattement, de l’abattement à l’effroi, de 
l’effroi à l’horreur, de l’horreur au désespoir, et remonte de ce dernier 
degré à celui d’où il était descendu. Est-ce que son âme a pu éprouver 
toutes ces sensations […]? Je n’en crois rien, ni vous non plus. 
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 (Diderot, 1994, p.62) 
 
Diderot instead conceives sensibilité as idiosyncrasy, organic feebleness, 
madness (1994, pp.43-44):  
 
La sensibilité, selon la seule acception qu’on est donnée jusqu’à présent 
à ce terme, est, ce me semble, cette disposition compagne de la 
faiblesse des organes, suite de la mobilité du diaphragme, de la vivacité 
de l’imagination, de la délicatesse de nerfs, qui incline à compatir, à 
frissonner, à admirer, à craindre, à se troubler, à pleurer, à s’évanouir, à 
secourir, à fuir, à crier, à perdre la raison, à exagérer, à mépriser, à 
dédaigner, à n’avoir aucune idée précise du vrai, du bon et du beau, à 
être injuste, à être fou.  
(Diderot, 1994, p.77)  
 
Far from being the ability to mould one’s feelings, it becomes a narrow 
repertoire of emotional weakness that hinders the interpretation of many 
characters. On the other hand, it is the lack of sensibility that grants the actor 
the ability to be a faithful and ductile interpreter of the character:  
 
Quelle est donc la qualité acquise ou naturelle qui constitue le grand 
acteur dans l’Avare […] et tant d’autres caractère tragiques ou comiques, 
où la sensibilité est diamétralement opposé à l’esprit du rôle? La facilité 
de connaître et de copier toutes les natures.  
(Diderot, 1994, p.76) 
 
But this easiness in copying all natures, which the first interlocuteur places in 
opposition to sensibility, is precisely what Sainte-Albine and Sticotti call 
sensibilité! 
 
And yet, even Diderot fleetingly acknowledges the distinct and contrasting 
connotations that the notions of sensibility and feeling may acquire; in a 
passage towards the end of the Paradoxe the first interlocutor says: ‘C’est 
qu’être sensible est une chose, et sentir est une autre. L’une est une affaire 
d’âme, l’autre une affaire de jugement’ (1994, p.109). It appears that although 
Diderot remains adamant that sensibility is not for the actor, he still has to 
concede that feeling may, as long as it is dependant on judgement.  
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In pushing his crusade against sensibility to the extremes, making it the emblem 
of mediocrity and incompatible with genius, Diderot takes us by surprise when 
he admits that ‘si la Nature a pétri une âme sensible, c’est la mienne’ (1994, 
p.98) and he describes an episode when he expressed his sensibility in an 
enthusiastic and deeply affected response to hearing of the success of one of 
Sedaine’s plays:  
 
je jette mes bras autour de son cou; la voix me manque, et les larmes 
me coulent le long de joues. Voilà l’homme sensible et médiocre. 
Sedaine, immobile et froid, me regarde et me dit: «Ah! Monsieur Diderot, 
que vous êtes beau!» Voilà l’observateur et l’homme de génie. 
(Diderot, 1994, p.64)  
 
The sensitive man becomes equated with the raw material which author and 
actor peruse to create or impersonate their characters: ‘Les hommes chauds, 
violents, sensibles, sont en scène; ils donnent le spectacle, mais ils n’en 
jouissent pas. C’est d’après eux que l’homme de génie fait sa copie’ (1994, 
p.43) while ‘Le grand comédien observe les phénomènes; l’homme sensible lui 
sert de modèle, il le médite, et trouve, de réflexion, ce qu’il faut ajouter ou 
retrancher pour le mieux’ (1994, p.69).  
 
By the same token that the sensitive man is degraded to an object of curiosity at 
the most, the dispassionate rationality of the man of genius, whether great actor 
or great playwright, is not spared a similar debasement. The detachment of the 
actor, guarantee of a perfected and consistent performance, comes to 
correspond to the ability to be deceitful: ‘Qu’est-ce donc qu’un grand comédien? 
Un grand persifleur tragique ou comique’ (1994, p.63). Diderot, alongside most 
other eighteenth-century theorists and practitioners of the theatre, does not 
doubt that the spectator experiences the feelings portrayed by the character. 
But the spectator, under the spell of the character’s feelings, is fooled in 
supposing that the same spell is also experienced by the actor: ‘tout son talent 
consiste non pas à sentir, comme vous le supposez, mais à rendre si 
scrupuleusement les signes extérieurs du sentiment, que vous vous y trompiez’ 
(1994, p.45). Probably inspired by a similar passage from L’Art du Théâtre 
(Riccoboni F., 1750, pp.36-37), Diderot proposes that actors are well aware of 
such rift between what they appear to feel and what they truly do not feel at all, 
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but they guard it as their secret: ‘Ces vérités seraient démontrées que les 
grands comédiens n’en conviendraient pas: c’est leur secret’ (1994, p.44).  
 
This method of acting costs the actor a great deal of exertion, so to make her 
tired at the end of the performance, but untouched by the feelings:  
 
Le socque et le cothurne déposé, sa voix est éteinte, il éprouve une 
extrême fatigue, il va changer de linge ou de se coucher; mais il ne lui 
reste ni trouble, ni douleur, ni mélancolie, ni affaissement d’âme. C’est 
vous qui remportez toutes ces impressions. L’acteur est las, et vous 
triste; c’est qu’il s’est démené sans rien sentir, et que vous avez senti 
sans vous démener.  
(Diderot, 1994, p.46) 
 
The actor is tired, the spectator unhappy: an idea clearly inspired by François 
Riccoboni’s suggestion that the signs of fatigue in the actor at the end of a 
performance should be attributed to her physical and not her emotional exertion 
(Riccoboni F., 1750, p.41).  
 
In a further passage Diderot arrives to a striking description of the actor in full 
consonance with Luigi Riccoboni’s (1728, pp.36-37) notion of the courtier as the 
quintessential actor:  
 
il pleure comme un prêtre incrédule qui prêche la Passion; comme un 
séducteur aux genoux d’une femme qu’il n’aime pas, mais qu’il veut 
tromper; comme un gueux dans la rue ou à la porte d’une église, qui 
vous injurie lorsqu’il désespère de vous toucher; ou comme une 
courtisane qui ne sent rien, mai qui se pâme entre vos bras.  
(Diderot, 1994, p.46)  
 
The paradox of the actor, to make the spectator feel what she herself should not 
and would not feel, becomes an act of conscious deceit. From this conclusion to 
a moral condemnation of the actor reminiscent of Rousseau’s, there is but a 
short step:  
 
Dans le monde, lorsqu’ils ne sont pas bouffons, je les trouve polis, 
caustiques et froids, fastueux, dissipés, dissipateurs, intéressés, plus 
frappés de nos ridicules que touchés de nos maux; d’un esprit assez 
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pathétique; isolés, vagabonds, à l’ordre des grands; peu des mœurs, 
point d’amis. 
(Diderot, 1994, pp.83-84) 
 
The effort by Sainte-Albine-Hill-Sticotti to build a theory which drew together 
sensibility, understood as the ability to adapt oneself to the expression of all 
emotions, with judgement, intended as studying and applying a correct 
interpretation of the role, had travelled in the direction of shaping acting as a 
morally useful enterprise, very much along the lines indicated by Luigi 
Riccoboni in his efforts to reform theatre in its artistic and moral aspects. The 
schism announced by the Paradoxe between a sensibility reported to be at the 
mercy of idiosyncratic emotions, and a rational detachment conceived as 
ultimately manipulative and malicious, risks plunging theatre and acting back 
into an aura of antipathy and distrust.  
 
The detailed analysis that I have dedicated to Diderot’s use of the words 
‘sensible’ and ‘sensibilité’ has been restricted to his critique of acting, because I 
have particularly contrasted it with the connotation given to the same words by 
those theories of the actor’s art against which the Paradoxe places itself. 
However, Diderot’s controversial rendition also reflects the parable of meaning 
that ‘sensibilité’ withstood in the eighteenth century.  
 
Originally used to define a certain sentimental quality in the behaviour of the 
upper classes, ambivalent attitudes towards its elitist overtones became 
apparent in some French literary works (Vila, 1998). A case in point is Prévost’s 
(1759) novel Histoire du chevalier des Grieux et de Manon Lescaut, in which 
the male protagonist is the paradigm of sensibility. Des Grieux, in the novel, 
describes this quality, which he skilfully employs to move other men to 
sympathise with his pleas, as an indisputable sign of a man’s ‘grandeur’ 
(Prévost, 1759, p.108). Sensibility is certainly effective in warranting him the 
solidarity of his aristocratic peers, but its positive value becomes problematic in 
relation to Des Grieux’s immoral behaviour, which reaches peaks of treachery, 
debasement, and even criminality. Because his sensibility is an effective means 
of exciting the sympathy of other characters, despite his persistent misconduct, 
it reveals itself as a deceitful sentimental double-talk (Vila, 1998, p.113).  
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This problematization of sensibility tended to remain intrinsic to the meaning of 
sensibility, despite the evolution that this term underwent during the 
Enlightenment. As I will discuss more in detail in the next chapter, the birth, in 
the eighteenth century, of the philosophical theory of sensism meant that the 
senses were granted primacy over religious belief and even rational judgement, 
in determining all knowledge, including moral principles. Therefore sensibility 
gained a positive connotation in as far as it stood for the means through which 
human beings could access their ‘natural goodness, benevolence and 
compassion’ (Csengei, 2011, p.5). Nonetheless, sensibility carried an intrinsic 
ambivalence, implying  
 
a potential dangerous quality that could lead to emotional excess, moral 
degeneracy, and physical debilitation. At the height of its conceptual 
popularity, therefore, sensibility was situated somewhere between 
enlightenment and pathology: it was seen as instrumental in the quest for 
reason and virtue, but was also implicated in the epidemic of nervous 
maladies that seemed to be overtaking the population of France and of 
Europe in general. 
(Vila, 1998, p.1) 
 
Diderot’s use of the term seems to waver between these positive and negative 
renditions of sensibility. On the one hand, he despises actors who, because of 
their great sensibility, are culpable of an excess of unregulated feeling that 
gives them the mark of mediocrity. On the other hand, while he praises the 
absolute lack of sensibility in great actors, he ends up linking it to their 
depravity. If for Prévost, sensibility did not guarantee moral conduct, for Diderot 
it is lack of sensibility that seems to grant mankind a presence of mind and a 
want of compassion.  
 
Ultimately, the debate about sensibility and judgement in the art of the actor, not 
only reflects, but also deepens, the examination of sensibility in its relations with 
morality. Because the conundrum of the actor poses the question of the moral 
status of the theatre, establishing the principles of the actor’s art becomes 
essential in understanding the function and the value of theatre for society. 
Unsurprisingly, this will constitute a central point of controversy within the 
eighteenth-century debate. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE PARADOX ANALYSED 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of Diderot’s seminal text, Paradoxe sur le comédien, is not only 
paradigmatic of a question central to theories of the theatre in general, but also 
of a flurry of ideas specific to the eighteenth-century debate. It could be argued 
that the eighteenth-century theorists, while all agreeing that there is something 
peculiarly interesting in the art of the actor that merits close examination, and 
generally identifying the area of interest as the workings of feeling versus those 
of judgment, arrive at a number of formulations that may best be termed ‘the 
paradoxes of the actor’. In this chapter I will dissect this question from the point 
of view of the eighteenth-century cultural and philosophical background, in 
preparation for a psychoanalytic interpretation that I will propose in the next 
chapter. By placing the points in question within the philosophical and cultural 
context of the eighteenth century, I will show how the careful consideration 
given to the actor reflects a similar preoccupation with the functions of the 
human mind at large. 
 
The dichotomies raised by the eighteenth-century debate on the actor’s art are 
multiple. Indeed, the one highlighted by the Paradoxe, between an actor who 
feels and one who does not, polarizes the argument into what William Archer 
(1888, p.11) will helpfully call the emotionalist versus the anti-emotionalist 
position. In the next section I will particularly address this question in the light of 
Archer’s analysis and of wider references. There are, though, other interesting 
polarities, which get obscured in Diderot’s argument, but afford critical insights 
into the mystery of the actor’s art. Of particular relevance is the distinction 
between an actor who plays her own feelings and one who plays the 
character’s feelings, and the somewhat related contrast between an actor who 
studies her role versus one who plays it by some form of instinct or superficial 
imitation. As I will endeavour to demonstrate later in the chapter, it is only when 
these aspects are considered simultaneously that the paradoxes may indeed 
admit of a resolution. 
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DUAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTING 
 
William Archer – the paradox put to the test 
 
In 1888, only fifty years following the publication of the Paradoxe, but more than 
a hundred after its composition, William Archer, a drama critic and writer, put 
Diderot’s theory to a sort of experimental test. His preoccupation with the 
Paradoxe had brought him to question the validity of a theory that sprang out of 
a dialogue between ‘a dogmatic First and a docile Second’, rather than, as he 
puts it, between ‘a trained psychologist and an experienced and versatile actor’ 
(Archer, 1888, p.3). In Archer’s view, Diderot’s dialogue was the rambling 
speech of a philosopher who, dissatisfied with his own theory, was not prepared 
to admit it and rather imposed his ideas on the reader as the first interlocuteur 
of the Paradoxe forces them on the ‘dumb’ second.  
 
Archer’s appraisal of Diderot’s work is clearly limiting given the enormous 
influence that the book has had on future scholarship, ‘by establishing itself as 
the paradigmatic text in its field’ (Roach, 1993, p.117). However it is in turn 
consequential at least for two reasons: first, it reveals and dismantles some of 
the key errors in Diderot’s argument; secondly, it calls on the authority of actors 
to address the conundrum of their art in a systematic way. 
 
That Diderot used some of the terminology in a problematic way, as I pointed 
out in the previous chapter, is a strong objection of Archer’s. In particular it is 
the use of the term ‘sensibilité’ that rightly disturbs him. If sensibility is what 
Diderot assumes it to be, ‘Hysteria, surely, is a much apter name for the 
disease’ (Archer, 1888, p.36). Incidentally, it needs to be clarified that Diderot’s 
understanding of ‘sensibilité’ as excessive and misplaced feeling did not have a 
connotation of femininity as the term ‘hysteria’ used by Archer seems to imply. 
As has been shown, 
 
French writers did not polarize sensibility in relation to sex and gender 
nearly as much as did their British counterparts, at least not until the last 
few decades of the century; rather, even the most hard-boiled 
philosophes prided themselves on their sensibility and saw nothing 
unmanly about cultivating this quality. 
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(Vila, 1998, p.3) 
 
The main difficulty with Diderot’s rendition of ‘sensibilité’ is perhaps his forced 
assumption that the only alternative to his ideally unfeeling and expressive actor 
is an actor so engrossed in feelings (or rather hysteria) that her power of 
expression gets overthrown. As Archer points out:  
 
the use of inward emotion is to reinforce, not to supplant, outward 
expression. No one has ever doubted that the actor must be able to 
express what he feels, or feeling will avail him to nothing. The question at 
issue is whether he ought, or ought not, to feel what he expresses.  
(Archer, 1888, p.89) 
 
To avoid these errors and more, Archer wished, as I mentioned, for a 
constructive dialogue between a psychologist and a distinguished actor. 
Despite being no psychologist, he believed that by interrogating actors he could 
at least avoid that mistake, which Diderot makes all too often, of making 
assumptions about actors’ methods. Suffice the example of Garrick, about 
whom Diderot was misinformed, as I shall discuss below. Moreover, Archer 
does not concede to the objection that actors lie about their art either 
deliberately or because they are unaware of it. By interrogating as many as he 
can reach, he hopes to arrive at more reliable conclusions than Diderot’s. 
 
Through his systematic collection of responses from eminent actors, he 
establishes that great actors (or indeed the majority of them) do actually feel 
while they act and that they consider this ‘feeling’ status to be their most 
powerful means of communicating with the audience. In order to invalidate the 
objection, already advanced by François Riccoboni and adopted by Diderot, 
that actors may think they feel or perhaps may like to mislead others into 
thinking it, but in reality they don’t, Archer asks actors to report about physical 
signs of emotions during their performances. He believes that signs like 
shedding tears, speaking in a broken voice, or, even more characteristically, 
blushing or paling, cannot be feigned; their abundant presence, testified by lots 
of his respondents, proves beyond question that actors in performance are truly 
feeling. 
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Having established that the actor feels, Archer asks a second crucial question; 
in his words: ‘In the first place, there were two questions at issue – a question of 
fact and a question of theory: do actors feel? and ought they to feel?’ (1888, 
p.195). The importance of the second question lies, in essence, with what 
Archer identifies as the problem of expression: actors ought to feel if by doing 
so they enhance their expressive capabilities and ultimately their effect on the 
spectators. His respondents are vastly in favour of this notion, providing Archer 
with a solid argument to dismantle Diderot’s paradox of an actor who does not 
feel in order to make a spectator feel. Such operation re-establishes order into a 
theory which goes back to Roman rhetoric and poetics (Horace’s ‘Si vis me 
flere, dolendum est/ Primum ipsi tibi’) and has been universally adhered to, 
including by Shakespeare, as Archer is eager to point out (1888, p.44). 
 
But dismantling a paradox may sometimes have the effect of generating a 
different one, and such is the case here. Archer does not wish to object to 
Diderot’s illustrations, of which there are several in the Paradoxe, of the actor’s 
ability to control her performance with a degree of shrewdness. For instance, 
during an intensively dramatic moment of a performance, an actress, piqued by 
the burst of laughter in the audience, turns to harangue them: ‘la Duclos, qui 
faisait Inès, indignée, dit au parterre: “Ris donc, sot parterre, au plus bel endroit 
de la pièce.” Le parterre l’entendit, se contint; l’actrice reprit son rôle, et ses 
larmes et celles du spectateur coulèrent’ (Diderot, 1994, p.69). Examples such 
as this pose the dilemma whether a state of awareness of one’s surroundings 
and even some preoccupation with personal matters extraneous to the 
performance, are compatible with the actor feeling her character’s emotions. As 
I will discuss below, Archer puts this question to his respondents. Before 
returning to how Archer proposes to solve the actor’s dilemma, and how his 
solution has roots in the eighteenth-century debate itself, I will briefly consider 
how eighteenth-century theorists examined the question of a possible paradox 
for the spectator. 
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The paradox of the spectator in the eighteenth century 
 
There is a fairly unanimous presumption in the authors whose theories on the 
actor I have analysed, including Diderot, that the actor is to induce the spectator 
to feel the character’s emotions. In this sense the spectator is supposed to 
succumb to the theatrical illusion. This presumption, however, is not fully 
straightforward, as exemplified by the controversy between two eighteenth-
century English men of letters.  
 
In his Preface to Shakespeare of 1765 Samuel Johnson affirms: ‘The truth is, 
that the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first act to the 
last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the players are only players’ 
(Johnson, 1765, p.14) to which William Kenrick replies:  
 
We do not pretend to say that the spectators are not always in their 
senses; or that they do not know (if the question were put to them) that 
the stage is only a stage, and the players only players. But we will 
venture to say they are often so intent on the scene as to be absent with 
regard to everything else. A spectator properly affected by a dramatic 
representation makes no reflections about the fiction or the reality of it, 
so long as the action proceeds without grossly offending or palpably 
imposing on the senses. 
(Vickers, 197928, cited in Sidnell, 1994, p.85 footnote 27) 
 
It is evident that the contention is not so much about whether a spectator is so 
engrossed in the theatrical illusion that he suffers a psychotic episode, but 
rather what one chooses to emphasize as the crux of the spectator’s 
experience: his awareness of fiction and capacity for detachment or, on the 
opposite front, his entrancement and emotional participation in the drama. For 
what concerns all the authors whose texts I have analysed in Chapter 3, the 
emphasis of the theatrical effect remains on the need for emotional 
identification between spectator and character, by which is meant the need for 
the spectator to be made to feel the character’s emotions as if they were his. 
However, running a somewhat parallel course, in those same authors there is 
also a vigorous call for the function of the spectator’s rational judgement, in 
order that he can be critical of the actor and thus promote her improvement.  
                                                       
28 Brian Vickers, editor (1979), Shakespeare: the Critical Heritage. Vol. 5, pp.1765-1774. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
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As I have hinted at in the previous chapter, one reason for giving prominence to 
the spectator’s judgement on the actor’s art is the need for some of the theorists 
to avail themselves of the status of spectators to justify their incursions into the 
debate. Sainte-Albine had already pre-empted the possible objection to his 
entitlement to write on the art of the actor, given that he was not himself an 
actor, although as a playwright he could claim some acquaintance with the 
subject at stake. That specific objection would be raised to Diderot, the 
playwright, by Madame Riccoboni, the actress, in her famous letter to him 
(Diderot, 1994, p.126): ‘Vous avez bien de l’esprit, bien des connaissances; 
mais vous ne savez pas les petits détails d’un art qui comme tous les autres a 
sa main-d’œuvre’. This admonition is the epitome of what most actors probably 
thought about the competence of others to judge about their art. As Dumesnil 
(1823) describes in her Mémoires, actors act as tyrants in their theatres and 
warn playwrights not to overstep the mark.  
 
Sainte-Albine had justified his infringement declaring that anyone can write on 
the actor’s art because: ‘sur les Arts, qui puisent leur principes dans la nature et 
dans la raison, tout homme sensible et raisonnable a droit de hazarder ses 
conjectures’ (1749, p.8). Moreover, he had also advanced the suggestion that 
one should be more suspicious of judgements coming from actors themselves 
as pertains to their craft, as they may have a vested interest in describing it as 
they personally profess it, rather than as it should be. This criticism of the 
incompetence of actors to judge of their art is a perfect antidote to the censure 
that actors may wish to impose on others on the same subject, and it will be 
favoured in many corners. Diderot, for instance, will accuse actors of a 
calculated self-interest in keeping their secrets: ‘Ces vérités seraient 
démontrées que les grands comédiens n’en conviendraient pas; c’est leur 
secret’ (Diderot, 1994, p.44). He is echoing a similar observation made by 
François Riccoboni against his companions:  
 
Etonnés d’une si parfaite imitation du vrai, quelques-uns l’ont prise pour 
la vérité même, et ont cru l’Acteur affecté du sentiment qu’il représentoit. 
Ils l’ont accablé d’éloges, que l’Acteur méritoit, mais qui partoient d’une 
fausse idée, et le Comédien qui trouvoit son avantage à ne la point 
détruire, les a laissés dans l’erreur en appuyant leur avis. 
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 (Riccoboni F., 1750, pp.36-37)  
 
The status of the spectator as judge of the actor’s art is hence partly a question 
of authority and ultimately of professional rivalry. However, calls for spectators 
to be critical about the actor’s craft came sometimes from actors themselves. 
Luigi Riccoboni dedicates his pioneering attempt to reform the art of the actor, 
the poem Dell’Arte Rappresentativa, to both actors and spectators, because of 
the acknowledgement that there is interdependence between the good habits of 
actors and the taste of spectators. The one has the power to elevate the other 
or similarly to corrupt it, in a reciprocal influence.  
 
In fact, the two aspects of the spectator’s experience, his detached judgement 
on the actor’s performance and his surrender to the theatrical illusion, are more 
intertwined than appears at first sight. Until perhaps more recent experiments – 
I am thinking, for instance, of Grotowski’s (De Marinis, 2000) – it is a cliché that 
the chief purpose of the actor’s art is to be exercised for the benefit of the 
audience. Referring back to ‘Horace’s dictum in the Ars Poetica that poetry 
should mix the “pleasing” and the “instructive” ’ (Harris, 2014, p.174), such 
benefit may entail enjoyment, moral improvement, or both. Luigi Riccoboni, 
alongside many of his contemporaries, including Diderot, regarded pleasure 
and moral instruction as the intertwined desirable effects of theatre on 
audiences (Cappelletti, 1986). Precisely because spectators need to be granted 
the appropriate experience and by consequence the desired psychological 
response (be it enjoyment, moral improvement or both), it is in their interest to 
retain some control over such an important matter, especially where moral 
improvement is concerned. Hence the capacity for detached critical evaluation 
will act as a guarantor for the quality of the experience during the succumbing 
to the illusion. I will indeed dwell on the moral question in Chapter 6. For the 
purpose of this discussion what needs highlighting is the complexity of the 
problem.  
 
The actor’s double feeling 
 
Although the contention about the spectator brings to the fore the value of his 
rational judgement, the belief in the benefit of the spectator’s emotional 
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identification with the character is not at stake: Brecht is a long way off. The 
debate rather establishes that spectators’ brains can engage in what William 
Archer (1888, p.150) called, in reference to actors, a double or multiple action: 
they can feel the character’s emotions while also being aware of their 
surroundings and conscious that they are a different person from the character. 
This is what Archer proposed to be the solution to the actor’s paradox: ‘The real 
paradox of acting, it seems to me, resolves itself into the paradox of dual 
consciousness’ (1888, p.150). 
 
As Kenrick points out in response to Johnson, the spectator can well be in his 
senses while being fully captivated by the emotional experience of the 
character. Hence, one could presume, like Archer does, that such an 
assumption may be the solution to the paradox of the actor as well as to that of 
the spectator. But I argue that this may rather be a red herring, simply pointing 
to an obvious psychological truth (the brain’s ability to engage in multiple 
actions), which has got little to do with the question of sensibility and judgement 
in the actor’s art. This error is what Diderot ultimately falls into when he 
describes the actors as the cynical masters who bicker about their own marital 
discords while playing the characters of two tender lovers (Diderot, 1994, pp.57-
60). 
 
The same misleading solution to the paradox of the actor, was indeed offered 
by James Boswell in his essay On the profession of a player (1929) published 
in The London Magazine in 1770, the same year that saw in France the 
appearance of the Garrick (Sticotti, 1770). Boswell, like Sticotti, takes Garrick’s 
practice as the quintessence of great acting. In affirming that Garrick feels while 
he acts, he also claims that the great actor would easily admit to it:  
 
I am persuaded that Mr. Garrick will tell us, that it is easy to him to play a 
part in which the passions display themselves naturally. In such a part, 
when he is once entered into the character, its different effusions are like 
the effusions of his own mind. 
(Boswell, 1929, p.13) 
 
In fact we know from his correspondence that Garrick was an emotionalist. In a 
letter of 1769 he wrote:  
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Madm Clairon is so conscious and certain of what she can do, that she 
never (I believe) had the feelings of the instant come upon her 
unexpectedly. –but I pronounce that the greatest strokes of Genius, have 
been unknown to the Actor himself, 'till Circumstance, and the warmth of 
the Scene has  sprung the Mine as it were, as much to his own Surprize, 
as that of the Audience– 
(Letters 2, p.635, Garrick, 196329, cited in Roach, 1993, p.96)  
 
Incidentally, yet again Diderot is contradicted as pertains the reliability of his 
referencing: as I have discussed in the previous chapter, in the Paradoxe 
(1994, p.81) he employs the example of Garrick’s practice as illustration of an 
anti-emotionalist position, equating it indirectly with Clairon’s style and craft. 
Perhaps Garrick would have hardy felt flattered if he had known Diderot’s 
opinion of him. 
 
Boswell was therefore in the right as far as Garrick’s views of the actor feeling 
her part were concerned. Despite this, he shared Diderot’s misgivings about 
taking the emotional identification between actor and character as an absolute 
state of mind.  
 
I am aware that my proposition, that a player is really and truly the 
character in which he appears, may be misrepresented; and I remember 
to have heard the most illustrious author of this age, whose conversation 
is thought by many even to excel his writings, exert his eloquence 
against this proposition, and with the luxuriance of humour for which he 
is distinguished, render it exceedingly ridiculous: “If, sir,” said he, “Garrick 
believes himself to be every character that he represents, he is a 
madman and ought to be confined. Nay, sir, he is a villain, and ought to 
be hanged. […] If, sir, he has really been that person in his own mind, he 
has in his own mind been as guilty as Macbeth”.  
(Boswell, 1929, pp.14-15) 
 
I have cited this passage at length to show how the question whether emotional 
identification is equivalent to a psychotic state, is posed for the actor as it was 
for the spectator (incidentally, again by Samuel Johnson, who is the illustrious 
author cited in the quotation above), and similarly refuted. 
 
                                                       
29 David Garrick (1963), Letters. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Belknap Press. 
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Boswell’s response to the absurdity of an actor who has fallen mad is the 
concept of ‘double feeling’:  
 
If I may be allowed to conjecture what is the nature of that mysterious 
power by which a player really is the character which he represents, my 
notion is, that he must have a kind of double feeling. He must assume in 
a strong degree the character which he represents, while he at the same 
time retains the consciousness of his own character. The feelings and 
passions of the character which he represents must take full possession 
as it were of the antechamber of his mind, while his own character 
remains in the innermost recess.  
(Boswell, 1929, pp.17-18) 
 
The concept of double feeling is very similar to William Archer’s idea of double 
consciousness (Archer, 1888, p.150) and possibly its precursor. Archer collects 
a series of illustrations from his respondents about situations in which they were 
acting in full emotional identification with the character while also entertaining 
other extraneous thoughts on their minds. One case in point is about an actress 
whose little daughter was seriously ill while she was playing Juliet:  
 
Never, she says, did she enter more thoroughly into the part, and never 
did she play it with greater effect. She was strung up by excitement to a 
higher emotional pitch than she could ordinarily attain. And all the time 
the best part of her mind was with her child.  
(Archer, 1888, pp.157-158) 
 
A more trivial incident was reported by Salvini, who once found himself in the 
embarrassing situation of feeling the belt of his trousers giving away during a 
passionate scene; artfully, ‘he dashed at a tiger-skin which covered the divan 
and swathed it round his body […] “I was told,” he says, “that I had never played 
the scene with greater intensity of rage, irony and despair” ’ (Archer, 1888, 
p.163). Supplying plenty of similar examples, Archer demonstrates that actors 
may indeed, during a performance, engage in activities which are simultaneous 
but extraneous to the performance, such as removing a diamond earring from 
the stage or quarrelling with one’s spouse, but this is no proof that the actor is 
not feeling the character’s emotions. 
 
The supposition of double feeling or double consciousness in the spectator and 
in the actor may well state a psychological truth about the human mind, and in 
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fact both Boswell and Archer emphasize that this phenomenon pertains to all 
human beings, not just the actor. As Boswell puts it: ‘The double feeling which I 
have mentioned is experienced by many men in the common intercourse of life. 
Were nothing but the real character to appear, society would not be half so safe 
and agreeable as we find it’ (Boswell, 1929, p.19). 
 
Archer’s declaration as to the universality of double consciousness is even 
more unequivocal:  
 
I looked upon the double action of the brain as a matter of universal 
experience, a thing to be assumed just as one assumes that the normal 
man has two legs. I did not regard it as a tendency peculiar to actors, but 
common to all men. 
(Archer, 1888, p.151) 
 
Although he maintains that this activity must take a special form in the actor, his 
affirmation begs the question of how double consciousness would be the core 
of the actor’s art, if it is as universal as having two legs. 
 
THE CONFLUENCE OF FEELING AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE ACTOR’S ART 
 
Archer’s (or indeed Boswell’s) solution to the actor’s paradox, aimed at 
confuting Diderot’s thesis, advances a psychological explanation that is not that 
different from the philosophe’s own suggestions. Actors are deemed to be 
champions in dissociating their feelings from their consciousness, whether they 
do it to obliterate them completely (Diderot) or to let them flow without disturbing 
the rational mind (Archer). 
 
But the actor’s paradox, falsely solved by Diderot and Archer, may neither be 
that she does not feel while the audience feels, nor that she feels in a 
dissociated way. Perhaps the truest paradox is best described by John Hill: that 
the actor feels, but she does so in a peculiar way. In a passage already quoted 
in Chapter 3, he writes:  
 
Here is the great perfection of the science: we would have him, while he 
feels all this, yet command his passions, so that they do not disturb his 
utterance, and yet we would not have that expression he keeps for 
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himself take away the pain of it from us; we would have his manner of 
pronouncing the words take all that effect upon us, which the passage 
has on the most sensible reader; but we would not have it take that effect 
on himself. 
(Hill, 1755, pp.54-55) 
 
According to many of the authors that I have amply considered in Chapter 3, 
the actor feels through a special form of sensibility which is guided by judgment 
and understanding. Such judgement and understanding originate in the study 
that a good actor always applies to the character she needs to impersonate; the 
need for study and understanding are conspicuous clues to the insight into the 
actor’s art. This is because of an apparently simple fact: that the actor does not 
play her personal feelings, she plays those of the character. As Boswell says of 
Garrick: ‘when he is once entered into the character, its different effusions are 
like the effusions of his own mind’ (Boswell, 1929, p.13). As I have already 
shown, according to Luigi Riccoboni (1728, p.17), the actor must endeavour to 
feel what she represents so that what is another person’s concern may be 
believed to be her own. Her act of feeling is neither the abandonment to a 
spontaneous self-expression, nor an act of feigning for the purpose of an 
abstract representation. It is an act of study and understanding at the service of 
the feelings of another: the character. Such act we call an interpretation, and I 
shall discuss in the next chapter the strong parallels with the use of the word in 
psychoanalysis. 
 
Diderot’s investigation on acting as trajectory 
 
It could be argued that the trajectory of Diderot’s writing on the theatre 
exemplifies the examination from these different perspectives of the actor’s 
mystery of how she comes to interpret her character. In the project of Le Fils 
naturel and the associated Entretiens, the dilemma of the relationship between 
actor’s and character’s feelings prompts the solution of an absolute 
correspondence between the two, because actor and character are in fact the 
same person. If it were true that this project reveals a particular preoccupation 
with the status of the actor’s feelings, it would be easier to make sense of 
Diderot’s game with fiction and reality that characterizes the play and the 
accompanying dialogue.  
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In an intermediate period, represented by the ideas he expresses in one of his 
Lettres à Mademoiselle Jodin (1994, pp.145-197), composed in 1766, Diderot 
touches on the conviction that feeling and understanding in actors must go 
hand in hand, coming the closest to the theories of his supposed adversaries:  
 
Un acteur qui n’a que du sens et du jugement est froid; celui qui n’a que 
de la verve et de la sensibilité est fou. C’est un certain tempérament de 
bon sens et de chaleur qui fait l’homme sublime; et sur la scène et dans 
le monde, celui qui montre plus qu’il ne sent, fait rire au lieu de toucher. 
Ne cherchez donc jamais à aller au-delà du sentiment que vous aurez; 
tâcher de le rendre juste.  
(Diderot, 1994, p.158) 
 
This is certainly the formulation which is most akin to that of Sticotti and his 
predecessors, and it leaves us to wonder why Diderot neglected it in his 
theoretical writings. Seeping through the letters is mistrust for the morality of 
actors, which he insightfully links to the problem of sensibility. In another letter 
to Jodin, he states: ‘Il y a bien de la différence entre jouer et sentir. C’est la 
différence de la courtisane qui séduit, à la femme tendre qui aime et qui 
s’enivre elle-même et un autre’ (1994, p.160). Perhaps it is the preoccupation 
with keeping the character’s feelings secured from the risk of contamination by 
those of the actor that brings Diderot to his last theoretical deflection. 
 
Ultimately, as we know very well, the dilemma of the relationship between the 
emotional life of the actor and that of the character is made explicit and solved 
in the Paradoxe by attributing to the actor the ability to display a feeling which 
she does not feel. By this point, the moral preoccupations about actors have 
given place to a frank and cynical mistrust towards them. It seems that Diderot’s 
extensive explorations on the subject would not allow him to reconcile a craft 
based on the ability to control and manipulate the arousal and expression of 
feelings with the presumption of honesty and integrity. If the actor feels, she 
must be a bad actor; if she does not feel, she must be a bad woman. Chapter 6 
will give me ample scope to discuss the relationship between the actor’s art and 
the moral status of the theatre and to propose a solution. In the meantime, it is 
of note that it is precisely because the moral question is a constituent feature of 
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the issue at hand that the debate on the art of the actor must be of past and 
present concern. 
 
The dissociation of feelings between actor and character posited by Diderot, is 
decisively refused as a solution by the ‘emotionalist’ theorists. Nevertheless, 
many of these authors toy with the notion of feeling as feigning. Sainte-Albine 
for instance distinguishes a lover from a spectator in that the lover may allow for 
being grossly abused by feigned feelings which flatter his vanity, while the 
spectator consents to be deceived only up to a point: ‘Il consent d’être abusé, 
mais il veut que son erreur ait l’air raisonnable’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.40). 
Likewise, Luigi Riccoboni will allow the actor to feign only when all attempts at 
feeling have failed her: ‘E per arte forzando i sensi tuoi,/ O senti, o fallo credere 
all’astante;/ E la tanto vantata ignota a Noi/ Arte Mimica cerca, pensa, inventa,/ 
E sia fittizio il Ver s’altro non puoi’ (1728, pp.33-34)30. The preoccupation with 
the special status of the actor’s feelings as pertains to truth versus feigning runs 
through Luigi Riccoboni’s entire poem on the actor’s art, as testified by his 
labouring with the distinction between the concepts of false and feigned. 
 
La principale, e necessaria parte 
Del Comico è di far chiaro vedere 
Che da la Verità non si diparte. 
Così facendo, quasi persuadere 
Potrai che non sia falso quel che è finto, 
E se fin là non vai non puoi piacere.  
(1728, p.17)31 
 
Luigi Riccoboni dwells on the tension between false and feigned in other 
passages; at one point he supposes a dramatic situation in which an actress 
has to portray a female character who feigns crying in order to deceive a male 
character into believing that she loves him. This actress, he maintains, will have 
to represent the subtle nuances of a credible but faked sadness, so that the 
male character may perceive as real what the audience understands as feigned 
(1728, p.35). For Riccoboni this is precisely the core of the actor’s art: 
                                                       
30 And artfully forcing your feelings,/ Either feel, or make the audience believe you do;/ And look 
for, think about, invent, the Mimetic Art/ so much vaunted and ignored by us,/ and let Truth be 
feigned if you cannot otherwise. 
31 The principal, and necessary role/ Of the Actor is to show clearly/ That there has been no 
departure from Truth./ In so doing, you can almost convince/That what is feigned is not false,/ 
And if you don’t get that far, you cannot please. 
 152 
 
Sono queste le reti, e son gli aguati  
Ove il Comico attende i Spettatori  
per renderli confusi, edificati.  
Poiché d’un doppio finto ammiratori  
Veggon, che senza ancora il sentimento  
Fingi il pianto, e da vero t’addolori. 
In ciò consiste l’Arte, ed il talento. 
(1728, p.36)32 
 
And who better than courtiers, with their constant hiding of their true feelings 
under feigned ones, can be teachers of the actor’s art? Again, the subtleties of 
the argument risk making it collapse backwards into an anti-emotionalist 
position, and yet it shall not be so. Understanding the peculiarities of the actor’s 
feelings entails diving into the depths of a psychological process that, far from 
being as simple as a man having two legs, does nevertheless illuminate hidden 
functions of the human psyche at large. 
 
The actor’s art and the question of nature 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, eighteenth-century theories of the actor’s art, 
renouncing the rhetorical tradition of the expression of emotions through fixed 
gestures, identify the peculiarity of the actor in coming to feel the character’s 
emotions through study and understanding, rather than by some spontaneous 
reaction or personal impression – the instinctual acting condemned by Diderot 
and many others. Therefore the investigation of what the actor needs to study 
and understand must now come into focus. This I will call, by employing a 
suggestive word from the debate on the actor, the question of nature. 
 
The specific reference to nature as intending to reflect the study of the 
naturalistic expression of emotions is exemplarily expressed in The Actor under 
the heading of Concerning what is called natural playing:  
 
The term, Playing Naturally, is very frequent in the mouths of actors and 
of criticks; but they have not ascertained its meaning. If, by playing 
                                                       
32 These are the nets, and the snares/ Where the Actor waits upon the Spectators/ To make 
them confused, edified./ As admirers of a double fiction/ They can see that even without feeling/ 
you feign crying, and you truly suffer./ The Art, and the skill consist in this. 
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naturally, be meant the acting up to nature in the several characters that 
are given to be represented, doubtless it is the consummate point of 
theatrical excellence; and all that has been written in this treatise tends to 
it: but many express by it another thing […] faulty in the greatest degree, 
[which] depends upon an error already mentioned, the actor’s feeling for 
himself, and not as his character; and tho’ called by this name, nothing 
can be more unnatural. Natural playing, when it flows from a perfect 
understanding of the whole art and the rules of the profession is the 
excellence of the theatrical representation; but those who use the term, 
generally employ it to express that dependence upon nature, which 
excludes all the assistance of art: and it has been observed before, that 
such nature will never make a player. That playing which appears 
natural, because it is divested of all pomp and ceremony, is the greatest 
that is possible; but natural as this appears, it is the result of perfect art. 
 (Hill, 1755, pp.258-259) 
 
As well explained by Hill, the word ‘nature’ is used by most authors in two 
different ways. One way is to mean natural endowments, those skills of the 
individual actor that do not derive by any study but are instead part of her inborn 
personality. In this sense, nature is akin to the concept of ‘playing by instinct’ in 
as far as it means a faculty which is given and cannot be modified or controlled 
in any way. But there is another conspicuous definition of nature, the one which 
is given prominence by the cultural and philosophical debate of the eighteenth 
century, and which is essential to my analysis. It is this second meaning of 
nature that Luigi Riccoboni applies when he exhorts the actor to study the 
natural expression of emotions through observation guided by consulting her 
reason (1728, pp.14-15).  
 
The notion that the actor should endeavour to study the expression of emotions 
in real life in order to transpose them on the stage is valid beyond the dilemma 
of the Paradoxe, of whether such transposition is created through sensibility or 
is purely an artefact. In point of fact, even the anti-emotionalist François 
Riccoboni professes the principle of naturalistic expression. Like his father, he 
urges the actor to study mankind, which is probably the most precise translation 
of what François calls ‘le monde’. With reference to the impersonation of 
characters, he writes:  
 
On peut, en lisant, apprendre comment pensent les hommes suivant 
leurs différens caractères, mais ce n’est qu’en les voyant que l’on peut 
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connoître la manière dont ils expriment leurs pensées. Il faut, pour se 
former en ce genre, beaucoup d’étude du monde.  
(Riccoboni F., 1750, p.60)  
 
In another passage he uses ‘nature’ and ‘monde’ almost as synonyms:  
 
Examinons cependant si l’on ne pourroit pas trouver dans la nature, des 
modèles, qui parfaitement suivis, donneroient l’extrême vérité […]. 
Observons le monde: je ne dit pas seulement ce monde choisi qui se 
pique du bel air; je dit le monde en général.  
(Riccoboni F., 1750, p.42) 
 
The idea that the actor should study human nature is almost universal among 
these thinkers. Boswell admits to the observation of mankind as a form of 
knowledge peculiar to actors:  
 
it must be observed, that knowledge is not to be circumscribed to what 
we learn in books and schools; a great variety of it is picked up in the 
practice of life; and however ignorant low comedians may have been in a 
relative sense, it may be affirmed that none of them, who have excelled, 
have been destitute of discernment and observation in the sphere in 
which they have moved; so that they cannot be said to have been 
ignorant of their own subjects, if that term may be used here.  
(Boswell, 1929, p.9) 
 
David Garrick himself, in his short Essay on Acting, writes:  
 
The only Way to arrive at great Excellency in Characters of Humour, is to 
be very conversant with Human Nature, that is the noblest and best 
Study, by this Way you will more accurately discover the Workings of 
Spirit (or what other Physical Terms you please to call it) upon the 
different Modifications of Matter. 
(Garrick, 1744, pp.9-10) 
 
As late as the Paradoxe, Diderot – incidentally, echoing once more Goldoni’s 
own dictum – writes in support of the actor perfecting her talents through the 
study of mankind and the practice of the craft. Goldoni (1983, p.114) had 
famously claimed that his two guidebooks as a playwright had been ‘Mondo e 
Teatro’ [the world and the theatre], and like for François Riccoboni, ‘mondo’ is 
best translated as mankind. Diderot similarly declares about actors: ‘C’est à 
l’étude des grands modèles, à la connaissance du cœur humain, à l’usage du 
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monde, au travail assidu, à l’expérience, et à l’habitude du théâtre, à 
perfectionner le don de nature’ (1994, p.36). 
 
According to these authors, the study of human nature corresponds to the 
understanding of the determinants of the different manifestations of feeling. 
Such understanding, as I have amply shown in Chapter 3, is to be reached 
through the study of those ‘given circumstances’ which will become 
unconditionally valued only two centuries later by Stanislavski (1980, pp.50-52). 
In the next chapter, I will discuss how a psychoanalytic perspective can 
illuminate the significance of the study of the given circumstances in order to 
interpret feelings; I will also explain how this particular emphasis on the 
reaching of feelings through understanding brings the actor’s art into a 
perspective which is utterly relational.  
 
But before entering into such repercussions, I will next highlight some crucial 
cross-referencing, within the eighteenth-century cultural milieu, between these 
novel theories of the theatre and paradigmatic developments within science and 
philosophy. In order to do so, I will concentrate my attention on the concepts, 
central to the debate on the actor, of nature, sensibility and ‘esprit’. Although it 
could be maintained that the new scientific discoveries and philosophical ideas 
unilaterally condition the new aesthetic theories (see Roach, 1993), the 
complexity of the cultural context seems to suggest that both aesthetic and 
scientific/philosophical innovations are co-implicated in the shift between the old 
and the new theories of the human mind. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL DEBATE 
 
Nature 
 
The focus on the need of the actor to study the expression of emotions in 
human nature places the debate on the actor in the context of the birth, during 
the eighteenth century, of a new science of the mind, through which the value of 
a psychological approach to truth becomes preponderant. At the same time, the 
debate on the actor, with the pretext of the theatre, will become an opportunity 
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to engage with the philosophical enquiry of what it is to be human, and will 
extend to questions about society and the underpinnings of morality in general. 
In this respect, the eighteenth-century preoccupation with the actor anticipates 
a comparable surge of interest in the twentieth century, and not solely on the 
part of Brecht. 
 
The philosophical and cultural movement of the Enlightenment, within which the 
eighteenth-century debate took place, had one of its most pregnant roots in the 
influence that the theories of Newton and the English empiricists such as Locke 
and Hume, wielded on French philosophical thought during a time of crisis of 
religious orthodoxy (Wade, 1971). In the seventeenth century, Descartes’s 
emphasis on reason had displaced the quest for truth from religion and God, to 
man and his capacity for thinking. Albeit unintentionally, Descartes’s philosophy 
greatly contributed to the dismissal of religious belief as a possible source of 
knowledge. 
 
The eighteenth-century concept of nature exemplifies the contrast between the 
old metaphysical theories and the new philosophy. As beautifully illustrated by 
the entry in the Encyclopédie (Vol.11, pp.44-45), in its metaphysical connotation 
‘naturel’ is that which is distinguished from the ‘surnaturel ou miraculeux’, in as 
far as it is governed by laws which can be comprehended by man. On the other 
hand, ‘naturel’ is also that which is distinguished from ‘artificiel’, in as far as it is 
not produced by human craft or will. Yet a further clarification specifies that: 
‘Jamais ce qui est surnaturel et miraculeux ne sauroit être dit naturel; mais ce 
qui est artificiel peut s’appeler naturel, et il l’est effectivement en-tant qu’il n’est 
point miraculeux’. The three planes of the definition of naturel, that which is 
governed by apprehensible laws, that which is not artificial, but also the artificial 
in as far as it is not supernatural, correspond to the prismatic view of what is 
intended by nature in the actor’s art.  
 
The laws of nature, as they were studied by the natural philosophers, starting 
with Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo, and leading to Boyle and Newton, apply to 
the physical world, but they also pertain to ‘the science of human nature’, as 
Hume called moral philosophy (Ayer, 1980, p.24). In moral philosophy, the 
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emphasis on the natural as distinct from the supernatural tallies with the idea of 
a human psychology responding to laws which are determinable, hence 
dismantling the notion of differences based on divine rights in favour of a view 
of human nature as ‘socially’ determined. While the emergence of this new 
conception corresponds to the preoccupations of a bourgeois audience and 
anticipates the more radical ideas of naturalism in the next century, it also leads 
to wider implications.  
 
In as far as humanity is part of nature, it is possible to subject it to systematic 
study like any other science. Hume for instance maintains ‘that the custom of 
drawing inferences from past to future experience, as well as the assumption of 
firmer regularities than we have actually discovered, occur no less in the social 
than in the natural sciences’ (Ayer, 1980, p.76). In his Enquiry concerning 
human understanding, he writes:  
 
Where would be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no 
certain or determinate powers to produce particular sentiments, and if 
these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what 
pretence could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author, if 
we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors, either 
natural or unnatural, to such characters, and in such circumstances? It 
seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage, either in science or 
action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and 
this inference from motives to voluntary actions; from characters to 
conduct. 
(Hume, 2007, [90] p.6533, cited in Ayer, 1980, p.76) 
 
Hume talks of the possibility to study the normative principles of feelings and 
behaviours in accordance to character and circumstances. Although he is not 
specifically talking about the theatre, he is clearly referring to fictional characters 
and to the impression they make on the literary critic of either being natural or 
unnatural as a proof that such normative principles actually must exist. The 
philosopher, or indeed the actor, can study the laws of human nature, but such 
study is not an invention, an act of arbitrary or wilful creation (hence the 
distinction between the naturel and the artificiel); to stay within nature means to 
observe and discover what is already given; it means to understand the 
                                                       
33 David Hume, 2007, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
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functioning of human nature, which is an object of study in its own right and not 
some idiosyncratic and subjective proposition of the philosopher or the actor. As 
Sticotti puts it, translating from Hill’s The Actor: ‘L’art du Théâtre est une 
science, il faut donc l’étudier comme une science’ (Sticotti,  1770, p.19). 
 
Nature intended as natural talent and nature intended as ‘human nature’, as 
pertains to the distinct uses made by the eighteenth-century theorists of the 
theatre, become hence intimately linked within the art of the actor: human 
nature does express itself spontaneously albeit according to its laws. But the 
question of nature for the actor is to resist giving effect to her own peculiar 
instinct in order to represent the nature of another: in this sense the art of the 
actor is not spontaneous while it remains natural. As Sticotti poignantly remarks: 
‘l’art porté à son comble devient nature, […] les grands Acteurs ne 
l’abandonnent jamais; ils élèvent sur cette base un édifice, pour ainsi dire, plus 
naturel quel la nature même’ (1770, p.10). When the actor reproduces nature, 
trespassing in the realm of the artificial, he needs to follow the laws of nature as 
he has observed them in mankind, and not act in an arbitrary fashion. In this 
way the artificial of the actor’s art remains natural, or indeed, more natural than 
nature itself. 
 
Following the principle of nature consists, for the actor, in the operations that 
esprit or understanding apply to the raw material of sensibilité or sensibility. 
Sensibilité is the ‘cire molle’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.32), which ties the human 
nature of the actor to that of all mankind. Esprit aptly modifies it in precise 
reproduction of the natural laws under study. Here we can see the conflation of 
all the meanings of ‘natural’. Sensibility is natural in as much as it is the raw 
material (the capacity for feeling) in each actor as a human being; but it is also 
natural in as much as through study it is modified to reproduce emotions at will, 
under the guidance of study and rational understanding. Nature is hence the 
domain of the actor’s art where sensibility and understanding interact in their 
dynamic relationship and it points to a fundamental principle: human nature 
must be understood and the actor can serve this function. As we shall see in 
the next chapter, according to psychoanalysis ‘to be understood’ is a structural 
need in psychic development that grounds the relational nature of the psyche. 
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In this sense, it is the principle which underlies the moral imperative of the 
actor’s art. 
  
Sensism, sensibilité and esprit 
 
The philosophy of the Enlightenment had its roots in the seventeenth-century 
movements of English empiricism and Descartes’s rationalism. Overall, 
however, Descartes’s emphasis on the capacity of reason to reach knowledge 
was set aside by empiricism and its attribution of primacy in knowledge to the 
facts of experience rather than to reason. John Locke, partaking of the cultural 
milieu in which eminent scientists such as Newton and Boyle were conducting 
their scientific discoveries, formulated a theory of human knowledge entirely 
based on experience (Sini, 1986).  
 
In particular Locke identified two distinct categories of knowledge: sensation, 
based on the experience of the outside world, and reflection, based on the 
experience of one’s own mind. While consolidating the central position of the 
human mind in the pursuit for knowledge, and placing experience at the core of 
it, he maintained a certain dualism in his distinction between the psychic 
processes of sensation and reflection (Cassirer, 1951). 
 
Further developments of Locke’s thought went in the direction of overtaking 
such dualism, arriving at the most radical conclusion that all psychological 
reality is ultimately based on sense perceptions and that ‘what we commonly 
regard as the “higher” powers of the mind, contrasting these powers with 
sensation, is in reality only a transformation of the basic element of sense 
perception’ (Cassirer, 1951, p.25). Eminent elaborations of this kind were 
carried out during the Enlightenment by Condillac in France and David Hume in 
Britain. Condillac was the philosopher mostly responsible for disseminating 
Locke’s ideas in France and was closely associated with Diderot, Rousseau 
and d’Alembert for a period of his life (Wilson, 1972). David Hume, a major 
exponent of the Scottish Enlightenment, lived in Paris between 1763 and 1766 
where he had the opportunity to befriend the circle of the philosophes, and he 
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continued to be a correspondent of Diderot’s after his return to Britain (Zaretsky 
& Scott, 2009). 
 
Condillac’s starting point was Locke’s theory that human knowledge is 
ultimately based on experience, but he had some reservation about the 
distinction between sensation and reflection as two separate operations. In his 
masterpiece, the Traité des Sensations, published in 1754, one of the major 
contributions to the theory of sensism, Condillac proceeds to argue that all 
knowledge derives from sensation, including all other psychic operations 
including reflection (Sini, 1986). Again taking inspiration from Locke’s idea that 
the onset of human will is a remembrance of displeasure and uneasiness, 
which the mind tries to avoid, Condillac extends it to all operations of the mind.  
 
Uneasiness (inquiétude) is for him not merely the starting-point of our 
desires and wishes, of our willing and acting, but also of all our feeling 
and perceiving and of our thinking and judging, indeed of the highest 
acts of reflection to which the mind can rise. 
(Cassirer, 1951, p.103) 
 
In the seventeenth century Descartes’s philosophy had placed reason at the 
centre of human mental activity, attributing to it the ability to regulate the senses 
and their appetites, and considering the accompanying ‘affects as 
“perturbations of the mind” (perturbationes animi)’ (Cassirer, 1951, p.105). In 
the eighteenth century, the advent of sensism identified the affects as the 
original and indispensable impulse behind all the operations of the mind 
(Cassirer, 1951, pp.105-106). Hume’s notorious pronouncement that ‘Reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them’ (Hume, 198234, p.415, cited in Ayer, 
1980, p.19), in full harmony with the principles of sensism, turns the Cartesian 
hierarchy between reason and feelings upside down. Like Condillac, Hume 
places sensations and feelings at the basis of all mental activities, including 
abstract ideas, reasoning and even moral behaviour (Sini, 1986).  
 
                                                       
34 David Hume, 1982, A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Diderot himself was permeated by these philosophical ideas. In his 
Philosophical Thoughts, an early work of 1746, he fully endorses the notion that 
reason is founded on feelings, and he maintains that:  
 
It is of no avail to oppose the passions, and it would be the height of the 
ridiculous to try to destroy them since in so doing we should undermine 
the proud foundations of reason. Everything excellent in poetry, painting, 
and music, everything sublime in art and morals, is derived from this 
source. Hence the affects must not be weakened but strengthened; for 
the true power of the soul springs from the harmonious balance of the 
passions.  
(Cassirer, 1951, pp.107-108) 
 
During the age of Enlightenment, reason undergoes a fundamental permutation 
of meaning. In the seventeenth century Descartes had celebrated reason as the 
means to acquire knowledge, but then reason ‘had meant the possession of a 
number of innate and transcendent ideas, much like the highest category of 
knowledge or reason described by Plato in The Republic’ (Wilson, 1972, 
pp.191-192). In the eighteenth century reason came to be seen as a point of 
arrival, rather than a point of departure: ‘the eighteenth century regarded reason 
as a sort of energy, a force, a means by which to do something. It was not so 
much an essence as it was a process’ (Wilson, 1972, p.192).  
 
This semantic change reflects similar preoccupations and solutions to the 
functioning of the human psyche that we encounter in the debate on the actor: 
the philosophical shift in ideas about the relationship between reason and 
sensation parallels the theatrical debate on sensibility versus judgement in a 
striking way. In order to explore the associations between the philosophical and 
the theatrical arguments, I will now consider the definition of ‘esprit’ and 
‘sensibilité’ as given in the Encyclopédie.  
 
‘Esprit’, we shall recall, is the term used by Sainte-Albine (1749) to describe the 
rational element of the actor’s art as opposed to ‘sentiment’. As I have 
illustrated in Chapter 3, ‘esprit’ will be translated as ‘understanding’ or 
‘judgement’ in John Hill’s treatise The Actor and will be returned to the French 
language through Sticotti’s Garrick as ‘jugement’ or ‘intelligence’. ‘Jugement’ 
will also be used in the Paradoxe. ‘Sentiment’ will be translated into English as 
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‘sensibility’ by John Hill (1755) and returned to French as ‘sensibilité’ by Sticotti 
(1770). Diderot will also use it in the Paradoxe.   
 
In the entry in the Encyclopédie (Vol.5, pp.972-976), composed by Voltaire, 
esprit partakes of the wider semantic field comprising words such as jugement 
and intelligence. In discussing its meaning, Voltaire distinguishes between the 
realms of metaphysics, philosophy and chemistry. In metaphysics esprit defines 
a thinking and intelligent being, which in the tradition of the Christian 
philosophers is differentiated in three kinds: God, the angels and the human 
esprit. This latter coincides with rational thinking, as opposed to the divine esprit 
which amounts to intuition. In philosophy esprit is a quality of the soul and can 
signify a number of different mental operations such as judgement, talent, taste, 
discernment, intelligence and so on, and needs to be specified by an 
accompanying adjective: ‘C’est un mot générique qui a toujours besoin d’un 
autre mot qui le détermine’ (Vol.5, p.973). Voltaire suggests as its synonym that 
of ‘raison ingénieuse’. For the purpose of my discussion, it is significant that 
esprit sits at the boundary between metaphysics and philosophy, as this is 
evocative of that displacement of the seat of truth from religious orthodoxy to a 
human act of enquiry.  
 
The Encyclopédie (Vol.15, pp.38-52) has one single entry for the concepts of 
sensibilité (the word used by Sticotti and Diderot) and sentiment (the equivalent 
word used by Sainte-Albine). This indicates the overlap between their semantic 
fields. The entry was compiled by the physician Fouquet. As esprit is a quality 
of the soul, sensibilité is a property of the body. It denotes ‘l’animalité par 
excellence’ (Vol.15, p.38), assimilating human beings into the animal kingdom, 
in the same way as esprit was a function of the similarity between man, angels 
and god. As the most basic animal function, it is a way of perceiving the 
impression left on them by the objects of the external world and determining 
their quality, whether good or bad, as a consequence of which the body 
accordingly moves towards or away from the objects. It is, in other words, a 
‘principe impulsif inséparable de la vie, et qui dans chaque individu est la 
source de tous les mouvements qui conspirent à la durée de l’être et à sa 
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conservation’ (Vol.15, p.39). Sensibility denotes the area of the senses which is 
at the basis of all human knowledge according to sensism. 
 
THE DEBATE ON THE ART OF THE ACTOR IN LIGHT OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL DEBATE 
 
Comparing the theatrical with the philosophical concepts of nature, sensibility 
and esprit brings to the fore interesting considerations. The empiricists’ proof of 
the existence of determinable laws which man can discover and use to describe 
the workings of nature within the natural sciences, prompted the presumption 
that similar laws could be inferred for what concerns human nature. This implied 
the belief that human psychology can be subjected to study as much as any 
other field of knowledge.  It is this notion that legitimizes claims that the actor 
can arrive at an expression of feeling through her observation, study and 
understanding of the operations of the human mind: by studying the given 
circumstances, the actor can reach an understanding of the character and 
ultimately arouse the feelings which are congruent with such circumstances.  
 
There is here, it seems, a primacy of reason, which is endowed with the 
function of overseeing and understanding the whole of the mind, including 
feelings and their particular manifestations according to the given 
circumstances. On the other hand, the principles of sensism and the 
interpretations of the words sensibilité and esprit in the Encyclopédie point to 
the notion that sensations and feelings are the building blocks of all mental 
operations, including rational thinking and moral judgements. In this sense, the 
primacy falls on feelings, which are thus entrusted to give meaning to the 
workings of reason. 
 
These propositions imply a problematic contradiction, in face of which it is not 
surprising that the question of the relationship between feelings and reason has 
turned into an everlasting controversy. This is still the case today, if one thinks, 
for example, of the opposite models of spectatorship that I discussed in Chapter 
1, as put forward by the semiotician De Marinis (1985), who grounds 
spectatorship on the notion that emotional responses are regulated by 
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cognitions, and by the cognitivist McConachie who emphasizes cognitive 
theories which put emotions at the basis of any intellectual task (2008, p.3). 
 
In the next chapter I will analyse the relationship between emotional arousal 
and rational understanding through a psychoanalytic perspective. Feelings – 
rooted in the body and its instincts, and which psychoanalysis locates in the 
unconscious mind – and reason - rooted in consciousness – are mutually 
engaged in fostering psychic development from infancy into adult life. Through 
a fundamentally interpersonal process, the primitive language of feelings can be 
developed into reason through contact with the mind of others. In this sense, 
the self as character can have its feelings promoted to reason via the 
interpretation of the other as actor; conversely, the self as actor can apply its 
understanding to the feelings of another as character to promote their psychic 
development. It is the unravelling of this relationship which, I will argue, can 
ultimately dissolve the actor’s paradox. 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE ART OF THE ACTOR AS ALPHA-FUNCTION 
 
FREUD’S THEORY OF EGO FUNCTIONING 
 
The transition from the topographical to the structural model of the mind  
 
Freud’s greatest contribution to the study of the mind was the re-discovery of 
the unconscious. Not so much its discovery, but its appropriation from the realm 
of poetry and philosophy into the sphere of the medical sciences (Gay, 2006, 
pp.127-128). Johann Friedrich Herbart, a prominent German psychologist and 
philosopher, had, in the early nineteenth century, recognized the important part 
played by the unconscious in mental life, and to his views Freud had been 
exposed. Despite these antecedents, however, no one before Freud had ever 
examined the unconscious in detail, showing ‘how it worked, how it differed 
from other parts of the mind, and what were its reciprocal relations with them’ 
(Freud, 1915c, p.164). 
 
In Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 1895) and in subsequent works on 
the neuroses, Freud had proved the relevance of unconscious mental life for 
explaining and for curing common neurotic disorders. But it was with the 
Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900) that he proceeded to show how the 
unconscious was the dominant aspect of all mental life, not just of its pathology. 
For this reason he considered this book his most important contribution to 
psychology. As he declared:  ‘From the date of The Interpretation of Dreams 
psycho-analysis had a twofold significance. It was not only a new method of 
treating the neuroses but it was also a new psychology’ (Freud, 1924b, p.200). 
 
Freud’s study of depth psychology in his clinical practice, led him to propose 
theoretical systems that could explain the functioning of the mind accounting for 
the unconscious as well as the conscious phenomena progressively unravelled 
by psychoanalysis. As he continued to revise his theories of mental functioning 
to make them consistent with new clinical findings, he came to realize that not 
only does the unconscious dominate mental life, but also that consciousness is 
better understood as an accidental property of psychic phenomena. In the 
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introduction to The Ego and the Id, James Strachey, the eminent editor of the 
English ‘Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud’, explains how Freud had reached the conclusion that 
 
the criterion of consciousness was no longer helpful in building up a 
structural picture of the mind. Freud accordingly abandoned the use of 
consciousness in this capacity: ‘being conscious’ was henceforward to 
be regarded simply as a quality which might or might not be attached to 
a mental state. 
 (Freud, 1923, p.7) 
 
The earlier Freudian model of the mind, called the topographical model, had 
been based on the assumption that the psyche is simply divided into an 
unconscious, a preconscious and a conscious area (Freud, 1915c). Conscious 
wishes or memories, according to this model, can become repressed under 
certain conditions (for example when considered unacceptable, such as in the 
case of the traumatic memories of the hysterics). Through repression they 
become unconscious, but this does not mean that they are at rest; on the 
contrary repressed wishes and memories continue to push for conscious 
representation, and because repression counteracts this tendency, they 
manifest themselves under disguise, such as in a hysterical symptom. I have 
given examples of this phenomenon in Chapter 2.  
 
In the topographical model, the preconscious represents an intermediary area 
between the unconscious and the conscious, and it therefore regulates the 
communication between the two. The preconscious contains unconscious 
material that is very different from that contained in the unconscious. While the 
unconscious proper is the haven of all repressed ideas and affects, sheltered 
there against the force of repression, the preconscious harbours all those 
unconscious contents which are not under the thumb of repression, and hence 
could easily become conscious, but at any given moment are not immediately 
present to awareness. An example would be all those memories of recent 
events, which can promptly be recollected at will, but which currently are not 
within awareness because they are of no present interest. Hence, as Freud 
warns, it is important  
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to distinguish two kinds of unconscious – one which is easily, under 
frequently occurring circumstances, transformed into something 
conscious, and another with which this transformation is difficult and 
takes place only subject to a considerable expenditure of effort or 
possibly never at all. […] We call the unconscious which is only latent, 
and thus easily becomes conscious, the ‘preconscious’ and retain the 
term ‘unconscious’ for the other.  
(Freud, 1933, p.71) 
 
The topographical model had the advantage of a relative simplicity and seemed 
to work well to explain repression, symptom formation and the relieving of 
symptoms in the cathartic method. However, as Freud penetrated the depth of 
normal and pathological mental phenomena through his extensive clinical work 
over two decades, he revised his theories. In particular, he came to realize that 
the linear explanations provided by the topographical model, despite their 
appeal of simplicity, did not hold true because the psyche proved to be more 
complex than expected. As he writes, with his characteristic enthusiasm: 
 
We shall defend the complications of our theory so long as we find that 
they meet the results of observation, and we shall not abandon our 
expectations of being led in the end by those very complications to the 
discovery of a state of affairs which, while simple in itself, can account for 
all the complications of reality. 
(Freud, 1915c, p.190) 
  
It is the seminal writing of The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923), which marks the 
transition to what we know as Freud’s structural model of the mind. The 
dynamic principles established in the topographical model remain valid, in as far 
as the relationship between conscious, preconscious and unconscious goes, 
and their definitions. But the structural model provides a new perspective on the 
mind, which is now conceptualized as divided into three different agencies, the 
id, the ego and the super-ego35. The most important innovation is that none of 
these agencies can be simplistically equated with consciousness. The id is 
entirely unconscious and the seat of the instincts, the super-ego, comprising 
conscience, is also largely unconscious, although part of it operates within 
consciousness. And, even more strikingly, the ego, the agency for awareness, 
conscious will, and rational judgement, presents substantial unconscious 
                                                       
35 Freud, writing in German, called these three agencies, Es, Ich and Über-Ich, whose exact 
English translation would have been ‘It, I, Over-I’. 
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portions, especially as it is the seat of repression, which is an unconscious 
mental operation. 
 
Despite the emphasis on the unconscious as domineering over the psyche, 
Freud remains interested in consciousness, not least because it is the only 
modus operandi in which we can be aware of ourselves and our minds: in a 
way the unconscious would not be known or be recognized unless there was a 
consciousness which brought it to its epiphanies. On this point, he states with 
humour:  
 
And it is indeed the case that large portions of the ego and super-ego 
can remain unconscious and are normally unconscious. That is to say, 
the individual knows nothing of their contents and it requires an 
expenditure of effort to make them conscious. [...] At first we are inclined 
greatly to reduce the value of the criterion of being conscious since it has 
shown itself so untrustworthy. But we should be doing it an injustice. As 
may be said of our life, it is not worth much, but it is all we have. Without 
the illumination thrown by the quality of consciousness, we should be lost 
in the obscurity of depth-psychology.  
(Freud, 1933, pp.69-70) 
 
From the psychology of impulse to the psychology of the ego 
 
Freud’s focus on the unconscious had led him to investigate instinctual life 
extensively. In the first place, this resulted in his formulation of what is 
universally known as the libido theory, according to which unconscious drives, 
ultimately linked to a primitive sexual energy, are the foundation of all mental 
life, and determine the development of the child into the adult. Instincts need to 
negotiate their encounter with actual reality, and Freud conceptualized this as 
the continuous negotiation between two principles: the pleasure principle, which 
is the law of the instincts, and the reality principle, which must be the rule of the 
ego, if the ego’s adaptation to reality is to be successful. 
 
To do justice to the wide implications of libido for all mental life, Freud was 
aware of needing to emphasize the distinction between libido as he understood 
it and a restricted view of libido as genital sexuality. In his words:  
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what psycho-analysis called sexuality was by no means identical with the 
impulsion towards a union of the two sexes or towards producing a 
pleasurable sensation in the genitals; it had far more resemblance to the 
all-inclusive and all-preserving Eros of Plato’s Symposium.  
(Freud, 1925a, p.218) 
 
As he modified his model of the mind into the structural model, he also changed 
his theory of the instincts until he arrived at his definitive formulation, first 
presented in 1920 in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920). Here Freud 
maintained that all human instincts are ultimately ascribable to either ‘libido’, the 
creative force of life and represented by Eros, or ‘destructiveness’, the 
annihilating force of death, ultimately leading all organisms to their dissolution, 
but also put at the service of the destruction of others through aggression. Thus 
the negotiation between pleasure and reality is complicated by the conflict 
between Eros and the death instinct. 
 
As Freud proceeded to recognize the ego as the negotiator of the different 
forces which made psychic life so complex, he gradually shifted his interest 
from the study of the instincts towards the study of the ego and its mechanisms. 
In doing so, he adumbrated many of the developments that some of his 
followers, and especially Melanie Klein and her circle, accomplished in 
psychoanalytic theory. 
 
In particular, in his shift to the structural model, Freud indicated and attended to 
three areas of unconscious psychic functioning, which would be brought 
together into a coherent theory by Klein and her collaborators: 
- In the first place, he became more and more interested in the functioning 
of the ego, as he recognized its central role in mediating between the 
force of the instincts and the constraints of reality.  
- Secondly, he revised his libido theory with the introduction of the death 
instinct and came to the radical classification of instinctual life as 
fundamentally reducible to a perpetual struggle between Eros and the 
death instinct.  
- Thirdly, he introduced the idea that processes of identification were at the 
basis of the formation of the ego and the super-ego (Freud, 1923). 
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I will now outline Freud’s insights into these areas, so that in my subsequent 
discussion of Klein’s theory, the points of continuity with Freud’s ideas will 
become apparent. 
 
The relationship between the ego, the id, and reality 
  
Freud saw the ego as a specialized development of the id, which comes into 
being as the id is obliged to grapple with reality and adapt to it, if the baby is to 
survive. For example, the baby’s need for food and warmth, generating from the 
baby’s id, needs to be negotiated with the limitations that the environment, in 
the case of the baby especially represented by the mother, put on the 
satisfaction of such needs. The way the baby adapts to such limitations will 
ultimately affect his development. The ego, that is, develops as the instincts 
meet the objects of their satisfaction or, indeed, of their frustration, in the 
environment. 
 
In his seminal paper on the ego, Freud writes: ‘It is easy to see that the ego is 
that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the 
external world’ (Freud, 1923, p.25). The mediation that the ego effects between 
the instincts of the id and external reality is also a mediation between 
unconscious and conscious, in as far as the external world is apprehended 
through sense-perceptions which are conscious, while the instincts operate at 
an unconscious level. It is in this way that the ego, departing from the need to 
manage internal drives and respond to external perceptions, enriches and 
develops. 
 
Whilst the ego strives to keep control over the whole of mental life, it is not 
always successful. The relationship between id and ego is depicted by Freud 
using a metaphor which reminds us of Plato’s charioteer allegory in the 
Phaedrus (246a–254e, trans. Rowe, 1986, pp.60-77). The ego is  
 
in its relation to the id […] like a man on horseback, who has to hold in 
check the superior strength of the horse […] The analogy may be carried 
a little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is 
obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in 
the habit of transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own. 
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(Freud, 1923, p.25) 
 
If one remembers that Plato’s allegory depicts two horses which adumbrate 
Freud’s division of the instincts into Eros and the death instinct, this metaphor 
casts a light on the delicate dynamic at play between the id (with its opposing 
forces within) and the ego.  
 
Identification through introjection and projection 
 
Freud suggests that both ego and super-ego (which he conceives as a 
specialized part of the ego) form through cycles of identification:   
 
Thus we have said repeatedly that the ego is formed to a great extent 
out of identifications which take the place of abandoned cathexes36 by 
the id; that the first of these identifications always behave as a special 
agency in the ego and stand apart from the ego in the form of a super-
ego, while later on, as it grows stronger, the ego may become more 
resistant to the influences of such identifications. 
(Freud, 1923, p.48) 
 
While he put forward a number of mechanisms through which these 
identifications come to be, he never brought these to bear on the formulation of 
a systematic and coherent theory. This will be developed instead by Melanie 
Klein, as I shall discuss in the next section.  However he foreshadowed both 
projection and introjection as the two fundamental procedures underpinning 
identification:  
 
Under the dominance of the pleasure principle a further development 
now takes place in the ego. In so far as the objects which are presented 
to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, ‘introjects’ them (to 
use Ferenczi's term); and, on the other hand, it expels37 whatever within 
itself becomes a cause of unpleasure.  
(Freud, 1915b, pp.135-136) 
 
It is important to note that introjection and projection are unconscious 
mechanisms and the resulting identifications, are equally unconscious.  
                                                       
36 In psychoanalytic terms ‘cathexis’ means the investment of libidinal energy onto an object, for 
instance the desire for the breast that the baby experiences as part of its instinctual constitution, 
or the desire for the mother’s love which is a prototype for all future loving relationships.	
37 As a note to the text indicates, ‘expels’ here has to be understood as equivalent to ‘projects’. 
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For what concerns introjection, Freud suggests that when the instincts from the 
id remain frustrated in their aim of obtaining the object conducive to their 
satisfaction, the ego can cope with the frustration and protect itself against the 
pain of it, by introjecting the object and identifying with it. In this way the ego 
can tease the id into believing that its frustrated libidinal energy (i.e. its 
abandoned cathexis) can now obtain satisfaction by moving its aim from the 
unavailable object to the ego itself. An example of this would be what happens 
when grieving for the loss of a loved person:  
 
it may be said that this transformation of an erotic object-choice into an 
alteration of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control 
over the id and deepen its relations with it—at the cost, it is true, of 
acquiescing to a large extent in the id's experiences. When the ego 
assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, so to speak, upon 
the id as a love-object and is trying to make good the id's loss by saying: 
‘Look, you can love me too—I am so like the object.’ 
(Freud, 1923, p.30) 
 
Freud first describes this mechanism in relation to melancholia (what we 
nowadays call depression); in a paper dedicated to it, he explains that the self-
reproaches of the depressed person are often perceived as bizarre because in 
actual fact they are the expression of complaints towards an internalized object 
with which the depressed person has identified (Freud, 1917). It is important to 
remember that the identifications in question are unconscious, and the 
depressed person is not aware of them, unless these are brought to light by 
psychoanalysis. I will illustrate this with an example from my clinical practice.  
 
A depressed man was often hospitalized when his behavior became bizarre: he 
would crawl all over her house, and instead of speaking, he would emit 
shrieking sounds. The impression that he gave to his family was that in those 
moments he was behaving like a toddler, and when asked whether he knew 
why he was behaving like that, he would say that Goldilocks came to live inside 
his body and compelled him to do so. His symptoms had made their 
appearance following his wife’s recovery from a stroke that had made her 
unable to walk and talk for a period of time. It eventually transpired that his 
depression was linked to his deep-seated conflict with his wife, who had been 
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unfaithful to him for many years, but without this ever being openly 
acknowledged between them for the sake of their three children and to keep up 
appearances. Following the stroke, which happened when the youngest of their 
children was fourteen, he had nursed his wife patiently for nearly two years. 
Once recovered, she had become much more attached to him and, in his 
words, now ‘wanted to play the happy couple for real’. This new and 
unexpected situation had left him ambivalent; during the time preceding the 
stroke he had somewhat entertained the idea that they would separate for good 
once all the children had left the family home. Now he was stuck with a wife that 
he was not sure he wanted any more, while he unconsciously felt he had lost 
her anyway at the time of her first extramarital affair, many years ago. The only 
way he could negotiate the painful conflict between his sense of duty to 
continue acting as a devoted husband, and his deep-seated feeling of loss, was 
to introject his wife: Goldilocks living inside him symbolized this introjection. His 
ensuing identification with her was represented by his crawling and shrieking, 
which were close enough symbols of his formerly ill wife, when, during the time 
following the stroke, she had been neither able to walk nor speak. 
 
The other mechanism through which identification takes place is that of 
projection. Freud’s first encounters with projection had been in his study of 
paranoia (Quinodoz, 2005, p.105). In general he considered projection to be a 
characteristic of all psychoses. In one of his case studies dedicated to the 
investigation of paranoia (Freud, 1911a) he gives several examples of this 
phenomenon. One of them is what happens in erotomania, a psychotic disorder 
in which a person believes without foundation that someone (typically a famous 
person to whom they are unknown or a slight acquaintance that in their eyes is 
of high-status, such as a teacher, or a politician) is in love with them. Such 
belief is held with delusional intensity, i.e. it is held despite all proof of the 
impossibility of the situation. Freud suggests that the delusional belief of 
erotomania may be explained through a process of identification involving a 
projection: the ill person had fallen in love with the famous person, but his 
awareness of the impossibility that his love may be reciprocated was too painful 
to bear. His desire to be loved, which would have to remain frustrated and 
cause great pain, is hence projected from himself into the object, so that he 
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loses any awareness of being himself in love. Unconsciously he has identified 
with his object and therefore he can now safely believe that it is his object, the 
famous person herself, who is in love with him: 
 
Many cases of erotomania might give an impression that they could be 
satisfactorily explained as being exaggerated or distorted heterosexual 
fixations, if our attention were not attracted by the circumstance that 
these infatuations invariably begin, not with any internal perception of 
loving, but with an external perception of being loved. 
(Freud, 1911a, p.63) 
 
The same process happens in paranoia, where the patient’s delusions of 
persecution often derive from his projection of his own hostile feelings towards 
someone. I will illustrate this with another example from my clinical practice. A 
woman was referred to the psychotherapy clinic following a nervous 
breakdown. She had lost her job of many years and following a year of 
unemployment and unwise investments she was nearly bankrupt. She was 
convinced that there had been a conspiracy against her at work, which had led 
to her dismissal, in which her boss and some other colleagues were implicated. 
She had always been a hard-working professional woman, and her career had 
been the highlight of her life; she had been married for many years to an idle 
man who was completely dependent on her for his maintenance. They had no 
children. 
 
During therapy it emerged that her problems at work had started one year back, 
shortly after the separation from her husband. She had then discovered that he 
had a relationship with another woman, but had been willing to forgive him if he 
only were to stop the affair. Unfortunately for her, her husband chose to stay 
with his lover and asked instead for a divorce. Despite the shock, my patient 
maintained a detached and friendly attitude towards her husband and 
consented to the divorce. Her hate for her husband’s new partner remained 
unacknowledged, but during psychoanalytic treatment it emerged that the 
patient had harboured a secret wish that this woman may be ruined and lose 
everything, so that her husband would not be interested in her any longer. 
These hateful and vengeful desires were incompatible with her view of herself 
as a kindly and generous person and had to be repressed. In doing so, she 
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projected them into her boss and her colleagues, who were in an ideal place to 
receive the projection, as they were perceived to be successful women and her 
‘rivals’ at work. Although she had apparently forgotten that she hated her 
husband’s new partner, she had instead been convinced that it was her boss 
and colleagues who hated her and were conspiring against her. These beliefs 
brought her to the verge of collapse and her proficiency at work fell so 
miserably that in the end she was dismissed. By projection she had put her 
boss in her place as the hateful avenger and herself in the place of her hated 
rival as the defenceless victim; the wish that the rival may be ruined had turned 
upon the self. 
 
Although introjection and projection are mostly described by Freud with 
reference to pathological states, he also describes introjection as the basis of 
the formation of a person’s character, and sees it as especially intense during 
childhood. As he writes: 
 
We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder of melancholia by 
supposing that [in those suffering from it] an object which was lost has 
been set up again inside the ego — that is, that an object-cathexis has 
been replaced by an identification. At that time, however, we did not 
appreciate the full significance of this process and did not know how 
common and how typical it is. Since then we have come to understand 
that this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form 
taken by the ego and that it makes an essential contribution towards 
building up what is called its ‘character’. 
(Freud, 1923, p.28) 
 
While introjection was explored by Freud in relation to both pathology and 
normal development, his descriptions of projection are more sparse. Yet, 
somewhat unwittingly, he gives a most interesting example of projection as a 
form of identification in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), when he 
describes the mechanism of repetition-compulsion in the reel-game. I say 
unwittingly, because in this paper Freud mentions projection as a way in which 
the ego deals with unpleasure by projecting the unacceptable desire or feeling 
(for example the unfulfilled love of the erotomanic patient or the unacceptable 
hate of the paranoid patient) into an external object, but he does not connect 
this explicitly to identification nor to normal development. He writes: 
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a particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which 
produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat 
them as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the 
outside […]This is the origin of projection, which is destined to play such 
a large part in the causation of pathological processes. 
(Freud, 1920, p.29) 
 
As we shall recall from Chapter 2, Freud had observed his grandson’s repetitive 
playing with a cotton reel, throwing it away from himself, and pulling it back. 
Freud had interpreted the game as a re-enactment. Every time his mother went 
away leaving the child behind for a few hours, the little boy showed little distress 
but engaged with the game of throwing away objects, of which the reel-game 
was a variant. The reel was thrown away and regained by pulling it back. As 
such it could represent the mother leaving the child and coming back again. But 
most likely, it also represented the child himself, being left behind and re-found. 
The little boy, losing the beloved mother through her departure, introjects her in 
order to avoid the pain of having lost her. Now he is unconsciously identified 
with her and he is the one in control of the partings and reunions. Conversely, 
his sense of frustrated desire for the mother and his vulnerability is projected 
into the cotton reel, which unconsciously becomes identified with the child 
himself through projection.  
 
This example gives a very useful picture of how the ego uses unconscious 
identifications by introjection and projection to mediate between the instincts of 
the id and the necessity to adapt to reality. As Freud explains in his comment 
on the reel-game:  
 
one gets an impression that the child turned his experience into a game 
for another motive. At the outset he was in a passive situation – he was 
overpowered by the experience; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable 
though it was, as a game, he took on an active part. 
(Freud, 1920, p.16) 
 
Freud describes the psyche as caught within a dynamic between passive and 
active mental processes: the ego can both be the passive recipient of instinctual 
forces from the id, which may risk to overwhelm it, and also has a capacity for 
re-acting to this situation, by taking an active stance towards the instincts in an 
attempt to master them. Through the reel-game, the child has overcome 
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passive submission to reality, such as could have been expressed by giving in 
to despair and crying, and has instead engaged with an action which not only 
represents the reality of the mother leaving him through the surrogate object of 
the reel, but also offers opportunity for experimenting with such reality, insofar 
as the reel can be thrown away but also pulled back.  In this way, the re-
enactment represents the first step taken by the ego towards the reality-
principle, considering that it is a very basic attempt at mastering the 
overpowering displeasure of a frustrated instinct or need. Not least, the game 
permits for positions to be swapped: the reel can represent the abandoning and 
rejected mother, but also the abandoned child. The child, in identification with 
the introjected mother, and through his mastering of his actions with the reel, 
can experiment with the idea of sending the projected child (the reel) away. This 
allows for the elaboration of feelings very different from those of him as the child 
left behind by the real mother. 
 
These operations of projection and introjection will be described by Melanie 
Klein as cycles in which the exchange between self and other through 
unconscious identifications is the basic mechanism in the formation of the ego 
and its development throughout life. In the Kleinian theoretical system 
projections and introjections will act through a process of splitting of the ego, 
necessary if the ego can place parts of itself in others, or take parts of the 
others into itself. Although Freud never fully developed this concept, he 
recognized it in his clinical practice (Quinodoz, 2005, p.151) and towards the 
end of his life, he postulated that it is a feature of psychotic as well as neurotic 
disorders: 
 
The view which postulates that in all psychoses there is a splitting of the 
ego could not call for so much notice if it did not turn out to apply to other 
states more like the neuroses and, finally, to the neuroses themselves. 
(Freud, 1938, p.202) 
 
In conclusion, while it will have to be left to Melanie Klein to explain in a 
systematic way the interplay between instincts, adaptation to reality, and the 
mechanisms of projection and introjection, Freud had already foreshadowed it 
by: 
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- recognizing the importance of unconscious identification for the formation 
of ego and super-ego, and ultimately of character; 
- establishing introjection and projection as the two mechanisms through 
which unconscious identification is effected; 
- noticing splitting of the ego as an unconscious process of mental life. 
 
As I will discuss in the next section, all these psychic operations – the 
unconscious functioning of the ego in the regulation of instincts with respect to 
reality, the significance of the conflict between death and life instincts, the 
splitting of the ego, and the mechanisms of projection and introjection as the 
basis for identification – became the pillars of Klein’s theory of the ego’s 
unconscious functioning. Taking Freud’s structural model as a starting point, 
she succeeded in equipping psychoanalysis with a coherent model of ego 
organisation, through the theory of object-relations and the concept of 
unconscious phantasy. 
 
KLEINIAN THEORY OF OBJECT-RELATIONS 
 
Historical introduction 
 
The theory of object-relations was developed principally by Melanie Klein and 
her collaborators, who started from Freud’s latest interest in the functioning of 
the ego with respect to its role of negotiator between instincts and reality. Klein 
accepted the division of all drives into the life and death instincts. She also 
followed Freud in the idea that the ego is fundamentally pleasure-seeking, in as 
much as it strives for satisfaction of the instincts and wants to get rid of pain and 
frustration, but it can only achieve its objective by adapting to reality. The 
conflicts between the life and death drives on one hand, and between the drives 
and the limitations of reality on the other, determine the development of the 
ego.  
 
By focusing on their objects instead of the instincts themselves, Klein and other 
object-relations theorists opened up a new way of looking at the operations of 
the mind. As Fairbairn put it, ‘the point had now been reached at which, in the 
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interests of progress, the classic libido theory would have to be transformed into 
a theory of development based essentially upon object-relationships’ (Fairbairn, 
1984, p.31). 
 
Melanie Klein started her career as a child psychoanalyst, encouraged by 
Sandor Ferenczi, who was one of Freud’s earliest and closest disciples. During 
her analysis with him, he suggested she dedicate herself to the analysis of 
children, and so she became one of the pioneers of child analysis (Grosskurth, 
1995, p.74). Although Freud had himself once been involved in the analysis of a 
child’s phobia, in the renowned case of Little Hans (Freud, 1909a), he had 
generally inferred his theories of child psychic development from his analysis of 
adults. Even in the case of Little Hans, he had met with the child only once and 
had de facto conducted his analysis at one remove, basing it on the 
observations and interventions of Hans’s father, who regularly consulted with 
him during the period of the treatment. Klein instead developed her theories on 
the wealth of first hand direct analysis of children from very young ages, 
including toddlers. As Hanna Segal eloquently put it: ‘Freud discovered the 
repressed child in the adult. Investigating children, Melanie Klein discovered 
what was already repressed in the child – namely the infant’ (Segal, 1989, 
p.49). 
 
What allowed Klein to move psychoanalytic investigation from adults to children 
was the development of a specific technique, which used observation of and 
participation in the child’s playing activity on the part of the analyst.  
 
Taking her cue from Freud’s (1920) observation of the child’s play with 
the reel, Melanie Klein saw that the child’s play could represent 
symbolically his anxieties and phantasies. Since small children cannot be 
asked to free-associate, she treated their play in the playroom in the 
same way as she treated their verbal expressions, i.e. as symbolic 
expression of their unconscious conflicts. 
(Segal, 1988, p.2) 
 
In child-analysis, the child is given free access to a variety of tools, such as 
small toys, paper, and crayons, and the analyst observes his play activity in the 
same way as the adult’s analyst would listen to her patient’s free associations. 
The most striking aspect of Klein’s technique entails that the play activities are 
 180 
systematically interpreted as transference situations (Klein, 1997), therefore 
preserving the significance of transference re-enactments for the analytic 
procedure and its success. While the analyst may be represented in the child’s 
play through the use of dolls or other toys, there are times when the 
transference re-enactments become alive in the session, by the child actually 
casting the analyst in a specific role. For instance, Klein talks of a little patient, 
the 6-year-old Erna, who would often make Klein be the child, while Erna 
played at being the mother or the teacher (Klein, 1929, p 199).  
 
One interesting feature of children’s play is that in it ‘acting plays a prominent 
part’ (Klein, 1926, p.135). Her extensive experience with the play technique led 
Klein to the conclusion that personification in children’s play was, in fact, the 
same phenomenon at the basis of transference re-enactments (Klein, 1929, 
p.207). This resonates with the notion that I discussed in Chapter 2, that 
transference re-enactments may be equivalent to the Greek concept of mimēsis 
inasmuch as mimēsis means an innate propensity to dramatic enactments, 
which promotes human development. That is to say, the personifications and 
impersonations inherent in much of children’s play, a certain meaning of 
mimēsis, and transference re-enactments, are in essence the same 
phenomenon. What characterizes their common nature is the way in which 
cycles of unconscious identifications are realized through the mental operations 
of projection and introjection. Klein and her close collaborators describe these 
unconscious mechanisms under the denomination of ‘unconscious phantasy’, 
as I shall presently consider. 
 
Unconscious phantasy 
 
Like Freud, and always preoccupied to situate her clinical and theoretical work 
within the legitimacy of the Freudian legacy, Melanie Klein was interested in 
unravelling the mysteries of the unconscious, in the belief that it was the 
fundamental site of psychic processes. Joan Rivière, a Kleinian psychoanalyst 
and one of her close collaborators, explains:  
 
the unconscious is not a vestigial or rudimentary part of the mind. It is the 
active organ in which mental processes function; no mental activity can 
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take place without its operation, although much modification of its 
primary activities normally ensues before it determines behaviour in an 
adult. The original primary mental activity which usually remains 
unconscious, we call unconscious ‘phantasy’. There is, therefore, an 
unconscious phantasy behind every thought and every act. 
(Rivière, 1989, p.16) 
 
By unconscious phantasy, a word purposely spelt with a ‘ph’ to denote its 
unconscious nature as opposed to ‘conscious fantasy’, Klein and her 
collaborators came to define the complex process by which psychic reality is 
formed through the meeting of inside impulses with their outside objects. Freud 
had already recognized that the interaction between internal and external reality 
is one of the foundations of the psyche, by stating that the ego is formed to 
effect the negotiation between the unconscious impulses from the id and the 
reality that these need to confront for their satisfaction. Departing from these 
premises, Klein extended the psychoanalytic understanding of this process, 
describing systematically the mechanisms at its core.  
 
As well as being the bedrock of all mental phenomena, unconscious phantasy 
is the primary content of the baby’s mind. As soon as the baby is born, he is 
under the sway of powerful instincts and at the same time he has to deal with 
the impact of reality on the gratification of such instincts (Segal, 1988). In 
keeping with object-relation theory, Klein believes that instincts are always 
represented in unconscious phantasy as linked with the objects at which they 
aim for their satisfaction. For the newly born baby the first object is typified by 
the mother or, rather, by the mother’s breast. As Klein explains:  
 
the tiny child is only concerned with his immediate gratification or the lack 
of it; Freud called this the ‘pleasure-pain principle’. Thus the breast of the 
mother which gives gratification or denies it becomes, in the mind of the 
child, imbued with the characteristics of good and evil.  
(Klein, 1936, pp.290-291) 
 
The baby desires the breast and perceives it as the source of goodness through 
the gratification of a good feed. At the same time he will experience frustration 
from the breast, when left to scream in hunger by the absence of it. However, 
the undeveloped psyche of the infant is not capable of comprehending 
absence, and hence construes it as badness. Hence the two opposing aspects 
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of the breast will form separate phantasies of two breasts, one which gives milk, 
pleasure and love to the baby (the so called ‘good breast’) and one which 
withholds milk, causes pain and ultimately is perceived as hateful towards the 
baby (the so called ‘bad breast’). In Klein’s words:  
 
I have often expressed my view that object-relations exist from the 
beginning of life, the first object being the mother’s breast which to the 
child becomes split into a good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast 
[…] I have further suggested that the relation to the first object implies its 
introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning object-relations 
are moulded by an interaction between introjection and projection, 
between internal and external objects and situations. 
(Klein, 1946, p.2) 
 
Projection and introjection 
 
In unconscious phantasy, the goodness attributed to the good breast is a 
mixture of the child’s loving feelings for it (part of his Eros) and the experience 
of satisfaction coming from the real feed; conversely the badness attributed to 
the bad breast is a mixture of the child’s aggressive feelings (part of his death 
instinct) and the experience of frustration.  The wish for the baby to have 
goodness inside himself, will result in the good breast being introjected (i.e. 
perceived as inside) by the infant’s mind so that he can take the goodness 
inside him to warrant it always being available and secure. At the same time, in 
response to the threat of annihilation posed by the bad breast, the infant’s mind 
will project the bad breast into the actual breast (the mother’s breast), 
perceiving it as outside of itself.   
 
As I have shown, Freud had anticipated the existence of the mechanisms of 
projection and introjection as operations that influence the development of the 
ego.  In a description of how the primitive ego conceives the instincts and their 
objects, his view comes to be strikingly similar to that of Melanie Klein: 
 
Expressed in the language of the oldest—the oral—instinctual impulses, 
the judgment is: ‘I should like to eat this’, or ‘I should like to spit it out’; 
and, put more generally: ‘I should like to take this into myself and to keep 
that out.’ That is to say: ‘It shall be inside me’ or ‘it shall be outside me’. 
As I have shown elsewhere, the original pleasure-ego wants to introject 
into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is 
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bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to 
begin with, identical. 
(Freud, 1925b, p.237) 
 
According to Klein’s theory, and resonating with Freud’s own suppositions, 
introjection and projection’s basic function is to allow the baby’s ego to free itself 
from its own aggressiveness (corresponding to its death instinct), and retain the 
goodness derived from the life instinct inside. However the state of things is not 
so simple. Because the mother’s breast has been imbued with badness and 
aggressivity by projection of the bad breast, the baby feels that the mother’s 
breast has become threatening, capable of attacking him and giving him a 
sense of persecution. Hence, at times when the baby is under the influence of 
such powerful persecutory feelings, his psyche will project the good breast into 
the mother’s breast with the aim of placing it outside, where it may be kept 
safer. Equally, the bad breast, which is apprehended as a persecutor, may be 
introjected, taken inside, as a way of gaining control over it, although this 
introjection makes the baby feel bad himself.  
 
These movements of objects outside and inside the baby’s psyche are 
continuous: the new born infant, who has become an individuated body through 
the rupture of the fusion with his mother and the expulsion from her body, now 
confronts the task of becoming an individuated mind. To use a bodily metaphor, 
it is like the baby’s mind has retained after birth an umbilical cord attached to 
his mother’s mind, through which ‘objects’ move in and out, to and fro, and are 
gradually used to build the baby’s own individuated mind. As Kristeva 
elucidates: ‘the fragile ego is not truly separated in the sense of a “subject” 
separated from an “object”, but it incessantly consumes the breast from within 
and ejects the breast into the outside world by constructing-vacating itself while 
constructing-vacating the Other’ (Kristeva, 2001, pp.62-63). 
 
In her paper On identification Klein explains that ‘introjection and projection 
operate from the beginning of post-natal life and constantly interact. This 
interaction both builds up the internal world and shapes the picture of external 
reality’ (Klein, 1955, p.141). Through the processes of projection and 
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introjection, in unconscious phantasy objects become the basis of identification 
between the baby and the mother.  
 
In these various phantasies, the ego takes possession by projection of 
an external object – first of all the mother – and makes it into an 
extension of the self. The object becomes to some extent a 
representative of the ego, and these processes are in my view the basis 
for identification by projection or ‘projective identification’. Identification 
by introjection and identification by projection appear to be 
complementary processes. 
(Klein, 1952b, pp.68-69) 
 
Identificatory mechanisms start in the infant’s psyche in relation to the breast, 
but continue throughout life, first in relation to the mother and gradually to the 
father and other people (Klein, 1936). In Klein’s words:  
 
My analytic experience has shown me that processes of introjection and 
projection in later life repeat in some measure the pattern of the earliest 
introjections and projections; the external world is again and again taken 
in and put out – re-introjected and re-projected.  
(Klein, 1955, p.155) 
 
Object-relation theory places unconscious phantasy, and the mechanisms of 
projection and introjection underpinning it, at the core of all psychic phenomena, 
even when this is not apparent, as is the case in most adult psychic activity.  
According to Klein and her collaborators, unconscious phantasy constitutes the 
basis of all psychic development and represents the ‘effective source of all 
human actions and reactions’ (Rivière, 1989, p.2). This is most evident in the 
baby and the young child, where other more sophisticated psychic processes 
such as language, rationality and critical judgement have not yet developed.  
Nonetheless the mechanisms of unconscious phantasy are absolutely relevant 
to the adult, because they ‘exert a continuous and powerful influence on the 
emotional and intellectual life of the individual’ (Klein, 1936, p.290).  
 
Paradigmatically, unconscious phantasy gets expressed in the transference and 
projection and introjection are the mechanisms underpinning its unconscious re-
enactments (Klein, 1952a). The analyst has therefore a privileged viewpoint into 
unconscious phantasy and its functioning in the adult’s mind through 
transference. 
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Ego-splitting and integration 
 
The psychic situation in which projection and introjection take place, is a 
peculiar one, because the binding between the instincts generating from the 
baby’s id and the objects of the external world is so tight that the primitive ego 
needs to lose a part of itself whenever he projects the object outside. This 
means that the splitting of the object into good and bad (the good and the bad 
breast) corresponds to a parallel splitting of the ego (Klein, 1946), whereby the 
aggressive impulses follow the fate of the bad object (whether this is projected 
or re-introjected) and the life instincts move in and out of the mind bound with 
the good object. As Melanie Klein explains: 
 
I believe that the ego is incapable of splitting the object – internal and 
external – without a corresponding splitting taking place within the ego. 
Therefore the phantasies and feelings about the state of the internal 
object vitally influence the structure of the ego. […] The processes I have 
described are, of course, bound up with the infant’s phantasy-life; and 
the anxieties which stimulate the mechanism of splitting are also of a 
phantastic nature. It is in phantasy that the infant splits the object and the 
self, but the effect of this phantasy is a very real one, because it leads to 
feelings and relations (and later on thought processes) being in fact cut 
off from one another. 
(Klein, 1946, p.6) 
 
Freud had also noticed the phenomenon of ego-splitting and had presumed the 
possibility that identificatory mechanisms could result in ‘conflicts between the 
various identifications into which the ego comes apart, conflicts that cannot after 
all be described as entirely pathological’ (Freud, 1923, p.31). Freud had 
therefore adumbrated the possibility that split off parts of the ego may exist 
side-by-side, causing internal conflict, even in healthy minds. These split off 
parts remain as unconscious mental objects and get expressed in repetition-
compulsion, forming the basis for transference re-enactments. 
 
Although the mechanism of splitting is predominant in the first few months of 
life, due to the fragility of the infantile ego and its as yet scant ability to deal with 
external reality, the introjection of the good object and the tendency of the life 
instinct to promote integration, concur to the development of the ego: ‘This first 
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internal good object acts as a focal point in the ego. It counteracts the 
processes of splitting and dispersal, makes for cohesiveness and integration, 
and is instrumental in building up the ego’ (Klein, 1946, p.6).  
 
Klein devises her own terminology to describe this shift. She names the psychic 
situation of when the ego is dominated by splitting, the paranoid-schizoid 
position (Klein, 1952b). The term indicates both that the fragile ego is split in 
phantasy (schizoid) and also that within this split, the ego feels at the mercy of 
the perils posed by the bad object (paranoid), because the bad object is either 
felt to be threatening it from the outside, or filling it with badness from the inside. 
As I mentioned earlier, it is the inability of the baby’s mind to comprehend 
absence that created the phantasy of the bad object: the frustrated instinct 
cannot be conceived to have been left without an object because that feeling 
would imply the appraisal of a separation between the absent object and the 
baby’s instinct itself. Hence the frustrated instinct coupled with the absent object 
is construed in phantasy as a bad object. 
 
The introjection of the good breast enhances the ego’s possibility to tolerate 
frustration and perceive the absence of the object. This psychic state is defined 
by Klein as the depressive position38 (Klein, 1952b). The perception of absence 
allows the baby’s mind to understand that the good and bad breasts are indeed 
one and the same. The bad breast is nothing else but the absent good breast. 
Klein believes that this recognition makes the baby sad (hence the name 
depressive position) because he realizes that his aggressive impulses have 
been directed towards the one and the same breast that he also loved. He now 
feels less persecuted by the object, because the all-bad breast does not exist 
as such, but he also has lost the idealized all-good breast. He is left with a more 
realistic object, a ‘good enough’ mother (to use Winnicott’s (1953) phrase), 
which can satisfy his needs but can also at times frustrate them by being 
absent.  
 
                                                       
38	 The depressive position (psychic state) should not be confused with depression (clinical 
disorder); in psychoanalytic terms, depression is considered a defence against transition into 
the depressive position. 	
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This new psychic state is hence dominated by the fear of having damaged the 
object and of losing it. However at the same time, it also allows for a number of 
positive developments: the integration of the object promotes the integration of 
the ego. This in turn increases the ego’s capability of perceiving external reality, 
what in Freud’s terms would correspond to the predominance of the reality 
principle. Finally, the integrated ego and its increased capacity for perceiving 
reality establishes the capability to distinguish between the self and the other: 
 
The very experience of depressive feelings in turn has the effect of 
further integrating the ego, because it makes for an increased 
understanding of psychic reality and better perception of the external 
world, as well as for a greater synthesis between inner and external 
situations. 
(Klein, 1946, p.14) 
 
The phenomenon of integration is a progressive one and the baby moves from 
a relationship to the breast to the perception of the mother as a person, and, 
gradually, of the father and other people around him: ‘Out of the alternating 
processes of disintegration and integration develops gradually a more 
integrated ego. […] The infant’s relation to parts of his mother’s body, focussing 
on her breast, gradually changes into a relation to her as a person’ (Klein, 
1952b, p.71). 
 
The birth of the self 
 
Ultimately the distinction between the paranoid-schizoid positions and the 
depressive position resides in the fact that only in the depressive position is 
psychic reality acknowledged as such, and it is because of this recognition that 
one’s own selfhood can be distinguished from that of others. In the paranoid-
schizoid position, the inability to understand one’s own mind results in the use 
of the primitive functions of projection and introjection as the basic solution for 
disencumbering the ego from painful feelings and appropriating an inner sense 
of pleasure. This however is never definitive, because new frustrations are 
bound to generate yet more pain and need for projection and introjection. In 
these cycles the ego becomes split and ultimately pleasure is forestalled. In the 
paranoid-schizoid position: 
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the bad object is not only kept apart from the good one, but its very 
existence is denied, as is the whole situation of frustration and the bad 
feelings (pain) to which frustration gives rise. This is bound up with denial 
of psychic reality. […] It is, however, not only a situation and an object 
that are denied and annihilated – it is an object relation which suffers this 
fate; and therefore a part of the ego, from which the feelings towards the 
object emanate, is denied and annihilated as well. 
 (Klein, 1946 p.7) 
 
It is only in the depressive position that acknowledgment of the absence of the 
object will allow for recognition of one’s own psychic reality as distinguished 
from that of the other. But in fact, the depressive position can only come about 
as a consequence of the paranoid-schizoid one. Repeated cycles of projection 
and introjection are necessary to establish the dynamic relationship between 
internal and external reality, before these can be construed as distinct.  
 
While Klein, departing from her work with children, arrives at a description of the 
beginnings of psychic life intended in developmental terms, her theory, 
supported by extensive analytic work with adults conducted by her and her 
collaborators, establishes that the fluctuation between the paranoid-schizoid 
position and the depressive position is the foundation of all mental activity 
throughout life. In Klein’s words: ‘The tendency towards integration, which is 
concurrent with splitting, I assume to be, from earliest infancy, a dominant 
feature of mental life’ (Klein, 1955, p.144). 
 
Reality-thinking, as the predominant modus operandi of the mature ego and 
hence of the adult’s mind, still ‘cannot operate without concurrent and 
supporting unconscious phantasies’ (Isaacs, 1989, p.109). Moreover, ‘the 
broader expressions of character and personality […] are always found in 
analysis to be related to specific sets of varied phantasies (Isaacs, 1989, 
p.101). Projection and introjection, as processes of unconscious identification 
which confuse self and other, ultimately lead to the formation of the self, that is, 
of one’s conscious sense of identity.  
 
For the purpose of spectatorship, aside from the significance of projection and 
introjection as identificatory mechanisms at the basis of psychic development, 
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there is another aspect which is of note. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the 
inability of the ego to distinguish between internal and external reality entails a 
sense of omnipotence for which the infantile ego believes itself in control of its 
objects and such control is construed as an action. Because the ego is not 
aware of the psychic aspect of these operations, it understands them as 
‘deeds’. Talking about the child’s earliest unconscious phantasies, Susan Isaac, 
one of Klein’s closest collaborators, writes: 
 
In his earliest days, his own wishes and impulses fill the whole world at 
the time when they are felt. It is only slowly that he learns to distinguish 
between the wish and the deed, between external facts and his feelings 
about them. 
(Isaacs, 1989, p.85) 
 
Freud had a similar conception of the most primitive and unconscious mental 
processes being experienced as actions when he talked of repetition-
compulsion as the psychic activity ‘beyond the pleasure principle’ (Freud, 
1923). Bion will further elaborate on this aspect of unconscious phantasy by 
which primitive psychic processes are in fact more akin to actions than to 
thoughts.  
 
There is another aspect of Klein’s theory which Bion will be instrumental in 
expanding and elucidating, the mechanisms by which the mother’s mind 
promotes psychic development in the baby. Or, to put it another way, while 
Klein focussed on the development of the self and the mental operations that 
ground it, Bion will extend the enquiry into that psychic process in the ‘other’ 
which is instrumental for the development of the self. This he will call an alpha-
function, as I shall discuss next. 
 
BION’S THEORY OF ALPHA-FUNCTION 
 
Like Klein, and being himself part of her circle in the first part of his career as 
psychoanalyst, Bion starts from Freud’s idea that the ego develops from the id 
with ‘the function of establishing contact between psychic and external reality’ 
(Bion, 1984a, p.25). Still occupying himself with the unconscious processes that 
contribute to the development of the ego, he extends the enquiry from the 
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mechanisms inside the baby’s mind (unconscious phantasy and the intrinsic 
mechanisms of projection and introjection) to the occurrences in the mother’s 
mind. These must be essential to the development of the baby’s ego, if it is true 
that the mind of the baby grows not independently of what happens outside of 
it, but in a mutual and continuous interaction with the mind of the mother, and 
indeed of that of other people who take care of him. 
 
Melanie Klein had moved the focus of enquiry from the relationship between the 
id and the ego, to the relationship between the ego and its objects. Her 
description focused on the vicissitudes of the objects in the baby’s mind, such 
as the introjection and projection of the good and bad breast in unconscious 
phantasy. While she acknowledged the importance of external factors in 
determining the development of the ego and the shift between the paranoid-
schizoid and the depressive position, she did not describe the processes in the 
mother’s mind which promote or hinder this development. 
 
Projective identification 
 
Bion takes a particular interest in identification by projection, or ‘projective 
identification’. Melanie Klein (1946, p.8) had used this term to emphasize the 
fact that projection does not only allow the ego to get rid of painful or unwanted 
objects, but also results in a sense of identification with the object into which the 
projection is effected. However, she restricted the experience of identification to 
the child’s unconscious, and did not explore whether the projection would also 
induce a sense of identification in the mother herself. Bion, as we shall see, 
reads projective identification not just as a psychic act of representation - the 
child or the subject representing to himself the evacuation of an internal object 
in unconscious phantasy – but also as an act of communication through which 
the projection effectively speaks to the other person’s unconscious. Bion 
maintains that: 
 
There is a field of emotional force in which the individuals seem to lose 
their boundaries as individuals and become ‘areas’ around and through 
which emotions play at will. Psycho-analyst and patient cannot exempt 
themselves from the emotional field. 
(Bion, 1984b, p.146) 
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Projective identification is in effect an unconscious communication between two 
minds, a phenomenon whose existence Freud had envisaged. In a paper aimed 
at instructing physicians on the technique of psychoanalysis, he gave the 
following advice to the analyst: that ‘he must turn his own unconscious like a 
receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient’ (Freud, 
1912b, p.115). The phenomenon of projective identification has since been 
recognized as having a great bearing on what goes on during a psychoanalytic 
session, representing the way in which the analyst can understand her patients’ 
unconscious communication, beyond the words that they speak. I will give an 
example from my own psychoanalytic practice.  
 
A young woman had been referred for psychotherapy because of marital 
difficulties and a past history of sexual abuse as a child. During many sessions, 
I found myself noticing the attractiveness of this woman, her elegant way of 
dressing, her impeccable make-up. The room filled with the pleasant scent of 
perfume as soon as she stepped in. She always wore a dress with a skirt above 
her knee and high heels. Her long dark and curly hair looked as if she had just 
walked out of a hairdresser. I noticed a fleeting feeling of being attracted to her 
because of her physical appearance. This feeling sat uncomfortable with me, 
because it was unusual – in general I hardly notice people’s attire or hairstyle – 
but also because it came with a sense that there was something ‘wrong’ in the 
way I felt towards her. It was an intriguing situation, and I often thought about it, 
but for a long time it seemed to make no sense. One day, though, during a 
particular session, the nature of my feeling was revealed: it was in fact a 
projective identification from the patient. She revealed how she had always felt 
awkward in her relationship to other women, especially women she liked. With 
men, she tended to be flirtatious, but with women, this did not seem to her an 
appropriate attitude, it felt ‘wrong’. And because using her physical 
attractiveness was the only way in which she knew how to get close to people, 
she ended up having no close relationships with other women and her intimate 
friends were all men.  
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There was now a clear explanation for my feelings towards her: my being 
attracted to her and the sense of awkwardness that went with it were her 
unprocessed emotions, which she had placed within me through projective 
identification. While her projection was a mechanism for ridding herself of her 
uncomfortable impulse of wanting to get close to me through physical 
seduction, it also acted as a powerful communication, in making me feel what 
she felt, or, as Bion would say, in making me ‘become’ that feeling. Following 
the session during which her projected feelings were revealed, and made 
conscious, one of those extraordinary transformations that sometimes happen 
in psychoanalysis followed. The next session the patient came in a tracksuit 
and without make-up. Her appearance had markedly changed and the 
awkwardness and physical attraction had completely dispersed. 
 
The projection of the objects into another person (specifically the mother in the 
case of the baby, or the analyst in the case of the patient), is for Bion a 
communicative experience: projective identification is a communication to the 
mother of unmanageable feelings in the hope that she will experience them, 
understand them and give them back in a manageable form (Bion, 1984b). 
Therefore, according to this model, not only the recipient of the projection feels 
what is projected into her, but also she can act on the projection and transform 
it, through what Bion will call an alpha-function. Reading Bion’s theoretical 
system through Klein’s terminology, it could be argued that unconscious 
phantasy is the realm of unconscious communication and meaning-making, 
effected through projective identification and alpha-function.  
 
Alpha-function 
 
In order to understand what Bion means by alpha-function it is useful to explain 
his theory of thinking and the specific terminology he employs. According to 
Bion, the primitive form of experiencing an emotion is of a thing-in-itself (the bad 
or good object in Kleinian terms). This mode of psychic functioning is what 
Melanie Klein described for the paranoid-schizoid position: the baby 
experiences the distress caused by the absence of the breast when he needs it 
for comfort or feeding, as a bad breast, a concrete object, a thing-in-itself. It is 
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only with the shift to the depressive position that the baby, learning to 
understand absence, can integrate the split parts of the objects and apprehend 
the difference between self and other. Filling the gaps in understanding left by 
Klein’s theory, Bion proposed that the transition between the paranoid-schizoid 
position and the depressive position is characterized by the development of a 
thinking apparatus that can transform things-in-themselves into thoughts. 
 
Bion postulates that things-in-themselves are ‘thoughts without a thinker’ 
(Symington J. & N., 1996, p.102) and ‘thinking has to be developed as a 
method or apparatus for dealing with “thoughts” ’ (Bion, 1984a, p.83). Things-in-
themselves are primitive forms of emotional experience that lack a thinker, 
because the ego has not yet developed the capability of thinking about them. 
‘Thoughts without a thinker’ are only fit for projective identification and are 
called by Bion ‘beta-elements’ (Bion, 1984a, p.6). It is because beta-elements 
(or things-in themselves, thoughts without a thinker, concrete objects, 
whichever we choose to call them) cannot be thought about, that they are only  
 
suited for use in projective identification. They are influential in producing 
acting out. They are objects that can be evacuated or used for a kind of 
thinking that depends on manipulation of what are felt to be things in 
themselves as if to substitute such manipulation for words or ideas. 
(Bion, 1984a, p.6) 
 
By placing beta-elements into the mother, the baby is not only getting rid of 
them from his own mind, but also communicating them so that they can be 
transformed into thoughts. As Bion explains: ‘Projective identification makes it 
possible for him to investigate his own feelings in a personality powerful enough 
to contain them’ (Bion, 1984b, p.106).  
 
The beta-element placed in the mother’s mind is transformed, through alpha-
function, into an alpha-element, which can then be returned to the baby as a 
thought. According to Bion:   
 
alpha-function must operate on the awareness of the emotional 
experience; alpha-elements are produced from the impressions of the 
experience; these are thus made storable and available for dream 
thoughts and for unconscious waking thinking. [...] Alpha-function is 
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needed for conscious thinking and reasoning and for the relegation of 
thinking to the unconscious when it is necessary to disencumber 
consciousness of the burden of thought […] 
(Bion, 1984a, p.8) 
 
Although Bion does not specifically say this, what he means is that once the 
beta-elements are processed through alpha-function and are transformed into 
alpha-elements, they become available within the ego, where they can be used 
in conscious thought, or they can be stored as preconscious elements; their 
new nature does not make them conscious at all times, but easily available for 
conscious thought when needed, as it is the case for preconscious ideas.  
 
The transformation of beta-elements into alpha-elements is essential for psychic 
development as much as food and drink are essential for physical growth:  
 
A central part is played by alpha-function in transforming an emotional 
experience into alpha-elements because a sense of reality matters to the 
individual in the way that food, drink, air and excretion of waste products 
matter. Failure to eat, drink or breathe properly has disastrous 
consequences for life itself. Failure to use the emotional experience 
produces a comparable disaster in the development of the personality. 
(Bion, 1984a, p.42) 
 
By the re-introjection of alpha-elements, which have been produced in the 
mother’s mind by the transformation of the baby’s beta-elements, the infant’s 
psyche can develop the capacity for thinking. Its emotional experience is no 
longer a concrete, unthinkable ‘thing-in-itself’ but rather a thought, an 
abstraction that has given meaning to the emotion. ‘Alpha function endows the 
mind with a sense of subjectivity. Now the mind can think about itself and have 
a personal response to emotional occurrences. It is able to transform the basic 
emotional experience into thought’ (Symington J. & N, 1996, p.63). 
 
Because the new-born baby has hardly any capacity for alpha-function, his 
mother’s alpha-function will be crucial for his psychic survival. However, 
repeated cycles of introjection of alpha-elements will trigger the development of 
the baby’s own alpha-function, which he can then gradually apply to his own 
emotional experiences, becoming partly independent from the mother. Through 
projective identification, 
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the infant communicates his emotional state to his mother. Her ability to 
tolerate and process these feeling states, especially the frightening ones, 
enables the infant to take them back in a manageable form and also 
gradually to introject this capacity to process emotional experiences. 
(Symington J. & N, 1996, p.154) 
 
The development of the baby’s own alpha-function probably underpins the 
value of play. As brought to notice by Klein and her circle, from the first few 
weeks of life, ‘the infant spends an increasing amount of time in 
experimentative play, which is, at one and the same time, an attempt to adapt 
to reality and an active means of expressing phantasy’ (Isaacs, 1989, pp.97-
98). By projecting his objects into the external world, like Freud’s grandson did 
with the cotton reel, the child experiments with unconscious identifications in 
phantasy. His own alpha-function is then set in motion in relation to the raw 
emotional experiences represented by the objects, and used to produce 
meaning. According to Bion’s theory, this would only be possible inasmuch as 
the child has already introjected alpha-elements in relation to this particular 
emotional situation (for instance, in the case of Freud’s grandson, the situation 
of being left by the mother) and hence has developed at least a rudimentary 
ability for alpha-function. Freud’s grandson might have experienced previous 
partings from the mother, when as a baby she left him in his cot, and her return 
to sooth him might have provided the alpha-elements necessary for the 
processing of later emotional experiences of similar kind.  
 
The work with patients in psychoanalysis shows two important aspects of alpha-
function. On the one hand, cases when alpha-function hardly develops at all are 
rare, and present themselves as serious psychotic illnesses, in which emotional 
experiences are not understood and remain as things-in-themselves that haunt 
the patient in the forms of delusions and hallucinations. On the other hand, 
neurotic patients and even healthy people have areas of their personality which 
remain ‘psychotic’, or split off from the integrated ego. These areas harbour 
beta-elements for which an internal capacity for alpha-function has not 
developed (although alpha-function may be well developed with regards many 
other forms of emotional experience). These beta-elements are then expressed 
as re-enactments and become evident as such in the transference. 
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Anyone, including the mother, or indeed the analyst, had a need as a baby for 
other people to perform alpha-function on their behalf; moreover, even in their 
maturity, anyone is most likely to harbour beta-elements in their psychotic area 
of the personality, where alpha-function is inoperative. Because alpha-function 
is established and promoted through the ‘other’, its interpersonal aspect is 
crucial. That explains why psychoanalysts need to undergo their own analysis 
for many years during their training, and they tend to return to analysis as 
patients, from time to time, during their working life. 
  
The double nature of alpha-function 
 
Alpha-function is the capacity to apply one’s understanding to an emotional 
experience: ‘An understanding mother is able to experience the feeling of 
dread, that this baby was striving to deal with by projective identification, and 
yet retain a balanced outlook’ (Bion, 1984b, p.104).  
 
In order to be subjected to alpha-function, the beta-element, in projective 
identification, must be experienced by the mother as if it was her own feeling. 
When the baby projects the bad breast into the mother, the mother feels the 
distress of the baby as if it was hers; in fact in projective identification she has 
‘become’ it. Bion distinguishes between a situation when a psychic reality 
corresponding to a beta-element is inferred and a situation when it is intuited. If 
the mother knows that the baby is in distress because she sees him crying and 
hears his screams, this is very different from a situation when the mother intuits 
the baby’s distress because she becomes it. Only in this second case can 
alpha-function be put into effect, because it is provided with the raw material 
necessary for its operation. 
 
To return to the example of my patient, my feelings of being attracted to her 
were in fact an intuition through projective identification. By sojourning inside 
my psyche, those intuited feelings were transformed through my thinking 
process (my alpha-function). They could then be returned to the patient in the 
form of thoughts which she was eventually able to think, as happened in the 
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session I described. This process would not have occurred if my understanding 
of the patient had been reached through my observations of her. For instance, 
my noticing her stylish attire could have made me suppose that she was trying 
to impress me in some way, and I could have deduced that this was her way of 
relating to women in general. The content of this understanding would have 
been similar to the one reached via projective identification and alpha-function, 
but the outcome would have been very different. According to psychoanalytic 
theory, no transformation would have been effected. Should I have chosen to 
discuss my deductions with the patient, it might have resulted in a 
reinforcement of her repressed unprocessed emotions.  
 
The emotional understanding that alpha-function fosters is therefore of a very 
special kind, and should not be confused with a rational appraisal of a situation. 
I want to stress this point once more, with a quotation from a book on Bion 
written by two eminent psychoanalysts: 
 
The case where you see someone blushing and infer shame is quite 
different to the one where the analyst intuits shame. In the one case it is 
outside and in the other the analyst has become it. A psychic reality is 
only known by being ‘become’ first. What we have said of shame goes 
for grief, joy, envy, love, hatred, gratitude, meanness, anxiety and all the 
emotions. 
(Symington J. & N., 1996, p.167) 
 
The reason why I insist so much on this point is because it will be an essential 
parameter in the discussion of the art of the actor. 
 
In operating alpha-function, the mother (or the analyst) has to become the 
emotional experience in order to abstract it into a thought and make it available 
for emotional development. In this sense, alpha-function can be described as 
having a double nature, one of feeling and one of thinking, which are not in 
opposition to each other and do not represent alternative modalities. On the 
contrary, the emotional experience and the understanding of it are in a 
reciprocal dynamic relationship; one could not exist without the other. 
 
The theory of alpha-function posits therefore a particular form of connection 
between feeling and thinking: in developmental terms, thinking emerges from 
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feeling, and in this sense it underpins a philosophy of the mind much similar to 
the eighteenth-century theory of sensism. On the other hand, the generation of 
thinking out of feeling is only possible by the interposition of a function that is in 
itself a form of thinking. The main difference from sensism, is that the theory of 
alpha-function places the fruitful dynamic between feeling and thinking in the 
special context of interpersonal relationships. 
 
Bion borrowed the term alpha-function from the language of mathematics, for 
which he had a fascination. But he also chose it as a deliberately neutral term to 
emphasize that he did not know the nature of this entity (Bion, 1984a, p.26). 
This attitude of ‘not knowing’, which he generally praised very much in all 
contexts that have to do with acquiring knowledge, allowed him the freedom to 
reach new decisive insights. I am therefore reluctantly going to label ‘alpha-
function’ as ‘sympathy’, because it will be useful to do so, in order to relate it to 
the wider debate on spectatorship and the art of the actor that I engage with in 
this thesis. 
 
According to Melanie Klein, who explored most extensively the idea of 
projective identification in her paper On Identification, projective identification is 
‘the projective mechanism underlying empathy’ (Klein, 1955, p.143). Although 
she only hints at it, she also suggests that sympathy is slowly developed out of 
cycles of projective identification and introjection. To use Bion’s terminology, it 
is the projection of beta-elements in projective identification and the re-
introjection of alpha-elements that supports the development of sympathy. 
 
The terms of empathy and sympathy have a range of different definitions, their 
meaning is sometimes swapped and they have also been used as synonyms. 
For the purpose of my analysis, I suggest following the lines indicated by 
Melanie Klein and to call empathy a state of unconscious emotional 
identification in which a person experiences a feeling which is not hers, but has 
been projected into her through projective identification. I propose to call 
sympathy a state of conscious emotional identification in which a person 
understands what another is feeling, because she also understands the 
meaning of such feeling. With this definition, while an aspect of empathy (the 
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‘feeling in unison’) would also be part of sympathy, only in sympathy is there an 
awareness that what one feels is not one’s own feeling but belongs to someone 
else. In this sense, empathy would correspond to the notion of ‘fear’ and 
sympathy to the notion of ‘pity’ in Aristotle. I will return to this point in Chapter 6. 
 
When alpha-function goes wrong 
 
Because of its complex nature, alpha-function is not always operative and can 
be disrupted. This may depend on a number of factors. An extreme situation is 
when the projective identification cannot be intuited, and hence the mother (or 
the analyst) cannot ‘become’ it. The classical example in psychoanalysis is that 
of a depressed mother, whose internal state of self-preoccupation makes her 
impermeable to the emotions that reach her through a projection. The 
depressed mother can still see and hear her baby’s signs of emotions, for 
instance she may see and hear her infant crying, but she cannot ‘become’ it. 
Although her practical response to the baby may be very similar to that of a 
mother who is emotionally tuned in, for example picking up the baby or giving 
him milk, her alpha-function will not be operative, and while her baby’s physical 
needs will have been attended to, his psyche will remain starved.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are situations when the beta-elements 
projected into the mother may be intuited but do not encounter a capability for 
alpha-function, because the mother lacks such capability. The extreme case 
would be that of a psychotic mother. However, as I have anticipated, even 
healthy people may have areas of their personality which are filled with beta-
elements and which lack a capacity for processing particular forms of emotional 
experience. This phenomenon is one of the causes of the intergenerational 
transmission of trauma. As Bion writes: ‘If alpha-function is disturbed, and 
therefore inoperative, the sense impressions of which the patient is aware and 
the emotions which he is experiencing remain unchanged’ (Bion, 1984a, p.6). 
Not only will the baby be returned his own beta-elements as they stand, but he 
may in turn be subject to the projection of the mother’s own beta-elements, 
greatly hindering his capacity for thinking in this emotional area. 
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One of my patients, a mother of three, was well-functioning in most areas of her 
life, but she felt also deeply unhappy. She had found it difficult to bond with her 
second child, a little girl who was now three years old, while she was closer to 
her elder son. The relationship between her and her daughter was getting 
increasingly hostile, and conflicts arose especially because of the child’s rivalry 
with her one-year-old little sister. My patient was the eldest of two daughters, 
and memories from her early childhood included what she called her mother’s 
‘screaming fits’. These would happen when her and her sister, perhaps during a 
game, would end up fighting. If this situation occurred when the father was not 
at home and the mother was the sole carer in the house, the mother would lock 
the girls in the bathroom. My patient would then hear her scream loudly. Only 
when the screaming ceased, would the girls, now comprehensibly frightened, 
be allowed out of the bathroom again. This is a somewhat extreme example of 
what an absence of alpha-function and re-projection of beta-elements might 
look, and feel like. The patient’s mother, emotionally incapable of sustaining the 
conflict between her daughters, not only had no soothing or understanding to 
offer them, but becoming aroused in her own psychotic part of the personality, 
she would then project her own despair into her daughters through her 
screams. My patient, otherwise a mature and competent woman, still harboured 
those beta-elements in herself, and was unable to ‘retain a balanced outlook’ 
(Bion, 1984b, p.104) on her own daughters’ rivalry.  
 
The case of the depressed or the psychotic maternal response can apply to 
psychoanalysts as well. Although analysts are trained to accept the patient’s 
projections and to maintain a balanced outlook, they always need to be alert for 
times when they may become impermeable to the projections of their patients’ 
beta-elements or for times when they may be tempted to ‘act in’. As I discussed 
in Chapter 2, these are the detrimental responses that Freud (1915a) warns 
against, when talking about the erotic transference: either inviting the patient to 
repress her erotic longings for the analyst, or giving in to the temptation of 
satisfying them. What the analyst needs to do to bring the transference cure to 
good effect (or, in Bion’s terms, to perform her alpha-function for the patient) is 
to accept the expression of the repressed emotions and to interpret their 
meaning in the context of the transference and the past history of the patient. 
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Bion talks of another situation when the mother’s alpha-function may be 
disrupted, this time because of an obstacle in the baby, rather than the mother; 
this is the case of envy. Melanie Klein introduced and explored the notion of 
envy as part of the paranoid-schizoid position (Klein, 1957). She maintained 
that envious impulses, which express the desire to damage or destroy the good 
object, were part of the death instinct, and were particularly prominent in 
situations when the death instinct prevailed over the life instinct in the baby’s 
psyche. She contrasted envy with gratitude, which is instead part of the life 
instinct, and leads to desiring, loving, and introjecting the good object. When 
envy and the death instinct prevail, integration of the good and bad breasts is 
hindered and the object remains split into an all-bad breast and an all-good 
breast. The all-good breast is unrealistically idealized and as such it may be 
introjected with the projection of the all-bad breast:  
 
Some people deal with their incapacity (derived from excessive envy) to 
possess a good object by idealizing it. This first idealization is precarious, 
for the envy experienced towards the good object is bound to extend to 
its idealized aspects. The same is true of idealizations of further objects 
and the identification with them, which is often unstable and 
indiscriminate.  
(Klein, 1957, p.193) 
 
Bion maintains that when envy prevails in the baby, due to the operations of the 
death instinct, his projections into the mother have a peculiar quality which 
disrupts alpha-function. In this case the result of projective identification is felt 
by the baby to be a further depletion of meaning and a destruction of the 
thinking process (Symington J. & N., 1996). When this happens in analysis, it 
may manifest as a resistance on the part of the patient to the analyst’s 
interpretations. The patient is not interested in the analyst’s capacity for thinking 
and alpha-function; on the contrary he wants to destroy it. In this attempt, he 
may chose to concentrate on asking the analyst questions about her private life 
or on dismissing the analyst’s attempts at understanding as pointless, stupid, or 
fake. 
 
A middle-age man was referred for psychotherapy and came for his first 
assessment. Following my invitation to tell me what brought him to the session, 
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instead of responding, he asked me whether I was qualified for the job, how 
long had I been working as a psychotherapist and demanded to be seen by the 
most senior clinician in the department. He also requested to see my manager 
immediately. By doing so, he was desperately trying to stop me from thinking 
about him. When I said so, he calmed down and became tearful. He then 
proceeded with the assessment. Further engagement with therapy showed that 
many of his difficulties in life, characterized by frequently losing his job and his 
friends, had to do with his unconscious envious attacks on people whom he 
perceived to be taking advantage of their knowledge of him. He could not 
conceive or tolerate that other people had a genuine interest in his welfare and 
he utterly refused to listen to their advice, which he perceived as patronising 
and belittling. As the therapy progressed, after much toing and froing, his inner 
psychic change manifested as a sense of gratitude towards his therapist. By 
entrusting the therapist with his beta-elements, he was eventually able to 
experience her alpha-function, which resulted in a sense of being understood, 
and made him feel grateful. 
 
As I said, a situation of envy may arise because of the prevailing force of the 
death instinct over the life instinct in the baby or the patient. However, it is 
hardly ever a primary situation. Most often, it is the result of previous 
experiences of failure of alpha-function, which then make the baby (or patient) 
suspicious about the possibility that the mother (or analyst) may have 
something to offer. According to Bion, the relationship between the baby and 
the mother during alpha-function is ‘commensal’, because both the baby and 
the mother gain in psychic growth: ‘the mother derives benefit and achieves 
mental growth from the experience: the infant likewise abstracts benefit and 
achieves growth’ (Bion, 1984a, p.91). On the other hand, an encounter 
characterized by envy ‘precludes a commensal relationship’ (Bion, 1984a, 
p.96), and leads to experiencing confusion and meaninglessness. In the most 
extreme cases, the fragmentation of the ego that results from such psychic 
transaction leaves the baby filled with a ‘nameless dread’ (Bion, 1984a, p.96). 
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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ART OF THE ACTOR AS ALPHA-FUNCTION 
 
So far in the chapter, I have delved into the psychoanalytic descriptions of the 
unconscious psychic processes underpinning alpha-function in detail. Because 
these processes happen at a psychic level which is far removed from 
consciousness, they are difficult to grasp outside specific contexts such as the 
psychoanalytic setting. Although they operate in everyday mental activity, it is 
easy to be blind to them or to dismiss them as unintelligible. 
 
Freud’s distinction between the unconscious proper and the preconscious helps 
to clarify the difference between psychoanalytic investigation and other forms of 
scientific insight into the operations of the unconscious. For instance, when 
McConachie talks of the unconscious aspect of cognitive blending, as I 
discussed in Chapter 1, he emphasizes that although blending takes place 
‘mostly below the level of consciousness’ (2008, p.42), it was once a conscious 
process which subsequently became ‘habitual’ (2008, p.56). In psychoanalytic 
jargon, we may call this a preconscious psychic mechanism, which can easily 
be brought to awareness. On the other hand, the identifications that occur 
through projection and introjection in unconscious phantasy have to be 
understood as belonging to the unconscious proper: their conscious recognition 
is only possible after they have been submitted to a process of analysis 
involving considerable psychic effort. 
 
Having illustrated the modus operandi of unconscious phantasy and alpha-
function, I now propose to indicate how these concepts may shed light on the 
art of the actor as described by the eighteenth-century theories which I 
investigated in depth in Chapter 3 and 4. 
 
The eighteenth-century debate on the art of the actor was particularly 
concerned with the status of the actor’s emotions in relation to those of the 
character. Most theorists were keen to underline the delicate balance that the 
actor needs to achieve between sensibility and judgement, and they described 
in detail what was meant by these terms. Sensibility is the actor’s ability to 
arouse in herself any emotion in the specific nature and degree required by the 
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rendition of the character. Such arousal is greatly favoured by the actor steering 
away from her own personal feelings, so that her sensibility, as soft as wax, can 
be subjected to all the modifications appropriate to the interpretation of the 
character. The actor’s sensibility therefore is put at the service of the emotions 
of ‘another’. 
 
Judgement (or esprit) is instead that quality of the actor which serves the 
purpose of regulating her sensibility. It is the actor’s ability to reflect, so that she 
can regulate her feelings at the service of the interpretation of the character. 
Such regulation entails distinguishing the nature and degree of the emotions on 
the basis of the given circumstances, and it is ultimately an act of 
understanding. It is acquired and perfected through the study of human nature, 
so that the actor’s artificial act of interpretation may become a rendition more 
natural than nature itself. 
 
Three important aspects of acting can be identified in the above description: 
- the particular relationship that feeling and understanding enjoy in the art 
of the actor; 
- the crucial circumstance that acting is at the service of the emotions of 
the character, and has therefore a transpersonal dimension; 
- the fact that the purpose of acting is in relation to the study of human 
nature. 
In the following sections, I will focus on all these three aspects from a 
psychoanalytic perspective. While I will turn immediately to the first two points, I 
will leave the third topic for discussion at the end of the chapter. 
 
The relationship between sensibility and understanding 
 
The relationship in the art of the actor between sensibility and judgement, 
feeling and understanding, can be illuminated by the theory of alpha-function. 
Alpha-function processes emotional experience through an act of 
understanding which gives it meaning, but in order to be subjected to alpha-
function, an emotional experience needs to be ‘become’ first: a compelling 
dynamic between emotional arousal and understanding is at its foundation.  
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Beta-elements, the unprocessed ‘things-in-themselves’ of the infant’s emotional 
experience, are projected into a mind, that of the mother, that can become them 
while keeping a balanced outlook. There they can be processed into alpha-
elements, which will be returned as thoughts suitable for thinking, fostering the 
infant’s capacity for his own alpha-function and promoting his sense of self.  
 
In the actor, the emotions gathered by sensibility need to be subjected to an act 
of understanding; as Hill explains: ‘What we should wish in the perfect player is, 
that he has all the sensibility […] and yet all the command of himself necessary 
to regulate its emotions’ (Hill, 1755, pp.53-54). Actors may possess sensibility 
and understanding in different degrees, and they may employ them in a 
disjointed fashion, but in these instances the actor displeases the audience. 
Sensibility and understanding need to cooperate in a fruitful and dynamic 
process, in order to fulfil their function in the actor’s art. As Hill maintains, the 
great actor ‘has both in such a degree, that while the judgement regulates the 
sensibility, the sensibility animates, enlivens, and inspires the understanding’ 
(Hill, 1755, p.58).  
 
Perhaps the most suggestive description of the actor’s alpha-function is given 
by Sainte-Albine, when he writes that under certain conditions ‘le sentiment 
deviens quelquefois esprit’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.2). The actor David Garrick 
has also given us a depiction of acting evocative of alpha-function:  
 
Wou’d a Player perform […] excellent in his Profession, let him be 
introduc’d into the World, be conversant with Humours of every Kind, 
digest ’em in his Mind, let ’em be cherish’d by the genial Warmth of his 
Conception, transplanted into the fair Garden of his Judgment, there let 
’em ripen to Perfection, and become his own. 
(Garrick, 1744, p.10) 
 
The dynamic between sensibility and understanding in the art of the actor can 
thus be construed as an alpha-function: her becoming the emotions of the 
character through her sensibility yields an act of understanding. Crucially, such 
understanding is directed at the character’s emotions, not her own, according to 
a process which is known, in theatre jargon, as an ‘interpretation’.  The parallel 
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with the work of the analyst is strikingly plain: the analyst must ‘become’ the 
patient’s emotions which she has intuited through projective identification, in 
order to submit them to alpha-function. If she succeeds in giving them meaning 
through her reflective process, these emotions can be returned to the patient in 
a ‘thinkable’ form, and this operation of meaning-making and restitution 
happens, in psychoanalysis also, through the work of interpretation.  
 
Not all the utterances that the analyst makes during a session should be 
considered interpretations in the strict sense of the term. While the analyst may 
provide other forms of useful information for the patient, through stimulating 
conscious or preconscious activities which build understanding on the basis of 
observation or inference, only understandings which derive from an experience 
of ‘becoming’ are truly transformative of the unconscious ego, promoting 
integration and developing subjectivity. If it is admitted that a similar distinction 
may be valid for the art of the actor, further clarification makes it necessary to 
bring the nature of the spectator’s experience into the equation. 
 
Transpersonal alpha-function and the spectator’s experience 
 
Theatre spectatorship is indisputably an opportunity for emotional arousal. At an 
unconscious level, this amounts to the activation of unconscious phantasy, 
including those ‘psychotic’ parts of the personality which contain unprocessed 
beta-elements. In unconscious phantasy, the spectator’s beta-elements are 
projected into the character(s) through a process of ego-splitting. In the mode of 
functioning of the paranoid-schizoid position, beta-elements are split off into 
‘psychotic’ parts of the ego and as such can be projected into the character(s).  
 
The ability of the characters to receive the projections and to ‘become’ them 
depends, of course, on the actors who play them. A passage in Hill’s Actor, 
highlights that particular feature of sensibility which allows the actor to become 
the receptacle of emotions coming from another: there he specifies that 
sensibility is the ‘disposition to receive those impressions by which our own 
passions are affected’ (Hill, 1755, p.49). An actor who ‘becomes’ the emotions 
she portrays uses her sensibility to receive the spectator’s projection. The 
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principle that the actor’s sensibility should be at the service of the emotions of 
another is of course greatly emphasized through the insistence that she should 
avoid being distracted by her personal feelings, in order to concentrate on those 
of the character.   
 
The transpersonal dimension of alpha-function and the mechanisms of 
projection and introjection in unconscious phantasy, substantiate the existence 
of a reciprocal code of communication between actors and spectators. As I 
discussed in Chapter 1, despite actors testifying to their sensing the audience’s 
presence and reactions, the impossibility of identifying a common 
communicative code between stage and auditorium has cast doubts on the 
nature of the actor-spectator transaction. Albeit at an unconscious level, 
projective and introjective identification in unconscious phantasy provides proof 
of that common code of communication between spectators and actors. 
 
A good actor plays the character through the interpretation that she has 
carefully prepared. It is through her interpretation, that the actor will subject the 
spectator’s beta-elements to alpha-function and return them to the spectator as 
alpha-elements, which will be re-introjected to give meaning to his emotional 
experiences. Effecting a transition of the spectator’s psyche into the depressive 
position, the actor’s alpha-function promotes his ego integration and sense of 
self. If this is the case, one need hardly wonder why spectators, as advocated 
by John Hill and others, should take a keen interest in the art of the actor.  
 
Alpha-function and the actor’s double game 
 
The interpretation of the art of the actor as alpha-function elucidates the 
significance of what Eco has called the double game of the actor as theatrical 
sign. The receiving of the spectator’s projective identifications is dependent on 
the actor’s physical presence: as the psychoanalyst ‘must turn his own 
unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the 
patient’ (Freud, 1912b, p.115), so the actor must use her personal unconscious 
to receive the spectator’s projective identifications. This operation is contingent 
on the actor’s extemporaneity.  On the other hand, it is the portrayal of the 
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character, constructed through her interpretation, which contains the reflective 
understanding necessary for alpha-function.  
 
While even anti-emotionalists like Diderot have admitted to the necessity that 
the actor engages with her own feelings during the preparation of her 
interpretation, the anti-emotionalist argument has rested upon the claim that the 
actor should not experience emotions during the performance itself. Suffice that 
she portrays those external signs of emotions which she has fixed during 
rehearsals. The theory of alpha-function establishes a distinction between the 
actor feeling the emotions of the character for the purpose of her interpretation 
tout court and for the purpose of receiving the spectator’s projective 
identifications and becoming them. It is this second situation which demands of 
the actor to intuit the emotions anew at each performance. Therefore, if 
technically a good actor may leave behind her feelings once arrived at a valid 
interpretation, she will also leave behind her alpha-function if she does so. 
 
While I will not address this particular theme in this thesis, it could be said that 
the bodily presence of the actor on the one side (for the purpose of the 
extempore intuition of emotions) and the intellectual operation of her 
interpretation on the other, represent the conjunction which makes alpha-
function possible. If we circumscribe our analysis to those forms of acting in 
which the use of language is pivotal to the reaching of an interpretation, it is 
possible that the actor’s double game reflects a dynamic between embodiment 
and language, making this the distinctive feature of theatre as a form of art. I 
will briefly re-consider this point in Chapter 6. 
 
Disruptions of alpha-function in the art of the actor 
 
With an actor who plays herself, or with an actor who refuses to ‘become’ the 
spectator’s projective identification, the double game is broken. This disruption 
is precisely what happens for what I will tentatively call the psychotic and the 
depressed actor.  
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As the eighteenth-century theorists have aptly described, there are situations 
when actors displease, either because they play their feelings instead of those 
of the character, or because they fake the character’s emotions instead of truly 
experiencing them. As Hill explains, ‘Insipidity is the general character of inferior 
performers; and extravagance is too much that of the superior ones’ (Hill, 1755, 
p.8). Of the two, extravagance is the most intolerable.  
 
Situations in which actors express their own personal feelings instead of those 
of the character are caused by the application of sensibility without judgement. 
They entail that form of ‘playing by instinct’ unanimously deprecated by all 
eighteenth-century theorists. The actor who plays by instinct, or, to put it 
another way, who plays her own feelings, is like a mother who responds to the 
baby’s beta-elements with the psychotic part of her personality. By withholding 
understanding, she will not be able to subject the spectator’s beta-elements to 
alpha-function and will bounce them back as unprocessed emotional 
experiences. Moreover, the actor may take the performance of the character as 
an opportunity to re-enact her own unprocessed emotional experiences and in 
turn project her own beta-elements into the audience. As Hill lucidly expounds, 
the extravagance of uncontrolled sensibility not only disgusts the spectator but 
also induces him to ‘despise the player who forces it’ upon him (Hill, 1755, 
p.11). Like a psychotic mother, the actor appears inconsistent, incoherent, 
extravagant. Like a baby at the hands of a psychotic mother, the spectator will 
be forced into becoming confused, disgusted, overwhelmed.  
 
The actor who plays by resisting the arousal of feelings within herself is like a 
deceiving mistress, or a skilful courtier, who feign emotions which they do not 
feel. While the spectator may be able to tolerate a certain degree of artfulness, 
ultimately he does not admit that this is in his best interest: ‘Il goûte [du plaisir] à 
montrer qu’il n’est pas la dupe du prestige, lorsque l’artifice est trop grossier 
pour lui faire illusion. Il consent d’être abusé, mais il veut que son erreur ait l’air 
raisonnable’ (Sainte-Albine, 1749, p.40). The actor who feigns, like a depressed 
mother, makes herself impermeable to the spectator’s projective identifications. 
As I said earlier, a depressed mother may remain competent on a practical 
level, because inferring the baby’s needs from external signs. Her responses to 
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the baby may therefore appear indistinguishable from those of a healthy 
mother.  
 
Like a depressed mother, an actor who refrains from using her sensibility may 
appear competent. She can construct an understanding of the character’s 
emotions that may be indistinguishable from the one expressed by a feeling 
actor. But according to the theory of alpha-function, the unconscious experience 
that she grants the spectator is of a very different kind to that of an actor who 
can couple understanding with feeling. Because her understanding is based on 
inference, rather than intuition, and she has not become the emotions, the 
spectator’s unconscious psyche will be left to starve. Although on an intellectual 
plane the character’s interpretation may leave the spectator enriched with 
conscious information about emotions, no alpha-function will be available for his 
projected beta-elements. 
 
It seems that overall the eighteenth-century theorists are more tolerant of the 
‘depressed’ actor than of the ‘psychotic’ one. Luigi Riccoboni, as we have seen, 
admits to feigning in situations when it becomes impossible for the actor to 
reach the extent of the feeling required. Although feeling is always preferable, 
feigning is an acceptable if undesirable expedient. In negotiating the dynamic 
between feeling and feigning consists, according to Luigi Riccoboni, all the 
greatness of the actor’s art. 
 
On the other hand, the actor who solely feigns is the prototype of acting 
championed by Diderot’s Paradoxe, and also a foreshadowing of Brecht’s A-
effect. According to Diderot, acting regulated by judgement but deprived of 
sensibility is the epitome of great acting. As I have shown in Chapter 3, 
however, even Diderot admits that emotional arousal may be an essential part 
of the preparation that a great actor makes during the rehearsal stage. 
Moreover, he remains ambiguous with regard to the distinction between 
sensibility (that in his definition equates to playing by instinct) and a form of 
feeling regulated by judgement. While he bans the first from the art of the actor, 
he concedes to the second. 
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There is an important point to be made with reference to the actor who feigns. 
Alpha-function, while needing to originate in an encounter with the other, 
subsequently develops as an internal operation that one can apply to one’s own 
emotional experiences. This happens already in the very young child, when 
through play he activates unconscious phantasy and uses inanimate objects as 
the receptacles of his projections. The spectator, therefore, has inevitably 
developed some capability for alpha-function to a lesser or greater extent. 
Surely, a theatre performance, like a novel or a painting, may set in motion the 
spectator’s own alpha-function: in this sense, an actor who does not feel the 
emotions she portrays, while starving the spectator with regards to the provision 
of her own alpha-function, may still furnish an opportunity for the activation of 
the spectator’s personal alpha-function. This may explain why a ‘depressed’ 
actor may be tolerable, while a ‘psychotic’ one is hardly so. 
 
Brecht’s theory of the actor in relation to alpha-function 
 
Brecht’s theory of the Verfremdungseffekt proposes that actors should remain 
impermeable to the emotions of the character, along similar lines of those of the 
Paradoxe. Whilst Brecht’s preoccupation with the mirroring of experience 
between actor and spectator is very different from Diderot’s implicit assumption 
that a degree of emotional identification with the character is inherent to 
spectatorship, they both depart from an aversion for the ‘psychotic’ actor. 
Brecht expresses this pointedly in his Conversation about being Forced into 
Empathy:  
 
In [a] well-known passage Gottsched cites Cicero writing on oratory, 
describing how the Roman actor Polus played Electra mourning her 
brother. His own son had just died, and so he brought the urn with his 
ashes on to the stage and spoke the relevant verses ‘focusing them so 
painfully on himself that his own loss made him weep real tears. Nor 
could any of those present have refrained from weeping at that point?’ I 
must say there is only one word for such an operation: barbaric.  
(Brecht, 1957d, p.270) 
 
If the spectator has to risk being overwhelmed by the actor’s beta-elements, it is 
preferable that he relies on his own reflective capabilities, not those of the actor. 
In explaining his ideas about theatre reception, Brecht hints at this point: ‘The 
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one tribute one can pay the audience is to treat it as thoroughly intelligent. It is 
utterly wrong to treat people as simpletons when they are grown up at 
seventeen. I appeal to reason’ (1926, p.14). Although it may be far-fetched to 
imply that Brecht meant to appeal to the spectator’s own alpha-function, in a 
passage to be found immediately after, he states: ‘The audience has to be a 
good enough psychologist to make its own sense of the material I put before it’ 
(1926, p.14). 
 
There is another indication that Brecht’s theory of spectatorship may point in the 
direction of privileging the activation of the spectator’s alpha-function rather 
than the spectator having to depend on that of the actor: it is his urge for the 
‘literarization of the theatre’ against ‘the fact that the theatre can stage anything: 
it theatres it all down’ (1931, p.43). Brecht hopes that through the more literary 
means employed by the epic theatre, such as the use of titles and film 
projections, 
 
the spectator adopts an attitude of smoking-and-watching. Such an 
attitude on his part at once compels a better and clearer performance as 
it is hopeless to try to ‘carry away’ any man who is smoking and 
accordingly pretty well occupied with himself. 
(Brecht, 1931, p.44)  
 
As I briefly suggested earlier, the activation of transpersonal alpha-function may 
well be peculiar to the theatre among the literary arts, as no other form, 
including cinema, features the live presence of the artist. It remains 
questionable, whether other ‘non-literary’ performing arts such as music and 
dance may also presuppose alpha-function; this point would merit special 
attention, which is outside the remit of my research. 
 
It is significant that towards the end of his career, Brecht changed his view of 
the role of empathy in the theatre. By then, he had an extensive experience of 
the theatre not only as playwright, but crucially, as director. In a series of notes 
that were written as an appendix to A Short Organum for the Theatre and which 
remained unpublished during his lifetime, he declares: 
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The contradiction between acting (demonstration) and experience 
(empathy) often leads the uninstructed to suppose that only one or the 
other can be manifest in the work of the actor (as if the Short Organum 
concentrated entirely on acting and the old tradition entirely on 
experience). In reality it is a matter of two mutually hostile processes 
which fuse in the actor’s work; his performance is not just composed of a 
bit of the one and a bit of the other. His particular effectiveness comes 
from the tussle and tension of the two opposites, and also from their 
depth. The style in which the S.O. is written is partly to blame for this.  
(Brecht, 1964, pp.277-278) 
 
A long acquaintance with the practice of the theatre seems to have persuaded 
Brecht that the art of the actor is characterized by the fruitful dynamic between 
empathy, intended as emotional identification, and acting, intended as the 
portrayal of the character. As Brecht worked more and more with real actors, it 
is possible that he became more trusting of their dispositions and also that he 
understood better the special role that transpersonal identifications play in 
spectatorship. Perhaps it could be insinuated that alpha-function could not 
elude his sharp intelligence. 
 
Spectatorship- envy or gratitude? 
 
Earlier I proposed to apply Klein’s terminology to Bion’s discovery and to call 
alpha-function an act of sympathy. Through repeated cycles of projection and 
introjection, which Klein hints to be the basis for sympathy, ‘enrichment and 
deepening of the ego comes about. In this way the possession of the helpful 
inner object is again and again re-established and gratitude can fully come into 
play’ (Klein, 1957, p.189). If sympathy engenders gratitude, it is possible that 
the rounds of applause that close a theatrical performance are partly 
occasioned, perhaps especially in their warmest and most spontaneous 
manifestations, by the sense of gratitude that the audience feels for the gift of 
alpha-function. 
  
It is, however, not uncommon, at least in psychoanalysis, that past experiences 
of disrupted alpha-function, the prevailing of the death instinct, and the 
resistances against ego integration that this entails, provoke the surge of envy. 
According to Klein, ‘a patient’s co-operation has to be based on a strong 
determination to discover the truth about himself if he is to accept and 
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assimilate the analyst’s interpretations relating to these early layers of the mind’ 
(1957, p.232). Similarly, it may be argued that a spectator needs to be animated 
by a desire to understand himself, if he is to allow the actor’s alpha-function to 
operate on his projections. Envy, and the resulting disruption of alpha-function, 
may represent a tempting alternative solution.  
 
As we have seen, envy is characterized by the internalization of an idealized 
object, which provides a fragile and unstable identification. An idealized object 
is a split off all-good object that cannot be integrated within the ego and remains 
as a psychotic fragment of the personality, a beta-element not fit for thinking. 
On this basis, I would like to suggest that such a phenomenon might explain 
certain forms of curiosity that spectators take in actors’ private lives. Focussing 
on the person of the actor outside her function of interpreter of the character 
may help spectators elude the actor’s alpha function. Interestingly, actors often 
enjoy, in these instances, a form of idealization, which is fragile and unstable 
and may easily be turned into disparagement. As Klein writes: ‘The former 
idealized person is often felt as a persecutor (which shows the origin of 
idealization as a counterpart to persecution), and into him is projected the 
subject’s envious and critical attitude’ (1957, p.193). 
 
This theoretical formulation suggests that there may be a strong link between 
the phenomenon of the ‘star actor’ and spectators’ unconscious envy. Although 
such proposition would need to be verified with future studies, a few provisional 
points may be inferred. First of all, the mutual exclusion of envy and alpha-
function would mean that any activity which triggers interest in the private affairs 
of the actor or which encourages idealization (or indeed denigration) of her as a 
person would inevitably enhance envy and hinder alpha-function. During the 
actor’s performance, spectators would be distracted by preoccupations with her 
person and therefore disrupt the unconscious identification with her 
interpretation of the character which is necessary for alpha-function to be 
effected. It would follow that performances which particularly attract an 
audience by featuring one or more star actors in the cast, may unconsciously 
invite spectators to actively impede alpha-function.   
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If envy impedes alpha-function, it may also be possible that actors who are 
particularly poor at alpha-function may be especially prone to engendering envy 
and therefore to becoming idealized or denigrated. For instance, becoming a 
star actor may be facilitated in the cinema because film actors are exempt from 
the extempore performance of alpha-function on spectators. It would be 
interesting to research whether ‘psychotic’ actors or ‘depressed’ ones are also 
more easily casted in the role of stars. 
 
The fourth wall 
 
The question of the fourth wall pertains to the art of the actor inasmuch as it is a 
potent device to promote emotional identification of the spectator with the 
character(s). That is why it is championed by the eighteenth-century theorists 
who take empathy as a necessary aspect of the spectator’s experience. As I 
proposed before, I use the term empathy to signify unconscious emotional 
identification, as intended in psychoanalytic terms, although for the eighteenth-
century theorists of the theatre it was rather conceptualized as the spectator 
giving in to the theatrical illusion.  
 
If the fourth wall enhances empathy, it is not surprising that Brecht urges actors 
to ignore its rule: 
 
The first condition for the achievement of the A-effect is that the actor 
must invest what he has to show with a definite gest of showing. It is of 
course necessary to drop the assumption that there is a fourth wall 
cutting the audience off from the stage and the consequent illusion that 
the stage action is taking place in reality and without an audience. That 
being so, it is possible for the actor in principle to address the audience 
direct. 
(Brecht, 1951, p.136) 
 
Similarly, Dario Fo talks about the necessity to destroy the fourth wall. He bases 
this on the argument that the fourth wall produces in the spectator the attitude 
of being a ‘voyeur’ who spies a narrative which he is not part of. The spectator 
comes to the theatre to steal a story that belongs to someone else (Fo, 1977, 
pp.93-94). Bringing his vision to bear on Brecht’s, it appears that the fourth wall 
achieves empathy by distancing the spectator from the stage. 
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It is somewhat counterintuitive to think of a ‘wall’ as enhancing, not hindering, 
unconscious communication between auditorium and stage. However, reflecting 
on the nature of the unconscious communication and focussing on the idea of 
projection, may help understand how this process works. The fourth wall, 
excluding the spectator from conscious communication with the stage, allows 
him to sit back in his chair and relax, similarly to what happens to the patient on 
the analyst’s couch. Because the characters do not seem to be concerned with 
his presence, and they do not call him to pay conscious attention to anything in 
particular, he can slip into a state of ‘passivity’, a quasi-hypnotic state, as Brecht 
would have it, whereby his resistances lessen and his unconscious phantasy 
can prevail over other mental activities. The apparently distancing effect of the 
fourth wall brings unconscious phantasy to the fore.  
 
As many theorists have argued, one should not fall into the mistake of thinking 
the spectator out of his senses; as Samuel Johnson points out, the spectator 
remains aware of being at the theatre. Theatre does not obliterate reason, or 
other conscious faculties, but rather tips the delicate balance between 
consciousness and unconscious in favour of the latter. Thus the apparent 
‘passivity’ of the spectator masks a surge of unconscious activity with the 
arousal of unconscious phantasy and projective identification. 
 
Spectatorship- passive submission or active engagement? 
 
It should be clear by now that what Brecht and subsequent theorists have 
identified as the passive spectator, is in fact a spectator whose unconscious 
phantasy is very active. This is true whether or not the actor responds to the 
spectator’s projective identification through alpha-function. It should also be 
added that in that case when alpha-function is disrupted by the spectator’s own 
death instinct through the arousal of envy, the unconscious of the envious 
spectator is also well alive and active. However, as Bion has explained, while 
the outcome of transpersonal alpha-function is a commensal relationship 
resulting in mutual psychic growth, a disrupted alpha-function causes the 
spectator to suffer ego-fragmentation. This ultimately results in unavoidable 
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discomfort, and on this count the spectator’s experience could be construed to 
be the passive suffering of a psychic trauma.  
 
On the other hand, the successful attainment of alpha-function consists in ego-
integration and the development of subjectivity, a psychic activity at least as 
significant as those which are visible at a simply conscious level. What appears 
as a passive aspect of spectatorship is in reality an active operation of psychic 
development. It is here that I finally turn to the question of nature. 
 
Alpha-function and the study of human nature  
 
The eighteenth-century cultural and philosophical debate foregrounded the idea 
that human nature could be subject to systematic study and that it would be 
possible to discover the normative principles of feelings and behaviours in 
accordance with character and circumstances. As I discussed in Chapter 4, 
many eighteenth-century theorists exhort actors to study human nature so that 
they can reproduce it on stage. In his Essay on Acting, the actor David Garrick 
affirms that ‘to be very conversant with Human Nature […] is the noblest and 
best Study, by this Way [the actor] will more accurately discover the Workings 
of Spirit […] upon the different Modifications of Matter’ (Garrick, 1744, pp.9-10). 
 
The actor’s sensibility allows her to express human nature in its great variety of 
feelings; her understanding regulates the expression of such feelings according 
to the study of the character’s given circumstances. Ultimately, through her 
alpha-function, the actor applies her understanding of nature to the spectator’s 
emotional experience and she gives them meaning. 
 
According to the theory of alpha-function understanding emotions is a primary 
need in psychic development. As we have seen, such understanding is not a 
form of inference or deduction; it is a peculiar transformation of intuited 
emotions into thoughts. There is here a crucial distinction to be made. 
Understanding human nature in alpha-function is based on a primary emotional 
and unconscious experience and has got a transpersonal quality. It is based on 
intuition and it is a subjective operation, by which a person, through the 
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encounter with another, develops his own sense of self. On the other hand, 
understanding human nature from a cognitive perspective has a very different 
meaning. It is based on a primary cognitive experience grounded in inference or 
deduction; it is conscious or preconscious; it is generally thought to occur within 
the individual’s mind, though possibly with external help or facilitation. 
Furthermore, it aims at being an objective operation, which develops a sense of 
outer rather than inner truth. 
 
As I shall discuss in the next chapter, a psychoanalytic perspective on 
spectatorship generates new opportunities for appraising the function of theatre; 
if acting and spectating concern universal psychic processes, their implications 
are necessarily linked to wider concerns about humanity at large. 
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CHAPTER 6 – SPECTATORSHIP AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
THEATRE AND ITS MORAL FUNCTION 
 
The interest that theorists of the theatre manifest towards the status of 
spectatorship and of acting can, at least in part, be ascribed to their concerns 
about the moral value and function of the theatre. Brecht is the paradigm: his 
theoretical preoccupation with the effect of theatre on spectators and the 
ensuing creation of a new model of acting was strictly tied to his appraisal of the 
socio-political harm that traditional theatre is supposed to produce. His 
response was a life-long venture to reform theatre in the direction of making it a 
tool for political awareness and the amelioration of society. 
 
Diderot’s project of theatrical renovation was similarly coloured by ethical 
considerations; his active engagement as playwright and theorist, was 
grounded in his belief that theatre had a role to play in the promotion of moral 
habits. As has been suggested, ‘The […] principal object of Diderot in writing Le 
Fils naturel and in expounding his doctrines was to make the theater an 
institution for teaching morality’ (Wilson, 1972, p.270). Diderot’s own claim in 
the Entretiens that the object of drama ‘C’est, je crois, d’inspirer aux hommes 
l’amour de la vertu, l’horreur du vice’ (1939, p.149) is telling. 
 
By the time he wrote the Paradoxe, Diderot’s interest in dramaturgy had 
become secondary to his radically transformed view of actors. If the fictionalized 
actors of Le Fils naturel were involved in the writing and performing of plays of 
direct relevance to their immediate social context, the skilful but cynical actors 
of the Paradoxe were ‘polis, caustiques et froids, fastueux, dissipés, 
dissipateurs, intéressés, plus frappés de nos ridicules que touchés de nos 
maux’ (Diderot, 1994, p.83). Far from being vehicles for teaching morality, 
actors were now conceived as detached observers of human passions and 
utterly unconcerned about the amelioration of their fellow men and women: 
 
Jamais on ne se fit comédien par gout pour la vertu, par le désir d’être 
utile dans la société et de servir son pays ou sa famille, par aucun des 
motifs honnêtes qui pourraient entraîner un esprit droit, un cœur chaud, 
une âme sensible vers une aussi belle profession. 
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(Diderot, 1994, p.84) 
 
In spite of Diderot’s later distrust for actors, both his and Brecht’s criticism of the 
theatre entailed a design to contribute to its reformation, and the same could be 
said for all the theorists that I have considered so far, with the notable exception 
of Plato. But in this chapter I will introduce one particular eighteenth-century 
voice that condemned theatre at all levels without the possibility of appeal.  That 
is the voice of Rousseau. His arguments against the theatre will serve as a 
useful counterpoint to a wider discussion of the moral question. 
 
Rousseau (2003) must be credited with one of the most famous invectives 
against the theatre, his Lettre à D’Alembert. Published in 1758, the Lettre was a 
response to D’Alembert’s article for the VII Volume of the Encyclopédie (Vol.7, 
p.578) on the Swiss city of Geneva, of which Rousseau was a native. As a city-
state, Geneva had an independent statute which banned the performance of 
plays. In his article, D’Alembert advocated the future establishment of a theatre 
in the city, adducing its many advantages. In doing so he may have been under 
the influence of Voltaire, who had established a private theatre in his Geneva 
residence (Buffat, 2003).  
 
D’Alembert argued especially against the supposed immorality of actors, which 
he presumed to be the main reason behind the proscription of theatre in the 
city-state. His plea stemmed from the conviction that actors’ immoral conduct 
derived from their marginalisation in society, which incited disrespect, prejudice, 
and disdain against them. D’Alembert maintained that if only Geneva could 
adopt an enlightened attitude towards actors, perhaps compounded by strict 
laws to regulate their behaviour, she would surely soon be provided with the 
best acting troupe in Europe and could eventually spread her example to other 
nations. As I will discuss later, his claim may not be completely groundless. 
 
Rousseau’s response was prompt and fierce. Outraged by this public appeal, 
he took it upon himself to defend his city from the moral debasement that a 
theatre would threaten to plunge her into. If Plato had wished to ban poets and 
actors from his ideal city, Rousseau was determined to support the ban already 
in effect in his city-state. 
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Theatre, pleasure, and moral instruction 
 
Rousseau attacks the status of the theatre on its long-standing claim that its 
aim is to please and instruct. This idea derives from Horace, who in his Ars 
poetica (333-334) had written that poetry should either please or instruct, or 
both: ‘Poets aim either to benefit, or to amuse, or to utter words at once both 
pleasing and helpful to life’ (trans. Fairclough, 1970, p.479). The notion that the 
purpose of the theatre is entertainment and moral improvement has travelled 
across the centuries, and the question posed by the relationship between these 
two purposes is epitomised by the title of one of Brecht’s essays: ‘Theatre for 
Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction’ (1957a), in which he explains the aims for 
the epic theatre in relation to knowledge and social reform. 
 
According to Brecht, the epic theatre has wrongly been accused of over-
moralizing. Its aim in portraying social conditions and increasing social 
awareness is ‘not just to arouse moral objections to such circumstances […] but 
to discover means for their elimination’ (1957a, p.75). In this sense, Brecht 
clarifies that 
 
We are not in fact speaking in the name of morality but in that of the 
victims. These truly are two distinct matters, for the victims are often told 
that they ought to be contented with their lot, for moral reasons. Moralists 
of this sort see man as existing for morality, not morality for man. 
(1957a, p.75) 
 
The morality acquired through spectating at the epic theatre should promote a 
degree of freedom, according to the principle that it is not mankind who exists 
for a morality based on predetermined ideas about ethical values, but rather 
morality which exists for mankind, to guide their endeavours to improve society. 
Because Brecht could not imagine any desirable function for theatre outside its 
potential for instigating social change, he perhaps implicitly rejected the idea 
that the moral purpose of the theatre could be attached to a static vision of 
society and its values. Spectators should be placed in the position to judge for 
themselves if what they see on stage – the epic theatre’s truthful depiction of 
social conditions – is to be changed or not. As von Held explains: 
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In the age of science and technology, theatre must appeal to the 
spectator’s rational and cognitive rather than emotional interests. Just 
like a scientist, who with objective distance and cool curiosity observes 
her research material in order to discover the hidden principles behind it, 
Brecht wants his spectator to explore sociology through drama. 
(von Held, 2011, p.21) 
 
The insistence on the primacy of reason in mediating theatre’s political effect, is 
related to Brecht’s particular view of the status of emotional engagement in 
spectatorship: whether emotions derive from reason or arise independently of it, 
makes all the difference. The empathic emotional identification of the spectator 
with the character(s) entails a noxious effect of social submissiveness and 
conformism, whereas emotions ensuing from intellectual engagement with the 
play and detached observation of the characters’ social condition foster a 
desirable commitment to the reformation of society. This distinction leads Brecht 
to differentiate between two forms of theatrical pleasure. On one side is the 
pleasure of empathy, utilized by the Aristotelian theatre to hypnotize the 
audience and render it acquiescent to the status quo (Brecht, 1930). On the 
other side, the pleasure afforded by the epic theatre, altogether rejecting 
empathy, derives from ‘the wisdom that comes from the solution of problems, 
[…] the anger that is a practical expression of sympathy with the underdog, […] 
the respect due to those who respect humanity’ (Brecht, 1949, p.186).  
 
Brecht’s theory of pleasure in theatre is based on a sharp separation between a 
pleasure derived from instruction, and a pleasure independent of it; only the first 
condition endows theatre with its ethical and socio-political value. Interestingly, 
the supposition that instruction needs to generate pleasure for theatre to 
accomplish its moral purpose is squarely antithetical to Aristotle’s conception of 
the effect of tragedy. This should not surprise, given that Brecht’s formulation is 
openly in opposition to that of Aristotle. However, I think that this antithesis 
needs unravelling, if our understanding of spectatorship is to be enhanced. 
 
Aristotle professed that the first aim of poetry (dramatic and non) is to give 
pleasure, and moral teaching is at best relegated to be a secondary aim 
(Butcher, 1951). This is often misapprehended, because Horace’s dictum about 
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the moral purpose of poetry was so influential ‘that even writers focussing on 
Aristotle rather than Horace tended to project back onto the theory of catharsis 
moralistic aims that might appear quite alien to the Greek philosopher’ (Harris, 
2014, p.174). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s theory maintains a link between 
tragedy’s aims of aesthetic pleasure and of moral improvement. As a scholar of 
Aristotle has pointed out: 
  
The aesthetic representation of character he views under ethical lights, 
and the different types of character he reduces to moral categories. Still 
he never allows the moral purpose of the poet or the moral effects of his 
art to take the place of the artistic end. If the poet fails to produce the 
proper pleasure, he fails in the specific function of his art. He may be 
good as a teacher, but as a poet or artist he is bad. 
(Butcher, 1951, p.238) 
 
This reading of Aristotle may suggest that the Greek philosopher simply did not 
see pleasure and moral improvement as mutually exclusive, but still granted 
pleasure a much higher stake in representing theatre’s purposes. However, as 
Lessing has insightfully indicated, it is possible that Aristotle had a particular 
view of the relationship between pleasure and moral improvement which is 
opposite to that proposed by Brecht. Giving his own interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory of tragic katharsis, in article 78 of the Hamburg Dramaturgy, Lessing 
reads katharsis as the transformation of pity into virtue: ‘whoever has 
endeavoured to arrive at a just and complete conception of Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the purification of the passions will find that […] this purification rests in 
nothing else than in the transformation of passions into virtuous habits’ 
(Lessing, 1890, p.421). The pleasure implicit in tragic katharsis may therefore 
be construed as the necessary premise to the moral effect of theatre, in 
contrast with Brecht’s notion that theatrical pleasure inherent to katharsis is an 
obstacle to the moral function of the theatre.  
 
Perhaps it should puzzle us that Brecht turned his own theory on its head at the 
end of his career. In a note of 1952, appended to the published version of one 
of his writings, he declares: 
 
Recently […] we have given up examining works of art from their poetic 
(artistic) aspect, and got satisfied from theatrical works that have no sort 
of poetic appeal and from performances that lack virtuosity. Such works 
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and performances may have some effect, but it can hardly be a profound 
one, not even politically. For it is a peculiarity of the theatrical medium 
that it communicates awareness and impulses in the form of pleasure: 
the depth of the awareness and the impulse will correspond to the depth 
of the pleasure. 
(Brecht, 1952, p.230) 
 
Here it is not awareness which provokes pleasure, but pleasure which 
engenders awareness. This shift in Brecht’s view comes around the time when 
he also changes his appraisal of the role of empathy in the theatre. As I showed 
in Chapter 5, he eventually came to recognize that a fruitful dynamic between 
empathy and interpretation is necessary to the art of the actor. Albeit in the 
passage quoted above Brecht does not intimate that the spectator’s pleasure 
must be connected with empathy, he is explicitly stating that, without inherent 
pleasure, theatre cannot instigate political change, except for the possibility of a 
‘shallow’ effect.  
 
This is a completely opposite view to that of Rousseau, who not only denies any 
positive moral effect of theatre, but does so especially because of the link 
between theatre and pleasure. Rousseau starts from the assumption, in 
keeping with the Aristotelian perspective, that the principal aim of the theatre is 
to please, because only in this way will the spectators’ interest be engaged. He 
then turns the implications of this argument upside-down by claiming that 
spectators will only be pleased by what reinforces their values and beliefs: ‘Il 
faut, pour leur plaire, des spectacles qui favorisent leur penchants, au lieu qu’il 
en faudrait qui les modérassent’ (Rousseau, 2003, p.66). At best theatre will 
reinforce already established good habits, at worst it will strengthen existing bad 
habits: ‘la comédie serait bonne aux bons et mauvaise aux méchants’ 
(Rousseau, 2003, p.68). Therefore, the need for theatre to please is precisely 
what hinders its potential to morally instruct. 
 
As is the case with regards to the contention between Aristotle and Plato, the 
recognition of a link between theatre and pleasure remains throughout history a 
thorny question. The pleasure implicated in spectatorship can justify the 
condemnation of theatre (Plato and Rousseau), be taken as a primary effect 
which is necessary for the ensuing moral effect (Aristotle and the late Brecht) or 
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be thought to be useful insofar as it is generated by an intellectual engagement 
(Brecht’s epic theatre). As indicated by Brecht, the question of pleasure links to 
the question of emotions, and it is the judgement on the value of emotional 
identification that ultimately will guide theories about theatre’s moral function. 
 
Theatre and emotions 
 
If for Aristotle the emotional engagement at the basis of tragedy represents its 
highest value, Rousseau contends that the problem with theatre is precisely 
that theatre reception is about emotions, not reason. He ridicules the idea that 
through katharsis it may be possible to rescue the mind from the grip that the 
represented emotions have on spectators: ‘Je sais que la poétique du théâtre 
prétend […] purger les passions en les excitant: mais j’ai peine à bien concevoir 
cette règle. Serait-ce que pour devenir tempérant et sage, il faut commencer 
par être furieux et fou?’ (Rousseau, 2003, p.68).  
 
Like Plato, Rousseau understands emotional arousal as irrationality, madness 
even, and sees it as a perilous undercurrent which can amplify itself to a 
dangerous degree: 
 
Ne sait-on pas que toutes les passions sont sœurs, qu’une seule suffit 
pour en exciter mille, et que les combattre l’une par l’autre n’est qu’un 
moyen de rendre le cœur plus sensible à toutes ? Le seul instrument qui 
serve à les purger est la raison, et j’ai déjà dit que la raison n’avait nul 
effet au théâtre. 
(Rousseau, 2003, p.69) 
 
Reason only is capable of overcoming irrational emotionality, but there is no 
place for reason in the theatre: ‘Il n’y a que la raison qui ne soit bonne à rien sur 
la scène. Un homme sans passions, ou qui les dominerait toujours n’y saurait 
intéresser personne’ (2003, p.66). If there is no place for reason, there is 
therefore no scope for moral instruction.  
 
For Rousseau, like it was for Plato and would be for Brecht, theatre immorality 
ensues from the dangerous cocktail of emotional identification and pleasure that 
spectatorship entails. In contrast, other theorists, in the first place Aristotle, see 
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in the link between pleasure and emotional engagement the very essence of 
the theatrical effect on the audience. This is true for instance of the eighteenth-
century theorists I have considered, from the so-called emotionalists to the anti-
emotionalists, all of whom demand and expect that the spectator will submit to 
the theatrical illusion and enter into the characters’ feelings. Luigi Riccoboni 
(1928, p.17), in his poem on the art of the actor, hints at the link of emotional 
identification with pleasure as a desirable effect, when he claims that the actor 
cannot please unless she entices the spectator into the theatrical illusion.  
 
The question of the link between pleasure, emotional engagement, and the 
moral value of theatre becomes clearer if one can shed light on underlying 
assumptions about the psyche and the way emotions and reason are believed 
to related to each other. Theorists like Rousseau and the Brecht of the epic 
theatre insist on reason’s superior claims and wish to subject all other mental 
activities to its rule, especially for what concerns the purpose of moral 
improvement. Brecht declares: ‘The one tribute one can pay the audience is to 
treat it as thoroughly intelligent. […] I appeal to reason’ (1926, p.14). As we 
have seen, this attitude derives from Brecht’s conviction that emotions are 
secondary to reason, and therefore appealing to reason will lead to a 
modification of emotions and to behavioural change: ‘People’s opinions interest 
me far more than their feelings. Feelings are usually the products of opinions. 
They follow on. But opinions are decisive’ (Brecht, 1926, p.16). 
 
On the other hand, according to the eighteenth-century theory of sensism, a 
philosophical system which attributed to sensations the primacy over all other 
mental processes, reason develops from sensation and feeling, and is therefore 
dependent on their stimulation. From sensism derived Diderot’s idea in the 
Philosophical Thoughts that the emotions must not be weakened but 
strengthened, because intellectual abilities proceed from the harmonious 
balance of the passions (Cassirer, pp.107-108). Theatre and other forms of art 
have therefore an important role to play precisely because they are sources of 
emotional engagement. This view tallies, of course, with the psychoanalytic 
description of the mind. 
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UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES OF ACTING AND SPECTATING 
 
Emotional processing in alpha-function 
 
As human beings, our psychic development is as crucial as our physical one for 
our survival. Emotions and our ability to make sense of them are the primary 
nourishment of our minds, which allow them to grow and mature. However, 
while emotions are, with sensations, the primary content of our psychic 
experience, we are not born with a thinking apparatus ready to process them 
and make them available for psychic growth. Such apparatus needs to be 
established through the caring function of the mother, as much as our other 
physical needs make us also, as infants, dependent on the mother.  
 
As the mother’s milk provides the infant with the first necessary nutrients for the 
development of his body, so the mother’s psyche endows him with the 
rudimentary thoughts necessary for the growth of his mind. Slowly developing a 
capacity for self-care will eventually make the child virtually independent with 
regards to his physical needs, although, of course, he will have to rely on the 
environment, and on social cooperation at various levels, for survival. On the 
other hand, emotional processing will always remain at least partly dependent 
on the mind of the other, whilst an increased capacity for inner alpha-function 
will guarantee a partial degree of autonomy39. 
 
Children use the personifications and impersonation of play to stimulate and 
develop their autonomous alpha-function. Adults can employ, among other 
things, works of art. Freud drew a direct comparison between the playing of 
children and the creative process of artists: 
 
The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a 
world of phantasy which he takes very seriously – that is, which he 
invests with large amounts of emotion – while separating it sharply from 
                                                       
39 It is interesting to engage with the observation that the need for social cooperation intrinsic to 
the survival of the human species may justify, from an evolutionary perspective, why it is 
advantageous that psychic development remains partly determined by interpersonal dynamics: 
if human beings are psychologically dependent on each other, they will tend to stick together, 
even if they could, at least in theory, choose to live in isolation. This will make them stronger as 
a species. Further analysis of this supposition is outside the remit of this thesis.	
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reality. Language has preserved this relationship between children's play 
and poetic creation. It gives [in German] the name of ‘Spiel’ [‘play’] to 
those forms of imaginative writing which require to be linked to tangible 
objects and which are capable of representation. It speaks of a ‘Lustspiel’ 
or ‘Trauerspiel’ [‘comedy’ or ‘tragedy’: literally, ‘pleasure play’ or 
‘mourning play’] and describes those who carry out the representation as 
‘Schauspieler’ [‘players’: literally ‘show-players’]. 
(Freud, 1908, p.144) 
 
Although Freud is specifically talking about the writer, the reader and the 
spectator also invest their emotions in the fiction of the book or the play. In 
doing so, they engage their unconscious phantasy which can in turn activate 
their personal alpha-function. In this sense it can be argued that all art 
stimulates unconscious phantasy and fosters autonomous alpha-function. 
 
There are however situations when one’s own personal alpha-function is not fit 
for purpose and one needs to turn to ‘another’ for the processing of the beta-
elements. The projection of one’s own beta-elements into other people happens 
continually in personal relationships through re-enactments, which are a feature 
of everyday life, though it is psychoanalysis that particularly puts them under 
the spotlight. As Freud says: 
 
We must be prepared to find, therefore, that the patient yields to the 
compulsion to repeat [...] not only in his personal attitude to his doctor but 
also in every other activity and relationship which may occupy his life at 
the time. 
(Freud. 1914, p.151) 
 
The activation of transpersonal alpha-function is characteristic of 
psychoanalysis: through transference re-enactments the patient projects his 
beta-elements into the analyst, who ‘becomes’ the unprocessed emotional 
experience through projective identification. By resisting censure at the one 
end, and ‘acting in’ at the opposite end, the analyst strives to keep the beta-
element in the psychic sphere, so that she can give meaning to the 
unprocessed emotional experience through her understanding and 
interpretation. The work of analysis transforms the beta-element into an alpha-
element which will be introjected by the patient and increase his self-
awareness. 
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In drawing a parallel between the work of the analyst and the art of the actor, I 
have proposed that the actor’s art consists of performing transpersonal alpha-
function for the spectator’s beta-elements projected into her. This is achieved 
through the dynamic tension in the actor’s double game between being a real 
person on stage who can respond with emotional arousal to the spectator’s 
projective identifications, and her portraying a fictional character through the 
intellectual activity of her interpretation. In semiotic terms the actor operates 
both as a real sign and as an artificial one, and it is precisely this doubleness 
which raises a number of questions related to the moral function of the theatre. 
 
The severing of transpersonal alpha-function 
 
The crucial problem with alpha-function is its availability, as starvation of alpha-
function equates with repetition of splitting and fragmentation. The absence of 
transpersonal alpha-function in the theatre poses the additional threat that the 
spectator’s unconscious phantasy may be further burdened by the beta-
elements projected by an actor who operates in a psychotic mode. An actor 
deprived of alpha-function may use the excuse of her performance to project 
her own beta-elements into the audience. In such cases, not only do the 
spectator’s psychotic beta-elements remain unchanged, but, as Rousseau 
points out, they swell into greater irrationality and even madness. 
 
To avoid the risk of re-traumatization, falling short of the more drastic solution of 
banning theatre tout court, theorists have proposed expedients to preclude 
spectators from having to rely on transpersonal alpha-function, with the risk of 
being subjected to the actor’s own beta-elements. Spectatorship thus gets 
confined to the activation of autonomous alpha-function. Brecht’s A-effect is the 
most lucid attempt in this direction.  
 
According to Roland Barthes (1979), Brecht’s project of the epic theatre, 
including the invention of the A-effect, addresses the semiological problem of 
the double game of the actor and, more generally, of all theatrical signs. 
Brecht’s intention would have been to compensate for the spectator’s emotional 
identification rather than to negate it. Reading Barthes’s proposition in the light 
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of the theory of alpha-function, it could be argued that while epic theatre 
obliterates transpersonal alpha-function, the A-effect still allows for intra-psychic 
activation of the spectator’s autonomous alpha-function. In other words, the 
epic theatre does not aim at impeding the spectator’s identification with the 
character, but rather at breaking the unconscious emotional resonance between 
actor and spectator in projective identification. 
 
The project of the epic theatre entails a ‘literarization’ of the theatre which turns 
spectators and actors into observers. In alpha-function terms, conventional 
theatre, which ‘theatres it all down’ (Brecht, 1931, p.43), imbues the spectator 
with thoughts through the actor’s alpha-function, while the literarization of the 
theatre puts him in the position to think for himself, to employ his own alpha-
function. Although Brecht’s formulation is peripheral to considerations of alpha-
function because his model of spectatorship does not distinctly recognize the 
relevance of productive unconscious processes, he uses a suggestive 
expression to indicate the actor’s emotional engagement: ‘has one the right to 
offer others a dish that one has already eaten oneself?’ (1931, p.45). In alpha-
function, the actor returns to the spectator an emotional experience which he 
has previously ‘digested’ on his behalf, and in Brecht’s opinion this operation is 
illegitimate. 
 
The distinctive feature of the disruption of transpersonal alpha-function by the 
A-effect is that the actor, while keeping herself impermeable to the projections 
of the spectator, invites the spectator to adopt a reciprocal attitude: both actor 
and spectator are complicit in exploiting the character as the object of their 
observation; neither of them is placed in the vulnerable and reciprocal position 
of the infant-mother couple. On the other hand, the proposition of eighteenth-
century anti-emotionalists entails a very different situation, in which the severing 
of alpha-function by a depressed actor happens in the face of a spectator 
whose unconscious phantasy has been exposed. The spectator is here put in a 
position akin to that of a vulnerable and emoting baby handled by an 
unreceptive mother. 
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The depressed actor and the manic position 
 
François Riccoboni was an unusual eighteenth-century voice in insisting on the 
lack of the actor’s emotional arousal during performance. It is debatable 
whether his conviction followed the need for protecting the spectator from a 
‘psychotic’ actor, or rather from a preference for a ‘depressed’ style of acting. 
François is not preoccupied, like Brecht is, with the emotional arousal that an 
actor can effect in the audience. On the contrary, he specifies that the actor 
needs to make the spectator feel what she herself does not: ‘L’on appelle 
l’expression, l’adresse par laquelle on fait sentir au spectateur tous les 
mouvements dont on veut paroître pénétré. Je dit que l’on veut le paroître, et 
non pas que l’on est pénétré véritablement’  (Riccoboni F., 1750, p.36). On the 
other hand, he describes his uneasiness about an actor who feels, his anxiety 
being that she may risk becoming overwhelmed by her emotions: 
 
Si dans un endroit d’attendrissement vous vous laissez emporter au 
sentiment de votre rôle, votre cœur se trouvera tout-à-coup serré, votre 
voix s’étouffera presqu’entierement; s’il tombe une seule larme de vos 
yeux, des sanglots involontaires vous embarrasseront le gosier, il vous 
sera impossible de proférer un seul mot sans des hocquets ridicules. 
(Riccoboni F., 1750, pp.37-38) 
 
In psychoanalytic terms, depression is a protection against deterioration into a 
psychotic breakdown. By keeping herself impermeable to the baby’s 
projections, the mother is unconsciously striving to avoid becoming psychotic. 
François Riccoboni’s depressed actor seems to be engaged in a similar 
struggle to deflect the spectator’s beta-elements in order to avoid activating her 
own psychotic ego-fragments. Her ego is too fragile to be made available for 
the benefit of the spectator’s psychic development. Like in the case of the epic 
theatre, the spectator will have to activate his own alpha-function or remain 
psychologically starved.  
 
Diderot’s elaboration of François Riccoboni’s theory is interesting because with 
the Paradoxe the impossibility of a transaction in feelings between actors and 
spectators becomes a clear-cut division between spectators who merely feel 
and actors who merely think, and such a distinction extends to human beings at 
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large. Diderot’s actor is not, like François Riccoboni’s, on the verge of an 
emotional impossibility; she is indeed deliberately deceitful. Safe in her 
awareness of superior power, instead of putting her alpha-function at the 
service of the other, she is withholding it wilfully in order to let the spectator 
seethe with his own emotions, while she remains detached and controlled. 
 
Departing from Freud’s idea that mania is a mechanism by which the 
unconscious mind evades depression (Freud, 1917), Melanie Klein described 
the manic position as a form of defence against the depressive position. The 
transition from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position entails 
ego integration, but it is also characterized by the painful realization that the bad 
object towards which the baby’s aggression was directed is one and the same 
with the good object. If the ego is too fragile to bear this painful realization, it 
may either revert back to the paranoid-schizoid position or escape into the 
manic position. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the ego is trapped in 
fragmentation and continues to project and introject its split objects in 
unconscious phantasy. In the manic position, the ego employs a ‘sense of 
omnipotence for the purpose of controlling and mastering objects’ (Klein, 1935, 
p.277). In unconscious phantasy the ego feels that it is above the influence of 
objects and it is instead in full control of them:  
 
This disparagement of the object's importance and the contempt for it is, 
I think, a specific characteristic of mania and enables the ego to effect 
that partial detachment which we observe side by side with its hunger for 
objects. Such detachment, which the ego cannot achieve in the 
depressive position, represents an advance, a fortifying of the ego in 
relation to its objects. 
(Klein, 1935, p.163) 
 
Although Melanie Klein does not expand on these points, two aspects of her 
description are interesting for my discussion. Firstly, the manic position allows 
the ego to feel in control and fortified with respect to its objects. Its being 
‘impermeable’ to projections is not any more a strenuous struggle to keep itself 
from slipping into psychosis, but rather a triumphant sense of being in control 
and beyond reach of the dangerous effects of the projections. Secondly, the 
manic ego is simultaneously ‘hungry’ for objects, precisely because it believes 
itself above their power. Likewise, the actors described in the Paradoxe, are 
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always eager to observe the passions and even the madness of others, by 
which they remain emotionally untouched:  
 
Les grands poètes, les grands acteurs, et peut-être en général tous les 
grands imitateurs de la nature, quels qu’ils soient, doués d’une belle 
imagination, d’un grand jugement, d’un tact fin, d’un goût très sûr, sont 
les êtres les moins sensibles. Ils sont également propres à trop de 
choses; ils sont trop occupés à regarder, à reconnaître et à imiter, pour 
être vivement affectés au-dedans d’eux-mêmes. Je les vois sans cesse 
le portefeuille sur les genoux et le crayon à la main.  
(Diderot, 1994, p.43) 
 
The manic position helpfully explains the nuanced differentiation between 
François Riccoboni’s and Diderot’s description of the unfeeling actor, the first 
endeavouring to shield herself from madness, the second triumphantly 
delighting in the madness of others. Although both models of actors equally 
deprive the spectator of transpersonal alpha-function, the actor of the Paradoxe 
adds to her emotional unavailability a malicious ascendancy on the spectator, 
which risks justifying an outright condemnation of her profession. 
 
The envious spectator 
  
Diderot’s notion of the paradoxical actor is not flattering and leads him to 
describe actors with disparaging words, despite his assertion that he loves and 
esteems their profession. In the same passage in which he affirms that actors 
are ‘hommes d’un talent rare et d’une utilité réelle, […] prédicateurs les plus 
éloquents de l’honnêteté et des vertus’ (Diderot, 1994, pp.82-83), he writes of 
them: 
 
isolés, vagabonds, à l’ordre des grands; peu de mœurs, point d’amis, 
presque aucune de ces liaisons saintes et douces, qui nous associent 
aux peines et aux plaisirs d’un autre qui partage les nôtres. J’ai souvent 
vu rire un comédien hors de la scène, je n’ai pas mémoire d’en avoir 
jamais vu pleurer un. 
(Diderot, 1994, p.84) 
 
From Diderot’s to Rousseau’s disparaging description, it is but a short step: 
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je vois en général que l’état de comédien est un état de licence et de 
mauvaises mœurs; que les hommes y sont livrés au désordre; que les 
femmes y mènent une vie scandaleuse; que les uns et les autres, avares 
et prodigues tout à la fois, toujours accablés de dettes et toujours versant 
l’argent à pleines mains, sont aussi peu retenus sur leurs dissipations 
que peu scrupuleux sur les moyens d’y pourvoir. Je vois encore que, par 
tout pays, leur profession est déshonorante, que ceux qui l’exercent, 
excommuniés ou non, sont partout méprisés, et qu’à Paris même, où ils 
ont plus de considération et une meilleure conduite que partout ailleurs, 
un bourgeois craindrait de fréquenter ces mêmes comédiens qu’on voit 
tous les jours à la table des grands. 
(Rousseau, 2003, pp.127-128) 
 
Diderot’s conception of the paradoxical actor accords well with Rousseau’s 
belief that the actor’s predicament derives from her double game: 
 
 Qu’est-ce que le talent du comédien? L’art de se contrefaire, de revêtir 
un autre caractère que le sien, de paraître différent de ce qu’on est, de 
se passionner de sang-froid, de dire autre chose que ce qu’on pense 
aussi naturellement que si l’on le pensait réellement, et d’oublier enfin sa 
propre place à force de prendre celle d’autrui. […] Quel est donc, au 
fond, l’esprit que le comédien reçoit de son état ? Un mélange de 
bassesse, de fausseté, de ridicule orgueil, et d’indigne avilissement, qui 
le rend propre à toutes sortes de personnages, hors le plus noble de 
tous, celui d’homme qu’il abandonne.  
(Rousseau, 2003, p.132) 
 
As far as Rousseau is concerned, there is no actor without double game, and 
because the double game is corrupting of moral values, there should be no 
actors.  
 
Rousseau, although clearly despising the actor’s ability to transform into the 
character, has yet trouble to justify his straight censure of it. He pre-empts his 
critics’ objection that the actor is not ‘un fourbe qui veut en imposer’ (Rousseau, 
2003, p.132): because the spectators know that the actor is feigning, her deceit 
is inherently harmless. His condemnation therefore has to take an indirect 
route: actors are culpable of changing themselves into characters as their 
purpose is that of making money, effectively putting their own person publicly 
on sale (2003, p.132). Furthermore, their ability to deceive, whilst innocent 
perhaps at the theatre, becomes the blemish of their personal character: 
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Aussi ne l’accuse-je pas d’être précisément un trompeur, mais de cultiver 
pour tout métier le talent de tromper les hommes, et de s’exercer à des 
habitudes qui, ne pouvant être innocentes qu’au théâtre, ne servent 
partout ailleurs qu’à mal faire. 
(Rousseau, 2003, pp.132-133) 
 
The censure towards the art of the actor drifts inevitably into a criticism of her 
person.  
 
Following the theory of alpha-function, this shift can be construed as an 
unconscious envious attack. Rousseau’s misgiving about the possibility of a 
transpersonal commensal relationship, whereby a shared emotional experience 
in alpha-function can foster psychic development, drives him to distrust the 
actor and pre-empt her motives as expedient, exploitative, or at best 
ungenerous. In psychoanalysis the patient’s suspicions that the analyst may 
just be helping ‘for the money’, or that she unscrupulously exploits the patient’s 
vulnerability to rejoice in her triumph over him, are powerful defences against 
the work of analysis. Although it is not impossible that the analyst may be 
incompetent or corrupted, this is a different situation from when it is the patient’s 
unconscious envy that results in the super-imposition of degrading attributes to 
the person of the analyst.  
 
Radical reading of the theory of alpha-function implies that the deceitful yet 
competent actor is a phantasy created by the spectator under the impulse of 
envy. The actor can either be deceitful, in which case she is not competent; or if 
she is competent, her supposed fraudulence is an unconscious construction on 
the part of the spectator. It is the ineffectual use of alpha-function that marks the 
incompetent actor, and this happens when the actor is either psychotic or 
depressed (with the variant of the manic position). In such cases, her psychic 
operation is ultimately deceitful, as it does not promote the spectator’s psychic 
development. But there are situations when the actor’s competence is rendered 
useless by the disruption of alpha-function through the spectator’s envy. In such 
cases, the deceitfulness of the actor is only apparent: the competent actor is 
made incompetent in spite of herself. However, all these situations are difficult 
to distinguish, because the competence of the actor acts on unconscious 
processes which are concealed from awareness. 
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The person of the actor 
 
If the availability of the actor’s alpha-function is so crucial for fostering the 
spectator’s psychic development, at least for those beta-elements for which he 
does not possess an autonomous alpha-function, it should not surprise that the 
art of the actor creates such an aura of controversy. 
 
While the spectator may unconsciously disrupt alpha-function from the surge of 
his envious impulses, it is ultimately the responsibility of the actor to make her 
alpha-function available for the spectator’s psychic growth. Her ability to 
distance herself momentarily from her personal preoccupations, generously 
putting her mind at the service of the emotions of another, is central to her art. 
 
The art of the actor seen in the light of alpha-function is not an easy labour. It is 
not an over-statement to compare her dedication to the other, her self-denial, 
her generosity, to that of the mother for her baby. But it is no wonder if, like in 
the case of the mother, the intensity, and sometimes the violence, of 
unprocessed emotional experiences overwhelms her ability to fulfil her task.  
 
As we have seen, the actor’s art depends on a delicate dynamic between her 
real presence, necessary for her to receive the projective identifications, and 
her portrayal of the character through her interpretation. In both these domains, 
her person will influence the ensuing operations. It is after all from her ego, and 
the sense of self that she has constructed, that she gives effect to alpha-
function. Both her ability to accept the projections and her competence in giving 
them meaning are operations of her own mind. It is therefore no wonder that the 
actors’ reputation outside the theatre comes under scrutiny. While the spectator 
needs to be free from preoccupations about the actor’s private life during her 
performance, so that transpersonal alpha-function is not disrupted, a 
reassurance that the actor is morally credible will facilitate the spectator’s 
trustful engagement that this process entails.  
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This perspective lends some credit to D’Alembert’s belief that a respectful 
attitude towards actors, coupled with laws that regulate their conduct, may be 
conducive of excellence in their profession. Similarly, it justifies Sticotti’s (1770, 
aiij-xij) assertion that prejudices and hostility against actors hinder the 
enhancement and perfection of their art. Diderot’s letters to Mademoiselle 
Jodin, a young actress towards whom he assumed the role of a fatherly figure, 
are full of exhortations that she may build for herself ‘la reputation d’une bonne 
et hônnête créature’, not only for her personal benefit, but also for that of her 
audience (1994, p.153).  
 
Luigi Riccoboni, who had always been concerned with guarding the reputation 
of his actors, wrote a book dedicated to the reformation of theatre, which 
includes a list of regulations that he recommends to be imposed on actors. 
Interestingly, among these advisable rules, there are two which forestall 
Rousseau’s objections against actors’ moral standards. Riccoboni proposes 
that actors should have a proven record of honourable conduct (they even need 
to present a certificate of good standing!) and that they should not profit from 
their work. As he explains: ‘le  Roy ordonneroit qu’on ne reçût point d’Acteur qui 
ne fût connu pour homme d’honneur, et, comme tel, avoué de sa famille. A cet 
effet il seroit obligé de produire des témoins et de présenter des Certificates en 
bonne forme’ (Riccoboni L., 1967, p.100). Moreover, ‘La recette entrera toute 
entiere dans la caisse; et, à la fin de l’année, ce qui restera, tous frais payez, 
sera employé en œuvres de pieté’ (Riccoboni L., 1967, p.105). 
 
While Rousseau’s preoccupations about the moral conduct of actors eloquently 
epitomise a habitual eighteenth-century concern, his proposition of abolishing 
the theatre stimulated counterarguments and alternative proposals. For 
instance, in Restif de la Bretonne’s novel La mimographe, the female 
protagonists proclaim that the theatre is necessary to humanity, inasmuch as 
‘l’homme est né spectateur, l’appareil de tout l’Univers, que le Créateur semble 
étaler pour être vu & admiré, nous le dit assez clairement’ (Restif de la 
Bretonne, 1770, p.52). Besides, the theatre’s ability to engage the spectators 
emotionally is deemed essential to its function. And yet, it is precisely this ability 
to move that represents the danger of theatre: there is something alluring in the 
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emoting actor, which induces men to approach actresses to make them their 
lovers. The solution, like it was for Luigi Riccoboni, can only reside in a 
reformation of the actor, rather than the theatre. And the proposed remedy is 
strikingly ingenious if unpractical: all young people shall be actors once in their 
life. Let professional actors be abolished and ‘des Acteurs & des Actrices-
citoyens’ (Restif de la Bretonne, 1770, p.202) replace them, but only for a short 
period of time and only to play a single role. 
 
From paradox to paradox, the actor risks having to submit to a monastic rule in 
order to safeguard her function and pre-empt the risk of banishment. While the 
spectator should take no interest in the actor’s private person during a 
performance, yet, her personal morality will be an inducement to entrust her 
with one’s own projective identifications. An upright personality will guarantee 
emotional competence, generosity, and make it less likely that she may fall into 
the temptation of abusing her position of power in order to triumph over the 
spectator in a manic position.  
 
SPECTATORSHIP AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The actor’s interpretation and her moral values 
 
The person of the actor is not only relevant to her function as natural sign, 
linked, as we have seen, to her generous dedication to the psychic growth of 
the spectator. There is yet another important correlated issue, which has to do 
with her function as artificial sign. 
 
When the actor prepares her interpretation, she will need to make choices 
based on her understanding of human nature. Eighteenth-century theorists 
almost unanimously recommend that the actor should study human nature for 
what concerns the normative principles of the expression of emotions in relation 
to the context in which they arise, the so-called ‘given circumstances’. Such 
study is not only serving the interest of the actor insofar as she employs it 
towards her successful interpretation, but being at the basis of the way in which 
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the actor understands the character, it will also be transferred to the spectator 
through her alpha-function.  
 
The actor’s choices in relation to the rendition of the character will be influenced 
by her moral views. For instance, in interpreting the Roman emperor Titus in 
Racine’s Bérénice (an example inspired by Rousseau’s discussion of this 
theme in the Lettre à D’Alembert, 2003, pp.104-105), an actor may reach a very 
different interpretation whether he believes that Titus should sacrifice his love 
for Berenice to his duty as statesman or whether he is convinced that love 
should triumph over national interest. His interpretation may be coloured by 
considerations derived from his personal values as well as those of the society 
he belongs to. The interpretation of a character will bear the signs of the cultural 
identity and moral beliefs that imbue each particular actor. Such supposition 
begs a crucial question: does the actor’s interpretation consist in nothing more 
than her conformism to socially accepted morals, which she unconsciously 
reinforces in the spectator through her alpha-function? If this were the case, 
Brecht’s horror for the capacity of acting to induce socio-political compliance 
and to hinder social reform would be amply justified. 
 
Incidentally, the link between alpha-function, the understanding of human 
nature, and the transmission of social values calls into question the role of the 
playwright. Many eighteenth-century theorists insist on the actor’s duty to 
consider the author’s intentions to inform her interpretation: ‘Here it is that the 
greatest discernment of an actor is shewn, in understanding the intent of the 
author; and his highest judgement in representing the temper of his mind as the 
other intended’ (Hill, 1755, p.14). However, they also concede that the actor, 
using her creative faculties, always adds her own to the author’s perspective. 
The actor is ultimately at the service of truth and although she must take into 
account the playwright’s text, she also has a duty to enhance those ideas where 
the author has been incomplete, becoming ‘in some degree an author’ herself 
(Hill, 1755, p.31). 
 
Although the issue of the playwright is outside the remit of this thesis, its close 
connection with the question of the actor’s art is also demonstrated by the fact 
that in many theorists, including Luigi Riccoboni, Diderot and Brecht, the 
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reformation of acting goes hand in hand with that of dramaturgy. The 
significance of the text and the playwright’s alpha-function for spectatorship 
remains an interesting field for future research.  
 
The conundrum of the link between the actor’s own cultural and moral values 
and the general function of the theatre for moral development, needs 
unravelling. To this purpose, what is intended by moral development needs to 
be scrutinized and understood. Brecht suggested that his conception of the 
socio-political value of the theatre did not entail that the theatre should force 
spectators into taking a particular view. It was rather that it should put 
spectators in the position of judging for themselves whether the social 
conditions portrayed on stage were to be accepted or objected to. This attitude 
sees the moral value of the theatre in increasing socio-political awareness 
(whatever that may look like) in order to enhance people’s freedom to be active 
participants of their destiny. 
 
It could be argued that such value-free morality may hardly be attainable, and 
perhaps not even desirable; moreover, considering Brecht’s political beliefs and 
activism, it is doubtful whether he would fully abide by a value-free approach to 
socio-political engagement. Nevertheless, the perspective suggested by Brecht 
remains very different from that of Rousseau, who departs from an explicit 
conception – his own – of what an ideal society should look like. As has been 
pointed out, Rousseau understands morality ‘as something given, something 
fixed, rather than as something to be explored and revaluated’ (Barish, p.26640, 
cited in Harris, p.210). Theatre is immoral insofar as it teaches children to rebel 
against the authority of their parents or women to seek amusement outside the 
confinement of their domestic duties as mothers and wives. In criticizing 
Molière, he exclaims: 
 
Voyez comment, pour multiplier ses plaisanteries, cet homme trouble 
tout l’ordre de la société; avec quel scandale il renverse tous les rapports 
les plus sacrés sur lesquels elle est fondée; comment il tourne en 
                                                       
40 Jonas Barish (1981), The Antitheatrical Prejudice. Berkley/Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 	
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dérision les respectables droits des pères sur leurs enfants, des maris 
sur leurs femmes, des maîtres sur leur serviteurs! 
(Rousseau, 2003, p.84) 
 
Moral development can therefore be understood at one extreme as a set of 
established rules which must govern human behaviour at all costs; and at the 
other extreme as a continuous re-evaluation of social circumstances which 
engenders idiosyncratic responses according to the particular viewpoint of the 
appraiser. The actor, needing to consider the playwright’s text and the given 
circumstances of the character, alongside her duty to abide by the truth of what 
she apprehends to be universal human nature, is in a privileged position to 
negotiate between these two extremes. Her need to be faithful, at least to a 
degree, to the playwright’s text pulls her in the direction of compliance with the 
normative principles of a pre-given frame of reference. On the other hand, her 
study of the character and her duty towards ‘truth’ will make her approach to 
interpretation inevitably inquisitive and open to new insights. The necessity to 
locate her own understanding into the constrictions of the text creates the 
conditions for the fruitful tension between being the receptacle of the text and 
appropriating it through her personal insight.  
 
According to a psychoanalytic perspective, it will be the adoption of this 
receptive and reflective position which will be transmitted to the spectator and 
foster his moral development. To illustrate this point, I will now consider the 
psychoanalytic view of the relationship between psychic growth, moral 
development and spectatorship. 
 
Alpha-function and moral development 
 
According to the structural model of the mind, Freud had divided the psyche 
into three agencies, the id, the ego and the super-ego. The super-ego, which he 
conceived as a specialized part of the ego, is formed through identifications with 
external figures, particularly the parents. This mechanism explains how morality 
develops: prohibitions and injunctions, originating in sanction from external 
people, are internalized (introjected) and become the voice of conscience. In 
Freud’s words, the super-ego is ‘the representative of our relation to our 
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parents. When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we 
admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves’ (1923, 
p.36). 
 
In Freud’s model, the super-ego is conceived as separate from the ego, and 
pressurizes the ego into following its precepts. Freud’s super-ego is not always 
coherent or constructive and when it is too harsh, it can be at the origin of 
pathological states, including sadism. While the super-ego fulfils the vital role of 
inducing the ego to abide by the rules of communal living and civilization, it also 
has another facet, and may ‘become harsh, cruel and inexorable against the 
ego which is in its charge’ (Freud, 1924a, p.167). Consequently, the super-ego 
can represent morality either as constructive social adaptation or as the cruel 
imposition of the law of retaliation. 
 
Klein modifies the theory of moral development and makes it consistent with her 
model of ego-formation. She distinguishes between a morality of the paranoid-
schizoid position, in which there is a clear separation between the good and the 
bad object that tallies with a black and white view of good and bad: an inflexible 
system determines what is definitely good and what definitely bad, and moral 
values would remain set in stone if it were not for the sudden swings of 
idealization or denigration that the fragmented objects may have to endure 
following operations of projection, introjection and splitting. She believes that 
’super-ego’ functioning corresponds to this situation.  
 
On the other hand, the shift into the depressive position and the integration of 
the good and bad object leads to a different moral sense characterized by the 
lessening of aggressive impulses, the abating of persecutory fears, a feeling of 
greater security and a drive to make reparation. With Klein, true moral 
development becomes a function of the ego. As she explains: ‘good and bad 
internal objects come closer together – the bad aspects being mitigated by the 
good ones – the relation between the ego and super-ego alters, that is to say, a 
progressive assimilation of the super-ego by the ego takes place’ (Klein, 1952b, 
p.214). Moral development is thus not the imposition of a set of rules or values, 
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but the capacity for reflection and emotional processing that consists of alpha-
function itself. Alpha-function, in short, is moral development. 
 
Empathy and sympathy 
 
The reading of alpha-function as moral development explains the Aristotelian 
notion that the pleasure inherent in katharsis is conducive to the moral effect of 
theatre. The fruitful dynamic between the actor’s sensibility and her 
understanding effects transformation of the spectator’s beta-elements into 
alpha-elements, which can be returned to the spectator through his introjective 
identification. This results in ego integration and the growth of his sense of self. 
The spectator experiences within himself the shift between a situation of 
empathy with the character (the Aristotlelian fear), whereby he is unconsciously 
emotionally identified with her, and a situation of sympathy (the Aristotelian 
pity), whereby he gives meaning to his own feelings through the representation 
of the character as a possible self. 
 
In article 75 of the Hamburg Dramaturgy, Lessing gives an interpretation of 
Aristotelian katharsis strikingly similar to the one I propose in this research. He 
affirms that according to the theory of tragic katharsis, fear and pity were not to 
be aroused in a disjointed way: ‘this was not Aristotle’s reason; according to his 
definition of compassion, it of necessity included fear, because nothing could 
excite our compassion which did not at the same time excite our fear’ (Lessing, 
1890, p.409). Moreover, in article 76 Lessing specifies that, according to 
Aristotle, pity is in actual fact best understood as self-referential: 
‘Compassionate emotions unaccompanied by fear for ourselves, he designates 
philanthropy, and he only gives the name of compassion to the stronger 
emotions of this kind which are connected with fear for ourselves’ (1890, p.412). 
 
If fear is the necessary root of pity, no act of sympathy can be achieved without 
previous empathy, and therefore one would have to answer affirmatively to 
Rousseau’s question: ‘Serait-ce que pour devenir tempérant et sage, il faut 
commencer par être furieux et fou?’ (2003, p.68). Introjected as alpha-
elements, the new thoughts made available through alpha-function override 
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repetition-compulsion and increase self-awareness and reflexivity. It is therefore 
wrong to suppose, like Rousseau does, that empathy with negative characters 
will inevitably result in the encouragement of vice: if alpha-function is effected, 
the split off ‘bad objects’, useful only for acting out, will be transformed into 
thoughts, freeing the mind from the compulsion to repeat and placing the 
aggressive or destructive impulses under the control of reason. 
 
Diderot conveyed this positive ethical repercussion of sympathy in his essay De 
la poésie dramatique: 
 
Le parterre de la comédie est le seul endroit où les larmes de l’homme 
vertueux et du méchant soient confondues. Là, le méchant s’irrite contre 
des injustices qu’il aurait commises; compatit à des maux qu’il aurait 
occasionnés, et s’indigne contre un homme de son propre caractère. 
Mais l’impression est reçue; elle demeure en nous, malgré nous; et le 
méchant sort de sa loge, moins disposé à faire le mal, que s’il eût été 
gourmandé par un orateur sévère et dur.  
(Diderot, 1939, p.312)  
 
On the other hand, Rousseau upholds a quite opposite view of the effects of 
sympathy on morality: he believes that to sympathize at the theatre is 
tantamount to dispensing with one’s own responsibilities in real life: 
 
Au fond, quand un homme est allé admirer de belles actions dans des 
fables, et pleurer des malheurs imaginaires, qu’a-t-on encore à exiger de 
lui ? N’est-il pas content de lui-même ? Ne s’applaudit-il pas de sa belle 
âme ? Ne s’est-il pas acquitté de tout ce qu’il doit à la vertu par 
l’hommage qu’il vient de lui rendre ? Que voudrait-on qu’il fît de plus ? 
Qu’il la pratiquât lui-même ? Il n’a point de rôle à jouer : il n’est pas 
comédien. 
(Rousseau, 2003, p.74) 
 
As will be clear by now, the possibility that unconscious identifications result in 
ego development depends on the availability of the spectator’s or the actor’s 
alpha-function: when alpha-function is not available, the re-introjection of beta-
elements will result in increased ego-splitting and fragmentation of self. The 
ultimate effect on the bloodthirsty Sylla will depend on the actor’s art. 
 
The actor who acts instinctively, without having prepared her interpretation 
through study and reflection, will inevitably project her idiosyncratic feelings into 
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the spectator, leaving him filled with unprocessed emotions that have a 
compulsive quality. Brecht calls this operation barbaric and gives the example 
of the Roman actor Polus who cried on his dead son’s real ashes to arouse the 
grief through which he intended to represent Electra mourning her brother 
(Brecht, 1957d, p.270). Thus the bloodthirsty Sylla may be moved to tears at 
the witnessing of an onstage slaughter, but his fragmented and violent self will 
remain untouched or possibly strengthened. 
 
Conversely, a meaningful interpretation of Electra’s grief, which proceeds from 
the study and understanding of her ‘given circumstances’, would implicitly 
endow the spectator with enhanced reflective capability and desire for 
reparation that constitutes true moral development and consists in the ability to 
reconsider and revaluate principles of moral conduct on the basis of a balanced 
outlook grounded in reality.  
 
Rousseau however does not admit to the function of theatre in improving 
morality. His absolute mistrust in the effects of theatrical sympathy on morality 
may be explained by his attitude towards alpha-function; in particular I have 
suggested that one of his main reasons for his anti-theatrical stance is his 
unconscious envy for the function of the actor. This also tallies with his call for 
the abolition of theatre, in contrast with most other theorists, including Brecht, 
who depart from similar concerns about the function of the theatre but seek its 
reformation, not its eradication. 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
Starting from the interpretation of moral development as alpha-function, it is 
possible to analyse the controversies over the moral function of the theatre and 
shed new light on the relationship between morality, emotions, and pleasure in 
spectatorship.  
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Reason and emotions 
 
Theorists of the theatre have debated whether reason or emotions are 
responsible for the moral effect of theatre. Whilst some have claimed that the 
audience’s emotional engagement is necessary for their moral development, 
others have insisted that emotions are incompatible with it. 
 
The theory of alpha-function distinguishes between two kinds of emotions: beta- 
and alpha-elements. Beta-elements are raw emotional experiences, which 
constitute the building blocks of the psyche and from which the ego and its 
moral views and attitudes must be constructed. In this sense, raw emotional 
experiences are primary to any psychic development including morality.  
However, raw emotional experiences per se are only fit for re-enactment and 
projective-identification. It is through their processing in alpha-function, that they 
contribute to ego development and hence morality. Thus alpha-elements, as 
sympathetic emotions, are secondary to understanding and represent the 
constituents of the integrated ego and its moral standing. Raw emotions, if not 
transformed by alpha-function, are incompatible with moral development. 
 
Alpha-function is a peculiar form of understanding through which intuited 
emotions are given meaning and are modified into thoughts. This operation of 
meaning-making is not a conscious intellectual activity, but rather an 
unconscious process which proceeds from an emotional experience. Therefore 
it should not be equated to what some of the theorists of the theatre call 
‘reason’. Brecht’s revision of his theory of spectatorship illustrates this point. 
 
When Brecht theorized the primacy of reason in the fruition of the epic theatre, 
he maintained that unconscious emotional arousal was completely redundant to 
spectatorship and noxious to the moral effect of theatre. The ‘reason’ Brecht 
was thinking about was one based on inference, whereby the conscious 
imparting of information about social processes would enhance socio-political 
awareness. Later in his career, however, he realized that unless theatre took 
advantage of the fruitful dynamic between empathy and interpretation in the art 
of the actor, its moral effect would at best be shallow. Coming close to 
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Aristotle’s theory of tragic katharsis, he recognized that only intuition of 
emotions could lead to a transformative experience, and that the spectator’s 
pleasure was inherent to the moral function of the theatre. 
 
Spectatorship and pleasure 
 
The theory of alpha-function affords a particular view of the question of pleasure 
in spectatorship, and its relation to morality. If alpha-function represents the 
transition from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position, 
pleasure comes into its operations in two ways. From a Freudian perspective, it 
allows the overcoming of repetition-compulsion, which is a phenomenon 
‘beyond the pleasure principle’. By integrating the split-off objects into the ego 
and making them available for thinking, alpha-function fosters the psyche’s 
ability to control its impulses and to adapt to reality. The mind can therefore be 
rescued from the compelling force of re-enactments and acquire a degree of 
freedom in choosing its actions, now placed under the rule of the reality 
principle. 
 
From a Kleinian perspective, the transition to the depressive position entails the 
overcoming of the all-good and all-bad psychotic objects, and the internalization 
of an integrated ‘good-enough’ object, which enhances the ego’s sense of love 
and security, by protecting it from fragmentation and enhancing its ability to 
successfully adapt to reality. This transition, which allows for an increased 
capacity to distinguish the self from the other, marks the insurgence of feelings 
of gratitude towards the actor, who has endowed the spectator with the gift of 
sympathy. Such gratitude may partly underlie the motivation for the round of 
applauses at the end of a performance. 
 
The actor and the moral function of theatre 
 
The actor’s moral function is accomplished as far as she has applied her alpha-
function to the spectator’s projections. As I have illustrated, disruptions of the 
moral function of theatre happen any time that the actor withdraws her alpha-
function. The actor who plays her own feelings through a spontaneous or 
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instinctual performance, risks overwhelming the spectator with unprocessed 
emotional experiences that will reinforce psychotic fragmentation of his ego. 
Likewise, the actor who withholds her emotional engagement leaves the 
spectator to his own devices for emotional processing. For those emotional 
experiences where the spectator’s alpha-function is not available, the 
spectator’s ego is left dealing with cycles of fragmentation.  
 
Although the incompetence of the actor justifies concerns about the possibility 
that theatre may result in the reinforcement of irrational and immoral attitudes, 
criticism of the actor’s profession dictated by unconscious envy may in turn 
hinder the moral function of theatre. By departing from an unconscious distrust 
for transpersonal emotional processing, it is the spectator himself who impedes 
the actor’s alpha-function and moral development. Rousseau is the 
paradigmatic theorist of this position. 
 
The transpersonal dimension of spectatorship 
 
Brecht’s project of the epic theatre starts from a distrust for transpersonal 
emotional transactions, and invites spectators to use their own autonomous 
alpha-function for emotional processing. The notion of a ‘literarization’ of theatre 
is revealing. While any form of art engages unconscious phantasy and hence 
promotes psychic and moral development through autonomous alpha-function, 
transpersonal alpha-function is specific to the theatre. This may explain why, as 
Aristotle implied for tragedy, theatre is superior to other forms of art in its effects 
on psychic life. 
 
Alpha-function as a transpersonal process, and its rooting in the double game 
of the actor, may also provide a solution to semiotics’ strivings to define the 
distinctiveness of theatre. As I have suggested in Chapter 5, it may be that 
theatre distinguishes itself from other non-performative arts because of the 
transpersonal nature of its alpha-function, and from other forms of performative 
arts, because of the way in which the actor’s double game happens within a 
dynamic between embodiment (intuition in projective identification) and 
language (linguistic aspect of the text and of the rendition of the text in 
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performance). This dynamic may be a fruitful subject for further investigations, 
also taking advantage of psychoanalytic insights about the relationship between 
body and language. 
 
Any philosophical approach that denies the relevance of unconscious 
processes is bound to be blind or frankly reject the moral function of the theatre. 
The inherent transpersonal nature of psychic development substantiates Eco’s 
claim that it is psychic life that needs theatre, not vice versa, a point which is 
completely missed by McConachie’s approach to spectatorship. For instance, 
McConachie recognizes ‘the “doubleness” of theatre – that is, the fact that a 
single body on stage can be both an actor and a character, simultaneously 
existing in both real and simulated time-space’ (2008, p.7) and he attributes to 
cognitive blending the spectator’s capability to perceive such doubleness. While 
his supposition may reassure us that our mind is equipped with the capability of 
sustaining the perception of the actor’s double game, it does not even attempt 
to explain how or why such double game may be particularly relevant to theatre 
spectatorship. Insisting on the conscious or preconscious nature of such 
phenomenon bars access to precious insights into theatre reception. 
 
Making alpha-function the core process in spectatorship, entails placing the 
unconscious at its core. There are important peculiarities to alpha-function that 
make it distinctive in relation to other forms of conscious learning. Because 
alpha-function results in self-sympathy and personal psychic change, its moral 
effect is not about teaching rules or determining principles for the regulation of 
other people’s attitudes and behaviours. It is first and foremost about the 
transformation of the self. Nevertheless, personal development in alpha-
function fosters the growth of inner alpha-function, which can be put at the 
service of the processing of emotional experiences of other people. In this 
sense, it has a wider social significance. 
 
Because theatre spectatorship happens in a group situation, elements of the 
audience’s communal experience may also contribute to its wider social 
significance. Although the question of group psychological processes was not 
addressed in this thesis, spectatorship in alpha-function points to their 
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relevance to the study of the theatre: while unconscious phantasy is operative 
at a personal level, it always entails a transpersonal element.  
 
In most theatrical performances, a number of actors are faced with projections 
from a collective of spectators called an audience: the unconscious 
identificatory processes are bound to be, at some level, also group 
identifications. Moreover, the actor not only receives the projections of multiple 
individuals, but also returns her interpretation simultaneously to the whole 
audience. Therefore questions of how the group unconscious phantasy leads to 
the development of a group sense of self should also be explored. 
Psychoanalytic theory has a concept of the group unconscious as distinct from 
the personal unconscious, a topic which I have not dealt with, but which should 
be explored in future research. 
 
Identification and identity 
 
The transpersonal aspect of alpha-function typical of the theatre emphasizes 
the relational character of moral development, embedded in social processes 
and impossible without them. In transpersonal alpha-function the ego is 
constructed through a blending of the unconscious of the actor with that of the 
spectator. It is out of this blending in projective identification that a sympathetic 
view of the self emerges. Transpersonal alpha-function is an interpersonal 
process where selves and identities are dismantled and re-formed. 
 
The consideration of questions of identification and identity connects to 
considerations of theatre reception as cultural phenomenon. The process of 
alpha-function, departing from projective identifications, highlights the fluidity of 
the ego in constructing the self, by transitions from fragmentation to integration. 
Such transitions consist in unconscious communications between audience and 
actors, providing an explanation for the perplexing phenomenon of the 
reciprocal code of communication between stage and auditorium. Unconscious 
identifications are based in unconscious phantasy and remain hidden from 
awareness despite having a vital impact on psychic development and ultimately 
on the personality. 
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Alpha-function challenges the tenet of the passive spectator. If it may appear 
that in transpersonal alpha-function there is an element of surrender of the 
unprocessed emotional experiences to the mind of another, which could be 
construed as ‘passivity’, this is followed by a flurry of unconscious activity that 
results in sympathy and moral development. The blending of the spectator’s 
and actor’s unconscious emotional processes in projective identification results 
in sympathetic identifications which foster ego development and the enrichment 
of one’s sense of self.  
 
By focussing on conscious aspects of identity, studies that emphasize 
spectatorship as a cultural phenomenon, remain blind to such processes. While 
there is no doubt that spectatorship is a multifaceted phenomenon, and that 
elements of cultural identity will influence theatre reception, consideration of 
unconscious mechanisms should be a welcome complement, especially 
because analysing the unconscious aspects of spectating and acting has 
revealed universal psychic phenomena which ground a novel appraisal of the 
ethical value of theatre. 
 
 252 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abirached, Robert (1994) ‘Notices’, in Diderot (1939), pp.206-209. 
 
Amossy, Ruth (1981) ‘Semiotics and Theater: By Way of Introduction’, Poetics 
Today, Vol. 2 (3), pp.5-10. 
 
Anderson, Lorin (1980) ‘Freud, Nietzsche’, Salmagundi, Vol. 47/48, pp.3-29. 
 
Archer, William (1888) Masks or Faces, a Study in the Psychology of Acting  
(London: Longmans, Green and co.). 
 
Aristotle (1954) The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle, translation by W. 
Rhys Roberts (New York: Random House). 
 
Aristotle (1987) The Poetics of Aristotle, translation and commentary by 
Stephen Halliwell (London: Duckworth). 
 
Aristotle (1997) Politics, Books VII and VIII, translation with a commentary by 
Richard Kraut (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
 
Artioli, Umberto (2000) ‘Le origini della regia teatrale’, in Storia del teatro 
moderno e contemporaneo. Il grande teatro borghese Settecento-Ottocento 
(Torino: Einaudi), Vol. 2, pp.49-135. 
 
Ayer, Alfred J. (1980) Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Barthes, Roland (1979) ‘Barthes on Theatre’, translated and introduced by 
Peter W. Mathers, Theatre Quarterly, Vol. 9 (33), pp.26-29. 
 
Bassnett-McGuire, Susan (1980) ‘An Introduction to Theatre Semiotics’, 
Theatre Quarterly, Vol. 10 (38), pp.47-53. 
 
Bennett, Susan (1997) Theatre Audiences (London: Routledge). 
 253 
 
Bion, Wilfred R. (1984a) Learning from Experience (London: Karnac).  
[Originally published in 1962] 
 
Bion, Wilfred R. (1984b) Second Thoughts (London: Karnac).  
[Originally published in 1967] 
 
Bion, Wilfred R. (1984c) Attention and Interpretation (London: Karnac).  
[Originally published in 1970] 
 
Boal, Augusto (2008) Theatre of the Oppressed, translation by Charles A. and 
Maria-Odilia Leal McBride and Emily Fryer (London: Pluto Press).  
[Originally published in 1974 as Teatro del Oprimido] 
 
Boswell, James (1929) On the Profession of a Player (London: Elkin Mathews & 
Marrot).  
[Originally published in 1770] 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1926) ‘Conversation with Bert Brecht’, in Brecht on Theatre. The 
Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett (London: 
Methuen, 2001), pp.14-17. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1927) ‘The Epic Theatre and its Difficulties’, in Brecht on 
Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.22-24. 
  
Brecht, Bertolt (1929) ‘Last Stage: Oedipus’, in Brecht on Theatre. The 
Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett (London: 
Methuen, 2001), pp.24-26. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1930) ‘The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre’, in Brecht on 
Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.33-42. 
 
 254 
Brecht, Bertolt (1931) ‘The Literarization of the Theatre’, in Brecht on Theatre. 
The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett 
(London: Methuen, 2001), pp.43-47. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1933) ‘Indirect Impact of the Epic Theatre’, in Brecht on Theatre. 
The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett 
(London: Methuen, 2001), pp.57-62. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1935) ‘The German Drama: pre-Hitler’, in Brecht on Theatre. 
The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett 
(London: Methuen, 2001), pp.77-81. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1938) ‘Notes to Die Rundköpfe und Die Spitzköpfe’, in Brecht on 
Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.100-103. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1949) ‘A Short Organum for the Theatre’, in Brecht on Theatre. 
The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett 
(London: Methuen, 2001), pp.179-205. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1950) ‘The Street Scene. A Basic Model for an Epic Theatre’, in 
Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by 
John Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.121-128. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1951) ‘Short Description of a New Technique of Acting which 
Produces an Alienation Effect’, in Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an 
Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), 
pp.136-147. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1952) ‘Formal Problems Arising from the Theatre’s New 
Content’, in Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and 
translated by John Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.226-230. 
 
 255 
Brecht, Bertolt (1957a) ‘Theatre for Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction’, in 
Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by 
John Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.69-77. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1957b) ‘On the Use of Music in an Epic Theatre’, in Brecht on 
Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.84-90. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1957c) ‘Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting’, in Brecht on 
Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.91-99. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1957d) ‘Conversation about being Forced into Empathy’, in 
Brecht on Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by 
John Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.270-271. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1963) ‘Two Essays on Unprofessional Acting’, in Brecht on 
Theatre. The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John 
Willett (London: Methuen, 2001), pp.148-153. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (1964) ‘Appendices to the Short Organum’, Brecht on Theatre. 
The Development of an Aesthetic, edited and translated by John Willett 
(London: Methuen, 2001), pp.276-281. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt (2001) Scritti teatrali (Torino: Einaudi). 
 
Buffat, Marc (2003) ‘Genèse de la Lettre à d’Alembert’, in Rousseau (2003), 
pp.197-213. 
 
Butcher, Samuel H. (1951) Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (New York: 
Dover Publications). 
 
Butler, Judith (1999) Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(Abingdon: Routledge).
 256 
 
Cappelletti, Salvatore (1986) Luigi Riccoboni e la riforma del teatro. Dalla 
commedia dell’arte alla commedia borghese (Ravenna: Longo Editore). 
 
Cassirer, Ernst (1951) The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
 
Cederna, Camilla M. (2007) ‘Goldoni et le genre sérieux: entre dénégation et 
reconnaissance’, Revue des études italiennes, Vol. 53, pp.97-105. 
 
Chaouche, Sabine (2007) La philosophie de l’acteur. La dialectique de 
l’intérieur et de l’extérieur dans les écrits sur l’art théâtral français (1738-1801) 
(Paris: Honoré Champion). 
 
Clairon, Hyppolite (1798) Mémoires d’Hyppolite Clairon, et réflexions sur l’art 
dramatique; publiés par elle-même (Paris: Buisson). 
 
Courville, Xavier de (1943) Un apôtre de l'art du théâtre au XVIIIe siècle. Luigi 
Riccoboni dit Lélio. I (Paris: Libraire E. Droz). 
 
Courville, Xavier de (1945) Luigi Riccoboni dit Lélio. II (1716-1731). 
L’expérience française (Paris: Libraire E. Droz). 
 
Courville, Xavier de (1958) Luigi Riccoboni dit Lélio. III (1716-1731). La leçon 
(Paris: Libraire E. Droz). 
 
Csengei, Ildiko (2011) Sympathy, Sensibility and the Literature of Feeling in the 
Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
De Marinis, Marco (1985) ‘Towards a Cognitive Semiotic of Theatrical 
Emotions’, translation by Benjamin Thorn, Versus, Vol. 41, pp.5-20. 
 
De Marinis, Marco (2000) In cerca dell’attore. Un bilancio del Novecento 
teatrale (Roma: Bulzoni). 
 257 
 
Diderot, Denis (1939) Théâtre: Le Fils naturel, Le Joueur, Le Père de famille, 
De la poésie dramatique, éditeur J. Assézat (Paris: Libraire Garnier Frères).  
[‘Le Fils naturel’ and the ‘Entretiens sur Le Fils naturel’ were originally published 
in 1757; ‘Le Père de famille’ and ‘De la poésie dramatique’ were originally 
published in 1758] 
 
Diderot, Denis (1968) Les bijoux indiscrets (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion).  
[Originally published in 1748] 
 
Diderot, Denis (1994) Paradoxe sur le comédien. Suivi de Lettres sur le théâtre 
à Madame Riccoboni et à Mademoiselle Jodin, éditeur R. Abirached (Paris: 
Gallimard).  
[The ‘Paradoxe’ was written between 1773 and 1777; the ‘Lettre à Madame 
Riccoboni’ was written on 27th November 1758; the ‘Lettres à Mademoiselle 
Jodin’ were written between 1765 and 1769] 
 
Dumesnil, Marie-Françoise (1823) Mémoires de Mlle Dumesnil, en réponse aux 
mémoires d’Hippolyte Clairon; revus, corrigés, et augmentés d’une notice sur 
cette comédienne par M. Dussault (Paris: Ponthieu). 
 
Eco, Umberto (1977) ‘Semiotics of Theatrical Performance’, The Drama 
Review: TDR, Vol. 21 (1), pp.107-117. 
 
Elam, Keir (1980) The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama (London: Methuen). 
 
Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
par une société de gens de lettres. Mis en ordre & publié par M. Diderot de 
l'Académie des Sciences et Belles-Lettres de Prusse, et quant à la partie 
mathématique, par M. d'Alembert de l'Académie royale des Sciences de Paris, 
de celle de Prusse et de la Société royale de Londres. 28 Vols. 1751-1772 
(Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durand). 
Accessed on the web via The Making Of The Modern World. 
[consulted articles are specified in the text] 
 258 
 
Fabbri, Paolo (2000) ‘Catharsis. Again?’, in Semiotic Efficacity and the 
Effectiveness of the Text (S. Marino: Breplos). 
Available at: http://www.paolofabbri.it/saggi/catharsis.html 
 
Fairbairn, W. Ronald D. (1984) Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
[Originally published in 1952] 
 
Ferrari, Stefano (2005) Scrittura come riparazione. Saggio su letteratura e 
psicoanalisi (Roma/Bari: Laterza). 
 
Fischer-Lichte, Erika (2008) The Transformative Power of Performance. A New 
Aesthetics (Abingdon: Routledge). 
 
Fo, Dario (1977) Dario Fo parla di Dario Fo, intervista e saggio introduttivo di 
Erminia Artese (Cosenza: Lerici). 
 
Fo, Dario (1977) Manuale minimo dell’attore (Torino: Einaudi). 
 
Freshwater, Helen (2009) Theatre & Audience (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1900) ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume IV and V (1900):  
pp.ix-627 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1905) ‘Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905 
[1901])’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Volume VII (1901-1905): A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on 
Sexuality and Other Works, pp.1-122 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1906) ‘Psychopathic Characters on the Stage (1942 [1905 or 
1906])’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
 259 
Freud, Volume VII (1901-1905): A Case of Hysteria, Three Essays on Sexuality 
and Other Works, pp.303-310 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1907) ‘Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva’, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume IX (1906-1908): Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’ and Other Works, pp.1-95 (London: 
The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1908) ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’, The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume IX 
(1906-1908): Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’ and Other Works, pp.141-154 (London: The 
Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1909a) ‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy.’ The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume X (1909): Two Case Histories: ‘Little Hans’ and the ‘Rat Man’, pp.1-150 
(London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1909b) ‘Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis.’ The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume X (1909): Two Case Histories: ‘Little Hans’ and the ‘Rat Man’, pp.151-
318 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1911a) ‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume Volume XII 
(1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, 
pp.1-82 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1911b) ‘Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Volume Volume XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, 
Papers on Technique and Other Works, pp.213-226 (London: The Hogarth 
Press). 
 260 
 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1912a) ‘The Dynamics of Transference’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume Volume XII 
(1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, 
pp.97-108 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1912b) ‘Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-
Analysis.’ The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Volume XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on 
Technique and Other Works, pp.109-120 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1914) ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through 
(Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II).’ The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and 
Other Works, pp.145-156 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1915a) ‘Observations on Transference-Love (Further 
Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis III).’ The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII 
(1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, 
pp.157-171 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1915b) ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-
1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on 
Metapsychology and Other Works, pp.109-140 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1915c) ‘The Unconscious’, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): 
On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology 
and Other Works, pp.159-215 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
 261 
 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1917) ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-
1916): On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on 
Metapsychology and Other Works, pp.237-258 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1919) ‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XVII (1917-1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, pp.157-168 
(London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1920) ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII (1920-
1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works, 
pp.1-64 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1923) ‘The Ego and the Id’, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX (1923-1925): 
The Ego and the Id and Other Works, pp.1-66 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1924a) ‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’, The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX 
(1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works, pp.155-170 (London: The 
Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1924b) ‘A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis (1924 [1923])’, 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works, pp.189-210 
(London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1925a) ‘The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis (1925 [1924])’, 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
 262 
Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works, pp.211-224 
(London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1925b) ‘Negation’, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and 
the Id and Other Works, pp.233-240 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1925c) ‘An Autobiographical Study (1925 [1924])’, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XX (1925-1926): An Autobiographical Study, Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety, Lay Analysis and Other Works, pp.1-74 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1926) ‘The Question of Lay Analysis. Conversations with an 
Impartial Person’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Volume XX (1925-1926): An Autobiographical Study, 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, Lay Analysis and Other Works, pp.177-258 
(London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1927) ‘The Future of an Illusion’, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI (1927-1931): 
The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works, 
pp.1-56 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1930) ‘Civilization and its Discontents’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI (1927-
1931): The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents and Other 
Works, pp.57-146 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1933) ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933 
[1932])’, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII (1932-1936): New Introductory Lectures on 
Psycho-Analysis and Other Works, pp.3-182 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
 263 
Freud, Sigmund (1938) ‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis’, The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII (1937-
1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis and Other 
Works, pp.139-208 (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1991) Saggi sull’arte, la letteratura e il linguaggio (Torino: 
Bollati Boringhieri). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1995) Opere 1886/1905 (Roma: Newton Compton Editori). 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1995) Opere 1905/1921 (Roma: Newton Compton Editori). 
 
Freud, Sigmund & Breuer, Joseph (1895) Studies on Hysteria. The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume II 
(1893-1895) (London: The Hogarth Press). 
 
Fumaroli, Marc (1993) ‘Feu et glace: le “Comédien” de Rémond de Saint-Albine 
(1747), anthithèse du “Paradoxe”’, Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, Vol. 
5, pp.702-716. 
 
Gay, Peter (2006) Freud. A Life for Our Time (New York/London: W. W. 
Norton). 
[Originally published in 1998] 
 
Garrick, David (1744) An Essay on Acting: in which will be consider’d the 
Mimical Behaviour of a certain fashionable faulty Actor, ... To which will be 
added, a short criticism on His acting Macbeth (London: Bickerton). 
 
Golden, Leon (1976) ‘The Clarification Theory of “Katharsis”’, Hermes, Vol. 104, 
pp.437-458. 
 
Goldoni, Carlo (1935) ‘Mémoires’, in Tutte le opere di Carlo Goldoni, a cura di 
Giuseppe Ortolani (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore), Vol. 1, pp.1-605. 
[Originally published in 1787] 
 264 
 
Goldoni, Carlo (1939) ‘Il vero amico’, in Tutte le opere di Carlo Goldoni, a cura 
di Giuseppe Ortolani (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore), Vol. 3, pp.567-640. 
[Originally published in 1751] 
 
Goldoni, Carlo (1971) ‘Prefazione alla prima raccolta delle commedie’, in 
Commedie di Carlo Goldoni, a cura di Nicola Mangini (Torino: Unione 
Tipografico-Editrice Torinese), Vol. 1, pp.61-74. 
[Originally published in 1750] 
 
Goldoni, Carlo (1983) Il teatro comico. Memorie italiane, a cura di Guido Davico 
Bonino (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore). 
[‘Il teatro comico’ was originally published in 1751] 
 
Grotowski, Jerzy (1975) Towards a Poor Theatre, edited by Eugenio Barba 
(London: Methuen). 
[Originally published in 1968] 
 
Grosskurth, Phyllis (1995) Melanie Klein. Her World and her Work (Northvale 
NJ/London: Jason Aronson Inc.). 
[Originally published in 1986] 
 
Halliwell, Stephen (1986) Aristotle’s Poetics (London: Duckworth). 
 
Halliwell, Stephen (1992) ‘Catharsis’, in A Companion to Aesthetics, edited by 
D.E. Cooper (Oxford: Blackwell), pp.61-63.  
 
Halliwell, Stephen (2002) The Aesthetics of Mimesis. Ancient Texts and Modern 
Problems (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Harris, Joseph (2014) Inventing the Spectator. Subjectivity & the Theatrical 
Experience in Early Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
 265 
Helbo, André (1985) ‘Approches de la réception. Quelques problèmes’, Versus, 
Vol. 41, pp.41-48. 
 
Hill, John (1755) The Actor: or a Treatise on the Art of Playing. A New Work, 
Written by the Author of the Former, and Adapted to the Present State of the 
Theatres (London: R. Griffiths). 
 
Hobson, Marian (1974) ‘Notes pour les “Entretiens sur “Le fils naturel”’, Revue 
d'histoire littéraire de la France, 74e Année, Vol. 2, pp.203-213. 
 
Horace (1970) ‘Ars Poetica or Epistle to the Pisos’, translation by H. Rushton 
Fairclough, in Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica (London: William Heinemann), 
pp.442-489. 
 
Irigaray, Luce (1993) ‘Psychoanalytic Theory: Another Look’, in This Sex Which 
is Not One, translation by Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke (New York: 
Cornell University Press), pp.34-67. 
 
Isaacs, Susan (1952) ‘The Nature and Function of Phantasy’, in Developments 
in Psychoanalysis, edited by Klein, M., Heimann, P., Isaacs, S. and Rivière, J. 
(London: Karnac, 1989), pp.67-121. 
 
Jauss, Hans R. (1982) Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).  
 
Johnson, Samuel (1765) Preface to Shakespeare, reprint (Gloucester: Dodo 
Press). 
 
Klein, Melanie (1926) ‘The Psychological Principles of Early Analysis’, in Love, 
Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (London: Vintage, 1998), 
pp.128-138. 
 
Klein, Melanie (1929) ‘Personification in the Play of Children’, in Love, Guilt and 
Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (London: Vintage, 1998), pp.199-209. 
 266 
 
Klein, Melanie (1935) ‘A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-
Depressive states’, in Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 
(London: Vintage, 1998), pp.262-289. 
  
Klein, Melanie (1936) ‘Weaning’, in Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other 
Works 1921-1945 (London: Vintage, 1998), pp.290-305. 
  
Klein, Melanie (1946) ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’, in Envy and 
Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997), pp.1-24. 
 
Klein, Melanie (1952a) ‘The Origins of Transference’, in Envy and Gratitude and 
Other Works 1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997), pp.48-56. 
 
Klein, Melanie (1952b) ‘Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional 
Life of the Infant’, in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963 (London: 
Vintage, 1997), pp.61-93. 
 
Klein, Melanie (1955) ‘On Identification’, in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 
1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997), pp.141-175. 
 
Klein, Melanie (1957) ‘Envy and Gratitude’, in Envy and Gratitude and Other 
Works 1946-1963 (London: Vintage, 1997), pp.176-235. 
 
Klein, Melanie (1997) The Psycho-Analysis of Children (London: Vintage). 
[Originally published in 1932] 
 
Klein, M., Heimann, P., Isaacs, S. and Riviere, J. (1952) Developments in 
Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac). 
 
Kristeva, Julia (2001) Melanie Klein, translation by Ross Guberman (New York: 
Columbia University Press). 
 
Lear, Jonathan (1988) ‘Katharsis’, Phronesis, Vol. 33 (3), pp.297-326. 
 267 
 
Lessing, Gotthold E. (1890) ‘Dramatic Notes’, in Selected Prose Works of G.E. 
Lessing, translation by E. C. Beasley and Helen Zimmern, edited by Edward 
Bell (London: George Bell and Sons), pp.227-493. 
[Originally published in 1767-1768] 
 
Marcuse, Herbert (1964) One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of 
Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press). 
 
Mazzocut-Mis, Maddalena (2010) ‘Presentazione’, in Paradossi settecenteschi. 
La figura dell’attore nel secolo dei lumi, edited by Accornero, M., Angioletti, K., 
Bertolini, M., Guaita, C. and Oggionni, E (Milano: Edizioni Universitarie di 
Lettere, Economia e Diritto), pp.9-11. 
 
McConachie, Bruce (2008) Engaging Audiences. A Cognitive Approach to 
Spectating in the Theatre (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
Meldolesi, Claudio (1969) Gli Sticotti. Comici italiani nei teatri d’Europa del 
Settecento (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura). 
 
Mittman, Barbara (1973) ‘Diderot’s First “Entretien” and Goldoni’, The Modern 
Language Review, Vol. 68 (2), pp.309-314. 
 
Muñoz, José E. (1999) Disidentifications. Queers of Color and the Performance 
of Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).  
 
Olsen, Michel (2011) ‘Riflessioni sulla recezione di Goldoni nel ‘700 francese’, 
Arena romanistica, Vol. 8, pp.44-58. 
 
Palissot de Montenoy, Charles (1777) ‘Petites lettres sur des grands 
philosophes’, in Œuvres de M. Palissot, nouvelle édition (Liège: Clément 
Plomteux), tome second, pp.95-149. 
[Originally published in 1757] 
 
 268 
Pavis, Patrice (1985) ‘La réception du texte dramatique et spectaculaire: les 
processus de fictionnalisation et d’idéologisation’, Versus, Vol. 41, pp.69-94. 
 
Phelan, Peggy (1993) Unmarked. The Politics of Performance (London: 
Routledge). 
 
Plato (1986) Plato: Phaedrus, translation and commentary by C. J. Rowe 
(Warminster: Aris and Phillips). 
 
Plato (1988) Plato: Republic 10, translation and commentary by S. Halliwell 
(Warminster: Aris and Phillips). 
 
Plato (2004) Republic, translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with 
introduction, by C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company). 
 
Quinodoz, Jean-Michel (2005) Reading Freud. A Chronological Exploration of 
Freud’s Writings, translation by David Alcorn (London: Routledge). 
 
Parker, Stephen (2014) Bertolt Brecht. A Literary Life (London: Bloomsbury). 
 
Prévost, Antoine F. Abbé (1759) Histoire du chevalier des Grieux et de Manon 
Lescaut, reprint (Paris: Club des Libraires de France). 
 
Regelski, Thomas A. (1996) ‘Scientism in Experimental Music Research’, 
Philosophy of Music Education Review, Vol. 4 (1), pp.3-19. 
 
Restif de la Bretonne, Nicolas-Edme (1770) La mimographe, reprint (Genève: 
Slatkine).  
 
Riccoboni, François (1750) L’Art du théâtre. A Madame *** (Paris: Simon & 
Giffart). 
 
 269 
Riccoboni, Luigi (1728) Dell’arte rappresentativa, reprint (Sala Bolognese: 
Arnaldo Forni Editore).  
 
Riccoboni, Luigi (1730) Histoire du théâtre italien, depuis la décadence de la 
comédie latine, avec un catalogue des tragédies et comédies italiennes 
imprimées depuis l’an 1500 jusqu’à l’an 1660 et une dissertation sur la tragédie 
moderne (Paris: Cailleau). 
[Originally published in 1728] 
 
Riccoboni, Luigi (1736) Observations sur la comédie et sur le génie de Molière 
(Paris: Veuve Pissot). 
 
Riccoboni, Luigi (1740) Réflexions historiques et critiques sur les différens 
théâtres de l’Europe. Avec les Pensées sur la déclamation (Amsterdam : Aux 
Dépens de la Compagnie). 
[Originally published in 1738] 
 
Riccoboni, Luigi (1767) De la réformation du théâtre. Nouvelle édition 
augmentée (Paris: Debure et Le Breton). 
[Originally published in 1743] 
 
Riccoboni, Luigi (1973) Discorso della commedia all’improvviso e Scenari inediti 
(Milano: Edizioni Il Polifilo). 
[Written in 1721-1722] 
 
Rivière, Joan (1952) ‘General Introduction’, in Developments in Psychoanalysis, 
edited by Klein, M., Heimann, P., Isaacs, S. and Rivière, J. (London: Karnac, 
1989), pp.1-36. 
 
Roach, Joseph R. (1993) The Player’s Passion. Studies in the Science of Acting 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press). 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2003) Lettre à d’Alembert (Paris: Éditions 
Flammarion). 
 270 
[Originally published in 1758] 
 
Sainte-Albine, M. Rémond de (1749) Le Comédien. Ouvrage divisé en deux 
parties. Nouvelle édition, augmentée et corrigée (Paris: Desaint & Saillant). 
 
Segal, Hanna (1988) Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (London: 
Karnac). 
[Originally published in 1973] 
 
Segal, Hanna (1989) Klein (London: Karnac). 
[Originally published in 1979] 
 
Segal, Hanna (1991) Dream, Phantasy and Art (Abingdon: Routledge). 
 
Sidnell, Michael J., editor (1994) Sources of Dramatic Theory. 2: Voltaire to 
Hugo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Sini, Carlo (1986) I filosofi e le opere. 2: L’età moderna (Milano: Principato). 
 
Stanislavski, Constantin (1980) An Actor Prepares, translation by Elisabeth 
Reynolds Hapgood (London: Methuen). 
[Originally published in 1936] 
 
Sticotti, Michel (1770) Garrick ou les Acteurs Anglois. Ouvrage contenant des 
Observations sur l’Art dramatique, sur l’Art de la Représentation, et le Jeu des 
Acteurs. Avec des Notes historiques et critiques, et des Anecdotes sur les 
différents Théâtres de Londres et de Paris, traduit de l’anglois, seconde édition, 
augmentée (Paris: J.-P. Costard). 
 
Stok, Fabio (2010) ‘Psychology’, in A Companion to the Classical Tradition, 
edited by C.W. Callendorf (Oxford: Wiley), pp.355-370. 
 
Symington, Joan and Neville (1996) The Clinical Thinking of Wilfred Bion 
(London: Routledge). 
 271 
 
Symington, Neville (1986) The Analytic Experience. Lectures from the Tavistock 
(London: Free Association Books). 
 
Ubersfeld, Anne (1982) ‘The Pleasure of the Spectator’, translation by Pierre 
Bouillaguet and Charles Jose, Modern Drama, Vol. 25 (1), pp.127-139. 
 
Valentino, Barbara (2011) ‘Pierre Rémond de Sainte-Albine and John Hill. From 
Le Comédien to The Actor’, Acting Archives essays. Acting Archives review 
supplement, 12. 
http://actingarchives.unior.it/Essays/RivistaIframe.aspx  
 
Veltruský, Jiří (1981) ‘The Prague School Theory of Theater’, Poetics Today, 
Vol. 2 (3), pp.225-235. 
 
Vicentini, Claudio (2000) ‘Teorie della recitazione. Diderot e la questione del 
Paradosso’, in Storia del teatro moderno e contemporaneo. Il grande teatro 
borghese Settecento-Ottocento (Torino: Einaudi), Vol. 2, pp.5-47. 
 
Vicentini, Claudio (2011) ‘Theory of Acting V. The Birth of Emotionalism’, Acting 
Archives Essays. Acting Archives Review Supplement, 5. 
http://www.actingarchives.unior.it/Essays/RivistaIframe.aspx 
 
Vicentini, Claudio (2012) ‘Theory of Acting VII. Antiemotionalism. Antoine- 
François Riccoboni, Lessing, Diderot’, Acting Archives Essays. Acting Archives 
Review Supplement, 16. 
http://www.actingarchives.unior.it/Essays/RivistaIframe.aspx 
 
Vila, Anne C. (1998) Enlightenment and Pathology. Sensibility in the Literature 
and Medicine of Eighteenth-Century France (Baltimore/London: The John 
Hopkins University Press). 
 
von Held, Phoebe (2011) Alienation and Theatricality. Diderot after Brecht 
(Oxford: Legenda). 
 272 
 
Wade, Ira O. (1979) ‘Le origini dell’illuminismo francese’, traduzione di Antonio 
Santucci, in Interpretazioni dell’illuminismo, a cura di Antonio Santucci 
(Bologna: Il Mulino), pp.131-148. 
[Originally published in 1971 as ‘The Intellectual Origins of the French 
Enlightenment’] 
 
Wasserman, Earl R. (1947) ‘The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteen-Century 
Theories of Acting’, The Journal of Acting English and Germanic Philology, Vol. 
16 (3), pp.264-272. 
 
Wilson, Arthur M. (1972) Diderot (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Winnicott, Donald W. (1953) ‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena 
– A Study of the First Not-Me Possession’, The International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis, Vol. 34, pp.89-97. 
 
Zaretsky, Robert & Scott, John T. (2009) The Philosophers’ Quarrel. Rousseau, 
Hume, and the Limits of Human Understanding (New Haven/London: Yale 
University Press). 
 
 
 
 
 
